r 


1 


BT  75  . R23  v.3 

Raymond,  Miner,  1811-1897 

Systematic  theology 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/systematictheolo03raym 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 


BY 

MINER  RAYMOND,  D.D., 

PROFESSOR  IN  GARRETT  BIBLICAL  INSTITUTE, 

EVANSTON,  ILL. 


Volume  III. 


CINCINNATI: 

WALDEN  AND  STOWE. 
NEW  YORK:  PHILLIPS  &  HUNT. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1879,  by 


HITCHCOCK  &  WALDEN, 


In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  III 


Book  Sixth. 

ETHICS. 

Part  I. — Theoretical  Ethics. 

CHAPTER.  PAGE. 

I.  Obligation, . 9 

I.  Origin  of  the  Idea  of  Obligation,  .  .  ,  ,  11 

II.  The  Ground  of  Obligation, . 22 

II.  Conscience, . 37 

I.  Definitions,  ........  37 

II.  Functions,  ........  40 

III.  Existence, . 48 

IV.  Authority, . 53 

III.  Virtue,  58 

I.  Right  and  Wrong-Innocence  and  Guilt,  .  .  59 

II.  Theory,  .........  63 

III.  Objections,  ........  68 

IV.  Virtue  in  Imperfect  Beings, . 69 

V.  Responsibility  for  Defects  in  Virtue,  ...  72 

IV.  Moral  Culture. . 74 

I.  Method,  .........  74 

II.  Means,  . . 76 

V.  Defects  in  Natural  Religion,  .....  80 

I.  Defects  in  Natural  Conscience,  .  .  .  .80 

II.  Defects  in  the  Theistic  Methods,  ....  82 

VI.  The  Holy  Scriptures,  .  86 


3 


4 


CONTENTS. 


Part  II. — Practical  Ethics. 

CHAPTER. 

PAGE. 

I.  Classification, . 

•  • 

9i 

II.  Self-Culture . 

• 

94 

I.  Physical  Training, . 

•  • 

95 

II.  Mental  Discipline, . 

• 

97 

“  as  to  the  Intellect, 

•  • 

99 

4<  “  “  Sensibility, 

100 

“  “  “  ^Esthetic  Nature, 

•  • 

102 

“  “  “  Will,  . 

103 

III.  Religious  Education,  .... 

•  • 

104 

III.  Duties  to  our  Fellow  Men,  or  Morality, 

107 

I.  What  is  Required  ?  . 

107 

II.  How  is  Duty  Discharged?  .... 

112 

III.  Duties  to  Men  as  Men,  .... 

•  • 

114 

1.  As  to  their  Rights,  .... 

114 

— ( a )  Their  Right  to  Life, 

•  • 

114 

( b )  Their  Right  to  Liberty, 

123 

(<;)  Their  Right  to  Property, 

*  • 

130 

( d )  Their  Right  to  Reputation, 

145 

2.  As  to  their  Wants,  .... 

•  • 

150 

3.  As  to  their  Character,  .... 

154 

4.  As  to  their  Demand  for  Truth — Duties 

of  Ve- 

racity,  ...... 

157 

IV.  Duties  arising  out  of  Special  Relations,  . 

•  • 

162 

1.  Doctrine  of  Rights,  .... 

162 

2.  The  duty  of  Chastity,  .  .  . 

•  • 

167 

3.  Domestic  Duties, . 

170 

—  4.  Civil  Duties, . 

•  • 

184 

IV.  Duties  to  God,  or  Piety, . 

194 

I.  Cultivation  of  a  Devotional  Spirit,  .  . 

•  • 

201 

II.  Prayer,  ........ 

• 

205 

III.  The  Sabbath, . 

•  • 

214 

CONTENTS. 


5 


Book  Seventh. 
ECCLESIOLOGY. 

CHAPTER.  PAGE. 

I.  The  Church . 233 

II.  The  Ordinary  Means  of  Grace,  ....  243 

III.  The  Sacraments, . 256 

IV.  Baptism . 275 

I.  Its  Nature . .  .  275 

II.  Its  Efficacy,  .......  286 

III.  Its  Validity,  ........  287 

V.  Subjects  of  Christian  Baptism,  ....  289 

VI.  Mode  of  Christian  Baptism,  .....  303 

VII.  The  Lord’s-Supper, . 343 

I.  Its  Nature, . .  347 

II.  Its  Efficacy . 357 

III.  Its  Validity, . 364 

VIII.  Church  Polity, . 372 

IX.  Classification  of  Ministerial  Duties  and  Offices,  427 

X.  Episcopacy, . 465 

XI.  Polity  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  .  .  488 


Book  Sixth. 


ETHICS 


PART  I. 


Theoretical  Ethics. 

■  ■  ■■  —  ■  ♦ - - - 

CHAPTER  I. 

Obligation. 

In  dogmatics  we  discuss  doctrines  and  inquire, 
What  ought  we  to  believe  ?  in  ethics  we  discuss 
duties  and  inquire,  What  ought  we  to  do?  To  the 
theologian,  to  him  who  has  satisfactory  evidence 
of  the  divine  inspiration  of  the  Holy  Scriptures, 
the  science  of  morals  may  properly  be  considered 
as  simply  a  branch  of  hermeneutics — simply  expla- 
nations  and  illustrations  of  Scripture  command¬ 
ments — and  some  do  so  regard  it.  Moreover,  it  is 
affirmed  that  all  morality  is  based  upon  religion, 
and  religion  upon  revelation,  so  that,  legitimately, 
the  only  answer  to  the  question  of  duty  is  found 
in  the  answer  to  the  question,  What  saith  the 
Word  of  God?  Further  still,  it  is  alleged  that  the 
will  of  God  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  obligation, 
and  that  therefore  there  is  no  science  in  ethics  be¬ 
yond  the  simple  discussion  of  the  question,  What 
does  revelation  affirm  the  will  of  God  to  be  ?  On 

9 


IO 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


the  other  hand,  it  is  affirmed,  not  without  reason, 
that  man  is,  in  some  sense,  a  law  unto  himself — 
that  what  man  ought  to  do  may  be,  at  least  in 
part,  inferred  from  what  he  is ;  that  a  system  of 
morals  may  be  constructed  from  an  examination 
of  the  nature  of  man  ;  in  other  words,  that  ethics 
finds  its  proper  basis  in  Psychology. 

The  truth,  as  we  see  it,  is  here  the  same  as  in 
dogmatics :  as  there  are  fundamental  doctrines  of 
religion  adequately  sustained  by  rational  evidence 
constituting  a  system  of  natural  religion,  so  there 
are  certain  prominent  duties  to  the  common  intel¬ 
ligence  obviously  obligatory,  which  constitute  a 
system  of  what  may  be  called  philosophical  ethics. 
And  as  there  are  doctrines  known  and  authenti¬ 
cated  solely  by  revelation,  constituting  a  system 
of  revealed  religion,  so  there  are  duties  known  and 
enforced  in  the  same  way  constituting  what  might 
be  called  a  system  of  Christian  ethics.  Nature  and 
revelation,  properly  interpreted,  are  never  antago¬ 
nistic  ;  their  utterances  are  words  proceeding  out 
of  the  mouth  of  God,  from  which  man  may  learn 
all  things  needful  for  faith  and  practice.  The 
parallel  may  be  extended,  as  natural  religion  is 
defective,  rendering  revelation  necessary  ;  so  also 
is  philosophical  ethics,  and  for  the  same  reasons — 
chiefly  because  human  nature,  through  transgres¬ 
sion,  has  become  depraved — it  is  evident  no  perfect 
system  can  be  deduced  from  an  abnormal  nature. 


OBLIGATION. 


1 1 

It  is  manifest  that  in  all  matters  of  morals  the 
ultimate  appeal  is  to  the  law  and  the  testimony ; 
but  it  is  also  evident  that  it  is  legitimate  to  inquire, 
What  of  the  moral  is  in  the  human  mind  ?  how 
came  it  there  ?  and  now  that  it  is  there,  what  can 
we,  and  what  ought  we  to  do  with  it?  We  may 
also  inquire  how  far  the  deductions  from  expe¬ 
rience  harmonize  with  the  teachings  of  revela¬ 
tion,  wherein  those  deductions  are  defective,  and 
to  what  extent  revelation  supplies  the  deficiency. 
Not  necessarily  that  these  are  to  be  considered 
separately,  but  rather  that  the  question  of  duty, 
whether  considered  abstractly,  in  respect  to  gen¬ 
eral  principles,  as  in  ethics,  or  in  respect  to  par¬ 
ticular  cases,  as  in  casuistry,  is  to  be  discussed  in 
the  light  of  whatever  information  can  be  obtained 
from  these  or  other  sources  of  knowledge  bearing 
upon  the  subject. 

The  term  obligation  expresses  the  central  idea ; 
science  therefore  requires  that  this  idea  be  treated 
of,  first  as  to  its  origin,  and  secondly  as  to  its  basis 
or  foundation.  These  two  discussions,  if  truthful 
and  exhaustive,  must  fully  reveal  the  nature  of 
obligation,  and  render  its  applications  to  particular 
cases  practical  and  obvious. 

I.  ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  OBLIGATION. 

That  man  is  a  moral  being  is  as  evident  as  that 
he  is  a  rational  being ;  all  men  distinguish  actions 


12 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


as  right  or  wrong,  certain  things  they  feel  they 
ought  to  do  and  to  leave  the  opposite  undone. 
Whence  came  this  idea  of  right  and  wrong,  this 
feeling  of  obligation,  this  sense  of  duty  ? 

Some  say  it  is  an  accident  of  education,  some 
that  it  is  a  necessity  of  human  nature,  some  that 
it  is  a  modification  of  other  ideas,  some  that  it  is 
a  product  of  the  judgment,  and  others  that  it  per¬ 
tains  entirely  to  the  sensibilities,  and  is  a  resultant 
of  what  is  called  conscience  or  the  moral  sense.  Of 
those  who  affirm  that  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong 
is  a  necessary  result  of  man’s  nature,  some  desig¬ 
nate  that  part  of  our  nature  which  gives  us  this 
idea  by  the  term  Intuition,  others  by  the  term  The 
Reason,  and  still  others  by  the  terms  Original  Sug¬ 
gestion  or  Original  Conception.  Of  those  who  use 
the  term  The  Reason,  some  make  no  distinctions  in 
the  use  of  this  term,  and  therefore,  at  least  appar¬ 
ently,  teach  that  the  idea  of  right  has  the  same 
origin  as  the  idea  of  space  or  of  time  ;  but  others 
make  distinctions  in  The  Reason,  and  give  us  what 
they  call  The  pure  Reason,  The  aesthetic  Reason, 
and  The  moral  or  practical  Reason ;  and,  of  course, 
refer  all  moral  ideas  to  the  latter. 

Now,  in  this  confusion  in  the  use  of  terms,  it  is 
impossible  to  state  precisely  what  we  mean  without 
intimating,  to  some  extent,  what  we  accept  as  a 
true  statement  of  that  part  of  psychology  which 
pertains  to  the  origin  of  ideas. 


OBLIGATION. 


13 


And,  first,  we  would  have  it  in  discussions  of 
this  kind  distinctly  understood,  and  kept  always  in 
view,  that  mind  is  one  and  indivisible  ;  it  is  only  a 
convenience  of  language  that  we  speak  of  the  judg¬ 
ment,  the  reason,  the  imagination,  and  the  will ; 
it  is  the  same  one  and  indivisible  mind  that  per¬ 
ceives,  compares,  abstracts,  classifies,  infers,  loves, 
hates,  and  volitionates  in  choice  and  action.  Mind, 
considered  as  a  somewhat  which  is  capable  of 
apprehending  the  qualities  of  matter,  is  called  per¬ 
ception  ;  considered  as  capable  of  apprehending 
relations,  it  is  called  judgment ;  and  so  of  all  the 
so-called  faculties.  Our  capacity  for  certain  func¬ 
tions  we  call  the  intellect,  for  others  the  sensi¬ 
bility,  and  for  still  others  the  will — not  that  mind 
is  divided  into  three  parts  as  a  building  is  divided 
into  apartments,  but  that  the  same  one  and  indivis¬ 
ible  mind  for  convenience  in  science  and  language, 
considered  as  performing  certain  functions,  is  called 
by  one  name,  and  considered  as  performing  other 
functions  it  has  another  name — the  mind’s  power 
to  perform  a  function  is  called  a  faculty.  Sec¬ 
ondly,  we  affirm  that,  in  giving  the  genesis  of 
thought,  in  all  cases  the  last  resort  is  a  reference 
to  the  nature  of  mind  itself.  Formerly  writers  on 
Psychology  were  accustomed,  when  discussing  the 
origin  of  ideas,  to  treat  first  of  perception,  refer¬ 
ring  to  it  all  our  knowledge  of  the  qualities  of 
matter ;  then  of  judgment,  referring  to  it  our  appre- 


14  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

hensions  of  relations ;  then  of  reason,  treating  it  as 
the  source  of  all  abstractions  and  inferences  ;  then 
of  imagination,  the  source  of  all  ideals,  and  then,  as 
last  and  highest  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  they 
discoursed  about  the  nature  of  mind  itself,  call¬ 
ing  it  intuition,  the  reason,  original  conception,  or 
something  else  as  best  pleased  the  writer  himself ; 
and  to  this  so-called  faculty  was  referred  all  neces¬ 
sary  ideas  and  truths,  such  ideas  as  space,  time, 
beauty,  virtue,  and  all  those  truths  which  are  called 
axioms  and  first  principles.  Many  treatises  now 
extant,  and  used  as  authoritative  standards,  still  do 
substantially  this  same  thing.  But  more  modern 
writers  have  discovered  that  this  is  not  scientific, 
since  it  is  manifest  that  the  first  apprehension  of 
an  external  object  necessitates  the  apprehension 
of  being,  of  self,  of  space,  of  substance,  etc.,  as 
contemporaneous  with  ideas  of  color,  form,  and 
magnitude  ;  hence  they  treat  of  intuition  or  the 
reason  in  connection  with  perception,  and  carry  it 
along  with  them  through  all  subsequent  discus¬ 
sions  as  indispensable  to  and  inseparable  from  any 
and  all  processes  of  thought,  emotion,  or  volition. 
This  is  right,  corresponds  with  the  facts  in  the 
case,  harmonizes  with  the  laws  of  mind,  and  is, 
therefore,  more  scientific  than  the  former  methods. 

But  a  difficulty  still  remains,  for  it  may  be 
asked,  Why  refer  the  idea  of  space  to  the  nature 
of  mind  itself  any  more  than  the  idea  of  color  ? 


OBLIGATION. 


15 


If  it  be  asked,  Why  is  it  that  when  a  visible  object 
affects  the  organ  of  sight  the  mind  has  an  appre¬ 
hension  of  color,  form,  and  magnitude  ?  the  only 
answer  possible  is  that  it  is  of  the  nature  of  mind 
to  be  so  impressed  when  such  conditions  occur ; 
and  it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  also  of  the  nature 
of  mind  that  it  contemporaneously,  under  the  same 
conditions,  conceives  the  idea  of  space.  To  our 
thought  the  only  basis  of  classification  in  mental 
phenomena  is  similarity  in  the  objective  thing  con¬ 
ceived.  Qualities  of  matter  constitute  a  class. 
The  mind,  considered  as  a  power  capable  of  ap¬ 
prehending  these  qualities,  is  called  a  faculty,  and 
named  perception.  The  things  conceived  as  under¬ 
lying  conditions  of  these  qualities,  such  as  sub¬ 
stance  and  space,  constitute  another  class  in  mental 
phenomena,  and  the  mind,  considered  as  a  power 
capable  of  conceiving  these  ideas,  is  called  a  fac¬ 
ulty,  and  named  intuition.  So  of  all  other  so-called 
faculties.  We  affirm  that  in  all  cases  the  origin 
of  ideas,  or  the  genesis  of  thought,  is  given  when 
the  conditions  on  which  the  thought  arises  are 
specified.  And  these  conditions  being  given, 
nothing  remains  but  to  affirm  that  under  such 
conditions  it  is  of  the  nature  of  mind  that  such 
thoughts  should  arise. 

The  above  considerations  being  kept  in  mind, 
the  usual  classifications  of  mental  phenomena  and 
the  terms  usually  employed  to  designate  the  facul- 


1 6  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

ties  by  which  said  phenomena  become  possible  and 
actual  are  of  service  in  mental  science.  It  is  well 
that  mind  be  regarded  as  intellect,  sensibility,  and 
will ;  that  intellect  be  considered  as  regulative, 
presentative,  representative,  and  elaborative  ;  and 
so  of  the  remaining  faculties.  The  reader  of 
these  pages  is  supposed  to  be  familiar  with  the 
usual  classifications  of  phenomena  and  the  usual 
designation  of  faculties.  The  most  scientific  and 
satisfactory  classification  and  arrangement  of  men¬ 
tal  powers  and  faculties  given  in  brief  outline, 
known  to  the  present  writer,  may  be  found  in 
Hopkins’s  “  Outline  Study  of  Man,”  to  which  the 
reader  is  referred. 

It  will  be  sufficient  for  our  present  purpose  to 
speak  of  what  is  called  the  regulative  faculty,  or 
“The  Reason.”  This  is  so  called  because  it  dis 
tinguishes  man  as  a  rational  being.  Upham,  nam¬ 
ing  the  same  faculty  “original  suggestion,”  says: 
“This  is  a  convenient  term  for  stating  the  fact  that 
the  mind  on  certain  occasions,  from  its  own  inherent 
energy,  gives  rise  to  certain  thoughts.” 

The  substance  of  this  whole  matter  is  this : 
When  the  mind  has  in  contemplation  sensible 
objects,  from  a  necessity  of  its  nature — because 
mind  is  what  it  is — by  a  necessary  law  of  thought, 
ideas  of  substance,  space,  being,  resemblance, 
number,  etc.,  arise  in  the  mind.  The  power  the 
mind  possesses  to  give  rise  to  such  ideas  is  called 


OBLIGATION. 


17 


a  faculty,  and  is  named  “  Pure  Reason.”  In  like 
manner,  when  an  intellectual  apprehension  is  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  affect  the  sensibilities,  when 
emotion  is  excited,  because  mind  is  what  it  is, 
ideas  of  the  beautiful,  the  good,  the  ludicrous,  and 
other  similar  ideas  necessarily  arise  in  the  mind. 
The  power  the  mind  has  to  give  rise  to  such  ideas 
is  called  a  faculty,  and  is  named  “The  Esthetic 
Reason/’  Again,  when  two  or  more  objects  of  the 
intellect  and  sensibility  combined  are  presented  to 
the  will  as  objects  of  choice  and  action,  when  occa¬ 
sion  for  volition  in  choice  and  action  occurs,  then, 
because  mind  is  what  it  is,  because  of  the  nature 
or  necessary  constitution  of  mind  itself,  ideas  of 
personality,  obligation,  duty,  responsibility,  neces¬ 
sarily  arise.  The  power  the  mind  has  to  give  rise 
to  such  ideas  is  called  a  faculty,  and  is  named 
“The  Moral  or  Practical  Reason.” 

We  have  thus  endeavored  to  make  plain  what 
is  intended  when  it  is  said  that  ideas  of  right,  duty, 
obligation,  responsibility,  are  intuitions  ;  and  may 
here  say  in  a  word  that  the  thing  intended  is  that 
they  are  ideas  which  on  the  occurrence  of  the 
proper  occasion  must  necessarily  arise  because  of 
the  nature  of  mind  itself.  Henceforth,  because 
the  term  “reasoning”  universally  signifies  a  pro¬ 
cess  so  entirely  different  from  any  thing  intended 
when  the  term  “the  reason”  is  used,  we  shall  dis¬ 
card  this  latter  term,  and  for  the  want  of  any  bet- 


i8 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


ter,  or  because  more  readers  will  understand  what 
is  meant  than  by  the  use  of  any  other  term,  we 
shall  use  the  word  “intuition”  as  the  name  of  the 
faculty  to  which  moral  ideas  are  to  be  referred  ; 
and  in  view  of  what  is  said  above  it  will  not  be 
necessary  to  mark  the  distinction  between  intel¬ 
lectual  and  moral  intuitions. 

We  have  now  found  the  faculty  to  which  the 
origin  of  moral  ideas  is  to  be  referred  ;  we  have 
found  the  place  in  mental  processes  where  the  idea 
of  obligation  has  its  birth.  When  the  self,  the 
man,  is  so  circumstanced  that  he  is  called  upon  to 
exercise  free  will  in  choice  between  two  or  more 
objects  —  objects  which,  being  apprehended  by 
the  intellect,  are  such  as  affect  the  sensibilities — 
then,  and  not  till  then,  there,  and  nowhere  else, 
the  mind,  from  its  own  inherent  nature,  gives  birth 
to  the  idea  of  obligation.  But  it  is  evident  we 
have  not  yet  given  a  full  account  of  the  origin  of 
the  idea ;  for  it  may  still  be  asked  what  is  that  in 
the  objects  of  choice  which  obligates  the  man?  A 
full  answer  to  this  question  involves  the  doctrine 
of  the  ground  of  obligation ,  which  we  shall  dis¬ 
cuss  hereafter  in  a  separate  section.  It  is  only 
requisite  in  this  place  to  specify  the  occasions  on 
which  the  intuitive  faculty  is  so  called  into  exer¬ 
cise  as  to  give  rise  to  the  idea  in  question. 

When  two  objects  of  thought  are  presented 
for  choice,  and  one  of  them  is  conceived  as  prom- 


OBLIGATION. 


19 


ising  a  greater  good  than  the  other,  the  man  in¬ 
stantly  feels  obligated  to  choose  that  which  prom¬ 
ises  the  greater  good.  Good  is  satisfaction  in 
consciousness  ;  it  is  that  that  best  harmonizes  with 
the  ends  of  being.  It  is  not  essential  to  a  feeling 
of  obligation  that  man  should  know  infallibly  what  is 
his  highest  good,  nor  that  he  should  know  certainly 
in  any  given  case  that  one  thing  is  more  produc¬ 
tive  of  good  than  another,  but  only  that  he  so 
conceive  it.  If  to  his  mind,  if  in  his  apprehensions 
of  the  case,  one  object  of  choice  is  more  in  har¬ 
mony  with  the  end  of  his  being,  is  productive  of 
higher  satisfaction  in  consciousness,  is  conducive 
of  greater  good  to  himself,  to  others,  and  to  God, 
he  has  at  once  an  apprehension  of  obligation  ;  he 
feels  he  ought  to  choose  the  higher  good ;  he  feels 
approved  if  he  do  so  choose,  and  condemned  if 
he  does  not. 

The  conditions,  then,  rendering  the  birth  of  the 
idea  of  obligation  a  possibility  are,  an  intelligent 
sentient  being,  endowed  with  free  will  or  the  power 
of  choice,  and  the  presentation  to  such  a  being  of 
objects  of  choice  which  differ  in  apprehended  ex¬ 
cellencies.  These  conditions  existing,  the  idea  is 
a  spontaneity ;  it  arises  by  the  necessities  of  the 
case.  Or,  to  give  the  case  another  putting,  man 
is  a  moral  being  by  creation.  He  has  a  moral 
nature;  a  nature  which,  on  the  occurrence  of  the 
proper  occasion,  gives  rise  to  moral  sentiments. 


20 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


He  is  by  nature  capable  of  certain  intellectual 
apprehensions  which  excite  emotions  and  desires. 
These  desires  are  motives  to  volition ;  they  tend  to 
move  the  mind  towards  choice  and  action.  Will  is 
free.  It  may  do  or  refrain  from  doing,  may  make 
a  selection  with  an  alternative.  An  election  being 
thus  possible,  the  moral  nature  obligates,  becomes 
law,  is  imperative,  promises  reward,  threatens  pun¬ 
ishment  ;  in  case  of  obedience  fulfills  its  promises, 
and  in  case  of  disobedience  executes  its  threats. 

The  circumstances  which  may  bring  into  exist¬ 
ence  the  state  of  mind  above  described  are  numer¬ 
ous  and  varied,  but  the  binding  force  of  obligation 
terminates  always  on  volition  in  choice.  Here  is 
diversity  of  object,  freedom  in  selection,  and  here 
alone  is  responsible  power.  Obligation  commands 
power  to  act  in  accordance  with  highest  motive, 
and  forbids  that  power  to  yield  to  the  promptings 
of  lesser  motive. 

Let  the  above  be  further  illustrated. 

When  one  apprehends  a  natural  normal  rela¬ 
tion  of  dependence  between  himself  and  another 
there  intuitively  arises  a  sense  of  obligation  towards 
him  upon  whom  he  is  dependent  —  obligation  to 
avoid  giving  offense,  to  reverence  the  superior 
power,  and  obey  the  superior  will.  This  feeling  is 
natural  in  children  towards  their  parents,  and  in 
all  men  towards  God.  Here  it  is  manifest  that 
the  circumstantial  occasion  is  the  apprehension  of 


OBLIGATION. 


21 


a  relation ;  but  it  is  equally  manifest  that  the  obli¬ 
gation  lies  upon  the  will,  and  that  the  obligation 
is  apprehended  only  when  choice  is  presented, 
choice  between  the  conduct  indicated  and  its 
opposite. 

Again :  when  any  one  receives  a  favor  bestowed 
in  kindness  and  good  will,  he  instantly  intuitively 
feels  obligated  to  be  grateful  towards  his  bene¬ 
factor.  Insensibility  in  such  a  case  is  inhuman, 
brutish.  The  common  sense  of  mankind  recog¬ 
nizes  an  obligation  of  binding  force.  Gratitude  is 
not  only  fit,  proper,  amiable,  but  in  the  common  esti¬ 
mation  it  is  such  a  demand  of  human  nature  that 
its  opposite  is  positively  censurable,  and  when  ex¬ 
ercised  towards  God  justly  punishable.  Here  the 
circumstantial  occasion  is  the  reception  of  a  benefit ; 
but,  as  in  the  cases  above,  the  obligation  lies  upon 
the  choice  between  gratitude  and  its  opposite,  and 
the  obligation  is  not  apparent  till  the  choice  is 
presented. 

Again :  when  one  enters  with  another  into  the 
relation  of  contracting  parties,  he  is  conscious  of  a 
sense  of  obligation  to  fulfill  his  part  of  the  condi¬ 
tions  stipulated ;  and  if  he  voluntarily  refuse  or 
neglect  to  do  so  he  is  conscious  of  self-condemna¬ 
tion,  acknowledges  demerit,  and  feels  that  he  is 
justly  punishable.  Here,  as  before,  the  circum¬ 
stances  are  different,  but  the  apprehension  of  obli¬ 
gation  is  in  the  same  place  and  manner  as  before. 


22 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


Free  will  in  the  exercise  of  intelligent  choice  be¬ 
tween  a  good  that  is  apprehended  as  greater  and 
one  apprehended  as  less  is  the  occasion  on  which 
the  intuitive  faculty  gives  the  idea  of  obligation. 

OBJECTION. 

Should  it  be  said  that  the  idea  of  obligation  is 
not  the  same  as  the  idea  of  right  we  answer,  This 
is  true,  but  is  no  objection  to  what  has  been  said 
respecting  the  idea  of  obligation.  The  idea  of 
right  will  be  discussed  in  the  section  next  follow¬ 
ing,  on  the  ground  of  obligation. 

The  only  objectors  to  the  theory  above  advo¬ 
cated  whose  objections  deserve  special  notice  are 
those  who  deny  that  man  has  a  moral  nature,  and 
affirm  that  all  moral  sentiments  and  opinion  are 
mere  accidents  of  education.  These  objectors — 
or,  rather,  their  denials  and  affirmations — will  be 
discussed  in  the  chapter  on  Conscience. 

II.  THE  GROUND  OF  OBLIGATION. 

All  acts  involving  obligation  or  moral  responsi 
bility  are  acts  of  choice.  Choice  is  the  sole  theater 
of  morals,  so  far  as  responsible  doing  or  not  doing 
is  concerned.  The  Scriptures,  indeed,  use  the 
term  sin  in  two  senses: — one  pertaining  to  conduct, 
as  when  they  say  sin  is  a  transgression  of  the  law, 
and  the  other  pertaining  to  character,  as  when  they 
say  it  is  no  longer  I  that  do  it,  but  sin  that  dwell- 


OBLIGATION. 


23 


eth  in  me  ;  but  it  is  obvious  that  a  man  is  respon¬ 
sible  for  his  character  no  farther  than  his  character 
is  self-imposed,  and  he  forms  his  own  character  in 
no  other  way  than  by  his  moral  choices.  A  man 
is  no  more  responsible  for  being  what  he  can  not 
be  than  he  is  for  doing  what  he  can  not  do.  The 
terms  personality,  obligation,  responsibility,  right, 
wrong,  guilt,  innocence,  all  arise  out  of,  center  in, 
are  founded  upon,  moral  choices.  And  in  the 
proper  sense  of  the  terms  the  same  thing  may  be 
said  of  virtue,  vice,  holiness,  sin,  righteousness, 
and  unrighteousness. 

Assuming  that  we  have  found  the  place  and 
nature  of  obligation,  we  next  inquire  after  its  basis, 
ground,  or  reason.  Why  are  we  obligated  to  do 
this  or  that  ?  What  is  the  reason  why  we  are  re¬ 
quired  to  do  one  thing  rather  than  another  ?  This 
question  is  sometimes  considered  the  same  as  the 
question,  Why  is  this  right  and  that  wrong  ?  but 
some  writers  insist  that  if  any  act  be  right  there 
is  something  back  of  the  rightness  that  makes  it 
right.  We  inquire,  therefore,  after  that  somewhat 
back  of  the  rightness,  What  is  it  that  makes  cer¬ 
tain  acts  of  choice  right  and  their  opposites  wrong? 
Again,  sometimes  this  question  is  carelessly  iden¬ 
tified  with  the  question  of  guilt  or  innocence  ;  but 
these  depend  upon  the  intentions  of  the  agent. 
We  inquire  after  that  characteristic  in  the  object 
of  the  agent’s  intentions  which  determines  whether 


24 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


he  be  virtuous,  innocent,  or  guilty,  What  is  the 
ground  of  obligation?  the  basis  of  moral  virtue? 

THEORIES. 

i.  The  first  theory  we  notice  is  that  which 
affirms  that  the  basis  of  virtue  is  the  will  of  God, 
that  God’s  will  is  the  ultimate  and  sole  ground  of 
moral  obligation.  It  is  said  God’s  will  is  first 
cause  of  all  things.  It  is  impossible,  therefore, 
even  in  thought,  to  find  any  thing  anterior  or  ex¬ 
terior  to  the  eternal  self-existent  will.  It  is  said 
what  God  requires  is  obligatory,  and  the  reason 
why  it  is  obligatory  is  that  he  requires  it.  And 
by  the  necessity  of  the  case  this  is  the  first  and 
last  word  that  can  be  said  on  the  subject. 

A  theory  different  in  statement,  and  in  a  sense 
really  different,  but  ultimately  coming  to  well-nigh 
the  same  thing,  is  as  follows:  “The  primary  idea 
of  goodness  is  the  essential,  not  the  creative,  will 
of  God ;  the  divine  will  in  its  essence  is  infinite 
love,  mercy,  patience,  truth,  faithfulness,  rectitude, 
spirituality,  and  all  that  is  included  in  holiness, 
which  constitutes  the  inmost  nature  of  God.  The 
holiness  of  God,  therefore,  neither  precedes  his 
will  nor  follows  it,  but  is  his  will  itself.  The  good 
is  not  a  law  for  the  divine  will  so  that  God  wills  it 
because  it  is  good,  neither  is  it  a  creation  of  his  will 
so  that  it  becomes  good  because  he  wills  it,  but  it  is 
the  nature  of  God  from  everlasting  to  everlasting. >% 


OBLIGATION. 


25 


On  this  theory  we  remark :  That  God’s  com¬ 
mand  is  binding  no  one  can  doubt ;  that  he  has 
commanded  is  sufficient  reason  why  his  creatures 
should  obey,  and  sufficient  ground  for  the  affirma¬ 
tion  that  what  is  commanded  is  right :  “  The  law 
of  the  Lord  is  perfect,  the  statutes  of  the  Lord 
are  right,  the  commandment  of  the  Lord  is  pure, 
the  judgments  of  the  Lord  are  true  and  righteous 
altogether.”  It  may  be  added  that  for  all  the 
practical  purposes  of  piety  and  morality  it  is  suffi¬ 
cient  to  say  this  is  right  because  God  has  com¬ 
manded  it,  and  that  is  wrong  because  God  has 
forbidden  it. 

The  fact  of  a  divine  command  is  adequate  proof 
of  obligatoriness  ;  but  it  is  not  so  clear  that  the 
command  constitutes  the  ground  or  reason  of  the 
obligation.  For  it  is  not  conceivable  that  duty  so 
depends  upon  the  arbitrary  will  of  God  as  that  it 
is  possible  for  God  to  reverse  the  case.  Hatred 
towards  our  neighbor  could  not  be  made  right  by 
any  volition  possible.  That  God  has  commanded 
his  creatures  to  exercise  mutual  good  will  one 
toward  another  is  sufficient  evidence  of  obligation, 
sufficient  reason  why  his  creatures  should  obey; 
but  his  command  is  not  the  ground  or  reason  of 
the  obligation,  for  if  it  were  it  would  be  their  duty 
to  hate  each  other  on  the  supposition  that  God 
should  so  will. 

Again,  that  duty  exists  because  God  wills  it,  is 


2  6 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


not  the  last  word  that  may  be  said  on  the  subject, 
because  it  may  be  asked,  Why  should  man  obey 
God  ?  and  this  question  admits  of  an  intelligent 
and  significant  answer.  It  may  be  said  man  is 
obligated  to  obey  God  because  God  is  his  creator 
and  preserver  ;  which  relation  confers  the  natural 
right  of  unlimited  possession,  and  imposes  the 
obligation  of  universal  obedience.  It  may  be  said 
man  is  under  obligation  to  love  God  supremely 
because  God  is  infinitely  lovely.  Again,  it  may 
be  said  man  is  obligated  to  love  God  supremely 
and  his  neighbor  as  himself  because  love  is  pro¬ 
motive  of  the  highest  good,  whether  that  good  be 
the  glory  of  the  Creator,  or  the  good  of  the  crea¬ 
ture,  or  the  glory  of  God  in,  through,  and  by,  the 
good  of  his  creatures.  Without  presuming  to  an¬ 
nounce  categorically  what  is  and  what  is  not,  and 
reminding  the  reader  that  in  all  questions  of  human 
science  the  question  is,  How  am  I  obliged  to  think 
it  ?  we  admit  on  the  one  hand  that  the  declared 
will  of  God,  even  in  the  absence  of  any  other 
reason,  is  adequate  ground  for  obedience,  so  that 
it  is  not  needful  for  any  practical  purpose  of  piety 
or  morality  to  seek  for  any  thing  anterior  or  ex¬ 
terior  to  God  as  the  ground  or  reason  of  his  com¬ 
mandments  ;  we  affirm,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it 
is  impossible  to  think  that  duty  so  depends  upon 
the  arbitrary  will  of  God  as  that  he  might  reverse 
the  case  and  make  duty  the  opposite  of  what  it  is. 


OBLIGATION. 


27 


We  do  not  conceive  it  necessary  to  postulate  any 
thing  that  is  not  God,  which  is  to  him  a  law, 
governing  him  in  his  conduct.  He  is  himself  to 
himself,  a  sufficient  law ;  and  yet,  as  in  mathe¬ 
matics  we  think  of  principles  that  are  immuta¬ 
ble  and  eternal,  so  that  we  do  not  conceive  the 
equality  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  to  two  right 
angles  as  a  resultant  of  the  divine  volition,  but  as 
a  necessity,  a  somewhat  which  could  not  not  be  ; 
so  we  are  compelled  to  think  of  moral  principles 
as  immutable,  eternal,  and  necessary.  Sentient 
and  intelligent  beings  supposed  as  actually  exist¬ 
ent,  and  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  that  it  could 
be  otherwise  than  that  they  are  under  obligations 
of  mutual  good  will. 

An  argument  for  the  theory  that  the  will  of 
God  is  ultimate,  common  among  theologians  and 
put  forth  with  a  confidence  that  indicates  the  opin¬ 
ion  that  the  argument  is  decisive,  is,  that  any  other 
theory  (for  example,  that  the  good  is  ultimate) 
gives  a  variable  rule — a  rule  dependent  upon  the 
opinions  of  men  as  to  what  is  for  the  great¬ 
est  good.  We  reply,  this  argument  is  conclusive 
against  the  affirmation  that  man’s  judgment  of 
what  is  for  the  greatest  good  is  more  reliable 
than  the  declared  will  of  God  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
against  the  affirmation  that  man  needs  no  revela¬ 
tion  in  words,  and  therefore  has  n’t  any,  because 
his  own  judgment  of  what  is  good  is  an  adequate 


28 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


rule  of  practice.  But  it  is  no  argument  against 
the  affirmation  that  good  is  ultimate,  that  that  is 
right  which  is  promotive  of  good,  and  that  God 
has  commanded  thus  and  thus  because  what  he  has 
commanded  is  good,  and  therefore  right.  But, 
again,  it  is  said,  inquiring  after  the  good  or  the 
right  is  a  roundabout  way  of  learning  duty.  We 
reply,  this  is  undoubtedly  so  as  compared  with  con¬ 
sulting  a  written  revelation.  The  shortest,  most 
reliable  and  every  way  best  method  of  learning 
duty,  for  him  who  has  a  Bible  in  his  hands  is  to 
consult  its  pages.  This  is  so  every  time ;  but  this 
is  not  saying  that  what  the  Bible  requires  has 
no  other  foundation  but  the  arbitrary  will  of  God. 

2.  Utilitarianism . — There  are  several  views  of 
the  subject  now  under  discussion,  all  of  which 
may  be  and  are  characterized  as  utilitarian.  Chief 
among  them  are  the  two  following,  and  perhaps  all 
may  be  classified  as  belonging  either  to  the  one  or 
the  other.  The  one  finds  the  basis  of  obligation 
in  the  well-being  of  the  subject ;  that  is,  each  indi¬ 
vidual  person  is  obligated  to  do  what  is  for  his  own 
best  good — and  any  course  of  conduct  that  is  to 
him  obligatory  is  so  because  it  is  for  his  own  good. 
It  is  said,  “Virtue  is  doing  good  to  mankind  in  obe 
dience  to  the  will  of  God  and  for  the  sake  of  ever¬ 
lasting  happiness;”  “intelligent  voluntary  beings 
never  act  voluntarily,  without  acting  from  a  regard 
to  their  own  well-being ;  there  can  no  more  be 


OBLIGATION. 


29 


motive  except  in  form  of  good  or  happiness  to  the 
agent  than  there  can  be  motive  that  is  no  motive. ” 
The  other  view,  above  referred  to,  finds  the  basis 
of  obligation  in  the  universal  good — the  greatest 
good  of  all;  of  God,  the  universe,  and  self;  “sat¬ 
isfaction  in  consciousness  of  all  being,  self  in¬ 
cluded;”  of  God,  our  fellow-men,  and  ourselves. 
The  first  of  these  makes  self-love,  and  the  second 
benevolence,  the  governing  motive  in  all  moral 
action. 

Of  the  first  we  have  to  say,  it  is  so  incomplete 
that  it  is  wholly  unsatisfactory.  Dr.  Paley’s  defini¬ 
tion  of  virtue  is  good  as  far  as  it  goes,  but  is 
inadequate,  and  its  chief  defect  is  in  a  vital  point. 
To  do  good  to  mankind  is  a  good  thing  in  itself,  to 
do  so  in  obedience  to  God  is  right  a,nd  proper,  and 
everlasting  happiness  is  a  suitable  motive  for  ac¬ 
tion  ;  but  when  a  man  does  good  to  mankind  even 
though  he  do  it  in  obedience  to  God,  if  his  own 
everlasting  happiness  be  his  sole  motive,  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  his  act  is  virtuous  or  even  inno¬ 
cent.  He  certainly  does  not  meet  his  entire  obliga¬ 
tion,  for  we  are  obligated  to  seek  to  promote,  and 
to  promote  as  far  as  opportunity  and  ability  allow, 
the  good  of  mankind  for  the  sake  of  the  good 
itself.  This  theory  is  so  evidently  out  of  harmony 
with  that  which  requires  us  to  deny  ourselves  and 
take  up  our  cross,  forsaking  all  that  we  have,  and 
with  the  affirmation  that  whosoever  will  save  his 


30 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


life  shall  lose  it,  and  whosoever  will  lose  his  life  for 
Christ’s  sake  shall  find  it,  that  we  may  dismiss  it 
as  fatally  defective,  without  further  discussion. 

Of  the  second  theory,  that  which  makes  benev¬ 
olence  the  governing  motive  in  all  virtuous  acts, 
and  the  good  that  is  sought,  the  end  of  being,  and 
the  ground  of  obligation,  we  shall  speak  at  length 
further  on.  We  have  introduced  this  theory  in 
this  place  because  its  opposers  have  been  pleased 
to  characterize  it  as  utilitarian ;  and,  for  the  same 
reason,  we  here  remark  that  it  is  undoubtedly 
utilitarian,  using  this  word  in  its  proper  sense. 
But  when  it  is  so  characterized  as  an  argument 
against  it,  the  term  utilitarian  is  used  as  synony¬ 
mous  with  the  term  selfish,  or  as  necessarily  involv¬ 
ing  that  idea.  Using  the  term  in  its  proper  sense, 
it  is  no  objection  to  the  theory  that  it  may  be  said 
to  be  utilitarian. 

3.  In  the  above  we  have  said  some  find  the 
ground  of  obligation  in  the  will  of  God,  some  in 
self-interest,  and  others  in  the  general  good.  We 
come  now  to  notice  another  theory,  one  which  finds 
the  object  of  our  search  in  The  Right,  called  some¬ 
times  the  rightarian  theory.  This  conceives  an 
eternal,  immutable  principle  of  right,  necessarily 
arising  out  of  the  nature  of  things — sometimes 
called  the  eternal  fitness  of  things.  Whatever  ac¬ 
cords  with  this  principle  of  right  is  virtuous,  and 
virtuous  because  it  accords  therewith — the  whole 


OBLIGATION. 


31 


of  duty  is  to  do  right,  and  rightness  is  sole  motive 
in  all  moral  acts.  The  will  of  God  is  our  rule  of 
practice,  because  he  always  wills  what  is  right,  and 
wills  it  because  it  is  right.  The  good  of  self  and 
the  good  of  others  are  proper  motives  for  action, 
because  what  is  right  is  always  promotive  of  those 
ends ;  and,  conversely,  whatever  is  promotive  of 
those  ends  is  right — right  not  because  thus  promo¬ 
tive,  but  right  in  itself.  Virtue  and  happiness  are 
universally  and  inseparably  connected  ;  but  virtue 
is  not  virtue  because  happiness  follows  from  it,  but 
is  virtue  in  itself.  We  are  to  do  right  though  the 
heavens  fall,  always  comforted  with  the  assurance 
that  they  never  will  fall,  since  in  all  cases  godli¬ 
ness  is  profitable.  The  welfare  of  self,  the  good 
of  others,  and  the  honor  of  God,  are  infallibly 
secured  to  right-doers,  not  because  the  right  has 
any  thing  to  do  with  these  things — it  is  right  in 
itself,  immutable  and  eternal — but  because  some¬ 
how  we  know  that  good  always  follows  the  right. 

The  chief  argument  for  this  theory  has  been 
already  intimated ;  it  is  that  it  is  impossible  to 
think  otherwise  ;  that  we  can  not  conceive  of  ab¬ 
stract  essential  virtue  as  dependent  upon  volition  ; 
virtue  and  vice  are  not  so  dependent  upon  volition 
as  that  volition  can  reverse  the  case  and  make 
virtue  vice  and  vice  virtue.  The  reply  to  this  has 
also  been  intimated  above ;  it  is  that  holiness  is 
not  a  law  external  to  God,  governing  him,  so  that 


32 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS 


he  may  be  said  to  will  thus  and  thus  because  it  is 
right ;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  holiness  a  crea¬ 
tion  of  will,  so  that  it  may  be  said  this  and  that 
are  right  because  God  wills  them,  but  holiness 
is  God  himself.  God’s  will  is  God  himself,  from 
everlasting  to  everlasting.  This,  as  we  see  it, 
is  an  unintelligible  speculation,  or,  if  there  be  a 
thought  in  it,  the  thought  is  lost  among  the  inscru¬ 
table  mysteries  of  the  divine  nature. 

Another  argument  for  the  doctrine  of  an  ab¬ 
stract  right,  also  for  the  idea  of  a  moral  instinct, 
and  as  against  utilitarianism,  is  found  in  the  pro¬ 
cess  of  moral  education.  It  is  said  we  do  not 
attempt  the  education  of  children  and  heathen  by 
showing  to  their  intellect  that  virtue  is  for  the 
general  good,  but  that  we  simply  call  attention  to 
the  relations  subsisting  between  them  and  others, 
trusting  that  their  own  moral  instincts  will  indicate 
the  obligations  which  arise  out  of  those  relations. 
For  example,  a  mother  does  not  attempt  by  argu¬ 
ment  to  convince  a  refractory  child  that  it  is  for 
the  general  good  of  the  family  that  children  obey 
their  parents,  in  order  to  educate  the  child  and 
secure  the  desired  obedience ;  but  she  says,  My 
child,  will  you  disobey  your  mother?  giving  her 
voice,  as  her  nature  dictates,  a  slight  tinge  of  the 
semitone,  and  giving  large  quantity  and  the  cir¬ 
cumflex  accent  to  the  words  child  and  mother ;  and 
when  this  fails,  she  applies  the  rod. 


OBLIGATION. 


33 


To  this  it  may  be  replied,  that  in  such  a  case 
the  appeal  is  to  mere  animal  instinct,  and  there  is 
no  moral  consideration  in  the  case.  The  whipping 
is  merely  the  regulation  of  machinery ;  it  is  as 
when  a  balky  horse  is  whipped,  he  is  whipped  to 
make  him  go,  he  is  not  whipped  to  punish  him  for 
not  going. 

The  chief  objection  to  the  rightarian  theory  is, 
as  Wesley  puts  it,  that  to  speak  of  “the  eternal  re¬ 
lations  of  things  existing  in  time  is  little  less  than 
a  contradiction.”  Wesley’s  point  is,  that  all  rela¬ 
tions  being  the  product  of  the  divine  will,  all  prin¬ 
ciples  involved  in  those  relations,  and,  of  course, 
all  obligations  arising  out  of  them  must  depend 
upon  the  divine  will,  so  that  a  reference  to  the  will 
of  God  is  the  last  word  that  can  be  said.  We 
repeat  here  what  we  have  said  above,  this  is  not 
the  last  word,  for  the  question,  Why  should  man 
obey  God  ?  is  significant. 

Another  objection  is  found  in  a  criticism  on 
the  sense  of  the  word  right.  It  is  said  right  is 
a  quality  of  an  action,  and  therefore  can  not  be 
predicated  of  a  principle,  specially  of  an  eternal 
principle.  It  is  further  alleged  that  right  is  accord¬ 
ing  to  rule,  or  that  that  course  of  action  is  right 
which  secures  the  end  sought — it  is,  therefore,  not 
predicable  of  any  thing  but  actions.  To  this  we 
say,  It  seems,  at  most,  nothing  more  than  a  dic¬ 
tionary  question,  and  does  not  at  all  affect  the 


34 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


merits  of  the  question  in  dispute  ;  and,  moreover, 
we  allege  that  the  term  right  is,  in  common  use, 
employed  in  a  significant  sense  that  admits  of  the 
term  the  right ,  and  does  signify  what  may  be  called 
an  eternal  principle. 

Again,  it  is  affirmed  that  no  man  can  in 
thought  even  predicate  the  right  of  any  action 
without  conceiving  of  something  back  of  the  right¬ 
ness  which  makes  it  right.  This  seems  to  be 
so,  and  constitutes  a  valid  objection  to  the  righta- 
rian  theory,  and  puts  us  on  the  further  search  after 
that  somewhat  which  is  the  thing  itself  sought  after 
in  all  this  discussion.  Is  the  good  that  thing  ? 

4.  If  we  say  the  ground  of  obligation  is  not 
the  arbitrary  will  of  God,  not  self-interest,  not  an 
abstract,  essential  right,  may  we  say  it  is  the  uni¬ 
versal  good,  the  summum  bonum  of  all  sentient, 
intelligent  beings? 

It  pertains  to  a  rational  being  that  he  act  for  a 
reason ;  or,  in  other  words,  all  rational  acts  are 
put  forth  in  view  of  some  end.  Ends  are  either 
subordinate  or  ultimate.  A  man  seeks  knowledge 
that  he  may  have  power  to  do  good  ;  in  such  a 
case  knowledge  and  power  are  subordinate  ends 
and  doing  good  an  ultimate  end.  An  ultimate 
end  may  be  supreme ;  that  ultimate  end  which  a 
man  seeks  above  all  other  ends  is  his  supreme 
end.  W e  always  determine  a  man’s  character  by 
that  which  we  conceive  as  his  supreme  end.  If 


OBLIGATION. 


35 


wealth  be  his  governing  motive,  we  say  he  is  ava¬ 
ricious  ;  if  power,  ambitious  ;  if  he  seek,  above  all 
things,  the  good  of  mankind,  we  say  he  is  a  phil¬ 
anthropist;  if  the  well-being  of  his  own  country  be 
his  supreme  end,  we  say  he  is  patriotic ;  if  he 
have  a  single  eye  to  the  honor  and  glory  of  God, 
we  characterize  him  as  a  pious  man — in  a  word, 
men  are  humanitarian,  pious,  benevolent,  patriotic, 
social,  domestic,  selfish,  ambitious,  covetous,  or 
whatever  may  be  their  character,  according  to  that 
which  they  choose  as  the  supreme  end  or  govern¬ 
ing  motive  of  their  lives.  Now,  is  it  conceivable 
that  a  man  can  choose  as  the  supreme  end  of  all 
his  acts  in  life  any  thing  higher  than  the  universal 
good ;  or,  more  definitely,  the  happiness  of  all, 
the  satisfaction  in  consciousness  of  all  sentient, 
intelligent  beings,  the  good  of  all — God,  fellow- 
men,  and  self?  We  think  not.  The  only  reply  to 
this,  as  we  see  it,  worthy  of  notice,  is,  that  holi¬ 
ness,  and  not  happiness,  is  the  true  and  supreme 
end  of  being.  To  this  we  have  nothing  more  to 
say,  than  that  the  Scriptures  declare  that  God  is 
love.  Love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law  ;  all  the  law 
and  the  prophets  are  summed  up  in  one  word,  love. 
Now  love  being  the  sum  total  of  all  obligation, 
and  good  being  the  supreme  end  which  love  seeks, 
it  would  seem  to  be  the  most  natural  thing  in  the 
world  to  say  that  the  universal  good  is  the  ground 
of  obligation.  In  conclusion,  if  this  be  not  the 


36 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


true  solution  of  the  problem,  we  see  not  to  the 
contrary ;  but  the  discussion  is  fruitless  and  the 
question  itself  useless.  It  may  be  that  man  does 
not  know,  and  in  his  present  life  can  not  and  need 
not  know,  why  God  made  him,  what  is  the  end  of 
his  being  or  ground  of  his  obligation.  It  may  be 
sufficient  that  man  knows  as  well  as  he  knows 
that  he  has  a  being,  that  he  is  created  under  law, 
under  obligation,  and  that  that  to  which  he  is 
obligated,  that  which  he  is  bound  to  do,  is  made 
to  him  so  plain  that  he  that  runneth  may  read  ; 
duty  is  made  so  plain  that  the  wayfaring  man, 
though  a  fool  in  other  matters,  need  not  err  in  this. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Conscience. 

I.  DEFINITIONS. 

This  term  is  used  by  all  who  think,  write,  or 
speak  on  the  subject  of  morals,  and  it  might  be 
expected  that  it  were  well  understood,  and  that 
all  would  agree  as  to  its  meaning.  But  strange, 
and  yet  not  strange,  there  are  but  few  terms  in 
common  use  concerning  which  there  is  a  greater 
diversity  of  opinion,  or  more  extended  controver¬ 
sies.  The  common  acceptation  of  the  term,  the 
sense  in  which  those  use  it  who  are  not  careful 
about  formulating  thought  scientifically,  makes  it 
.signify  all  of  that  part  of  man’s  nature  by  which  he 
is  capable  of  moral  ideas,  emotions,  and  affections. 

In  this  sense  it  pertains  both  to  the  intellect 
and  the  sensibility,  and  is  the  man  himself  think¬ 
ing  and  feeling  in  the  domain  of  morals.  Man  is 
by  nature  endowed  with  power  or  ability  to  appre¬ 
hend  a  moral  quality  in  human  actions,  to  deter¬ 
mine  in  judgment  whether  a  given  course  of 

conduct  be  right  or  wrong ;  he  feels  an  impulse 

37 


38 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


towards  the  right  and  a  restraint  from  the  wrong 
When  he  does  well  he  fells  approved  ;  when  ill, 
condemned.  All  this  he  does  necessarily  ;  that  is, 
by  a  necessity  of  his  nature.  In  other  words,  he 
has  a  moral  nature ,  and  this  is  called  conscience. 
Or,  to  state  the  same  thing  differently,  his  mind 
performs  these  discriminating  impulsive  and  retrib¬ 
utive  functions.  The  power  it  has  to  do  so  is 
called  a  faculty,  and  is  named  Conscience. 

According  to  another  view,  conscience  is  a  de¬ 
partment  of  the  sensibility  solely,  and  is  conceived 
as  a  kind  of  moral  instinct  by  which  man  knows 
instinctively  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong.  It 
is  that  by  which  we  are  able  to  apprehend  the 
existence  of  a  moral  quality  in  human  actions  ;  a 
faculty  which  pronounces,  ex  cathedra ,  that  this  is 
right  and  that  is  wrong.  It  is  to  the  moral  qual¬ 
ity  of -actions  what  sight  is  to  color,  the  power 
of  apprehending  it. 

In  this  we  have  a  defect  and  an  ‘error.  That 
there  is  a  moral  quality  in  actions,  that  this  is  a 
single  and  separate  quality,  and  that  man  has  the 
power  of  perceiving  it,  no  one  can  question.  If 
any  purpose  of  science  requires  that  this  power 
of  perceiving  the  moral  quality  of  actions  be  sep¬ 
arated  from  other  faculties  and  a  specific  name 
be  given  to  it  no  one  need  object ;  but  if  use  gives 
law  to  language  the  term  conscience  ought  not  to 
be  the  term  employed  for  that  purpose,  since  this 


CONSCIENCE. 


39 


is  but  one  of  several  functions  usually  ascribed  to 
it.  Again,  if  it  be  insisted  that  this  function  be 
regarded  as  instinctive,  so  that  we  may  speak  of 
conscience  in  itself  or  in  any  of  its  functions  as  a 
moral  instinct,  analogy  would  require  that  we  call 
man’s  power  of  apprehending  the  true  as  an  intel¬ 
lectual  instinct,  and  his  power  of  apprehending  the 
beautiful  as  an  cesthetic  instinct.  Intuition  is  a 
better  term.  Ideas  of  the  true,  the  beautiful,  the 
good,  and  the  right,  arise  in  the  mind  spontane¬ 
ously  on  the  occurrence  of  their  appropriate  occa¬ 
sion  ;  and  we  have,  to  designate  the  faculties  which 
give  us  these  ideas,  the  pure,  aesthetic,  and  moral 
intuitions ;  or,  if  the  reader  prefer,  the  pure  reason, 
the  aesthetic  reason,  and  the  moral  reason.  But 
chiefly,  the  word  instinct  usually  leads  the  mind 
too  far  away  from  man’s  rational  nature  to  be  ap¬ 
propriate  in  any  thing  pertaining  to  moral  charac¬ 
ter  and  responsibility. 

Again,  conscience  is  sometimes  defined  as  “the 
judgment  exercised  in  the  department  of  morals.” 
Defined  thus,  it  belongs  wholly  to  the  intellect,  and 
is  only  one  of  the  intellectual  faculties  exercised  on 
a  restricted  class  of  objects.  That  this  is  defective, 
is  too  narrow  a  limitation,  is  so  evident  that  reply 
is  evidently  unnecessary. 

Still  another  definition  may  be  mentioned. 
“  Conscience  is  moral  consciousness,  or  conscious¬ 
ness  in  the  department  of  morals.”  The  author 


40 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


who  thus  defines  the  term  defines  consciousness 
not  as~  the  notice  the  mind  takes  of  its  own  oper¬ 
ation,  not  as  the  mind  knowing  itself,  but  as  the 
self,  the  ego,  knowing  that  it  is  itself  that  knows. 
The  formula  of  consciousness  is  not,  “  I  know  that 
I  know,”  but,  “  I  know  that  it  is  I  that  know.” 
Having  thus  defined  consciousness,  he  defines  con¬ 
science  to  be  it  in  the  department  of  morals  ;  that 
is,  conscience  is  the  mind  itself  knowing  itself  as 
the  subject  of  moral  apprehensions,  of  self-appro¬ 
bation  or  of  guilt  and  remorse,  according  as  there 
is  in  consciousness  right  or  wrong  emotions  and 
affections.  With  great  deference  to  the  high  au¬ 
thority  holding  these  views  (if  we  have  rightly 
apprehended  and  fairly  represented  them),  we  are 
obliged  to  say  that,  to  our  thought,  this  leaves  the 
term  conscience  well-nigh  useless,  and  fails  to  give 
the  faculty  due  prominence  and  distinctness. 

Our  preference  is  very  decidedly  in  favor  of 
attaching  to  the  term  conscience  the  meaning 
given  to  it  in  common  parlance.  With  or  without 
definition,  we  mean  the  man  himself;  as  intellect, 
apprehending  moral  qualities  and  pronouncing 
moral  judgments  ;  as  sensibility,  impelling  toward 
duty,  restraining  from  crime,  rewarding  virtue,  and 
punishing  vice. 

II.  FUNCTIONS. 

The  functions  of  conscience  may  be  distin¬ 
guished  as  discriminating,  impulsive,  and  retrib- 


CONSCIENCE. 


41 


utive.  As  we  have  now  passed  over  the  region 
of  speculation,  and  have  discussed  the  more  ab¬ 
struse  and  difficult  ethical  questions,  we  must  at 
the  expense  of  some  slight  repetitions  discuss 
these  functions  with  special  distinctness  and  defi¬ 
niteness  ;  and, 

First,  of  the  discriminating  faculty. 

We  commence  at  the  beginnings  of  mental  phe¬ 
nomena.  Perceptions,  with  pure  intuition,  present 
the  percepts  and  concepts  we  have  of  the  material 
world.  Memory  and  imagination  represent  them. 
The  inner  sense  or  consciousness  gives  us  the 
apprehensions  we  have  of  mental  phenomena  and, 
with  intuition,  what  we  know  of  mind  itself.  Com¬ 
parison,  abstraction,  and  reasoning,  with  pure  intu¬ 
ition,  elaborate  these  apprehensions  of  the  material 
and  the  mental  into  all  the  various  conceptions  of 
which  pure  intellect  is  capable.  When  these  con¬ 
ceptions,  or  any  of  them,  are  of  a  nature  to  affect 
the  sensibility — that  is,  to  produce  emotions  and 
desires,  and  suggest  some  course  of  action  with 
reference  to  them — the  sensibility,  with  aesthetic 
intuition,  gives  rise  to  an  apprehension  of  a  good 
to  be  secured  by  the  course  of  action  proposed. 

Thus,  the  intellect  and  sensibility  combined 
may  be  said  to  present  to  the  will  an  occasion  for 
the  exercise  of  choice.  The  will  is  to  determine 
whether  it  will  adopt  or  reject  the  proposed  course 
of  action. 


42 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


At  this  point  we  must  not  fail  to  remind  our¬ 
selves  that  the  will  is  the  man  himself.  Here  we 
find  personality  ;  a  being  capable  not  only  of  the 
above  mentioned  antecedent  intellections,  emotions, 
and  desires  ;  capable  of  apprehending  this  diversity 
of  objects,  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  con¬ 
duct  proposed ;  but  also  a  being  endowed  with 
power  to  choose,  with  freedom  both  to  and  from 
the  proposed  action.  And  now  we  have  to  add 
one  other  element ;  namely,  that  in  these  presen¬ 
tations  of  intellect  and  sensibility  combined  there 
be  a  distinct  apprehension  that  in  the  proposed 
action  there  is  a  greater  good  than  in  its  opposite. 

Under  these  conditions  the  moral  intuition  gives 
rise  to  the  idea  of  obligation.  In  other  words,  the 
conscience,  the  mind,  the  man,  discriminates  be¬ 
tween  duty  and  its  contrary  ;  he  determines  what 
he  ought  to  do  ;  he  perceives  a  moral  quality  in 
the  action  proposed. 

The  reader  can  not  fail  to  see  that  this  is  the 
precise  point  where  the  controversy  respecting 
the  ground  of  obligation  comes  in.  Is  the  good, 
or  the  right,  the  sole  primary  and  ultimate  ground 
of  obligation  ?  if  one  be  primary  and  the  other 
secondary,  which  is  which  ?  or  may  they  both  be 
co-ordinate,  contemporaneous,  and  inseparable  ? 

That  the  idea  of  right,  using  the  word  in  the 
most  common  acceptation,  is  involved  in  the  idea 
of  obligation,  can  not  be  questioned.  If  the  right 


CONSCIENCE. 


43 


be  an  abstract  eternal  principle,  or  an  ultimate 
separate  and  single  quality  of  actions,  then  it  is 
plain  that  the  moral  intuition  is  a  power  of  perceiv¬ 
ing  that  principle  or  that  quality,  and  by  a  slight 
liberty  in  the  use  of  words  might  be  called  a  moral 
instinct ;  though,  as  objected  above,  the  term  in¬ 
stinct  is  too  exclusive  of  the  rational  to  be  properly 
used  in  this  connection.  Perhaps,  after  all,  when 
human  science  shall  have  mastered  this  difficult 
problem  more  perfectly,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
right  and  the  good  are  co-ordinate  grounds  of  ob¬ 
ligation.  Whether  holiness  be  for  the  sake  of 
happiness,  or  whether  happiness  be  an  accident 
of  holiness,  we  know  they  are  inseparably  con¬ 
nected.  Perhaps  they  are  eternally  co-ordinate. 

The  apprehension  of  obligation  to  pursue  any 
given  course  of  conduct  arises  out  of  a  conception 
that  that  course  of  conduct  will  be  productive  of 
good.  This  involves,  or  is,  an  expectation  of  re¬ 
sults.  Hence,  in  all  cases  where  moral  obliga¬ 
tion  is  apprehended  we  find  there  is  in  the  pos¬ 
session  of  the  mind  such  an  expectation,  and  that 
that  expectation  is  conceived  as  a  matter  of  inva¬ 
riable  certainty ;  that  is  to  say,  law  is  perceived — a 
certain  and  invariable  connection  between  the  moral 
quality  of  actions  and  its  results.  Let  the  distinc¬ 
tion  between  natural  and  moral  results  be  here  dis¬ 
tinguished.  Two  men  make  the  same  false  state¬ 
ment,  one  believing  it  true,  the  other  knowing  that 


44 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


it  is  false.  The  falseness  of  the  statement  has  its 
natural  result ;  namely,  the  deception  of  the  hearer, 
and  this  is  common  to  both  ;  but  in  the  latter  case 
there  is  a  moral  quality  involved  in  the  intention  to 
deceive,  and  from  this  there  results  self-condemna¬ 
tion  and  the  censure  of  all  who  have  knowledge  of 
that  intention.  In  like  manner,  universally  in  mor¬ 
als,  there  is  this  recognition  of  law,  found  in  this 
expectation  of  results ;  and  connected  with  this, 
inseparable  from  it,  and  in  part  involved  in  it,  are 
the  common  ideas  of  responsibility,  merit,  demerit, 
promised  reward,  and  threatened  punishment. 

Second,  the  impulsive  power  of  conscience. 

The  word  obligation  itself  expresses  to  all 
minds  some  degree  of  impulse  or  feeling;  and  to 
the  common  apprehension,  as  I  think,  the  impulse 
is  the  chief  thing  intended  by  the  term.  We  sel¬ 
dom  speak  of  the  conception  of  obligation  or  duty, 
but  most  generally  say  we  have  a  sense  of  duty,  a 
feeling  of  obligation.  We  say  we  feel  we  ought 
to  do  thus  and  thus.  Of  course  the  intellectual 
apprehension  is  antecedent  to  the  emotion,  but  the 
latter  follows  the  former  in  such  quick  succession 
that  no  distinction  of  time  is  cognizable  in  con¬ 
sciousness,  and  the  feeling  is  that  that  is  chiefly 
cognized. 

The  conditions,  then,  occurring  on  which  ideas 
of  personality,  freedom,  causation,  duty,  obligation, 
responsibility,  merit,  demerit,  reward,  and  punish- 


CONSCIENCE. 


45 


ment  arise,  there  instantly  arises  an  impulse  in  the 
sensibility  which  we  express  in  English  by  the 
terms  ought  and  ought  not.  Every  man  knows 
what  this  feeling  is — it  is  simple,  unique,  and  dis¬ 
tinctly  separate  ;  it  is  known  only  by  experience, 
and  can  not  be  logically  defined.  By  it  man  is 
impelled  towards  action ;  he  is  not  compelled  to 
act ;  it  is  an  zwpulsion,  not  a  expulsion.  It  may 
be  at  once  both  impulse  and  restraint ;  it  may  be 
considered  as  either  an  impulse  towards  duty  or  a 
restraint  from  the  contrary;  it  may  be  antagonized 
or  favored  by  impulses  not  belonging  to  itself  ; 
the  appetites,  passions  and  desires  may  favor  or 
oppose.  Happy  the  man  whose  appetites,  desires, 
and  all  that  is  in  him,  harmonize  with  his  convic¬ 
tions  of  duty  and  impulses  towards  it ! 

It  is  by  the  impulsive  power  of  conscience  that 
its  presence  is  most  distinctly  cognized  in  con¬ 
sciousness.  Other  impulses  may  antagonize  each 
other,  as  when  avarice  conflicts  with  appetite,  but 
conscience  being  absent,  the  contest  dwindles  into 
insignificance,  the  strongest  impulse  prevails,  and 
the  man  becomes  the  willing  slave  of  the  prevail¬ 
ing  impulse.  But  when  conscience  is  in  opposing 
contact  with  appetite,  passion,  desire,  or  self-love, 
strength  of  impulse  is  of  little  or  no  account ; 
authority  utters  its  commands  and  there  is  no 
peaceful  response  but  obedience ;  though  opposi¬ 
tion  be  powerful  and  persistent,  there  is  no  sur- 


4  6 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


cease ;  conscience  will  not  cowardly  retire,  but 
in  perfect  self-possession  holds  the  position  of 
authoritative  requirement,  and  effectually  secures 
accordance  or  promptly  executes  penalty.  The 
discriminating  function  of  conscience  may  be  per¬ 
formed  in  cool  deliberation,  its  intuitive  cognitions 
and  resultant  judgments  may  be  proclaimed  with 
unimpassioned  voices ;  before  consciousness  be¬ 
comes  distinctly  cognizant  of  the  process,  sensibil¬ 
ity  is  awakened,  and  then  the  authoritative  ought 
or  ought  not  takes  its  place  of  power,  and  holds  the 
man  firmly  and  steadily  to  his  responsibility.  Here 
more  than  anywhere  man  recognizes  his  person¬ 
ality,  knows  himself  as  a  moral  being,  as  having  a 
moral  nature,  as  determining  by  his  own  free, 
unconstrained  volitions  the  question  of  his  char¬ 
acter  and  through  this  the  question  of  his  destiny. 

Third,  the  retributive  power  of  conscience. 
When  will  has  made  its  choice,  the  morality  of 
the  case,  so  far  as  the  agent,  is  concerned,  has 
transpired,  is  decided.  If  we  may  not  say  that 
the  executive  nisus ,  the  exertion  of  the  power 
of  will  in  action  takes  place  necessarily,  we  may 
say  it  takes  place  as  a  matter  of  course.  In  all 
cases  where  the  choice  is  for  immediate  action, 
and  the  action  be  possible,  it  follows  instanter,  im¬ 
mediately  successive  to  the  act  of  choice.  But  a 
man  may  determine  to-day  what  he  will  do  to-mor¬ 
row.  Again,  he  may  choose,  may  decide  to  do, 


CONSCIENCE. 


47 


what  he  may  find  on  trial  he  has  no  power  to  do. 
In  all  cases,  whether  the  act  be  performed  or  not, 
the  agent’s  responsibility  for  the  moral  character 
of  the  act  is  found  in  his  choice,  and  is  determined 
by  the  end  he  proposes  or  the  motive  in  view  of 
which  he  made  his  choice.  The  act  being  per¬ 
formed  actually  in  action,  or  virtually  in  choice, 
results  in  consciousness  follow  sooner  or  later. 
Memory,  or  the  mind’s  retentiveness,  holds  the 
deed  in  view,  and  from  the  retributive  power  of 
conscience  there  arises  self-approbation  in  case 
of  well-doing,  or  condemnation,  remorse,  in  case 
of  ill-doing. 

Feelings  of  approval  or  remorse  are  not  acci¬ 
dents  of  education  ;  they  arise  in  the  mind  neces¬ 
sarily,  because  man  is  a  rational,  sentient,  and 
moral  being.  A  man  who  is  incapable  of  these  is 
idiotic  or  insane,  or  he  has  so  abused  his  moral 
nature  that  he  has  become  brutish  or  diabolical. 
Human  nature  that  is  normal,  or  maintains  any 
appreciable  approximation  to  a  normal  condition, 
becomes  more  or  less  conscious  of  the  convictions 
and  impulses  which  we  herein  ascribe  to  conscience 
or  man’s  moral  nature ;  no  man  can  avoid  them, 
they  belong  to  his  constitution,  as  it  is  by  crea¬ 
tion.  Self-approval,  since  it  assures  of  divine  ap¬ 
probation  and  all  blessings  accruing  from  the  di¬ 
vine  favor,  and  also  assures  of  approbation  from 
our  fellow-men,  yields  the  highest  pleasure  man 


48 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


enjoys ;  and  remorse,  for  a  similar  opposite  rea¬ 
son,  gives  the  severest  pain  man  can  suffer.  The 
pleasures  and  pains  which  constitute  the  retri¬ 
butions  of  conscience  demonstrate  the  existence 
of  a  moral  nature  in  man  beyond  the  possibility 
of  reasonable  doubt,  as  do  also  the  convictions  of 
the  discriminating  faculty  and  the  authoritative 
mandates  of  the  impulsive.  But  objections  have 
been  made  to  the  affirmation  that  man  is,  by  na¬ 
ture,  a  moral  being,  and  it  has  been  affirmed  that 
concience  is  a  creature  of  education  ;  hence,  it  is 
needful  that  these  objections  and  this  affirma¬ 
tion  be  noticed,  which  we  proceed  to  do  under 
another  section. 

III.  EXISTENCE  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

When  it  is  admitted  that  men  do  discriminate 
between  right  and  wrong,  that  they  feel  impulses 
which  they  express  by  the  terms  ought  and  ought 
not,  and  that  they  have  opinions  and  sentiments  of 
approval  and  disapproval ;  and  when  conscience  is 
defined  to  be  that  faculty  or  a  combination  of  fac¬ 
ulties  by  which  man  is  capable  of  such  discriminat¬ 
ing  impulsive  and  retributive  convictions  and  emo¬ 
tions,  it  would  seem  that  all  controversy  about  the 
existence  of  conscience  is  precluded.  Man  natu¬ 
rally  performs  certain  functions  ;  this  is  admitted 
matter  of  fact.  The  fact  that  he  performs  them  is 
proof  that  he  has  the  power  of  doing  so ;  that 


CONSCIENCE. 


49 


power  we  call  conscience — this  is,  of  course,  saying 
there  is  a  conscience. 

The  controversy  on  the  question,  “  Is  there 
a  conscience  ?”  arose  from  a  stand-point  different 
from  the  above.  Conscience  was  regarded  as  a 
sort  of  instinct,  infallibly  indicating  what  is  ab¬ 
stractly  right  or  wrong,  just  as  a  chemical  test 
indicates  the  presence  of  an  acid  or  an  alkali, 
turning  always  towards  the  abstract  right,  just  as 
the  needle  turns  towards  the  pole.  All  implanted 
principles  were  regarded  as  instinctive  ;  thus  ma¬ 
ternal  love  was  regarded  as  a  blind  instinct,  impell¬ 
ing  the  mother  to  act  irrespective  of  all  rational 
thought.  Dr.  Franklin,  because  his  mother,  not 
recognizing  him  after  long  absence,  refused  on  a 
cold,  stormy  Winter  night  to  entertain  him  at  her 
house,  declared  that  he  had  demonstrated  that 
there  was  no  such  thing  as  natural  affection.  Now 
it  is  plain  that  he  had  demonstrated  that  maternal! 
love  is  not  such  as  will  tell  a  mother  who  her  son 
is  when  she  has  no  other  means  of  knowing ;  but 
he  did  not  demonstrate  that  when  a  mother  knows 
her  son,  it  is  not  natural  for  her  to  regard  him,  on 
this  sole  account,  as  she  would  not  regard  him  if 
he  was  not  her  son.  To  affirm  that  man  has  a 
moral  nature,.  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a 
natural  conscience,  is  not  to  affirm  that  that  moral 
nature  is  a  blind  instinct  acting  irrespective  of  the 
intellect.  All  moral  impulses  are  awakened  by 


50  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

antecedent  intellections — the  moral  nature  includes 
intellect,  sensibility,  and  will. 

OBJECTIONS. 

The  objections  against  the  doctrine  of  a  nat¬ 
ural  conscience  and  the  arguments  for  the  affirma¬ 
tion  that  conscience  is  a  creature  of  education 
are  one  and  the  same,  and  are  urged  against  the 
existence  of  a  moral  nature  in  any  and  every 
phase  of  it  in  which  it  is  or  has  been  affirmed. 

It  is  said,  if  there  were  any  such  thing  as  a 
natural  conscience,  then  all  men  would  possess 
it,  and  all  moral  decisions  would  agree;  but  men 
differ  in  their  moral  judgments  and  impulses. 
What  one  nation  considers  right  another  con¬ 
siders  wrong ;  therefore,  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  natural  conscience.  We  reply,  the  argument 
admits  that  all  men  make  a  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong;  therefore,  they  have  the  power 
to  do  so,  and  the  alleged  difference  must  be  ac¬ 
counted  for  in  some  other  way  than  by  denying 
the  existence  of  that  power.  Again,  when  the 
ends  of  action  or  motives  to  it  are  taken  into 
account,  the  alleged  difference  disappears.  No 
man  ever  thought  it  right  to  intend  an  injury,  or 
wrong  to  intend  a  kindness.  Again,  when  men 
perform  actions  which  are  manifestly  wrong,  be¬ 
lieving  that  they  are  right,  they  do  so  for  reasons 
which,  if  true,  would  make  tthem  right,  showing 


CONSCIENCE.  5 1 

that  the  difference  is  in  the  conditions  of  the 
case,  and  not  in  the  indications  of  the  conscience. 
Men  agree  or  differ  in  their  decisions  of  questions 
of  virtue  and  vice  in  the  same  way  they  agree  or 
differ  in  their  decisions  of  questions  of  truth  and 
error.  Ask  an  ancient  which  of  the  two  moves, 
the  earth  or  the  sun,  in  the  diurnal  revolutions, 
and  he  would  say  the  sun.  Ask  a  modern  the 
same  question,  and  he  would  say  the  earth.  One 
judges  in  view  of  appearances,  and  the  other  in 
view  of  astronomical  observations  ;  but  let  both 
judge  in  view  of  the  same  things,  and  their  deci¬ 
sions  will  agree.  The  fundamental  principles  of 
virtue  are  the  same  every-where  and  always,  and 
not  unfrequently  they  assert  themselves  against 
great  odds.  In  spite  of  prevailing  custom,  popu¬ 
lar  opinion,  civil  enactments,  and  even  religious 
creeds  and  ceremonies,  men  and  women  have 
maintained  their  convictions  of  duty  unto  the 
death,  and  martyrdoms  are  suffered  usually  in 
defense  of  the  right. 

Again  :  it  is  said,  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine 
of  natural  conscience,  that  men  violate  every  obli¬ 
gation  of  virtue  without  remorse.  To  this  we 
reply,  If  such  a  monster  could  be  found,  who  could 
remorselessly  violate  every  obligation,  his  exist¬ 
ence  would  no  more  prove  that  man  is  not  a  moral 
being  than  the  existence  of  idiots  and  insane  per¬ 
sons  prove  that  man  is  not  a  rational  being.  That 


52 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


men  of  apparently  average  character  do  sometimes 
without  remorse  violate  some  of  the  obligations  of 
virtue  proves  defectiveness  of  conscience,  but  not 
its  non-existence.  All  men  whose  character  is 
worthy  to  be  considered  as  exponential  of  human 
nature  do  respect  some  virtues,  detest  some  vices ; 
do  approve  in  themselves  and  others  the  practice 
of  some  of  the  virtues,  and  condemn  themselves 
and  censure  others  for  the  practice  of  some  of  the 
vices.  They  have  a  conscience,  though  it  may  be 
defective. 

Again  :  it  is  claimed  that  the  existence  of  a 
natural  conscience  is  useless,  since  all  we  have  to 
do  is  to  violate  it  as  we  please,  and  then  suffer  its 
penalties.  This  objection  supposes  that  the  utility 
of  conscience  depends  upon  its  being  compulsory, 
when  it  is  manifest  that  freedom  is  one  of  the 
essential  conditions  of  its  existence. 

That  conscience  is  not  a  creature  of  education, 
we  aver,  is  evident  from  what  we  affirm  to  be  fact  ; 
namely,  it  is  not  conceivable  that  a  human  being 
can  be  so  educated  as  that  he  would  approve  him¬ 
self,  and  think  that  he  deserved  the  approval  of 
others,  for  intending  to  do  his  neighbor  an  injury ; 
nor  could  he  be  so  educated  as  to  be  made  to  be¬ 
lieve  that  he  deserved  the  censure  of  himself  and 
others  for  intending  a  kindness.  The  fact  is  that, 
in  all  these  cases  of  difference  in  moral  judgments 
and  practices,  education  has  to  do  with  the  making 


CONSCIENCE. 


53 


up  of  the  case,  with  the  intellectual  apprehensions 
of  the  conditions  of  the  case.  The  sources  of  in¬ 
formation  being  different,  the  information  itself  is 
different,  and  the  judgments  are  judgments  of  dif¬ 
ferent  cases.  Moreover,  in  most,  if  not  in  all. 
cases  where  the  moral  judgment  is  an  approval 
of  an  immoral  act,  the  evil  is  so  coupled  with  the 
good  as  to  make  out  a  case  of  an  overbalance  of 
good,  and  the  approval  is  based  on  that  surplusage 
of  supposed  good  ;  the  means  employed  and  ap¬ 
proved  are,  in  the  decisions  of  the  intellect,  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  good  sought,  and  it  is  the  security 
of  that  good  that  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  ap¬ 
proval.  If,  therefore,  there  be  any  cases  in  which 
any  thing  but  the  good  obligates  the  conscience, 
the  case  is  abnormal,  exceptional,  and  not  at  all 
determinative  of  what  is  man’s  normal  nature. 

IV.  AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

Is  it  asked  whether  conscience  be  infallible,  so 
that  if  a  man  be  strictly  conscientious,  and  always 
obeys  the  dictates  of  his  conscience  he  will  invari¬ 
ably  do  right?  the  answer  is  an  emphatic  no.  On 
this  there  is  no  dispute  ;  all  concede  that  a  man 
may  be,  and  that  all  men  at  some  time  are,  con¬ 
scientious  in  error,  and  as  a  consequence  do  with 
self-approval  what  ought  not  to  be  done.  Even 
Paul,  the  great  and  good,  a  model  of  conscien¬ 
tiousness,  said  of  himself  on  one  occasion,  “  I 


54 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


know  nothing  of  myself,  yet  am  I  not  thereby 
justified :  it  is  God  that  judgeth.”  That  is,  he 
was  conscientious,  he  was  self-approved  ;  but  that 
did  not  prove  that  his  conduct  fulfilled  the  law  of 
abstract  righteousness — God  only  could  know  that. 

Is  it  asked,  Is  a  man  obligated  always  to  obey 
his  conscience  ?  ought  he  to  do  invariably  what 
his  conscience  dictates  ?  the  answer  is  a  most 
emphatic  yes. 

For  what  is  conscience?  what  is  it  that  a  man 
does  when  he  obeys  his  conscience?  Plainly,  he 
does  what  he  thinks  and  feels  it  his  duty  to  do. 
What  else  can  he  do,  and  be  approved  either  by 
himself  or  others,  than  to  do  what  his  judgment 
tells  him  he  ought  to  do,  and  what  his  sense  of 
obligation  prompts  him  to  do  ?  But  it  is  said  his 
knowledge  of  the  facts  in  a  given  case  may  be 
imperfect,  incomplete  ;  his  judgment  may  be  per¬ 
verted,  biased  by  the  prejudices  of  education,  so 
that  he  thinks  it  his  duty  to  do  what,  were  he 
better  informed,  were  he  free  from  prejudice,  he 
would  clearly  see  he  ought  not  to  do.  Conscience 
prompts  him  to  do  what  is  in  violation  of  the  law 
of  righteousness  ;  must  he  do  it  ?  Most  certainly. 
Of  course  his  antecedent  obligations  bound  him  to 
inform  himself  to  the  extent  of  his  ability  and  op¬ 
portunity,  and  also  to  educate  his  conscience  to 
the  same  extent.  If  he  have  neglected  to  do  so, 
his  sin  lies  at  the  door  of  that  antecedent  neglect. 


CONSCIENCE. 


55 


But  now,  whether  by  a  rigid  self-education  his 
conscience  is  quick  as  the  apple  of  an  eye,  and 
his  intellect  be  fully  informed  of  all  the  facts  and 
principles  involved  in  the  case ;  or  whether  by  past 
neglect  his  conscience  is  seared,  his  judgment  per¬ 
verted,  and  his  intelligence  ill-informed, — in  either 
case,  and  in  all  cases,  he  has  nothing  left  but  to 
follow  the  best  judgment  he  has,  and  do  as  he 
now  feels  he  ought  to  do. 

Whatever  be  the  end  of  human  existence, 
whether  it  be  holiness  or  happiness,  or  both ; 
whatever  be  the  ground  of  moral  obligation, 
whether  the  right  or  the  good,  or  both, — that  end 
will  be  better  secured  by  obedience  to  conscience 
than  by  obedience  to  any  other  impulse.  Suppose 
happiness  the  end  of  being.  Now,  if  a  man  follow 
appetite,  his  pleasure  terminates  with  the  gratifi¬ 
cations  of  the  present  moment ;  if  he  follow  self- 
love,  his  good  terminates  on  himself;  but  if  he 
follow  conscience  he  secures  all  the  good  there  is 
in  the  gratification  of  appetite,  all  there  is  in  the 
ends  of  self-love,  with  the  added  pleasures  of  vir¬ 
tue,  the  blessedness  of  a  mind  conscious  to  itself 
of  right.  Suppose  holiness  the  end  of  being,  what 
higher  idea  of  holiness  in  imperfect  beings  can 
there  be  than  undeviating  obedience  to  moral  obli¬ 
gation  in  the  highest  sense  the  agent  is  capable 
of  conceiving  that  obligation,  or,  in  other  words, 
obedience  to  the  present  dictates  of  conscience  ? 


56 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


Does  any  one  say  authority  is  man’s  guide — that 
especially  the  uninformed  are  to  do  as  instructed  by 
their  teachers  ?  we  reply,  There  is  no  infallible  pope, 
there  are  no  infallible  teachers,  upon  whom  to  rely  ; 
and  man  can  not  so  easily  shift  from  himself  his  own 
moral  responsibilities.  Instruction  is  to  be  sought, 
and  the  services  of  teachers  secured,  as  means  of 
qualifying  ourselves  to  judge  for  ourselves.  Does 
any  one  say  the  Bible  is  man’s  guide?  I  answer 
as  before,  The  Bible  is  an  instrument  of  instruc¬ 
tion  and  education ;  by  it  the  good  man  is  fur¬ 
nished  unto  every  good  work,  because  it  qualifies 
him  to  judge  correctly  what  is  duty  and  what  is  sin. 

But  some  one  will  ask,  Suppose  a  strictly  con¬ 
scientious  person,  one  who  has  faithfully  employed 
all  the  means  of  moral  and  religious  instruction 
providentially  within  his  reach,  should  have  a  relig¬ 
ious  conviction  of  duty  to  do  a  wrong  thing  —  as, 
for  example,  a  Hindoo  mother  religiously  impressed 
that  it  is  her  duty  to  sacrifice  her  child  by  throw 
ing  it  in  the  Ganges  to  be  devoured  by  crocodiles — 
is  that  person  a  sinner,  guilty  of  disobedience  to 
God,  if  he  refuse?  We  answer,  first,  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  case  is  supposable  ;  it  is 
doubtful  whether  God  will  permit  a  strictly  con¬ 
scientious  person  to  be  so  deceived.  But,  sec¬ 
ondly,  suppose  the  case  possible  and  actual,  we 
answer,  first,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  a  person 
so  deceived  is  morally  responsible,  so  that  whether 


CONSCIENCE. 


57 


he  obey  or  refuse  there  is  no  moral  character  at¬ 
tached  to  his  conduct;  and,  secondly,  if  he  be 
morally  responsible  he  must  obey  his  conscience 
or  he  is  guilty.  If  the  Hindoo  mother  refuse,  for 
the  gratification  of  maternal  affection,  to  obey  her 
convictions  of  duty  to  God,  she  is  guilty.  We 
must  say  this,  or  we  must  say  that  Abraham  was 
in  heart  guilty  of  murder  when  he  purposed  and 
prepared  to  sacrifice  Isaac  in  obedience  to  what  he 
believed  to  be  a  command  of  God. 


CHAPTER  III. 


Virtue. 

We  have  seen  that  the  terms  virtue  and  vice, 
holiness  and  sin,  righteousness  and  unrighteous¬ 
ness  are  employed  in  two  general  senses ;  one 
applied  to  conduct  and  the  other  to  character. 
We  speak  of  virtuous  and  vicious,  holy  and  sinful, 
righteous  and  unrighteous  acts,  and  we  also  apply 
these  qualifying  terms  to  the  word  person  or  per¬ 
sons.  We  have  also  seen  that  in  all  questions  of 
moral  science  we  have  to  do  with  the  former,  since 
all  obligation  and  responsibility  relate  primarily  to 
actions.  Man  is  responsible  for  what  he  does 
and  not  for  what  he  is,  any  further  than  his  char¬ 
acter  is  the  result  of  his  own  voluntary  action ; 
and,  in  this  case,  the  responsibility  rests  upon 
those  antecedent  acts  which  caused  his  character 
to  be  what  it  is.  We  have  also  seen  that  the 
actions  which  involve  moral  responsibility  are  acts 
of  an  intelligent  sentient  being  endowed  with  free 
will,  and  that  they  are  always  acts  of  choice . 

We  come  now  to  inquire  as  to  the  nature  of 
58 


VIRTUE. 


59 


virtue,  which  is  the  same  as  to  inquire,  What  is 
the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  those  acts  of 
choice  which  obligate  the  conscience  ;  which  ought 
to  be,  which  are  right  or  righteous,  good  or  holy  ? 
Here  the  old  metaphysical  speculations,  discus¬ 
sions,  and  controversies  respecting  the  ground  of 
obligation  come  in  to  trouble  us,  and  they  make 
difficult  and  obscure  what  it  would  seem  ought  to 
be  the  plainest  of  all  moral  questions  ;  but  these 
deep  waters  are  now  before  us,  and  we  have 
nothing  else  to  do  but  plunge  in,  wade  or  swim 
if  we  can,  drown  if  we  must. 

If  the  ground  of  obligation  be  the  declared  will 
of  God,  then  virtue  is  obedience  to  God’s  will — 
it  is  volitionating  to  do,  and  doing  what  God  has 
commanded.  If  the  ground  of  obligation  be  an  * 
eternal  principle  of  right,  then  virtue  is  choosing 
and  doing  in  accordance  with  that  principle.  If 
there  be  an  eternal  fitness  of  things,  and  obliga¬ 
tion  naturally  and  necessarily  arises  out  of  the 
relations  intelligent  and  sentient  beings  sustain  to 
each  other,  then  virtue  is  choosing  and  doing  in 
accordance  with  those  relations  or  choosing  and 
doing  what  those  relations  intuitively  indicate  ought 
to  be  done. 

I.  RIGHT  AND  WRONG - INNOCENCE  AND  GUILT. 

If  either  of  the  above  theories  be  adopted, 
then  a  distinction  between  right  and  innocence, 


6o 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


wrong  and  guilt  is  to  be  made.  Right  and  virtue 
would  be  synonymous  terms  in  the  sense  of  the 
definitions  of  virtue  given  above,  and  would  apply 
solely  to  the  acts  of  choosing  and  doing,  abstractly 
considered.  The  same  would  be  true  of  vice  and 
wrong ;  but  the  terms  innocence  and  guilt  would 
signify  what  may  be  predicated  of  the  agent,  and 
would  depend  upon  the  agent’s  intentions,  so  that 
a  man  might  do  a  right  act  and  still  be  a  guilty 
person,  as  in  the  case  of  the  unjust  judge ;  he 
avenged  the  widow  which  was  an  act  correspond¬ 
ing  with  his  relations  to  her,  a  thing  he  ought  to 
do,  and  in  that  sense  a  right  act ;  but  he  did  it 
from  a  selfish  motive,  he  did  it  to  avoid  the  annoy¬ 
ance  of  her  persistent  importunities.  But  it  may 
be  said  the  judge  did  not  do  the  act  commanded, 
for  he  was  commanded  to  avenge  the  oppressed 
with  proper  motives.  This  vitiates  the  definitions 
and  makes  the  end  proposed  a  part  of  the  act. 
It  is  quite  clear  that  many  actions  have  no  moral 
character ;  at  least  quite  clear  that  the  external 
act,  considered  apart  from  the  intentions  of  the 
agent,  has  none.  The  giving  of  money  by  one 
person  to  another,  considered  in  itself,  is  morally 
nothing ;  if,  however,  it  be  in  payment  of  an  hon¬ 
est  debt,  it  is  an  act  of  justice ;  if  as  a  donation 
to  the  deserving  poor,  an  act  of  charity  ;  if  it  be 
the  wages  of  a  ruffian  to  secure  the  death  of  an 
enemy,  it  is  an  act  of  murder ;  if  to  secure  the 


VIRTUE. 


61 

destruction  of  one’s  country,  it  is  an  act  of  trea¬ 
son.  Plainly,  the  moral  quality  of  the  act  here 
depends  upon  the  intentions  of  the  agent.  Is  it 
always  so?  You  may  say  it  is  always  right  for  a 
man  to  wish  well  to  his  neighbor ;  but,  we  ask, 
is  it  virtuous  when  he  indulges  good  will,  really 
chooses,  desires  that  his  neighbor  may  prosper, 
and  does  so  for  a  selfish  purpose,  as  when  he  does 
so  that  his  neighbor  may  be  able  to  confer  favors 
upon  him  ?  If  you  say  no,  I  see  not  to  the  con¬ 
trary  but  that  the  controversy  is  ended,  and  it  is 
conceded  that  the  moral  quality  of  an  action  de¬ 
pends  upon  the  choice  of  an  end  for  its  own  sake . 
Virtue,  then,  involves  the  choosing  of  a  good  that 
is  a  good  in  itself,  good  for  nothing  beyond  itself; 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  virtuous  act  performed 
with  a  vicious  motive  ;  no  such  thing  as  a  man’s 
doing  a  right  act  and  being  a  guilty  person. 
When  a  murderer,  intending  to  take  your  life, 
plunges  a  dagger  into  your  person,  and  by  chance 
opens  an  abscess,  and  thus  saves  your  life,  he 
does  a  good  thing  with  a  murderous  intent ;  but 
it  is  not  morally  good  in  any  sense  whatever.  Dr. 
Wayland  says  “The  moral  quality  of  the  action 
resides  in  the  intention;”  and  again  he  says, 
“Right  and  wrong  depend  upon  the  relations 
under  which  beings  are  created,  and  hence  the 
obligations  resulting  from  these  relations  are,  in 
their  nature,  fixed  and  unchangeable.  Guilt  and 


6  2 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


innocence  depend  upon  the  knowledge  of  these 
relations,  and  of  the  obligations  arising  from  them. 
As  these  are  manifestly  susceptible  of  variation, 
while  right  and  wrong  are  invariable,  the  two  no¬ 
tions  may  manifestly  not  always  correspond  to  each 
other.  A  man  may  do  what  is  actually  right,  but 
without  a  desire  to  fulfill  the  obligation  of  which 
he  is  conscious  he  is  held  to  be  guilty.”  Is  this 
scientifically  correct?  is  that  which  a  man  does 
without  a  desire  to  fulfill  his  obligations  “actually 
right?”  does  not  the  agent’s  desire  and  intent 
enter  as  an  integral  part  of  every  moral  act  ?  A 
man  may  do  what  accords  with  his  relations,  what 
is  productive  of  good,  and  so  far  forth  his  act 
may  be  a  good  thing ;  but  is  it  morally  good 
when  his  motives  are  vicious  or  defective  ?  Again, 
the  doctor  says,  “An  action  may  be  wrong,  but 
if  the  agent  have  no  means  of  knowing  it  to  be 
wrong,  he  is  held  morally  guiltless  in  the  doing 
of  it ;  if  he  have  acted  according  to  the  best  of 
his  possible  knowledge  he  may  not  only  he  held 
guiltless, but  even  virtuous.”  Is  this  so?  does  not 
his  ignorance  enter  as  a  part  of  his  act,  and  so 
remove  his  act  entirely  from  the  field  of  morals  ? 
Is  an  act  done  in  ignorance  either  right  or  wrong, 
morally  considered  ?  It  may  be  beneficial  or  inju¬ 
rious,  but  can  not  be  properly  said  to  be  virtuous 
or  vicious?  All  moral  acts,  then,  are  either  blame 
or  praise  worthy ;  have  merit  or  demerit ;  are  to 


VIRTUE. 


63 


be  approved  or  condemned.  A  man  can  not  do 
what  may  properly  be  called  a  virtuous  act,  and 
in  respect  to  that  act  be  a  guilty  person.  In  like 
manner,  he  can  not  do  a  vicious  act,  and  be  vir¬ 
tuous  or  innocent. 


II.  THEORY. 

The  conditions  of  a  moral  act  are,  power,  intel¬ 
ligence,  freedom,  and  obligation.  A  moral  agent 
must  be  one  who  is  endowed  with  causative  power, 
ability  to  bring  something  to  pass.  He  must  have 
intelligence,  ability  to  comprehend  the  end  pro¬ 
posed,  and  the  means  adapted  to  accomplish  the 
end.  He  must  be  free,  both  to  and  from  the  act 
to  be  performed  ;  have  power  to  volitionate  the  act 
or  its  contrary.  And  he  must  be  conscious  of  obli¬ 
gation  ;  must  know — and,  knowing,  will  of  neces¬ 
sity  feel — he  ought  to  do  the  thing  proposed.  In 
this  we  are  speaking  of  the  act  done  considered 
as  a  whole ;  the  deed  done,  including  the  external 
muscular  act,  as  well  as  the  internal  volition  in 
choice  and  action. 

The  morality  of  the  act  is  found  wholly  in  the 
choice,  and  the  objects  of  choice  in  all  moral  acts 
are  the  ends  to  be  secured  or  promoted  by  the  act 
to  be  done ;  that  is  to  say,  the  choice  which  deter¬ 
mines  whether  the  act  be  a  virtue  or  a  crime  is 
not  the  choice  between  doing  the  external  act  and 
not  doing  it,  but  it  is  the  choice  between  the  mo- 


64 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


tives  in  view  of  which  the  agent  makes  his  choice. 
The  choice  of  motives  and  the  purpose  to  execute 
the  deed  are  not  distinguishable.  They  are  con 
temporary,  and  substantially,  in  consciousness,  one 
and  the  same.  They  determine  the  executive 
issues  and  the  external  act.  If  the  determining 
choice  be  a  virtue  it  is  a  choice  of  that  which  obli¬ 
gates  the  conscience,  that  end  or  good  which  con 
stitutes  the  ground  of  obligation. 

From  the  above  it  is  evident  that  the  pivotal 
question  in  this  whole  discussion  is,  briefly,  What 
is  the  thing  chosen  when  an  act  of  choice  is  itself 
a  virtue  ?  But  before  discussing  this  question  fur¬ 
ther  it  may  be  well  to  inquire,  Is  there  any  one 
act  of  choice  that  is  not  only  itself  a  virtue,  but  is 
so  related  to  all  that  is  virtuous  in  the  character 
and  conduct  of  the  agent  as  that  it  is  determina¬ 
tive  of  the  whole  question  of  obligation  and  re¬ 
sponsibility?  If  conversion  be  instantaneous,  if 
under  grace  a  man  may  by  one  single  act  translate 
himself  from  the  kingdom  of  darkness  to  the  king¬ 
dom  of  God’s  dear  Son,  if  by  a  single  act  a  man 
changes  himself  from  a  rebellious  transgressor  to 
an  obedient  servant,  then  this  question  is  answered 
affirmatively.  We  leave  the  provisions  of  grace, 
all  that  is  supernatural,  for  the  present,  out  of  the 
question,  and  looking  solely  at  what  is  natural  and 
philosophic,  we  shall  attempt  to  answer  both  ques¬ 
tions  at  once.  Suppose  one  engaged  in  any  em- 


VIRTUE. 


65 


ployment  you  may  please  to  choose,  say  a  student 
in  any  definite  course  of  study;  suppose  the  usual 
college  curriculum.  What  motive  prompts  his  in¬ 
dustry  and  diligence  ?  The  motive  proximate  to 
his  activities  may  be  obedience  to  the  requirements 
of  his  parents  and  teachers.  Obedience  may  have 
been  chosen,  because  he  recognized  the  right  his 
parents  and  teachers  had  to  command,  and  he  ac¬ 
knowledged  that  right  as  founded  upon  their  ability 
to  do  him  good,  and  their  disposition  to  require 
nothing  but  what  is  for  his  good.  But  the  good 
of  one  is  subordinate  to  the  good  of  the  many. 
Here  we  have  reached  the  ultimate  in  this  line  of 
thought.  The  highest  good  of  all  is  ultimate  ;  all 
below  is  subordinate.  The  proximate  motive  may 
have  been  to  qualify  himself  the  better  for  his 
after-life.  But  he  seeks  higher  qualifications  that 
his  future  labors  may  be  more  abundant  and  more 
efficient ;  and  this  that  he  may  have  the  more  ex¬ 
tensive  patronage  and  a  larger  remuneration  in 
wealth,  honor,  social  position,  and  other  advantages 
in  life.  But  still  he  seeks  these  that  he  and  those 
dependent  upon  him  may  be  happier,  may  enjoy 
higher  satisfaction.  The  good  of  the  few  is  less 
than  the  good  of  all.  Now,  here  again  we  have 
reached  the  ultimate  motive ;  all  below  is  subordi¬ 
nate.  But  we  can  find  nothing  higher,  nothing 
back  of  the  good  of  all,  to  which  it  is  subordinate, 

it  is  ultimate.  In  like  manner,  whatever  be  the 
c  5 


66  *  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

business  of  life,  whatever  be  the  motive  proximate 
to  the  activity,  in  every  case  there  may  be  an  end 
beyond  any  given  end  till  we  come  to  the  highest 
good.  All  below  is  good  for  that  above  ;  but  this 
good  is  good  in  itself,  and  no  answer  can  be  given 
to  the  question,  Why  is  it  good  ? 

Now,  it  is  evident  a  man  may  even  say  to  evil, 
Be  thou  my  good ;  or,  what  is  more  likely  to  occur, 
he  may  make  any  subordinate  his  chief  and  ulti¬ 
mate  end.  But  if  any  subordinate  end  be  chosen 
as  supreme,  or  any  desire  for  a  good  be  gratified 
beyond  the  limits  within  which  it  contributes  to 
that  which  is  higher,  obligation  is  violated.  Food 
may  be  desired,  sought  after,  obtained,  and  appro¬ 
priated,  so  far  as  it  contributes  to  the  health  of 
body  and  mind  ;  but  when  used  to  the  detriment 
of  what  is  higher  than  the  gratification  of  appetite 
this  is  sin. 

We  see,  then,  that  to  choose  the  highest  good 
of  all,  to  make  the  greatest  good  one’s  supreme 
end,  one’s  governing  motive  in  all  of  life’s  actions, 
is  itself  a  virtue,  is  that  in  which  a  virtuous  char¬ 
acter  consists,  and  so  controls  all  subordinate 
actions  as  to  make  them  virtuous.  If  a  man’s 
supreme  end  be  wealth,  he  is  avaricious ;  if  power, 
ambitious  ;  if  pleasure,  sensual ;  if  his  own  good, 
exclusive  of  the  good  of  others,  selfish ;  if  the 
good  of  all  sentient  being,  himself  included,  moral, 
benevolent,  pious. 


VIRTUE. 


67 


The  action  of  the  will  by  which  a  supreme  end 
is  chosen  is  sometimes  called  “the  immanent  pref¬ 
erence” — in  this  view  it  is  regarded  somewhat  as 
a  permanent  habit  of  mind.  It  may  be,  in  its 
beginning,  a  single,  distinctly  cognized,  instanta¬ 
neous  act ;  or  it  may  be  attained  by  a  gradual 
process,  may  be  approached  and  reached  by  a  suc¬ 
cession  of  choices.  Theology  teaches  that  it  is 
not  possible  in  any  case  except  under  grace  ;  that 
the  power  of  will  to  volitionate  such  a  choice  is  a 
gracious  bestowment ;  and  that  the  supernatural 
influences  by  which  it  becomes  a  possibility  are 
exerted  in  aid  of  the  educational  instrumentalities 
which  the  agent  employs  for  that  purpose. 

Subordinate  ends  are,  in  reference  to  ends  sub¬ 
ordinate  to  themselves,  sometimes  called  govern¬ 
ing  motives.  Thus  a  student,  pursuing  a  college 
course  may  lay  aside  his  studies  for  a  time  and 
go  into  business  for  the  acquisition  of  means  to 
further  prosecute  his  studies  :  in  such  a  case  edu¬ 
cation  is  a  governing  motive  and  money  the  sub¬ 
ordinate.  The  choice  of  a  certain  class  of  motives 
is  with  reference  to  a  governing  motive  called  a 
desultory  volition.  Thus,  a  man  forms  a  purpose 
to  journey  to  a  given  city;  on  his  way,  without 
relinquishing  his  purpose,  he  turns  aside  from  the 
direct  road  thither  and  ascends  some  eminence  to 
gain  an  extended  prospect  of  the  surrounding 
country.  To  reach  the  city  is  a  governing  motive, 


68 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


his  decision  to  ascend  the  mountain  is  a  desultory 
volition. 

Whatever  be  the  relation  of  motives  among 

♦ 

themselves  all  are  morally  characterized  by  the 
supreme  motive,  that  which  to  the  man  is  ulti¬ 
mate,  and  which  he  prefers  to  any  other  and  to 
all  others. 

III.  OBJECTIONS. 

The  affirmation  that  the  above  is  a  utilitarian, 
a  selfish  system,  has  been  sufficiently  answered  in 
preceding  pages.  Perhaps,  also,  enough  has  been 
said  of  the  affirmation  that  “the  right”  and  not 
“the  good”  is  ultimate,  and  in  all  virtuous  acts 
supreme  ;  any  way,  we  are  content  to  leave  this 
theory  by  simply  repeating,  in  substance,  what  has 
been  before  said  ;  namely,  that  if  we  may  have  an 
idea  of  an  abstract  eternal  right,  we  may  also  have 
an  idea  of  an  abstract  eternal  good.  There  may 

N. 

be  an  abstract  eternal  happiness  as  well  as  an 
abstract  eternal  holiness  ;  of  either  we  know  but 
little,  and  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny  any  thing 
very  positively.  Whether  one  or  the  other  be 
primary,  and  if  so,  which,  is  not  obvious  ;  for  aught 
we  can  know  to  the  contrary,  they  are  co-ordinate. 
When  of  any  definite  act,  purpose,  character,  or 
disposition  it  may  be  affirmed  that  it  is  right,  a 
reason  may  be  assigned  why  it  is  so  ;  but  of  the 
supreme  good  conceived  as  actual,  not  abstract 
and  eternal,  but  as  actually  existent  in  time,  no 


VIRTUE. 


6  9 


reason  can  be  assigned  why  it  is  good.  Here, 
then,  is  an  end  conceived  as  actual  which  is  ulti¬ 
mate  ;  no  other  such  end  is  known  or  conceivable, 
and  in  this  fact  is  found  a  reason  for  regarding  it 
as  the  only  end  which  may  practically  be  made  su¬ 
preme.  To  the  objection  that  virtue  does  not  con¬ 
sist  in  acts  of  choice,  but  in  character,  we  reply, 
character,  so  far  as  responsibility  extends,  is  the 
creature  of  acts  of  choice. 

It  is  objected,  again,  that  the  theory  does  not 
admit  of  degrees  in  virtue.  It  is  said  a  man  does 
or  he  does  not  choose  the  supreme  good ;  if  he 
does,  he  can  do  no  more,  and  is  therefore  per¬ 
fectly  virtuous  ;  if  he  does  not,  he  can  do  no  less, 
and  is  therefore  perfectly  vicious.  This  objection, 
in  view  of  what  is  obvious  in  religion,  deserves 
notice  and  reply. 

IV.  OF  VIRTUE  IN  IMPERFECT  BEINGS. 

The  objection  above  stated  is  made  chiefly  in 
the  interests  of  religion  ;  but  that  its  force  is  more 
in  appearance  than  in  reality  is  obvious  from  the 
fact  that  religion,  especially  the  Christian  religion, 
more  distinctly  draws  a  line  between  the  righteous 
and  the  wicked  than  is  or  can  be  drawn  in  ethics. 
Whether  a  man  be  far  off  by  wicked  works,  a 
stranger  and  an  alien  from  the  commonwealth  of 
Israel,  or  be  not  far  from  the  kingdom  of  God, 
he  is  not  in  the  kingdom  ;  and  if  one  be  in  the 


7° 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


kingdom,  whether  a  new-born  babe,  or  one  having 
attained  the  fullness  of  the  stature  of  Christ,  he  is 
a  child  of  God  and  an  heir  of  heaven.  In  the 
light  of  religion,  then,  a  man  is  or  he  is  not  a 
Christian  ;  and  no  interest  of  religion  is  periled  by 
saying  in  ethics  a  man  does  or  does  not  make 
choice  of  the  supreme  good,  and  that  his  moral 
character  is  determined  thereby  ;  that  he  is  a  vir¬ 
tuous  man  if  he  chooses  the  good,  and  a  vicious 
man  if  he  refuse  or  neglect  to  do  so. 

That  a  man  may  do  his  best,  and  yet  that  best 
be  vastly  inferior  in  itself  in  all  its  characteristics 
and  in  all  of  its  consequent  results  to  what  another 
man  may  do,  and  to  what  he  himself  at  another 
time,  and  in  other  conditions,  and  under  other  cir¬ 
cumstances  may  do,  is  too  obvious  to  admit  of  dis¬ 
cussion  ;  and  this  obvious  truth  does  not  at  all 
conflict  with  the  idea  that  his  then  best  act  may  be 
determinative  of  all  that  follows  it,  may  be  a  tran¬ 
sition  from  the  past  to  the  future,  a  crisis  in  his 
history  decisive  of  all  his  moral  relations. 

It  remains  only  to  state  in  what  respect  virtue 
may  be  imperfect — and,  after  the  above  discussion, 
we  judge  this  need  require  but  few  words. 

First,  the  discriminating  faculty  may  fail  to  per¬ 
form  its  functions  perfectly  for  several  reasons — 
the  facts  involved  in  a  question  of  conscience  may 
not  all  be  known,  and  known  facts  may  be  incor¬ 
rectly  interpreted  ;  the  case  as  presented  may  fail 


VIRTUE. 


7l 


to  affect  the  sensibility  so  as  to  awaken  a  proper 
apprehension  of  the  good  involved ;  the  moral 
intuition  may  be  feeble,  so  that  the  sense  of  obli¬ 
gation  is  different  from  what  the  truth  in  the  case 
would  require.  The  discriminations  may  be  so  at 
fault  that  the  man  may  feel  himself  obligated  to 
the  opposite  of  what  a  perfect  conscience  would 
indicate  ought  to  be  done. 

Secondly,  of  course  when  the  discrimination  is 
at  fault  the  impulse  is  towards  the  erroneous  or 
defective;  but  even  in  cases  where  the  moral  judg¬ 
ment  is  in  accordance  with  truth  the  sensibility 
may  be  so  enfeebled  that  the  impulse,  the  sense 
of  duty,  is  in  no  sense  commensurate  with  the 
interests  involved. 

Thirdly,  when  the  intellect  and  sensibility  make 
untruthful  presentations  to  the  will,  its  decisions 
are  likely  to  be  the  contrary  of  what  a  perfect 
moral  constitution  would  require,  and  when  these 
presentations  are  what  they  should  be,  the  will, 
from  a  constitutional  perverseness  or  an  habitual 
indecision,  may  fail  to  volitionate  the  choice  that 
ought  to  be  made. 

The  Bible  doctrine  of  natural  depravity  is  an 
affirmation  that  this  is  the  moral  condition  of  all 
men  destitute  of  grace,  and  it  is  the  opinion  of 
most,  if  not  all,  theologians  that  even  under  the 
provisions  of  grace  no  man  is  so  perfectly  saved 
from  these  defects  in  his  moral  constitution  as  to 


72 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


be  able  to  maintain  a  uniform  practice  of  virtue 
that  is  absolutely  perfect ;  and  the  facts  of  human 
history  abundantly  confirm  this  opinion.  All  hu¬ 
man  virtue  is  imperfect — imperfect  not  only  from 
the  necessary  limitations  of  a  finite  being,  but  also 
from  positive  defects  in  man’s  moral  constitution. 
Man  is  virtuous  relatively,  not  absolutely. 

We  say,  then,  whoever  has  a  purpose  of  right¬ 
eousness,  an  immanent  preference,  accordant  with 
the  best  light  he  has  and  correspondent  with  his 
moral  nature  as  it  is,  is  virtuous  in  the  highest 
sense  of  which  he  is  capable  in  his  then  existing 
character,  condition,  and  circumstances. 

V.  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  DEFECTS  IN  VIRTUE. 

Salvation  from  the  natural  results  of  defects  in 
virtue  and  from  the  judicial  results,  if  there  be 
any,  is  possible  only  under  the  provisions  of  grace. 
For  these  mere  philosophy  has  no  remedy;  escape, 
if  possible  at  all,  must  be  by  redemption,  the  same 
as  in  case  of  pardon  for  actual  transgressions  of 
known  and  acknowledged  law.  But  the  question 
is  asked,  Is  not  a  man  responsible  and  punishable 
for  his  failures  to  fulfill  the  law  of  absolute  right¬ 
eousness  ?  It  is  said  the  law  is  immutable,  it  can 
not  lower  its  claims  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  its 
subjects.  We  answer,  the  law  is  immutable,  in 
that  it  invariably  requires  what  is  just  and  equal ; 
but  it  does  not  invariably  require  the  same  specific 


VIRTUE. 


73 


act.  Again,  it  is  said,  much  of  man’s  inability  to 
keep  the  law  is  self-imposed,  it  is  the  consequence 
of  his  past  neglect,  his  past  sins,  and  he  is  respon¬ 
sible  for  all  the  consequences  of  his  sins.  We 
reply,  his  responsibility  to  the  full  extent  that  he 
is  responsible  rests  upon  his  past  sins  and  not 
upon  his  present  inabilities,  and  that  responsibility 
extends  not  to  all  the  consequences  thereof,  but 
only  to  those  which  he  was  reasonably  able  to 
anticipate. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Moral  Culture. 

Much  that  may  be  said  on  the  nature  and 
means  of  moral  culture  belongs  properly  to  prac¬ 
tical  rather  than  theoretical  ethics  ;  but  much  also 
belongs  as  well  to  the  latter,  and  consecutive 
thought  requires  that  this  be  discussed  in'  the 
present  connection. 

We  have  insisted  that  man  is  by  nature  a 
moral  being,  that  by  creation  he  has  a  moral  na¬ 
ture.  We  come  now  to  remark  that  this  moral 
nature  is  such  as  requires  development  by  educa¬ 
tional  processes ;  as  much  so,  and  in  the  same  way, 
as  man’s  physical  and  intellectual  natures  require 
educational  processes  for  their  development. 

I.  METHOD. 

It  is  a  general  law  of  man’s  nature,  applicable 
equally  to  the  physical,  the  intellectual,  and  the 
moral,  that  our  faculties  are  developed,  strength¬ 
ened,  and  in  every  way  improved  by  proper  use. 

The  exercise  of  any  faculty  accordant  with  the 
74 


MORAL  CULTURE. 


75 


nature  and  laws  of  that  faculty  will  increase  its 
power,  and  carry  it  forward  towards  maturity  and 
perfection.  The  abuse  or  disuse  of  any  faculty 
tends  to  weaken  its  power  and  vitiate  its  action. 

The  discriminating  faculty  will  thus  be  improved 
by  the  habit  of  inquiring,  in  reference  to  every 
proposed  enterprise  or  action,  What  good  will  come 
of  it  ?  is  it  right  ?  are  there  any  moral  obligations 
involved?  The  avaricious  man  habitually  inquires, 
What  profit  ?  what  the  prospect  of  gain  ?  The  am¬ 
bitious  man  seeks  to  know  what  increase  of  popu¬ 
larity  or  power ;  the  sensualist,  what  pleasure  is 
promised  ;  but  the  virtuous  man  inquires  chiefly, 
and  makes  all  other  inquiries  subordinate  to  this, 
What  moral  advantage  ?  what  good  is  there  in  this 
case  ?  He  acquires  this  habit  by  practice ;  and 
the  practice,  whether  induced  by  the  mandates  of 
will  or  by  the  influence  of  habit,  corrects,  quickens, 
and  strengthens  his  ability  to  distinguish  between 
the  good  and  the  evil,  between  the  right  and  the 
wrong.  Thereby  the  intellect  acquires  facility  in 
apprehending  and  interpreting  facts,  the  judgment 
gains  power  to  make  correct  decisions,  the  sensi¬ 
bility  becomes  more  intensely  sensitive  and  more 
readily  recognizes  the  good,  the  moral  intuition 
more  promptly  and  more  efficiently  cognizes  the 
obligation.  In  like  manner  the  impulsive  power 
of  conscience  is  quickened,  becomes  capable  of, 
and  gives  forth,  stronger  impulses. 


76 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


But  nowhere  does  culture  evince  itself  more  man¬ 
ifestly  than  in  the  volitionating  faculty.  Strength 
of  will,  promptly,  emphatically,  and  decisively  to  say 
to  temptation  no,  is  an  endowment  of  but  very  few, 
if  any.  This  power  is  usually  acquired,  if  ever  pos¬ 
sessed,  by  long-continued  practice.  He  who  would 
always  choose  the  good  and  refuse  the  evil  must, 
even  under  the  provisions  of  grace,  diligently  and 
vigilantly  use  his  will-power  in  the  interests  of  vir¬ 
tue.  The  law  that  our  faculties  are  strengthened 
by  use  and  weakened  by  disuse  or  abuse  applies 
equally  to  the  retributive  power  of  conscience. 

II.  MEANS. 

The  building  up  of  our  nature  into  maturity 
and  perfection  is  our  sole  earthly  business ;  all 
below  the  moral  nature  is  tributary  to  it,  and  cul¬ 
minates  in  it.  It  may  therefore  be  said  that  the 
formation  of  a  perfect  moral  character  in  ourselves 
and  others  is  the  end  of  our  earthly  existence. 
This  being  so,  it  were  natural  to  expect,  and  we 
here  affirm  it  to  be  a  fact,  that  every  thing  with 
which  we  have  to  do  should  be  so  related  to  us  as 
to  be  means  of  moral  culture.  Ourselves,  our  ex¬ 
periences,  our  surroundings,  our  fellow-men,  the 
earth  at  our  feet  and  the  heavens  above,  the  food 
we  eat,  the  books  we  read,  the  conversations  we 
have  with  acquaintances,  friends,  and  neighbors, 
all  that  pertains  to  us,  may  be,  and  ought  to  be, 


MORAL  CULTURE. 


77 


put  under  contribution  for  moral  purposes.  What¬ 
ever  we  do,  whether  we  eat  or  drink,  we  are  to  do 
with  a  single  eye  to  the  glory  of  God  ;  that  is, 
with  the  single  and  definite  purpose  of  making  the 
best  of  being  for  ourselves  and  others. 

A  catalogue  of  the  means  of  culture  and  the 
best  method  of  use  in  each,  of  course,  can  not  be 
given.  They  may  be,  and  are,  usefully  classified 
as  nature ,  providence ,  and  revelation. 

First,  nature,  which  may  here  be  made  to  in¬ 
clude  all  actually  existing  beings  and  things  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge.  Among  these, 
first,  most  prominent,  and  most  important,  is  human 
nature — ourselves  and  our  fellow-men.  What  are 
we  ?  of  what  composed  ?  how  constituted  ?  what 
the  laws  of  our  being  ?  wherein  is  our  chief  inter¬ 
est  ?  what  is  for  the  good  of  ourselves  and  others  ? 
The  man  who  would  understand  ethics  must  know 
psychology.  By  a  most  thorough  introspection 
and  self-examination  he  must  know  himself,  and 
by  extensive  observation  he  must  find  out  what  is 
in  others.  “ Know  thyself  ”  is  a  maxim  of  great 
wisdom,  not  only  for  the  purposes  of  general  sci¬ 
ence,  but  also  especially  so  for  ethical  purposes. 
Not  only  is  mental  science  a  means  of  moral  cul¬ 
ture,  but  also  natural  science  as  well.  We  may 
learn  man’s  duty  and  destiny  not  only  from  the 
study  of  mind,  but  also  from  the  study  of  matter. 


78 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


The  mere  naturalist  studies  nature  merely  to 
ascertain  the  facts  and  second  causes  of  things  as 
he  finds  them,  but  the  student  of  ethics  looks  for 
first  cause  and  intentional  design;  “looks  through 
nature  up  to  nature’s  God,”  that  he  may  find  out 
what  is  the  will  of  God  and  the  good  of  his  crea¬ 
tures.  In  all  his  searchings  he  inquires,  “  Who 
will  show  me  any  good?” 

Second,  providence,  which  may  here  include 
all  events  or  occurrences,  whatever  takes  place. 
These  are  all  under  benevolent  and  wise  control. 
Whatsoever  comes  to  pass  is  either  by  the  agency 
or  permission  of  him  whose  will  is,  that  he  and  all 
the  creatures  he  has  made  should  perpetually  and 
forever  enjoy  the  highest  possible  good.  The 
mere  historian  studies  events  to  ascertain  the  facts 
and  the  immediate  connections ;  but  the  ethical 
student  seeks  to  find  God  in  history.  He  inquires, 
in  all  events,  what  does  God  design,  intend,  pur¬ 
pose  by  this  ?  for  what  good  end  did  he  bring 
this  to  pass,  or  permit  it  to  be  ? 

But  the  defects  in  man’s  moral  constitution, 
and  the  derangements  in  his  surroundings,  are 
such  that  mere  natural  means  are  inadequate  for 
moral  instruction,  of  which  we  shall  speak  in  the 
next  chapter.  Hence  the  need  of,  the  necessity 
for,  a  direct  revelation  in  words  from*  the  Author 
of  all. 


MORAL  CULTURE. 


79 


Nature  and  providence  failing  as  adequate 
means  of  moral  culture,  revelation  comes  in  to 
complete  and  perfect  the  trinity  of  instructors. 
And  here,  as  nowhere  else,  the  man  of  God,  the 
man  seeking  moral  perfection,  is  thoroughly  fur¬ 
nished  unto  every  good  work. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Defects  in  Natural  Religion. 

I.  DEFECTS  IN  NATURAL  CONSCIENCE. 

Were  man’s  moral  nature  perfect,  were  all  its 
powers  in  perfect  adjustment  each  to  the  other, 
and  all  to  all  existences,  yet  coming  into  being  as 
we  do  in  infancy  under  the  law  of  development  by 
education,  it  is  manifest  that  without  instruction 
perfection  in  maturity  were  unattainable  ;  and  even 
suppose  man  were  created  in  maturity,  as  we  know 
by  revelation  the  first  man  was  created,  yet  it  is 
not  apparent  that  he  could  secure  the  end  of  his 
being  without  positive  instruction  from  his  creator  ; 
nay  more,  we  may  positively  affirm  that  the  attain¬ 
ment  of  his  highest  possibility  was  impossible  with¬ 
out  such  instruction.  Accordingly,  we  find  that 
God  gave  him  a  commandment  uttered  in  words, 
in  a  matter  in  which  the  will  of  God  could  be 
known  in  no  other  way.  Natural  conscience,  how¬ 
ever  pure  and  perfect,  could  never  indicate  that 
the  fruit  of  any  particular  tree  was  forbidden,  and 

so  also  of  all  positive  precepts.  Man,  then,  in 
80 


DEFECTS  IN  NATURAL  RELIGION. 


8 1 


any  condition  of  his  being  conceivable,  being  what 
he  is,  needs  a  revelation  of  his  Maker’s  will.  But 
if  a  revelation  be  needful  for  the  maturity  and 
highest  possibility  of  a  perfect  nature,  how  much 
more  is  it  needful  for  a  nature  fallen  from  original 
righteousness — diseased,  deranged,  depraved! 

That  man  is  not,  by  nature,  in  a  condition  of 
perfection,  is  too  obvious  for  philosophical  discus¬ 
sion.  That  he  is  not  as  he  was  by  creation,  has 
fallen  from  primal  perfection,  is  in  a  lapsed  and 
diseased  condition,  is  an  affirmation  in  anthro¬ 
pology,  and  the  discussion  belongs  to  that  depart¬ 
ment  of  systematic  theology.  If  the  reader,  at  this 
point,  desires  to  examine  the  arguments  usually 
adduced  in  confirmation  of  the  Bible  doctrine  of 
natural  depravity,  he  is  referred  to  the  second  vol¬ 
ume  of  this  work,  pages  89-106. 

The  deficiencies  of  natural  conscience  may  be 
illustrated  by  numerous  examples — instance  in  the 
case  of  parents ;  natural  conscience  might  indicate 
the  obligation  to  educate  their  children,  but  could 
give  no  information  as  to  the  best  methods  of 
discharging  that  obligation.  Again,  natural  con¬ 
science  might  obligate  us  to  love  our  friends,  but, 
to  say  the  least,  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  would 
ever  suggest  an  obligation  to  love  our  enemies. 
Whether  monogamy  is  obligatory  or  polygamy 
allowable,  whether  the  marriage  contract  is  for 
life  or  dissoluble  at  the  will  of  the  parties,  is  not 


82 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


decisively  determined  by  the  indications  of  an 
uninstructed  conscience. 

II.  DEFECTS  IN  THEISTIC  METHODS. 

Additional  to  the  dictates  of  natural  conscience 
the  divine  will  as  to  man’s  duty  and  destiny  is 
indicated  in  part  by  the  established  order  of  things, 
by  the  connection  between  cause  and  effect,  ante¬ 
cedent  and  consequent.  When  any  course  of  con¬ 
duct  is  found  by  experience  to  be  beneficial,  pro¬ 
ductive  of  good,  it  is  inferred  from  thence  that 
that  course  of  conduct  is  in  accordance  with  the 
will  of  God,  is  man’s  duty.  On  the  contrary,  any 
course  of  conduct  found  to  be  injurious,  productive 
of  evil,  is  regarded  as  contrary  to  the  divine  will, 
forbidden,  sinful.  This  is  reasonable,  accords  with 
the  dictates  of  natural  conscience,  and  is  in  har¬ 
mony  with  the  philosophy  of  the  case.  Any  good 
is  an  end,  the  highest  good  of  all  an  ultimate,  and 
ought  to  be  every  man’s  supreme  end  ;  whatever, 
therefore,  is  promotive  of  a  proper  end,  whatever 
will  secure  a  good,  is  right,  and  its  opposite  wrong. 
Thus,  by  observing  the  effects  produced  upon  indi¬ 
viduals  and  upon  society  by  different  courses  of 
conduct,  virtues  and  vices  may  be  discovered. 
The  only  objection  to  this  is  found  in  the  well- 
known  fact  that  some  courses  of  action  are  such 
that  though  their  immediate  results  are  pleasant, 
and  may  be  deemed  to  be  profitable,  they  are  after- 


DEFECTS  IN  NATURAL  RELIGION.  83 

wards  found  to  bite  like  a  serpent  and  sting  like 
an  adder ;  and  other  sources  of  conduct  produce 
results  which,  though  for  the  present  grievous, 
afterwards  work  the  peaceable  fruits  of  righteous¬ 
ness.  It  is  not  true  that  all  pleasures  are  allow¬ 
able,  nor  are  all  pains  prohibitory.  This,  how¬ 
ever,  is  no  objection  to  the  doctrine  that  duty  may 
be  learned  by  observing  the  results  of  conduct. 
The  fact  stated  is  nothing  more  than  an  apparent 
exception,  and  hardly  that,  to  the  universal  law  that 
virtue  and  happiness,  vice  and  misery  are  insepa¬ 
rably  united.  That  we  are  able  to  show  so  dis¬ 
tinctly  that  some  pleasures  are  not  allowable,  and 
that  some  pains  are  not  prohibitory,  vitiates  the 
objection  and  shows  plainly  that  this  method  of 
learning  duty,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  reliable. 

But  that  this  way  of  learning  duty,  valuable  as 
it  is,  is  not  adequate  for  all  the  purposes  of  morals 
and  religion  is  abundantly  evident.  The  fact,  just 
above  stated,  has  force  in  this  direction.  Though 
not  an  objection  to  the  law  itself,  it  constitutes  a 
difficulty  in  ascertaining  the  law,  and  so  far  forth 
demonstrates  that  this  method  of  learning  our 
duty  is  defective  and  inadequate. 

Again,  in  many  things  done  under  the  sun,  the 
effect  is  so  far  distant  from  the  cause  that  hu¬ 
man  wisdom  is  incompetent  to  anticipate  what  the 
effect  will  be ;  and  when  the  result  takes  place, 
the  connection  between  the  cause  and  the  effect 


84 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


is  not  discoverable  by  any  investigation  possible 
to  man. 

Again,  this  is  a  method  of  experiment.  We 
must  transgress  the  law  to  know  that  it  is  a  law  ; 
we  must  sin  to  know  that  it  is  sin.  Thereby 
we  contract  a  habit  of  sinning,  and  fall  in  love 
with  sin  itself;  a  condition  of  things  which,  is  an 
evil  for  which,  natural  religion  provides  no  pre¬ 
ventive  and  no  remedy. 

Again,  the  facts  in  nature  and  providence  have 
been  in  the  world  from  the  beginning,  but  many 
as  competent  as  any  to  interpret  them  have  failed 
to  do  so;  so  that  in  many  nations,  for  long  periods  of 
time,  natural  religion  has  done  nothing  appreciable 
in  diminishing  the  prevalence  of  sin  or  in  checking 
sin’s  destructive  agency  and  power. 

The  argument  for  the  necessity  of  a  revelation 
drawn  from  the  defects  of  natural  religion  is  ob¬ 
vious  to  any  intelligent  thinker,  and  therefore  need 
not  be  here  drawn  out  at  greater  length  than  it  is 
in  the  above  brief  statements.  Indeed,  Dr.  Paley 
says,  “I  deem  it  unnecessary  to  prove  that  man¬ 
kind  stood  in  need  of  a  revelation,  because  I  have 
met  with  no  serious  person  who  thinks  that  even 
under  the  Christian  revelation  we  have  too  much 
light  or  any  degree  of  assurance  which  is  super 
fluous.”  Dr.  Chalmers,  on  the  same  subject,  says, 
in  substance,  that  having  at  command  adequate 
evidence  that  a  revelation  has  actually  been  given 


DEFECTS  IN  NATURAL  RELIGION. 


35 


us,  it  is  not  requisite  that  we  suspend  the  exami 
nation  of  this  evidence  to  inquire  into  the  antece¬ 
dent  probability  that  a  revelation  would  be  given. 

But  rationalists  and  theists  of  all  ages  have 
insisted  that  it  is  antecedently  so  improbable  that 
such  a  being  as  God  is  should  communicate  in 
words  with  such  a  being  as  man  is,  that  no  amount 
of  evidence  possible  in  the  case  can  make  a  reve¬ 
lation  probable  ;  and  further,  that  this  antecedent 
improbability  is  rendered  more  apparent  by  the 
fact  that  God’s  will  and  man’s  duty  are  sufficiently 
indicated  in  the  teachings  of  nature  and  provi¬ 
dence.  This  objection  to  revealed  religion  is  con¬ 
sidered  at  length  in  this  work  under  the  head  of 
“Apologetics,”  Volume  I,  Chapter  i,  wherein  it  is 
fully  shown,  as  we  think,  not  only  that  a  revelation 
is  not  antecedently  improbable,  but  also  that  it  is 
so  eminently  probable  that  its  probability  consti¬ 
tutes  a  strong  presumptive  argument  that  a  reve¬ 
lation  has  actually  been  given. 

For  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  proofs  that 
the  Christian  Scriptures  are  a  revelation  from 
God — that  what  the  Bible  says,  God  says — the 
reader  is  referred  to  the  whole  of  Book  First  of 
this  work. 


CHAPTER  vi. 

The  Holy  Scriptures. 

We  here  assume  that  the  evidences  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  constitute  a  conclusive  argument,  and  ade¬ 
quately  prove  that  the  Bible  is  given  by  divine 
inspiration,  that  it  is  a  complete  and  perfect  rule 
of  faith  and  practice,  that  by  it  the  man  of  God  is 
thoroughly  furnished  unto  every  good  word  and 
work;  that  they,  “the  Ploly  Scriptures,  contain  all 
things  necessary  to  salvation,  so  that  whatsoever 
is  not  read  therein,  nor  may  be  proved  thereby,  is 
not  to  be  required  of  any  man  that  it  should  be 
believed  as  an  article  of  faith,  or  be  thought  requi¬ 
site  or  necessary  to  salvation;”  that  “in  the  name 
of  'the  Holy  Scripture  we  do  understand  those 
canonical  books  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament 
of  whose  authority  was  never  any  doubt  in  the 
Church;”  that  “the  Old  Testament  is  not  con¬ 
trary  to  the  New;”  that  “although  the  law  given 
from  God  by  Moses,  as  touching  ceremonies  and 
rites,  doth  not  bind  Christians,  nor  ought  the  civil 

precepts  thereof  of  necessity  be  received  in  any 
86 


THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 


8; 

commonwealth  ;  yet,  notwithstanding,  no  Christian 
whatsoever  is  free  from  the  obedience  of  the  com¬ 
mandments  which  are  called  moral/ ’ 

The  superiority  of  the  Christian  ethics  above 
all  others  is  in  no  respect  more  obvious  than  in 
their  perspicuity.  Duty  is  in  the  Scriptures  made 
so  plain  that  he  that  runneth  may  read  ;  the  way¬ 
faring  man,  though  a  fool,  need  not  err.  We 
know  the  opposite  is  boldly  affirmed,  and  it  is  even 
claimed  that  what  obviously  ought  not  to  be  is  in 
the  Bible  approved  of  God.  This  may  be  fairly 
met  with  a  flat  denial.  The  examples  adduced  do 
not  make  out  the  case ;  for  they  are  either  a  mere 
record  of  historic  facts,  recorded  without  indorse¬ 
ment,  or  special  commands  given  definite  persons, 
with  a  clear  intimation  that  they  are  not  designed 
for  general  practice.  No  father  ever  thought  him¬ 
self  commanded  of  God  to  sacrifice  his  son  because 
Abraham  was.  No  king  or  warrior  ever  thought 
himself  authorized  to  exterminate  a  nation  because 
Joshua  was  commanded  to  exterminate  the  Ca- 
naanites.  The  alleged  Bible  indorsements  of  war, 
slavery,  polygamy,  and  divorce,  in  the  light  of 
intelligent  interpretation,  give  no  encouragement 
to  those  practices,  and  never  in  any  sense  author¬ 
ize  them  as  Christian  institutions. 

Plainly,  no  reader  of  the  Bible  will  ever  feel 
bound  by  its  authority  to  the  performance  of  any 
act  unless  it  be  distinctly  made  known  that  that 


88 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


act  is  commanded  on  divine  authority,  and  that  he 
is  the  person  to  whom  the  command  is  given. 
This  will  exclude  all  mere  history,  and  all  precepts 
or  commands  given  to  particular  individuals  or  to 
particular  nations ;  it  will  include  all  command¬ 
ments  given  to  man  as  man,  and  whatever  is 
plainly  indicated  as  of  universal  obligation.  Thus 
the  civil  institutions  and  the  ceremonial  law  of  the 
Jewish  polity  were  binding  upon  the  Jews  only, 
and  are  not  at  all  binding  upon  Christians ;  but 
the  moral  law  is  as  binding  upon  all  men  as  upon 
the  Jews,  is  universally  applicable,  and  universally 
obligatory. 

We  have  thus  passed  over  the  leading  topics 
usually  discussed  under  the  head  of  Theoretical 
Ethics.  We  have  treated  them  briefly,  but  still 
as  extensively  as  to  our  thought  is  requisite  in  a 
primary  text-book.  We  conclude  this  First  Part 
with  a  few  observations  on  the  utility  of  such  dis¬ 
cussions,  or  the  value  of  Theoretical  Ethics.  We 
do  so  because  some  theologians  have  averred  that 
discussions  of  this  kind  disparaged  the  Scriptures, 
though  we  see  not  why  any  theologian,  especially, 
should  say  as  much. 

If  there  be  any  philosophy  in  morals,  certainly 
the  student  in  theology,  especially,  ought  to  know 
it ;  if  there  is  not,  it  will  be  of  special  advantage 
to  him  to  be  assured  of  that  fact. 


THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 


89 


The  book  of  nature  and  the  book  of  providence 
are  divine ;  and  so  far  forth  as  they  indicate  the 
divine  will  they  are  of  divine  authority.  Man  lives 
by  “  every  word  that  proceedeth  out  of  the  mouth 
of  God.”  Nature  speaks  to  us  with  a  command¬ 
ing  eloquence  concerning  both  our  duties  and  our 
destiny ;  what  fanaticism  must  that  be  which 
charges  with  impiety  him  who  listens  to  her  voices ! 

When  we  consult  psychology  to  find  man’s 
moral  nature  and  the  ground  of  obligation,  the 
same  thing  is  done  that  the  theologian  does  when 
he  consults  natural  science  to  find  marks  of  intel¬ 
ligent  design,  and  thus  proofs  of  the  divine  exist¬ 
ence.  Who  ever  thought  that  this  was  impiety,  or 
a  disparagement  of  revelation  ?  The  evidences  of  a 
revelation  demonstrate  the  being  of  God  ;  if  he  has 
revealed  himself  to  us  of  course  he  is,  and  the 
Bible  every  -  where  assumes  his  existence ;  is  it 
therefore  a  disparagement  that  we  seek  confirma¬ 
tion  in  natural  science  ?  Certainly  not ;  and  no 
more  is  it  a  disparagement  of  theology  that  we 
should  seek  confirmatipn  in  psychological  investi¬ 
gations  for  what  is  assumed  in  the  Bible  respect¬ 
ing  man  ;  namely,  that  he  is  by  creation  a  moral 
being,  is  created  under  law,  is  a  law  to  himself, 
that  obligation  and  responsibility  are  revealed  in 
the  necessary  laws  of  thought. 

In  all  questions  of  practical  morality,  lor  the 
Christian  believer,  the  ultimate  standard,  the 


90 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


decisive  authority,  is  the  law  and  the  testimony ; 
with  him  discussion  ceases  when  the  revealed  word 
has  uttered  a  determining  voice  ;  but  to  the  intel¬ 
ligent  believer  it  need  not  diminish  his  reverence 
for  the  Bible,  nor  his  appreciation  of  its  value,  nor 
his  sense  of  man’s  need  of  such  a  revelation,  to 
find  that  its  declarations  are  confirmed  by  the  con¬ 
stitution  and  laws  of  the  human  mind,  and  by  the 
constitution  and  order  of  things  in  the  world 
around  us. 

In  what  follows  we  propose  to  refer  chiefly  to 
the  revealed  Word  of  God  for  our  information  on 
questions  of  duty,  and  to  it  solely  as  of  decisive 
authority ;  but  we  shall  not  refuse  or  neglect  to 
notice  such  considerations  drawn  from  the  consti¬ 
tution  and  laws  of  being  as  to  us  may  seem  serv¬ 
iceable  for  purposes  of  illustration  or  confirmation. 


PART  II. 


Practical  Ethics. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Classification. 

All  our  duties  have  immediate  reference  either 
to  ourselves,  to  our  fellow-men,  or  to  God.  If, 
therefore,  we  classify  them  thus:  i.  Our  duties  to 
ourselves,  or  self-culture  ;  2.  Our  duties  to  our  fel¬ 
low-men,  or  morality;  and  3.  Our  duties  to  God, 
or  piety — we  should  construct  an  exhaustive  cate¬ 
gory.  But  this  would  not  be  a  logical  division, 
since  each  class  might  include  the  other  two. 
For,  evidently,  self-interest  requires  that  we  do 
our  whole  duty  ;  not  only  those  having  immediate 
reference  to  self  but  also  those  due  both  to  others 
and  to  God  ;  and  as  it  is  our  duty  to  promote  the 
highest  good  of  our  fellow-men  according  to  our 
ability  and  opportunity,  and  as  we  are  qualified  to 
do  this  the  better  by  a  faithful  discharge  of  duty 
to  ourselves  and  to  God  it  is  evident  that  the 
obligations  of  morality  might  indirectly  at  least 

include  all  others ;  and  so  also  of  piety,  for  we  owe 

91 


92 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


it  to  God  that  we  be  faithful  to  ourselves  and  to 
our  fellow-men. 

Further,  if  the  classification  of  duties  be  based 
on  priority  of  time,  the  order  would  be  as  above  ; 
but  if  on  priority  of  importance,  the  order  would 
be  reversed,  and  it  would  stand  thus:  i.  piety; 

2.  morality;  and  3.  self-culture.  If  the  law  of 
the  conditioned  and  conditioning  be  adopted  as  the 
basis  of  classification  ;  that  is,  if  that  which  is  a 
condition  of  others  be  placed  first,  and  that  which 
is  conditioned  follow,  then  the  order  first  named 
would  be  the  one  required. 

If  we  make  the  proximate  end  of  each  duty 
the  basis  of  classification,  then  the  above,  in  the 
order  named,  would  be  well-nigh  both  an  ex¬ 
haustive  category  and  a  logical  division.  Since 
this  is  as  common  and  as  serviceable  as  any  we 
know  of,  so  far  forth  as  we  attempt  classification, 
we  shall  follow  it. 

The  duties  of  self-culture  imply,  as  prerequi¬ 
sites  the  security  of  our  rights  and  the  supply  of 
our  wants,  and  may  be  subdivided  into  those  ap¬ 
pertaining  to,  1.  our  physical;  2.  our  intellectual; 

3.  our  aesthetic  ;  and  4.  our  moral  natures. 

The  duties  of  morality  may  be  subdivided  into 
duties:  1.  of  reciprocity;  2.  of  benevolence ;  and, 
again,  into  duties  domestic,  social,  civil,  and  eccle¬ 
siastical — those  pertaining  to  the  family,  to  general 
society,  to  the  State,  and  to  the  Church. 


CLASSIFICATION. 


93 


Dr.  Wayland  makes  a  very  natural  and  scien¬ 
tific  classification  of  the  duties  of  reciprocity,  thus  : 
i.  “  Duties  to  men  as  men  ;  2.  Duties  arising  from 
the  constitution  of  the  sexes ;  3.  Duties  arising 
from  the  constitution  of  civil  society.  Duties  to 
men  as  men,  include:  1.  Justice  as  it  regards,  (1) 
Liberty,  (2)  Property,  (3)  Character,  and  (4) 
Reputation.  2.  Veracity,  (1)  as  to  the  past  and 
present,  (2)  as  to  the  future.  Duties  arising  from 
the  constitution  of  the  sexes  include,  1.  The  gen¬ 
eral  duty  of  chastity.  2.  The  law  of  marriage. 
3.  Duties  and  rights  of  parents.  4.  Duties  and 
rights  of  children,.  Duties  arising  from  the  con¬ 
stitution  of  civil  society  include  duties,  1.  Of  mag¬ 
istrates.  2.  Of  citizens.  Duties  of  benevolence 
refer,  1.  To  the  unhappy;  2.  To  the  wicked;  and 
3.  To  the  injurious.” 


CHAPTER  II. 


Self-culture. 

This  topic  is  too  commonplace  for  extended 
discussion  in  such  a  place  as  this,  and  yet,  like  all 
common,  necessary  things,  too  important  to  admit 
of  omission. 

To  supply  our  wants,  by  labor,  economy,  and 
frugality,  is  made  our  duty  by  the  condition  of  our 
being.  In  man’s  primal  condition  of  innocency, 
purity,  and  perfection,  he  was  required  to  dress 
and  keep  the  garden.  After  his  transgression 
more  arduous  labors  were  imposed.  To  remind 
him  of  his  sin  and  of  his  Maker’s  displeasure, 
and  to  discipline  him  towards  recovery,  he  was 
appointed  to  eat  his  bread  by  the  sweat  of  his 
brow.  Without  labor,  development  of  our  powers 
in  any  direction  is  impossible  ;  if  all  men  were  idle 
the  race  would  become  extinct  in  a  single  age  ; 
somebody  must  work,  or  death  by  exposure  and 
starvation  is  inevitable.  Idleness  is,  therefore,  a 
sin  against  self,  as  well  as  against  others  and  God. 
It  is  one  of  the  many  lamentable  evidences  of 
natural  depravity  that  the  moral  obligation  to  be 
94 


SELF-CULTURE. 


95 


industrious,  economical,  and  frugal  is  so  feebly  ap¬ 
preciated,  especially  so  that  in  any  condition  of 
life,  among  any  class  of  people,  labor  should  be  a 
reproach.  He  who  condemns  to  degradation  the 
honest  laborer,  because  he  is  a  laborer,  sins  against 
himself,  against  humanity,  and  against  God. 

As  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  self-culture,  we 
are  not  only  to  supply  those  wants  needful  for  the 
health  of  body  and  mind,  but  also  to  secure  our 
right  to  life  by  self-defense.  Self-defense  is  said 
to  be  the  first  law  of  nature.  We  have  no  more 
right  to  allow  others  to  take  our  life  than  we  have 
to  take  it  ourselves  ;  we  must  defend  our  life,  even 
at  the  expense,  if  need  be,  of  taking  the  life  of 
another. 

EDUCATION. 

The  nature,  methods,  and  value  of  education 
are  common  topics  ;  but  not  too  common,  for  their 
importance  can  not  be  overestimated.  The  moral 
aspects  of  the  subject  are  too  frequently  over¬ 
looked.  That  it  is  man’s  first  and  all-important 
duty  to  build  himself  up,  to  edify  himself,  to  seek 
the  perfection  of  his  powers,  is  manifest  from  every 
consideration  by  which  the  question  of  duty  is  de¬ 
termined. 

I.  PHYSICAL  TRAINING. 

This  is  first  as  to  priority  in  time,  and  is  the 
indispensable  condition  of  all  other  upbuilding. 
By  the  proper  use  of  food,  clothing,  shelter,  air, 


9t> 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


and  exercise,  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  the 
constitution  of  the  physical  nature,  man  is  to  attain 
the  health,  strength,  beauty,  and  grace  by  which  he 
is  to  enjoy  life  himself,  and  make  himself  useful 
in  promoting  the  happiness  of  others.  Without 
these  physical  attainments  mental  and  moral  ac¬ 
quisitions  are  many  of  them  impossible,  and  those 
attainable,  under  the  embarrassments  of  impaired 
physical  health,  are  dwarfed,  enfeebled,  and  every 
way  imperfect. 

Man  is  impelled  by  the  necessities  of  his  nature 
to  pay  some  attention  to  these  things ;  and,  fur¬ 
ther,  his  appetites  and  desires  seek  their  gratifica¬ 
tion  in  this  direction.  Total  neglect  is,  therefore, 
next  to  impossible.  The  danger  is  that  man,  ob¬ 
livious  of  his  moral  obligations  in  these  matters, 
will  make  the  gratification  of  appetite  and  desire 
his  ultimate  end,  and  thus  himself  become  a  sen¬ 
sualist.  The  terribleness  of  this  peril,  and  the 
unspeakable  calamity  of  becoming  a  prey  to  it,  are 
daily  and  hourly  evinced  among  mankind  by  the 
almost  overwhelming  floods  of  intemperance  and 
licentiousness  that  sweep  over  the  face  of  society. 
Diseases,  deformities,  decrepitudes,  enfeeblements, 
disquietudes,  in  all  their  various  forms,  come  many 
of  them  from  criminal  neglect  of  duty  to  self.  A 
vivid  moral  sense  of  obligation  to  seek  by  self¬ 
culture  the  perfection  of  our  physical  powers,  if 
observed,  would  save  the  world  from  most  of  its  ills. 


SELF-CULTURE. 


97 


Specific  rules  for  diet,  dress,  habitation,  equi¬ 
page,  labor,  rest,  and  whatever  pertains  proxi- 
mately  to  the  body,  can  not  be  given  ;  for  what  is 
lawful  for  some  is  unlawful  for  others,  and  what  is 
expedient  and  proper  under  some  circumstances 
would  be  quite  inexpedient  and  improper  to  the 
same  person  under  other  circumstances. 

The  moral  requirement  forbids  that  in  any  case 
the  gratification  of  animal  appetites,  passions,  and 
desires  be  made  the  supreme  end  of  life.  Man 
is  never  to  live  for  these  things  ;  they  are  to  be 
sought  as  a  means  of  something  above  and  beyond 
them.  Within  this  limit  they  may  and  ought  to 
be  sought — the  more  diligently  and  efficiently  the 
better.  We  may  eat,  drink,  dress,  dance,  if  we 
like,  do  any  thing  that  pleases  us,  enjoy  any 
thing  that  makes  us  happy ;  provided,  always, 
by  so  doing  no  higher  good  is  periled.  Of  this 
every  man  must  be  his  own  judge  and  keeper ;  no 
man  need  be  bound  by  another  man’s  conscience 
in  these  matters.  Provided  he  is  in  all  these 
things  strictly  conscientious,  and  his  heart  do  not 
condemn  him  in  that  thing  which  he  alloweth,  he 
need  not  be  mindful  of  reproof,  no  matter  whence 
it  comes. 

II.  MENTAL  DISCIPLINE. 

As  the  body  comes  into  existence  in  infantile 
weakness,  so  the  mind  is  at  first  simply  an  aggre¬ 
gate  of  susceptibilities  and  capabilities.  All  know! 


98 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


edge  is  dependent  upon  educational  processes. 
One  has  facetiously  but  truthfully  said,  “No  child 
knows  how  to  take  milk  with  a  spoon  till  he  has 
learned  to  do  so.”  Knowledge  is  not  inherited. 
No  matter  how  highly  cultured  our  forefathers  or 
immediate  parents,  we  are  born  into  the  world  as 
ignorant  as  they  were  at  their  birth.  From  gen¬ 
eration  to  generation  the  same  processes  for  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge  and  the  development  of 

mental  powers  are  repeated.  In  part  the  neces- 

> 

sities  of  nature  impel  us,  and  we  instinctively 
employ  the  means  of  mental  education.  We  are 
led  farther  by  the  requirements  of  parents  and 
teachers,  but  this  avails  only  for  very  limited  ac¬ 
quisitions.  Without  our  own  voluntary  co-opera¬ 
tion  we  remain  but  slightly  removed  from  infantile 
ignorance  ;  and,  a  voluntary  neglect  continued,  we 
at  best  are  but  little  better  than  savages.  Parents 
and  teachers  may  pour  in  instruction,  but  without 
the  student’s  own  voluntary  efforts  his  mind  will 
remain  a  vacuum.  If  a  community  of  barbarians 
refuse  or  neglect  to  use  the  means  of  education 
their  barbarism  remains  ;  and  if  any  community, 
however  cultivated,  discontinue  the  use  of  educa¬ 
tional  processes  they  speedily  sink  down  into  a 
state  of  barbarism. 

Thus  we  are  taught,  by  the  constitution  of  our 
nature  and  our  relations  to  our  earthly  surround¬ 
ings,  the  duty  of  self-culture  as  to  mind. 


SELF-CULTURE. 


99 


Of  intellectual  education  the  moralist  need  say 
nothing-  more  than  to  insist  that  obligation  binds 
the  individual  and  society  to  seek  after,  to  aim 
at  the  highest  possibilities,  always  putting  aims, 
efforts,  and  attainments  under  contribution  to  some 
end  beyond  and  above  mere  intellectual  good.  A 
student  may  make  his  own  intellect  his  god,  and 
worshiping  himself  sin  against  himself  and  his 
Maker.  Alas  how  many  moral  monsters  have- 
stalked  abroad  in  intellectual  greatness !  How 
many  giants  in  logic,  in  philosophy,  in  statesman¬ 
ship,  have  disgraced  humanity  with  their  moral 
corruptness  !  The  intellectual  is  above  the  phys¬ 
ical,  but  it  lies  below  even  the  sentient  and  far  be¬ 
low  the  moral.  “That  the  soul  be  without  know¬ 
ledge  is  not  good.”  “My  people,”  saith  the  Lord, 
“are  destroyed  for  the  lack  of  knowledge.”  Men 
are  morally  obligated  by  cultivating  habits  of  read¬ 
ing,  conversation,  and  observation  to  acquire  a 
facility  for  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  to  quicken 
and  strengthen  their  powers  of  perception,  and 
thus  make  themselves  familiar  with  the  facts  that 
have  to  do  with  their  own  well-being  and  that  of 
their  fellow-men.  Without  the  power  and  habit 
of  reflection  man  can  not  attain  his  end  ;  he  is, 
therefore,  required  to  consider  his  ways,  to  reason 
with  God,  to  be  thoughtful.  Wisdom  is  the  prin¬ 
cipal  thing ;  therefore,  with  all  his  gettings,  man  is 
to  get  wisdom — the  wisdom  that  comes  from  ab~ 


IOO 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


stractions,  classifications,  reasonings.  Sound  ethics 
require  the  highest,  the  profoundest  philosophy. 
Correct  scholarship,  high  attainments  in  science, 
literature,  and  art  can  not  be  overestimated  as  to 
their  value  in  matters  pertaining  to  duty,  well¬ 
being,  and  destiny.  Let,  then,  intellectual  culture 
have  its  place ;  a  thing  to  be  intensely  desired, 
diligently  sought,  highly  esteemed  ;  let  its  pursuit 
obligate  the  conscience,  but  never  allow  it  to  be 
an  ultimate  end — this  is  selfishness,  it  is  idolatry. 
When  intellectual  greatness  becomes  an  ultimate 
and  supreme  end,  it  becomes  to  him  who  makes  it 
so  a  god  ;  and  he  that  worships  the  creature  and 
not  the  Creator,  thereby  destroys  every  interest 
involved  in  human  welfare. 

Discipline  of  the  Sensibility. — The  emotions, 
desires,  and  affections,  as  well  as  the  instincts  and 
appetites,  are  implanted  principles,  and  are,  like 
them,  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity  ;  but  to  some 
extent,  to  an  extent  involving  man’s  highest  re¬ 
sponsibility,  they  are,  like  the  appetites,  under  the 
control  of  the  will;  hence,  we  are  commanded  “to 
keep  the  heart  with  all  diligence,  for  out  of  it  are 
the  issues  of  life.” 

Here,  indeed,  is  the  great  battle-field  of  moral 
conflict — the  appetites  and  desires  are  our  tempta¬ 
tions  ;  for  their  gratification  men  sometimes  sacri¬ 
fice  every  interest  of  their  being,  prostitute  every 
power  of  their  nature,  and  in  the  end  miss  of 


SELF-CULTURE. 


IOI 


eternal  life  and  lose  themselves.  We  are  required 
not  only  to  keep  the  body  under  and  bring  it 
into  subjection, 'to  crucify  the  flesh  with  the  lust 
thereof,  but  also  to  bring  into  captivity  every 
desire  of  the  flesh  and  of  the  mind. 

The  desire  for  wealth,  for  power,  the  domestic 
affections,  friendship,  patriotism,  philanthropy,  are 
all  principles  implanted  by  our  Creator  in  our  na¬ 
ture  ;  they  arise  of  necessity  when  the  occasion 
occurs  ;  they  all  seek  as  a  proximate  end  a  real 
good ;  they  are,  therefore,  to  be  exercised,  in¬ 
dulged,  gratified.  It  is  no  sin  that  we  have  them  ; 
it  is  positive  defect  if  we  have  them  not.  Great 
strength  and  intensity  in  these  desires  and  affec¬ 
tions  is  no  affliction,  but  rather  a  blessing.  But 
though  man  may  lawfully  desire  wealth,  no  matter 
how  intensely,  the  more  so  the  better,  he  may  not 
become  a  miser  ;  he  may  be,  he  ought  to  be,  dili¬ 
gent  in  business,  economical,  frugal ;  he  may,  he 
ought,  to  provide  for  his  own  wants  and  the  wants 
of  those  dependent  upon  him,  both  for  the  present 
and  the  future,  but  he  must  not  make  money  his 
god.  He  may  seek  it  as  a  means  to  something 
higher,  he  may  seek  it  even  for  its  own  sake,  pro¬ 
vided  he  do  not  thereby  sacrifice  a  higher  good  ; 
the  subordinate  must  never  be  allowed  to  occupy 
the  place  of  the  ultimate,  the  ultimate  must  be 
supreme.  Herein  is  discipline,  herein  is  duty  ;  to 
“do  whatever  we  do  with  an  eye  single  to  the 


102 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


glory  of  God.”  The  glory  of  God  is  the  good 
of  his  creatures — this  good  must  be  chosen  as 
the  supreme  end  of  all  desires.  .To  habitually 
discipline  the  desires  and  affections  into  harmony 
with  such  a  choice  is  self-culture  as  to  the  sensi¬ 
bilities.  Happy  the  man  who  has  so  schooled 
himself  in  the  school  of  Christ  as  that  appealing 
to  the  searcher  of  hearts  he  may  say,  “Whom 
have  I  in  heaven  but  thee  ?  and  there  is  none 
upon  earth  that  I  desire  besides  thee.”  That  this 
is  utterly  impossible  to  mortals  under  the  sun, 
without  grace,  is  what  every  intelligent  theolo¬ 
gian  will  most  positively  and  emphatically  affirm, 
and  it  is  what  no  true  philosopher  will  attempt 
to  deny. 

Mental  Discipline  as  to  the  DEsthetic  Nature. — 
That  a  high  satisfaction  in  consciousness,  a  posi¬ 
tive  enjoyment,  a  real  good  comes  from  an  appre¬ 
ciation  of  the  beautiful,  the  sublime,  and  whatever 
else  are  adapted  to  gratify  the  taste,  either  as 
present  in  real  life  or  represented  by  the  imagina¬ 
tion,  is  fully  evinced  in  the  experience  of  all  men, 
even  children  and  savages  not  excepted.  But  this 
part  of  our  constitution  as  much  as  any  other,  prob¬ 
ably  more  than  some  others,  requires  cultivation, 
and  the  degree  of  enjoyment  therefrom  is  propor¬ 
tionate  to  the  degree  of  perfection  attained.  Man, 
therefore,  owes  it  to  himself  as  a  means  of  pro¬ 
moting  his  personal  good,  that  he  devote  attention 


SELF-CULTURE. 


103 


to  those  pursuits  by  which  his  taste  and  imagina¬ 
tion  are  improved.  It  is  his  duty  to  seek  and 
enjoy  pleasure  in  the  beauties  of  nature  and  art. 
The  danger  here  is  the  same  as  elsewhere  ;  it  is 
found  in  the  tendency  and  inclination  to  make 
these  pleasures  supreme.  The  devotees  of  art 
seem  to  think  there  can  be  no  danger  lurking  near 
pleasures  so  refined  ;  but,  alas,  how  fatal  this  mis¬ 
take  !  An  artist  without  religion  ;  who  is  less  a 
man  than  he?  Usually  such  are  among  the  most 
worthless  and  useless  specimens  of  humanity  to 
be  found. 

Mental  Discipline  as  to  the  Will. —  In  the  will 
we  have  personality,  the  man  himself.  Here  is 
obligation  and  responsibility  ;  here  conscience  ut¬ 
ters  its  voice,  makes  its  demands.  By  choices 
moral  character  is  determined.  “  I  would,  but  ye 
would  not;”  “ye  will  not  come  to  me  that  ye 
might  have  life;”  “whosoever  will  come,’ let  him 
come;”  “whosoever  cometh  to  me  I  will  in  no 
wise  cast  out;”  “this  is  the  condemnation,  that 
light  has  come  into  the  world,  and  men  choose 
darkness  rather  than  light.”  All  that  has  been 
said  in  this  and  in  a  previous  chapter  on  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  self- culture,  and  abundantly  much  more 
might  be  said,  all  centers  here  in  the  power  of 
volitionating  choices.  Here  is  found  that  which 
determines,  controls,  governs  all  that  pertains  to 
morals.  It  is  the  man  himself,  always  choosing 


104 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


the  supreme  good,  and  all  other  good  subordinate 
to  the  supreme. 

It  is  by  doing  so  that  he  acquires  facility  in 
the  doing.  At  first  duty  may  cost  self-denial,  may 
be  determined  after  severe  conflict,  and  discharged 
at  the  expense  of  ceaseless  vigilance  and  vigorous 
effort ;  but  once  done  additional  strength  is  ac¬ 
quired,  so  that  repetition  becomes  easy ;  the  path¬ 
way  shines  brighter  and  brighter,  and  wisdom’s 
ways  become  pleasant,  and  her  paths  paths  of 
peace.  That  man  owes  it  to  himself  to  make 
duty  the  guiding  star  of  his  life,  the  governing 
motive  of  all  his  actions  and  enterprises,  is  too 
evident  to  require  discussion.  It  is  the  only  method 
by  which  he  may  secure  the  end  of  his  being,  the 
only  method  by  which  he  can  make  existence  a 
blessing  to  himself,  useful  to  others,  and  an  honor 
to  God. 

III.  RELIGIOUS  EDUCATION. 

We  have  said  that  man  owes  it  to  himself  that 
to  the  extent  of  his  ability  he  seek  the  perfection 
of  his  powers  ;  especially  that  he  so  educate  his 
intellect  that  he  be  a  man  of  extensive  information, 
of  sound  judgment,  and  a  correct  reasoner ;  that 
he  so  discipline  his  volitioning  faculty  that  he  may 
always  hold  his  appetites,  desires,  and  affections 
under  control,  keeping  their  gratification  within 
the  limits  prescribed  by  our  Creator,  never  allow¬ 
ing  their  gratification  to  peril  a  greater  good  than 


SELF-CULTURE. 


105 


it  confers.  Now,  it  is  confessed  that  no  man 
living  ever  does  this  perfectly.  Theoretically,  its 
possibility  may  be  affirmed ;  for,  since  no  man  is 
obligated  to  do  what  he  can  not  do,  to  say  he  can 
not  perfectly  meet  his  obligations  is  to  say  he  can 
not  do  what  he  can  do.  But  theory  aside  for  the 
present,  the  fact  is  patent  that,  no  matter  what 
man  can  do,  we  know  he  does  not  do  his  very 
best.  We  here  add,  and  this  is  the  point  now 
specially  in  view,  that  without  religion  man  not 
only  fails  to  do  his  best,  but  he  also  makes  an 
utter  failure.  He  not  only  comes  short  of  what 
he  might  be,  but  he  is  also  diametrically  the 
opposite  to  what  he  ought  to  be.  The  direful, 
the  dreadful  result  of  an  utter  failure  is  avoidable 
only  through  the  provisions  of  grace.  “  Without 
me  ye  can  do  nothing.”  To  be  without  God  is 
to  be  without  hope.  Without  grace  we  not  only 
negatively  fail  to  get  good  and  do  good,  but  we 
also  positively  incur  evil  and  do  evil.  Hence  it  is 
a  man’s  duty  to  himself  to  avail  himself  of  all  the 
helps  proffered  him  by  the  grace  and  mercy  of 
God.  The  Bible  abundantly  assures  us  that  he 
who  seeks  shall  find,  that  to  him  that  asketh  shall 
be  given,  the  presence  and  power  of  God’s  Holy 
Spirit,  in  degrees,  at  times,  and  under  circum¬ 
stances  adequate  to  all  the  necessities  of  a  holy 
life  and  character.  But  these  proffers  of  grace  are 
conditioned  upon  man’s  faithful  use  and  improve- 


io  6 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


ment  of  all  the  divinely  appointed  means  of  grace 
providentially  within  his  reach. 

We  then  catalogue  among  the  duties  a  man 
owes  to  himself,  private,  domestic,  and  social 
prayer,  the  reading  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  hear¬ 
ing  them  read  and  expounded  in  the  Church  of 
God,  public  worship,  and  conformity  to  all  the 
covenanted  obligations  of  membership  in  the 
household  of  faith. 


I 


CHAPTER  III. 

Duties  to  Our  Fellow-men,  or  Morality. 

I.  WHAT  IS  REQUIRED. 

“Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all 
thy  heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy 
mind,  and  with  all  thy  strength  ;  this  is  the  first 
commandment.  And  the  second  is  like ;  namely 
this,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself. 
There  is  none  other  commandment  greater  than 
these.  On  these  two  commandments  hang  all  the 
law  and  the  prophets.  Love  works  no  ill  to  his 
neighbor,  therefore  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law. 
For  all  the  law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word,  even  in 
this,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself.  If 
ye  fulfill  the  royal  law  according  to  the  Scrip¬ 
ture,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself,  ye 
do  well.  Now  abideth  faith,  hope,  charity,  these 
three,  but  the  greatest  of  these  is  charity.  If 
a  man  say,  I  love  God,  and  hateth  his  brother, 
he  is  a  liar ;  for  he  that  loveth  not  his  brother 
whom  he  hath  seen,  how  can  he  love  God  whom 
he  hath  not  seen  ?  This  commandment  have 
we  from  him,  that  he  who  loveth  God  love  his 
brother  also.” 


107 


io8 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


These,  as  well  as  all  other  Scriptures,  teach 
that  all  obligation  is  discharged  by  obedience  to 
two  commandments,  and  that  these  two  are  insep¬ 
arable  ;  they  interpenetrate,  they  mutually  imply 
each  other,  so  that  all  obligation  is  expressed  by 
the  one  single  word  “love."  As  the  glory  of  God 
is  seen  in  the  well-being  of  his  creatures,  so  that 
state  of  mind  which  adoringly  recognizes  the  divine 
glory,  which  is  a  single  eye  to  the  glory  of  God, 
is  a  state  of  mind  which  seeks  the  well-being  of 
God’s  image.  To  love  our  neighbor,  then,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  commandment,  in  itself,  or  in  itself  with 
what  it  implies,  or  with  that  with  which  it  is  con¬ 
nected  inseparably,  is  to  fulfill  the  whole  law,  to 
meet  all  obligations.  Morality  implies  piety ;  piety 
involves  morality ;  all  duty  is  concentered  in,  is 
determined  by,  one  single  state  of  mind.  What  is 
that  love,  that  one  thing,  which  is  the  fulfilling  of 
the  law  ?  What  is  it  to  love  our  neighbor  as  our¬ 
selves  ?  Love  is  a  term  of  extensive  and  various 
uses  ;  it  signifies  a  state  of  mind  which  has  refer¬ 
ence  to  various  and  different  objects,  and  is  char¬ 
acterized  by  the  objects  to  which  it  refers. 

We  are  said  to  love  money,  books,  and  other 
inanimate  things.  In  this  case  the  feeling  is  chiefly 
a  desire — normally  a  desire  for  some  good  to  our¬ 
selves,  which  these  things  are  adapted  to  confer  ; 
abnormally  we  may  desire  things  for  their  own 
sake,  as  when  a  miser  desires  gold.  The  passion 


MORALITY. 


IO9 


for  animals  differs  from  the  love  of  things,  chiefly 
in  that  it  may  be  a  desire  for  good  towards  the 
animals  themselves,  as  well  as  a  desire  for  the 
good  we  may  derive  from  them.  Pity  is  a  desire 
for  good  towards  objects  considered  as  wretched, 
miserable,  unhappy.  Self-love  is  a  desire  for  good 
to  ourselves.  Benevolence  a  desire  for  the  good 
of  others.  Admiration  is  awakened  by  an  appre¬ 
hension  of  excellence  in  its  object.  Complacency 
is  a  delight  and  joy  awakened  by  an  apprehension 
of  excellence,  purity,  holiness,  and  is  accompanied 
by  a  sympathy  with,  and  an  affection  for,  him 
who  possesses  these  perfections.  Rational  love  is 
an  immanent  preference,  a  permanent,  habitual, 
governing  choice ;  its  object  is  the  good  of  all 
sentient  beings  ;  it  is  conditioned  upon  an  appre¬ 
hension  of  good  as  the  supreme  end  of  rational, 
sentient  existence.  It  is  distinguished  from  love 
of  every  other  kind  and  degree,  in  that  it  is  free, 
not  necessitated;  it  is  a  choice  that  the  subject 
may  or  may  not  volitionate. 

These  definitions,  though  very  imperfect,  are 
sufficiently  accurate  for  our  present  purpose.  They 
make  it  evident  that  what  is  commanded  in  the 
law,  and  is  declared  to  be  the  fulfilling  of  the 
law,  is  rational  love,  and  that  it  can  not  be 
any  other.  However,  as  this  may  be  doubted, 
a  further  discussion  may  be  needful.  All  other 
affections,  to  some  extent,  are  governed  by  the 


T  IO 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


law  of  necessity,  and  therefore  can  not,  so  far 
forth,  be  a  matter  of  command,  obligation,  and 
responsibility.  The  paternal  and  filial  affections, 
friendship,  patriotism,  and  philanthropy  are  im¬ 
planted  principles  ;  that  is,  on  the  occurrence  of 
proper  occasions,  they  arise  from  the  necessity 
of  our  nature.  Parents  are,  to  be  sure,  com¬ 
manded  to  love  their  children  ;  but  that  which  is 
the  object  of  the  command  is  something  beyond 
the  natural  instinctive  affection,  for  this  can  not  be 
volitionated,  either  as  to  its  existence  or  non-exist¬ 
ence  :  if  it  be  present,  the  parent  can  not  will  its 
absence ;  if  it  does  not  exist  the  parent  can  not, 
by  a  direct  act  of  will,  call  it  into  being.  We  may 
volitionate  the  conditions  on  which  the  feeling 
arises ;  hence  obligation,  law,  command,  must  have 
respect  to  those  antecedent  volitions  and  not  to 
the  affection  itself. 

Admiration  awakened  by  excellence  is  not  the 
fulfilling  of  the  law,  for  it  is  necessitated.  Very 
wicked  people  may  admire  that  which  is  admirable ; 
and,  moreover,  we  are  commanded  to  love  irre¬ 
spective  of  the  character  and  conduct  of  the  objects 
of  our  affection — we  are  to  love  our  enemies,  even 
those  who  persecute  and  despitefully  use  us.  The 
love  commanded  is  the  same  as  that  which  God 
exercises  towards  his  creatures  ;  it  is  good  will  to 
all,  it  is  that  which  seeks  the  highest  good  of  all ;  it 
is  a  subject  of  command,  because  it  is  a  prefer- 


MORALITY. 


1 1  I 


ence  of  the  will,  a  choice  of  this  highest  good  as 
the  supreme  end  of  being.  To  it  we  are  obligated, 
because  it  is  a  rational  free  act  that  may  or  may 
not  be  done  in  obedience  or  disobedience  to  law. 
It  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law,  because  it  is  the  very 
thing  the  law  requires.  It  is  the  sum  total  of  all 
commandments,  because  it  existing,  all  subordinate 
acts  of  obedience  follow,  as  effect  follows  cause. 
Let  a  man  intelligently,  rationally,  freely  make 
choice  of  the  greatest  good  as  his  supreme  end  ; 
let  him  do  this  without  mental  reservation ;  let 
him  thus  consecrate  himself  wholly,  entirely  to 
duty,  and  all  acts  of  life  and  dispositions  of  mind 
requisite  to  carrying  out  this,  his  governing  pur¬ 
pose,  will  naturally,  necessarily  follow.  By  this  one 
act  of  choice,  existing  as  an  immanent  preference, 
he  purposes,  as  he  has  ability,  to  feed  the  hungry, 
clothe  the  naked,  do  good  unto  all  men  ;  by  this 
permanent  preference  he  purposes  all  those  acts  of 
self-culture,  of  moral  discipline,  of  religious  educa¬ 
tion,  which  are  the  conditions  of  right  dispositions, 
tempers,  and  habits  of  mind  ;  by  this  one  perpet¬ 
uated  act  he  turns  his  whole  being  Godward,  and, 
as  a  consequent,  there  comes  down  to  him  com¬ 
placent  love,  the  blessedness  of  a  sympathy  with, 
and  an  affection  for,  the  infinite  beauty  of  holi¬ 
ness — “  the  love  of  God  shed  abroad  in  the  heart 
by  the  Holy  Ghost.” 


I  12 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


II.  HOW  IS  DUTY  DISCHARGED. 

We  have  thus,  as  above,  indicated  what  we 
understand  our  duty  to  our  fellow-men  to  be.  We 
now  come  to  consider  how  this  duty  is  to  be  dis¬ 
charged  ;  or,  more  properly,  to  inquire  how  the 
discharge  of  duty  is  manifested  in  the  practical 
details  of  every-day  life.  This  topic  is  a  plain  and 
obvious  one,  considered  as  to  its  general  applica¬ 
tions,  which  is  all  that  is  admissible  in  ethics. 
Casuistry,  the  consideration  of  specific  duties  in 
peculiar  circumstances,  requires  treatises  too  volu¬ 
minous  for  ordinary  reading  and  study.  All  wri¬ 
ters  on  practical  ethics  must,  in  a  case  so  obvious, 
pursue  substantially  the  same  track  of  thought — 
the  putting,  the  classification,  and  the  arrangement 
may  be  different,  but  the  substance  and  leading 
statements  must  be  the  same.  Dr.  Hopkins  says, 
“  If  we  would  love  our  fellow-men  as  we  do  our¬ 
selves,  we  must,  i.  Regard,  and,  if  necessary,  aid 
in  securing,  their  rights  ;  2.  Supply  their  wants  ; 
and  3.  Do  what  we  can  to  perfect  and  direct  their 
powers.”  Dr.  Waylancl,  as  I  suppose,  would  call 
the  first  of  these  Duties  of  Reciprocity,  and  the 
second  and  third  Duties  of  Benevolence.  Dr. 
Wayland  founds  all  obligation  on  the  relations  ra¬ 
tional  beings  sustain  to  each  other  ;  or,  rather, 
affirms  that  all  obligations  arise  out  of  relations  ; 
and  the  duties  of  reciprocity  according  to  his 


MORALITY. 


1 13 

showing,  arise  out  of  the  relation  of  equality. 
That  “all  men  are  created  free  and  equal,  and 
have  certain  inalienable  rights  ”  he  interprets  to 
mean  that  there  is  among  men  an  equality  of 
rights,  not  an  equality  of  condition.  That  is, 
every  man  has  the  same  right  to  use  the  means  of 
happiness  which  providence  has  placed  within  his 
reach  that  any  other  man  has  to  use  the  means 
of  happiness  which  providence  has  placed  within 
his  reach. 

The  natural  or  God -given  rights  which  are 
equal  among  all  men  have  respect  to,  1.  Life;  2: 
Liberty;  3.  Property;  4.  Character;  and,  5.  Rep¬ 
utation.  For  the  protection  of  these  all  just  gov¬ 
ernments  are  organized.  The  statement  of  these 
rights,  of  the  methods  of  their  security  and  de¬ 
fense,  of  the  possible  violations,  and  of  the  pun¬ 
ishments  to  be  inflicted  by  the  individual  or  society 
in  cases  of  violation,  constitute  the  themes  of  dis¬ 
course  in  practical  ethics.  The  same  topics,  so 
far  as  the  rights  and  obligations  of  society  are 
concerned,  constitute  the  science  and  art  of  civil 
government.  Ethics  includes  the  rights,  obliga¬ 
tions,  and  duties  of  both  the  individual  and  society ; 
civil  government  pertains  only  to  the  latter. 

In  the  common  arrangement  of  these  topics, 
duties  to  men  as  men  are  first  in  order,  and  after 
these  duties  arising  out  of  domestic,  social,  and 
civil  relations. 


c 


8 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


1 14 

III.  DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 

i.  As  to  their  Rights,  (a)  Their  Right  to 
Life .  “Thou  shalt  not  kill:  he  that  sheddeth 
man’s  blood  by  man  shall  his  blood  be  shed,  for 
in  the  image  of  God  made  he  man.  He  that 
smiteth  a  man  so  that  he  die  shall  be  surely  put 
to  death.  Whoso  killeth  any  person  the  mur¬ 
derer  shall  be  put  to  death  by  the  mouth  of  wit¬ 
nesses  ;  but  one  witness  shall  not  testify  against 
any  person  to  cause  him  to  die  :  at  the  mouth  of 
two  witnesses  or  three  witnesses  shall  he  that  is 
worthy  of  death  be  put  to  death,  but  at  the  mouth 
of  one  witness  he  shall  not  be  put  to  death.  If  a 
man  have  committed  a  sin  worthy  of  death,  and 
he  be  put  to  death,  and  thou  hang  him  on  a  tree  ; 
his  body  shall  not  remain  all  night  upon  the  tree, 
but  thou  shalt  in  any  wise  bury  him  that  day  (for 
he  that  is  hanged  is  accursed  of  God)  ;  that  thy 
land  be  not  defiled  which  the  Lord  thy  God  giveth 
thee  for  an  inheritance.  Ye  have  heard  that  it 
was  said  by  them  of  old  time,  Thou  shalt  not  kill, 
and  whosoever  shall  kill  shall  be  in  danger  of  the 
judgment :  but  I  say  unto  you  that  whosoever  is 
angry  with  his  brother  without  a  cause  shall  be  in 
danger  of  the  judgment.  Rulers  are  not  a  terror 
to  good  works,  but  to  the  evil.  Wilt  thou  not  be 
afraid  of  the  power  ?  do  that  which  is  good  and 
thou  shalt  have  praise  of  the  same,  for  he  is  the 


MORALITY. 


115 

minister  of  God  to  thee  for  good  :  but  if  thou  do 
that  which  is  evil,  be  afraid ;  for  he  beareth  not 
the  sword  in  vain :  for  he  is  the  minister  of  God,  a 
revenger  to  execute  wrath  upon  him  that  doeth  evil. 
If  I  be  an  offender,  or  have  committed  any  thing 
worthy  of  death,  I  refuse  not  to  die.” 

These  passages  recognize  man’s  right  to  life 
as  the  highest  possible ;  they  prohibit  malicious 
homicide  or  murder  under  the  severest  possible 
penalties  ;  they  do  so  for  a  reason  which  is  ap¬ 
plicable  to  man  as  man — namely,  “  he  was  created 
in  the  image  of  God.”  They  therefore  show  that 
the  prohibition,  and  the  capital  punishment  by 
which  it  is  sanctioned,  is  for  all  men  in  all  the 
ages.  The  law  enacting  the  death  penalty  was 
given  to  Noah,  a  representative  of  the  race  ;  and 
the  whole  of  the  Mosaic  law  referring  to  the  sin 
of  murder  is  re-enacted  in  the  New  Testament 
with  enlarged  significance  and  intensified  solemnity 
of  sanction  ;  the  magistrate  bears  not  the  sword  in 
vain — he  is  the  minister  of  God,  the  avenger  to 
execute  wrath.  These  passages  further  show  that 
though  life  must  be  protected  even  at  the  expense 
of  life,  so  that  homicide  in  self-defense  is  not  only 
not  forbidden,  but  also,  if  necessary,  morally  obli¬ 
gatory  ;  yet  punishment  for  the  crime  of  murder 
must  not  be  executed  by  the  individual,  but  is 
binding  upon  the  magistrate  after  adequate  proof, 
or  on  the  testimony  of  credible  witnesses. 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


1 1 6 

The  principles  taught  in  these  passages  accord 
with  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  with  the  dic¬ 
tates  of  reason  and  natural  justice,  and  with  the 
universal  judgment  of  men.  All  men  in  all  ages 
have  not  only  felt  themselves  at  liberty,  but  also 
morally  bound,  when  attacked  by  a  ruffian  with  a 
murderous  intent,  to  defend  themselves  by  taking, 
if  need  be  for  defense,  the  life  of  the  assassin. 
If  of  two  men  one  must  die,  all  agree  that  it 
should  be  the  aggressor,  and  not  the  aggrieved  ; 
the  guilty,  and  not  the  innocent.  Homicide  in  self- 
defense,  then,  is  required  by  the  law  of  love  ;  and 
if  a  man  love  his  neighbor  as  himself  he  will, 
when  his  neighbor  is  attacked  with  murderous  in¬ 
tent,  aid  his  neighbor  in  his  defense  to  the  extent 
of  taking,  if  need  be  for  defense,  the  ruffian’s  life. 
In  like  manner  and  for  the  same  obvious  reason, 
when  the  lives  of  our  fellow-men  are  imperiled  by 
riotous  assault,  duty  requires  even  the  individual, 
to  the  extent  of  his  ability,  to  defend  those  exposed 
lives  at  any  cost ;  but  especially  is  it  morally  binding 
upon  the  magistrate  to  disperse  the  mob,  and  when 
possible  in  no  other  way  to  do  so  by  the  use  of 
the  sword  or  other  instrument  of  death,  which  it  is 
his  duty  to  “bear  not  in  vain.” 

The  right  to  life  is  conferred  by  him  who  gave 
it ;  and  the  right  to  take  life  must  be  derived  from 
the  same  source.  This  is  primarily  conferred  upon 
the  magistrate.  “  He  is  the  minister  of  God,  a 


MORALITY. 


1 17 

revenger  to  execute  wrath.”  For  whatever  pur¬ 
pose,  then,  the  death  penalty  is  executed,  whether 
to  punish  crime  or  to  prevent  it,  the  power  to  ex¬ 
ecute  it  is  primarily  lodged  with  the  government. 
It  belongs,  therefore,  to  the  individual,  or  to  any 
number  of  persons  as  individuals,  only  by  the  ne¬ 
cessities  of  the  case  ;  as  when  in  the  absence  of 
the  governmental  power  and  authority  life  is  im¬ 
periled,  and  can  be  protected  in  no  other  way  than 
by  prompt  execution  from  the  hands  of  those 
present.  What  in  American  parlance  is  called 
lynch  law  is  in  every  way  extremely  reprehensible. 
There  is  no  exception,  unless  it  be  in  the  extreme 
case  when  government  has  become  so  corrupt  as 
to  favor  criminals,  or  so  weak  as  to  fear  them ; 
and  even  in  such  a  case  it  would  seem  that  the 
proper  thing  to  do  is  to  displace  the  corrupt  or 
feeble  government — peaceably  if  possible,  forcibly, 
if  necessary  —  and  inaugurate  a  magistracy  which 
will  be  “a  terror  to  evil  doers  and  a  praise  to 
them  that  do  well.” 

On  the  principle  that  the  life  of  an  aggressor 
may  be  taken  when  necessary  to  protect  the  life 
of  another,  for  the  same  reason  'that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  magistrate  to  protect  when  needful  the  lives 
of  his  subjects  by  the  death  of  rioters,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  government  to  resort  to  arms  when 
another  country  assumes  towards  it  a  warlike  atti¬ 
tude,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  citizens  to  sustain  the 


1 1 8 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


government  in  so  doing.  Of  course  it  is  not  re¬ 
quired  that  the  government  wait  till  a  foreign 
invasion  has  actually  taken  place  ;  it  is  enough  to 
know  that  the  lives  of  its  subjects  are  in  peril. 
When  satisfactory  evidence  of  actual  peril  exists, 
warlike  measures  may  and  ought  to  be  adopted, 
and  the  individual  citizen  is  morally  bound  to  do 
what  may  be  necessary  for  him  to  do,  not  only  to 
protect  his  own  life,  but  also,  as  he  is  bound  to 
love  his  neighbor  as  himself,  to  protect  his  neigh¬ 
bor’s  life. 

So  far  all  are  agreed.  Life  may  be  taken  when 
necessary  for  the  defense  and  protection  of  life  : 
first,  and  always,  by  the  government,  when  it  is  in 
the  power  of  government  to  provide  the  requisite 
protection ;  and,  second,  by  the  individual  citizen 
or  citizens,  when  in  the  absence  of  the  govern¬ 
mental  power  there  is  no  defense  except  in  their 
own  hands. 

But  it  is  asked,  May  not  a  man  be  justified  in 
taking  life  for  some  other  reasons  than  the  defense 
of  his  own  life  ?  and  may  not  a  nation  make  war 
for  other  reasons  than  to  defend  the  lives  of  its 
subjects  ?  Does  not  a  man  forfeit  his  right  to  life 
in  other  ways  than  by  assault  with  intent  to  kill  ? 

It  is  usually  said  that  a  man  forfeits  his  life 
not  only  by  murder  and  by  attempting  the  life  of 
another,  but  also  by  attempting  house-breaking  or 
robbery  in  the  night,  and  by  resisting  the  officers 


MORALITY. 


119 

of  the  law.  And  it  is  said  that  nations  may  make 
war  to  defend  the  honor  of  the  government,  or  to 
protect  the  liberties  and  the  property  of  its  sub¬ 
jects.  That  is  to  say,  personal  liberty  and  prop¬ 
erty  are  natural  rights,  which  under  some  circum¬ 
stances  may  be  put  in  the  same  category  as  the 
natural  right  to  life,  and  be  defended  even  at  the 
same  cost.  Is  this  so  ?  A  robber  with  presented 
pistol  demands  my  money  or  my  life  ;  no  matter, 
so  far  as  I  can  see  in  respect  to  the  present  ques¬ 
tion,  whether  in  the  night  or  by  day,  whether 
within  my  house  or  far  out  on  an  open  uninhabited 
plain.  Now,  suppose  it  is  manifestly  in  my  power 
to  fire  first,  am  I  morally  bound  to  do  so  ?  if  I 
do,  am  I  justified?  Most  men  answer  yes,  very 
promptly  and  very  confidently.  It  is,  however, 
manifest  that  they  do  so  assuming  that  the  alter¬ 
native  is  between  my  life  and  the  life  of  the  robber ; 
but  the  supposition  I  make  puts  the  alternative 
between  delivering  up  my  property  or  taking  the 
robber’s  life. 

May  I  take  life  to  save  my  property  ?  May  a 
nation  make  war  to  avoid  an  unjust  tribute  ?  I 
know  of  but  two  ways  to  answer  these  questions. 
The  one  is  to  inquire,  What  say  the  Scriptures? 
They  certainly  speak  of  other  crimes  as  “worthy 
of  death”  besides  the  crime  of  murder,  and  they 
certainly  approve  other  than  purely  defensive  wars ; 
and  that  this  is  not  peculiar  to  Old  Testament  times 


120 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


is  manifest,  among  other  New  Testament  allu¬ 
sions  and  references,  from  St.  Paul’s  recognition 
of  crimes  other  than  murder  as  worthy  of  death. 
The  other  method  of  reply  to  our  present  inquiry 
is  to  turn  to  our  fundamental  question,  and  inquire 
which  course  of  conduct  will  produce  the  greatest 
good.  Certainly  it  is  not  possible  for  human  wis¬ 
dom  to  determine  whether  the  surrender  of  prop¬ 
erty  or  the  taking  of  life  in  the  case  supposed 
accords  best  with  an  eternal  principle  of  right ; 
but  we  may  possibly  be  able  to  form  a  judgment, 
reliable  as  a  guide  in  the  case,  as  to  which  of  the 
two  alternatives  promises  the  greatest  good  to  the 
greatest  number.  Now,  were  it  well  understood, 
in  popular  opinion,  in  civil  and  ecclesiastical  juris¬ 
prudence,  that  no  man  or  nation  has  the  right  in 
any  circumstances  to  defend  property  by  taking 
the  life  of  assailants,  and  that  no  well-disposed 
person  would  ever  do  so,  it  is  plain  to  our  thought 
that  a  necessary  security  for  the  natural  right  of 
property  would  be  wanting.  To  place  such  an 
opinion  effectually  and  fully  in  the  public  mind 
would  be  to  remove  the  foundations  of  the  social 
structure  ;  it  would  plunder  the  race  of  an  inviola¬ 
ble  right,  and  deprive  it  of  one  of  the  most  ef¬ 
fectual  means  of  securing  the  highest  good. 

We  say,  then,  there  are  crimes  by  which  a  man 
may  forfeit  his  right  to  life  other  than  the  crime 
of  an  intent  to  kill.  There  are  other  purposes,  for 


MORALITY. 


I  2  I 


which  an  individual  may  take  life,  and  a  nation 
may  make  war,  than  the  purpose  of  defending  life. 

The  difficulties  in  the  case  lie  in  the  fact  that 
the  justification  is  found  in  the  circumstances ;  and 
the  judgment  as  to  what  those  circumstances  jus¬ 
tify  is  to  be  made  by  imperfect  men,  who  are 
themselves  deeply  interested  parties. 

No  specific  rules  can  be  given  to  guide  human 
conduct  in  such  cases.  The  greatest  good  is  here, 
as  in  all  human  actions,  to  be  the  governing  mo¬ 
tive  ,  and  here,  as  every-where  else,  what  is  pro¬ 
motive  of  that  greatest  good  is  right.  To  deter¬ 
mine  the  tendencies  of  conduct  is  the  great 
practical  question  submitted  to  human  judgments 
for  decision.  And  here  is  the  reason  why'  so 
many  of  the  wars  which  have  desolated  the  earth 
have  been  waged  without  just  cause,  and  why  of 
so  many  more  it  may  be  questioned  whether  they 
were  morally  justified.  War  without  just  cause  is 
an  enormous  crime  ;  but,  when  necessary  for  the 
proper  protection  of  natural  rights,  may  be  morally 
binding  both  upon  magistrate  and  citizens  as  a 
duty  due  to  their  fellow-men. 

But  it  must  be  distinctly  understood,  and  al¬ 
ways  kept  in  mind,  that  violent  resistance  in  any 
form  and  in  any  degree,  most  especially  resistance 
unto  blood,  when  justified,  always  presupposes  a 
manifested  purpose  on  the  part  of  assailants  to 
violate  our  rights  by  force.  So  that  in  all  cases 


122 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


of  violent  conflict  one  party  or  the  other,  or  both 
of  them,  must  be  held  guilty  and  responsible  for 
the  enormous  evils  which  always  attend  such  con¬ 
flicts.  Plainly,  differences  of  opinion  in  respect 
to  rights  which  can  not  be  settled  by  the  parties 
concerned  are,  according  to  Christian  principles, 
to  be  referred  to  disinterested  parties  for  settle¬ 
ment,  either  by  arbitration  or  by  the  decisions 
of  legally  constituted  courts  of  law.  For  the  set¬ 
tlement  of  private  differences  provisions  exist  in 
all  civilized  countries.  Perhaps  even  here  arbi¬ 
tration  is  better.  For  national  differences  arbitra¬ 
tion  may  always  be  resorted  to ;  and  if  legal 
processes  are  preferable,  an  international  court  or 
a  congress  of  nations  could  be  easily  established. 
Therefore,  we  repeat  that  violent  assault  between 
individuals,  and  war  between  nations  is  always  a 
crime,  for  which  one  party  or  both  are  responsible. 
If  both  parties  are  content  to  settle  differences  by 
arbitration,  of  course  there  will  be  no  conflict ;  if 
one  party  is,  and  the  other  is  not,  so  disposed, 
then  the  party  refusing  to  arbitrate,  and  mani¬ 
festing  its  purpose  of  violent  assault,  is  guilty  of, 
and  responsible  for,  all  that  follows.  If  both  par¬ 
ties  refuse  arbitration,  and  contemporaneously  pur¬ 
pose  and  prepare  for  violence,  then  both  are 
guilty,  no  matter  which  is  in  the  right  as  to  the 
questions  of  difference. 

Americans  justify  the  war  of  the  Revolution 


MORALITY. 


123 


among  other  reasons  as  a  necessary  means  of 
protecting  the  right  of  property  ;  taxation  without 
representation  is  regarded  as  an  injustice  to  be 
repelled  even  at  the*  expense  of  shedding  blood. 
The  war  of  1812  was  chiefly  a  defense  of  personal 
liberty ;  the  impressment  of  sailors  on  American 
vessels  by  British  authority  was  considered  a  viola¬ 
tion  of  a  natural  right.  The  recent  war  was  for 
the  protection  of  the  government ;  to  dissever  the 
union  of  the  States  was  regarded  as  rebellion 
against  lawful  authority,  to  be  resisted  for  the 
same  reason  that  riotous  assaults  and  mob  violence 
are  to  be  resisted. 

When  governments  become  oppressive,  and 
the  people  have  reasonable  grounds  for  the  expec¬ 
tation  of  success,  it  is  judged  they  have  a  natural 
right  to  resist  the  powers  that  be,  and  inaugurate 
a  new  state  of  things  and  another  sovereignty  ; 
that  is,  revolution  is  justifiable  when  the  people 
have  reasonable  expectations  of  success  in  resist¬ 
ing  an  oppressive  and  unjust  government. 

We  do  not  deem  it  needful  either  in  this  or 
any  other  connection  to  discuss  the  practices  of 
duelling  or  suicide  ;  they  are  obviously  enormous 
sins  against  our  fellow-men,  and  against  God — in 
every  case,  idiots  and  lunatics  excepted,  the  duel¬ 
ist,  the  suicide,  is  a  murderer. 

Duties  to  men  as  men,  (b.)  As  to  their  Right 
to  Liberty. — The  idea  of  liberty  here  is  not  free- 


124 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


dom  of  will,  liberty  to  choose,  but  freedom  of 
action,  liberty  to  do  as  we  choose ;  it  may  be 
regarded  as  physical,  intellectual,  or  religious. 
Physical  liberty  is  freedom  from  constraint  by 
another  in  doing,  in  all  outward  acts,  as  we  choose. 
We  have  physical  liberty  when  we  may  work  or 
be  idle  ;  work  at  one  employment  or  another,  go 
or  stay,  travel  in  this  direction  or  its  opposite  ;  in 
a  word,  do  in  all  physical  acts  without  restraint  as 
we  please.  We  are  free  intellectually  when  we 
may  without  compulsion,  as  we  please,  read  or 
remain  ignorant,  study  one  branch  of  knowledge 
or  another,  entertain  an  opinion  or  its  opposite, 
publish  our  thoughts  or  be  silent,  publish  one  set 
of  opinions  or  another.  We  have  religious  liberty 
when  at  our  own  option  we  may  worship  or  neg¬ 
lect  it,  may  worship  in  one  form  or  another,  may 
adopt  and  abet  this,  that,  or  the  other  creed,  or 
reject  all  creeds  ;  in  a  word,  may,  as  we  choose,  be 
religious  or  irreligious.  That  this  liberty,  provided 
always  that  its  exercise  does  not  interfere  with 
the  rights  of  others,  is  a  natural  and  inalienable 
right,  is  evident,  first,  from  the  teaching  of  the 
Scriptures.  The  precept  which  requires  all  men 
to  do  unto  others  as  they  would  that  others  should 
do  unto  them,  involves  this ;  for  every  man  regards 
personal  liberty  as  a  right  second  only  to  his  right 
to  life  ;  we  can  not,  therefore,  love  our  neighbor  as 
ourselves,  unless  we  leave  every  man  in  full  pos- 


MORALITY. 


125 


session  of  his  physical,  intellectual,  and  religious 
liberty,  and  so  far  forth  as  we  have  ability  and 
need  require,  aid  him  in  defending  and  maintaining 
this  natural  right.  To  deprive  a  man  of  his  per¬ 
sonal  liberty  disqualifies  him  for  the  discharge  of 
many  duties  required  in  the  Scriptures — as,  for 
example,  the  duty  of  parents  to  educate  their  chil¬ 
dren.  Slavery  annihilates  domestic  relations,  and 
takes,  as  it  chooses,  from  the  parent  all  authority 

0 

and  control  over  his  household.  It  claims  also  the 
right  to  dictate  and  limit,  at  its  pleasure,  educa¬ 
tional  advantages  and  religious  privileges.  That 
personal  liberty  is  a  natural  and  inalienable  right 
is  evident,  secondly,  because  it  is  essential  to  the 
security  of  man’s  highest  good.  Liberty  is  not, 
in  this  respect,  equal  to  life,  for  to  deprive  man 
of  life  is  to  deprive  him  of  all  the  good  continu¬ 
ance  in  life  could  confer,  and  man,  even  in  slavery, 
can  secure  to  himself  some  earthly  good — can,  to 
some  extent,  secure  the  end  of  life ;  but  when  de¬ 
prived  of  his  personal  liberty  his  highest  possible 
good  becomes  to  him  an  impossibility.  This  same 
truth  is  evident,  thirdly,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  the 
common  judgment  of  mankind,  “We  hold  these 
truths  to  be  self-evident,  that  all  men  are  created 
equal ;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator 
with  certain  inalienable  rights  ;  that  among  these 
are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.” 
Some,  indeed,  profess  to  think  otherwise,  and 


126 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


claim  that  they  are  born  to  govern,  while  others 
are  born  to  serve  ;  but  all  proffered  arguments  by 
which  attempts  are  made  to  sustain  such  a  posi¬ 
tion  are  fallacious  ;  sophisms  and  special  pleadings 
are  all  the  defenses  the  advocates  of  such  a  doc¬ 
trine  have  at  their  command.  In  our  country  the 
time  has  passed  in  which,  even  in  appearance, 
it  seems  necessary  to  show  the  fallacy  of  these 
alleged  arguments  for  slavery.  We  pass  them  all 
in  silence  as  undeserving  of  serious  attention,  and 
assume  that,  a  selfish  interest  aside,  all  men  accept 
as  axiomatic  the  affirmation  that  personal  liberty 
is  a  natural  right.  Fourthly,  the  opposite  of  this 
doctrine  is  absurd  or  self-contradictory.  If  all 
men  are  not  equally  entitled  to  personal  liberty  the 
difference  must  be  founded  upon  something.  No 
other  thing  can  claim  to  be  the  basis  of  an  ine¬ 
quality  of  right  except  inequality  of  condition ;  but 
if  inequality  of  condition  confer  inequality  in  right, 
then  rights  would  perpetually  conflict  and  mu¬ 
tually  destroy  each  other  ;  rights  founded  upon  su¬ 
periority  in  physical  strength  would  destroy  those 
founded  upon  intellectual  superiority,  and  these,  in 
turn,  annihilate  those  founded  upon  physical  supe¬ 
riority,  and  so  on  to  the  end  of  the  chapter. 

The  general  doctrine  is  as  stated  above  :  every 
man  has  a  natural  and  inalienable  right  to  himself, 
to  his  whole  person,  body  and  mind,  to  do  or  not 
to  do,  to  do  this  or  to  do  that,  as  he  chooses,  and 


MORALITY. 


127 


this  right  he  has  to  himself  is  equal  to  the  right 
any  man  has  to  himself,  provided,  in  all  cases,  the 
exercise  of  this  right  does  not  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  his  neighbor. 

The  difficulties  in  interpreting  and  exercising 
this  right  may  be  obviated  ;  the  objections  to  its 
existence  and  exercise  may  be  answered,  and  the 
exceptions,  limitations,  and  violations  defined  by  an 
intelligent  application  of  the  proviso.  The  right 
has  no  exception  or  limitation,  is  exposed  to  no  ob¬ 
jection  or  violation  so  long  as  the  rights  of  others 
are  duly  respected.  Parents  are  obligated  to  care 
for  their  children  ;  they  have,  therefore,  a  right  to 
control  them  during  their  dependence,  and  for  a 
time  afterwards,  as  a  remuneration  for  the  care 
and  expense  of  training.  Disobedience  to  par¬ 
ents,  then,  during  minority,  is  a  violation  of  the 
parents’  rights.  The  parent  may  transfer  his  right 
of  control,  as  in  the  case  of  indentured  appren¬ 
ticeship.  A  man  may,  for  a  consideration,  dispose 
of  his  services,  become  a  servant  for  wages ;  but  as 
this  is  his  own  voluntary  disposal,  the  restrictions 
to  his  natural  liberties  is  no  violation  of  his  rights. 

It  is  objected  that  if  a  man  be  allowed  unre¬ 
strained  physical  liberty  he  may  be  idle  and  come 
to  want.  We  reply,  to  some  extent,  in  some  cases, 
he  may  do  this  without  interference  of  others’ 
rights  ;  and,  in  such  cases,  the  remedy  is  starva¬ 
tion.  Within  limits,  it  is  ordained  that  he  that 


128 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


will  not  work  neither  shall  he  eat ;  but  as  gov 
ernment  is  established  by  divine  authority,  and  is 
required  to  make  provision  for  the  poor  and  des¬ 
titute,  it  has  the  right  to  protect  itself  against 
unnecessary  pauperism  by  restricting  the  liberty 
of  idlers  and  compelling  them  to  labor. 

It  is  again  objected,  that  if  men  are  allowed 
intellectual  liberty  without  restraint,  they  will  neg¬ 
lect  the  means  of  culture  and  remain  in  ignorance 
and  barbarism.  The  reply  is  the  same  as  above, 
so  far  forth  as  their  ignorance  is  no  violation  of 
others’  rights  it  is  their  right,  if  they  so  choose,  to 
remain  ignorant ;  but  so  far  forth  as  a  divinely 
instituted  government  requires  intelligence  in  the 
citizen,  it  is  the  right  of  government  to  control  the 
education  of  its  subjects  to  the  extent  of  compul¬ 
sory  education.  The  same  principle  applies  to 
religious  liberty;  a  man  may  be  irreligious,  even 
profane  and  wicked  to  any  extent  he  may  choose, 
provided  his  wickedness  does  not  interfere  with  his 
neighbor’s  rights  ;  his  accountability  in  such  a  case 
is  unto  God  and  not  unto  men  ;  but  so  far  forth 
as  the  essential  good  of  community  requires,  it  is 
the  right  of  government,  being  made  by  divine 
authority  the  conservator  of  the  essential  good  of 
the  commonwealth,  to  restrain  religious  liberties 
within  the  limits  required  by  the  public  good. 
Hence  slanderous,  blasphemous,  licentious,  and 
treasonable  words  and  publications  are  to  be  pro- 


MORALITY. 


129 

hibited,  and  the  crime  of  uttering  them  made  pun¬ 
ishable  by  law. 

Does  any  one  here  interpose  a  counter  objection 
that,  such  restraints  being  allowed,  the  govern¬ 
ment  will  be  liable  to  restrict  freedom  of  opinion 
and  the  liberty  of  the  press,  place  restraints  upon 
conscience,  and  interfere  with  religious  rights  ? 
We  reply,  This  is  possible,  even  quite  probable  in 
many  cases,  and  hence  it  is  incumbent  upon  the 
moralist  to  insist  as  strenuously  that  community 
shall  respect  the  rights  of  the  individual  as  he 
does  that  the  individual  shall  respect  the  rights 
of  his  neighbors. 

The  protection  of  individual  rights  against  in¬ 
fringement  by  the  government  is  well  secured  by 
the  right  of  trial  by  jury  and  of  an  appeal.  The 
limitations  of  governmental  authority  in  respect  to 
personal  liberty  are  well  defined,  and  generally 
understood.  A  man  may  not  be  deprived  of 
physical  liberty,  either  by  imprisonment  or  re¬ 
straint,  except  for  crime  of  which  he  has  been 
convicted  after  fair  and  impartial  trial ;  he  may  be 
detained  for  trial  under  legally  attested  accusation. 
Governmental  restraints  upon  intellectual  and  re¬ 
ligious  liberty  are  of  more  difficult  adjustment. 
When  an  individual  is  accused  of  slander,  treason, 
or  blasphemy,  or  of  publishing  what  is  licentious 
or  otherwise  destructive  of  public  morals,  it  is 
doubtless  ^difficult  in  many  cases  to  determine  to 


I3Q 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


what  extent  legal  interference  is  requisite.  When 
the  injured  have  themselves  the  means  of  repelling 
the  injury,  as  when  error  is  published  which  may 
be  refuted  by  argument,  legal  interference  is  rather 
an  injury  than  a  benefit.  In  all  cases  where  free 
discussion  is  adequate  protection,  an  open  field, 
and  fair  play  is  all  that  need  be  demanded.  But 
in  all  other  cases  it  is  obvious  that  the  government 
is  under  most  solemn  obligation  to  interfere  and 
punish  this  whole  class  of  crimes  with  uncompro¬ 
mising  severity.  A  man's  religious  liberty  may 
not  be  interfered  with  except  when  he  so  uses  it 
as  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of  others  ;  so  that 
manifestly  government  has  no  authority  in  matters 
of  religion  except  to  secure  its  own  rights  and  to 
prevent  its  subjects  from  interfering  with  each 
other’s  rights. 

Duties  to  men  as  men,  (7)  As  to  the  Right  of 
Property.  The  right  of  property  is  the  right  to 
use  something  in  such  a  manner  as  I  choose.  Duty 
to  others  in  respect  to  this  is  easily  understood  by 
reference  to  our  own  convictions  respecting  this 
right  as  it  applies  to  what  we  call  our  own. 

We  have,  concerning  certain  things,  an  intui¬ 
tive  conviction  that  they  are  ours  in  a  sense  that 
is  exclusive  ;  we  feel  we  have  a  right  to  appropri¬ 
ate  them  as  we  choose,  and  that  no  other  person 
has  any  similar  right  to  the  same  things.  This 
feeling  arises  in  childhood  long  before  it  could  be 


MORALITY. 


131 

created  by  any  process  of  education.  We  also 
feel  a  sense  of  injustice  when  these  things  are 
taken  from  us  without  our  consent,  or  with  our 
consent  forcibly  or  fraudulently  obtained.  Con¬ 
temporaneous  with  this  feeling  of  injustice  towards 
ourselves,  we  feel  a  sentiment  of  righteous  indig¬ 
nation  towards  those  who  thus  injure  us.  Our 
nature  prompts  us  instinctively  to  resist,  to  the 
extent  of  our  ability,  any  attempt  to  defraud  us  of 
what  we  feel  righteously  belongs  to  us  ;  and  that 
our  fellow-men  are  morally  bound  to  sustain  us  as 
far  as  need  be  in  this  resistance.  That  is  to  say, 
we  feel  that  all  men  are  morally  bound  to  respect 
our  right  to  the  things  we  possess,  and  to  assist 
us  as  need  be  in  defending  such  right.  Hence,  our 
duty  to  others  is  reciprocally  to  respect  and  defend 
their  property  rights. 

On  what  ground  do  we  affirm  the  obligation  to 
respect  and  defend  the  right  of  property?  First, 
because  the  Holy  Scriptures  recognize  this  right 
as  sacred,  natural,  and  exclusive.  Nowhere  in  the 
Bible  is  the  right  of  property  denied,  and  nowhere 
is  it  referred  to  as  a  human  device.  Two  of  the 
ten  commandments  presuppose  it,  and  a  large  part 
of  the  Word  of  God  refers  to  it  either  directly  or 
remotely.  All  Bible  injunctions  respecting  frugal¬ 
ity  and  economy,  honesty  in  trade,  promptness  in 
the  payment  of  debts,  hospitality  towards  stran¬ 
gers,  and  charity  to  the  poor ;  all  denunciations 


132 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


and  threatenings  of  punishments  for  covetousness, 
for  dishonesty  in  deal,  for  theft  and  robbery,  for 
selfishness  in  respect  to  the  meum  and  tuum  in  all 
its  various  forms ;  all  these  injunctions,  both  of 
requirement  and  denunciation,  plainly  teach  or 
necessarily  imply  that  the  right  to  property  is  a 
natural  right,  and  that  it  is  God’s  will  that  men 
should  sacredly  regard  it  and  rigorously  defend  it. 

Second,  that  to  respect  and  defend  the  right 
of  property  is  morally  binding  is  clearly  evinced 
from  the  obvious  fact  that  it  is  essential  to  the 
well-being  of  the  individual  and  of  society. 

If  a  man  has  no  exclusive  right  to  what  he 
produces  all  motive  to  economy  and  frugal  fore¬ 
sight  is  removed,  and  industry  is  restricted  to  pro¬ 
vision  for  the  present.  In  such  a  case  accumu¬ 
lation  would  not  occur,  there  would  be  neither 
tools  nor  capital,  and  man  would  be  left  with  noth¬ 
ing  but  his  teeth  and  claws  to  provide  for  his  ne¬ 
cessities.  Let  all  ideas  of  property  die  out  of  the 
minds  of  men,  and  the  race  would  speedily  sink  to 
barbarism,  and  then  to  extinction.  In  all  ages  of 
the  world,  among  all  the  peoples  dwelling  upon 
the  face  of  the  earth,  man’s  progress  toward  per¬ 
fection  and  the  public  regard  for  the  right  of 
property  have  ever  kept  even  pace,  and  been  in 
exact  proportion  the  one  to  the  other. 

The  arguments  adduced  by  communists  and 
others  for  a  community  of  goods  are  fallacies. 


MORALITY. 


133 


The  inference  from  the  fact  that  the,  disciples  at 
Jerusalem  immediately  after  Pentecost  had  all 
things  in  common,  proves  nothing  in  favor  of  a 
universal  community  of  goods,  for  the  facts  of 
history  prove  that  this  was  limited  to  the  Jerusa¬ 
lem  Church,  and  continued  only  a  short  time. 
Furthermore,  the  address  to  Ananias  supposes 
that  his  property  was  his,  subject  to  his  exclusive 
control,  and  that  his  sin  consisted  not  in  withhold¬ 
ing  what  did  not  belong  to  him,  but  in  pretending 
to  donate  what  he  withheld.  Again,  the  contribu¬ 
tion  made  by  the  Gentile  Churches  for  the  poor 
at  Jerusalem  implies  one  of  two  things,  either  that 
they  continued  to  have  all  things  in  common  and 
had  all  become  paupers,  which  is  a  poor  recom¬ 
mendation  of  communism,  or  that  there  was  at 
Jerusalem  at  that  time  a  financial  distinction  be¬ 
tween  the  poor  and  others.  Again,  the  utter  fail¬ 
ure,  at  all  times  and  among  all  people,  of  all 
attempts  to  annihilate  the  private  right  to  property 
evinces  the  futility,  fallacy,  and  falseness  of  the 
system. 

The  affirmation  that  capital  is  a  malicious  con¬ 
spiracy  against  labor  is  a  most  patent  error ;  for 
even  though  capitalists  were  malicious — the  as¬ 
sumption  that  they  are  is  evidently  an  atrocious 
slander — but  even  if  they  were,  the  interests  of 
capital  and  labor  are  by  the  necessities  of  the  case 
so  thoroughly  and  perfectly  identified  that  such  a 


134 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


conspiracy  would  be  suicidal.  It  is  for  the  inter¬ 
est  of  capital  that  labor  be  sufficiently  remunera¬ 
tive  to  attract  and  satisfy  laborers.  When  laborers 
are  few  capital  must  be  idle  ;  when  labor  is  unre¬ 
warded  it  is  imperfectly  done,  and  capital  so  em¬ 
ployed  is  employed  at  a  loss. 

The  assumption  that  loving  one’s  neighbor  as 
we  love  ourselves  requires  that  we  be  as  willing 
that  our  neighbor  enjoy  the  products  of  our  labor 
as  that  we  enjoy  it  ourselves  is  sheer  nonsense ; 
for  such  a  state  of  mind  is  neither  loving  our 
neighbor  as  ourselves  nor  better  than  ourselves — 
it  is  loving  neither,  but  injuring  both. 

The  conduct  of  the  apostles  in  respect  to  a 
community  of  goods  proves  that  the  practice  is 
not  unlawful ;  that  if  a  company  of  persons  choose 
to  establish  such  a  partnership  they  do  not  thereby 
necessarily  commit  sin.  Perhaps  it  proves  more, 
even, — that  under  some  conditions  of  life  such  a 
partnership  may  be  to  a  small  number  temporarily 
advantageous. 

We  hold  that  under  any  condition  of  general 
society  that  has  ever  yet  obtained  among  men,  or 
is  ever  likely  to  obtain,  to  annihilate  the  right  an 
individual  has  to  the  products  of  his  own  labor  is 
to  do  him  an  injustice  and  to  inflict  a  positive  det¬ 
riment  upon  society. 

The  right  to  property  may  be  acquired,  first, 
directly  by  the  gift  of  God .  A  man  who  enters 


MORALITY. 


135 


upon  unappropriated  lands  and  continues  to  oc¬ 
cupy  and  improve  the  same,  acquires  thereby  a 
right  to  said  lands  that  is  exclusive  of  all  others, 
which  right  he  may  transfer  by  gift  or  sale.  If  he 
leave  without  a  transfer  of  his  right,  the  lands 
then  become  unappropriated,  and  may  be  entered 
upon  by  others ;  but  while  he  or  his  successors 
remain  in  actual  possession  they  may  not  be  dis¬ 
turbed.  Suppose  a  savage  take  possession  of  un¬ 
appropriated  lands,  and  because  it  requires  a  thou¬ 
sand  acres  to  support  by  hunting  and  fishing  him 
and  those  dependent  upon  him,  does  he  thereby 
acquire  a  right  to  said  thousand  acres  which  will 
exclude  ten  civilized  men  who,  by  agricultural  and 
other  civilized  pursuits,  can  support  themselves 
and  families  by  the  products  of  the  same  thousand 
acres  ?  Perhaps  all  will  say,  at  once,  he  has  ac¬ 
quired  a  right,  and  that  the  civilized  man  may  not 
dispossess  him  of  any  portion  of  the  thousand 
acres  without  paying  him  what  wild  lands  are 
worth  to  a  savage.  But  suppose  the  savage  un¬ 
willing,  for  any  price,  to  relinquish  his  right,  may 
he  be  compelled  to  do  so  ?  This  is  a  difficult 
question,  for,  on  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  said  no 
man  can,  without  injustice,  be  deprived  of  any 
right,  whatever  it  be,  without  his  consent ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  may  be  said  that  when  barba¬ 
rism  and  civilization  come  face  to  face,  so  that  one 
or  the  other  must  yield,  it  is  evidently  God’s  will 


1 36 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


that  the  former  give  place  ;  and,  plainly,  it  is  for 
the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number  that  it 
should  so  be. 

The  right  of  property  may  be  acquired,  sec¬ 
ondly,  directly  by  labor .  Whatever  is  the  pro¬ 
ducts  of  one’s  own  labor  is  his  to  the  exclusion 
of  all  others.  When  products  are  the  resultants 
of  combined  labor  each  party  is  evidently  entitled 
to  only  that  part  of  the  product  which  his  own 
labor  has  produced.  Capital  is  the  result  of  past 
labor ;  when,  therefore,  the  laborer  uses  the  capital 
of  another,  he  and  the  capitalist  must  share  the 
product  in  just  proportion  to  the  labor  each  has 
bestowed.  In  the  arrangements  of  civilized  so¬ 
ciety  the  just  distribution  of  products  among  labor¬ 
ers  and  capitalists  has  been,  in  all  ages,  and  is 
still,  a  question  of  great  difficulty.  We  have  not 
the  assurance  to  attempt  the  solution  of  a  prob¬ 
lem  which  the  philosophers  and  statesmen  of  the 
a^es  have  failed  to  solve. 

The  right  of  property  may  be  acquired,  thirdly, 
indirectly  by  exchange ,  by  gift ,  by  will ,  by  inher¬ 
itance,  by  accession,  and  by  possession.  When  one 
delivers  property  to  another  for  a  consideration,  it 
is  called  exchange  ;  if  he  receive  other  commodi¬ 
ties,  it  is  barter ;  if  money,  sale ;  when  he  dis¬ 
poses  of  his  property  without  a  consideration,  it  is 
a  gift ;  when  he  directs  as  to  the  disposition  of  his 
property  after  his  death,  his  heirs  are  said  to 


MORALITY. 


137 


acquire  their  right  by  will.  If  a  man  die  without  a 
will,  being  possessed  of  property,  the  government 
divides  his  estate,  as  it  supposes  he  would  have 
done  had  he  made  a  will ;  that  is,  the  law  de¬ 
termines  who  are  his  heirs,  and  they  are  said 
to  acquire  their  right  by  inheritance.  Whatever 
value  one’s  property  produces  is  his ;  the  fruits  of 
the  earth,  the  increase  of  animals,  alluvions  or  de¬ 
posits  of  earth  by  natural  causes — and  this  is 
called  property  acquired  by  accession.  If  a  man 
have  had  peaceable  possession  of  property  for  a 
term  of  years  fixed  by  law,  no  matter  how  posses¬ 
sion  was  obtained  originally,  he  has  thus  acquired 
a  right  that  excludes  all  others  ;  he  may  not  have 
a  moral  right  to  the  property,  but  his  peaceable 
possession  imposes  upon  all  others  the  moral  obli¬ 
gation  to  leave  him  undisturbed.  In  such  cases 
the  right  of  property  is  said  to  be  acquired  by 
possession. 

Justice,  in  respect  to  property,  requires  that 
all  transfers  be  with  the  full  and  free  consent  of 
the  owners,  and  that  his  consent  be  obtained  by 
a  full  and  truthful  representation  of  the  consider¬ 
ation  offered.  The  right  of  property,  therefore,  is 
violated  by  robbery,  by  burglary,  by  theft,  by 
fraud,  by  cheating,  and  by  false  pretenses. 

Robbery  is  taking  property  with  the  consent 
of  the  owner  violently  obtained,  and  is,  therefore, 
a  violation  of  both  the  rights  of  person  and 


138 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


of  property.  Burglary  is  forcibly  taking  goods 
by  house-breaking  at  night,  and  is  a  violation 
of  the  rights  of  security  and  property.  Theft 
is  taking  property  without  the  consent  of  the 
owner  with  no  violence,  and  is  a  violation  of  the 
right  of  property  solely.  If  property  be  taken, 
and  the  consent  of  the  owner  be  obtained  by 
forged  paper,  it  is  fraud ;  if  by  concealment  or 
misrepresentation  the  owner  is  ignorant  of  the 
consideration  offered,  it  is  cheating ;  if  consent  be 
obtained  by  lying  or  deception,  without  an  equiva¬ 
lent,  it  is  obtaining  property  by  false  pretenses. 

When  the  owner’s  consent  may  k  be  fairly  pre¬ 
sumed,  as  when  a  passer-by  takes  an  apple  for  his 
own  eating  from  an  orchard,  or  in  some  cases 
where  spontaneous  fruits  are  so  abundant  as  that 
the  market  price  is  only  sufficient  to  pay  for  the 
gathering  and  transportation ;  in  a  word,  where 
the  taker  is  willing  the  owner  should  know  of  his 
taking,  by  common  consent  this  is  not  considered 
theft.  Taking  food  to  preserve  life,  even  if  con¬ 
sidered  of  doubtful  morality,  is  very  generally  ex¬ 
cused.  The  most  common  cases  of  the  violation 
of  the  right  of  property,  and  perhaps  the  only  ones 
requiring  discussion  in  works  on  ethics,  are  gam¬ 
bling,  speculating,  and  cheating. 

In  gambling  property  is  transferred  by  an  ap¬ 
peal  to  chance,  without  any  equivalent  given  or 
received.  In  some  games  of  chance  there  is  an 


MORALITY. 


139 


opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  skill,  and  in  betting 
there  is  oftentimes  opportunity  for  the  exercise 
of  judgment;  but  neither  skill  nor  judgment  modify 
the  case  when  the  essential  elements  of  o-ambline 
are  present ;  namely,  an  appeal  to  chance  for  the 
transfer  of  property  without  an  equivalent  either 
given  or  received.  When  an  association  owns 
property  which  must  be  sold  to  be  of  any  value 
to  the  association,  and  no  one  is  willing  to  pay  for 
the  article  its  full  value,  then  the  members  may 
individually  contribute  in  shares  the  full  value  of 
the  article,  and  determine  by  lot  who  shall  pos¬ 
sess  it.  Here  the  contributors  receive  an  equiva¬ 
lent  in  the  benefit  conferred  upon  the  association. 
The  money  paid  for  shares  is  a  voluntary  con¬ 
tribution  to  the  common  cause ;  if,  however,  any 
one  is  moved  to  the  purchase  by  the  hope  of 
gaining  the  prize,  the  benevolence  of  his  contribu¬ 
tion  is  vitiated  by  the  motive  which  prompts  it,  he 
is,  in  that  transaction,  guilty  of  gambling. 

That  an  appeal  to  chance  for  the  gain  or  loss 
of  property,  in  the  entire  absence  of  an  equivalent 
for  what  is  exchanged,  is  wholly  vicious  and  always 
so,  is  evident  from  the  terrible  ruin  wrought  by 
gambling,  from  the  character  and  intensity  of  the 
passions  it  excites  and  from  the  large  catalogue 
of  enormous  crimes  with  which  gambling*  almost 
universally  keeps  company. 

Speculation . — The  market  value  of  well-nigh  all 


140 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


kinds  of  property  is  at  one  time  or  another  subject 
to  great  variations.  By  investing  funds  in  prop¬ 
erty  whose  price  in  the  market  is  fluctuating  there 
is  a  possibility  of  speedy  and,  oftentimes,  of  great 
gains ;  and  also,  on  the  other  hand,  at  the  same 
time  a  possibility  of  sudden  and  ruinous  losses. 
If  a  man  has  funds  which  he  can  afford  to  lose, 
which  he  can  lose  without  damage  to  his  regular 
business,  and  without  periling  his  ability  to  provide 
for  his  household,  and  educate  his  children,  he 
may  invest  those  surplus  funds  in  property  of  this 
kind.  This  is  innocent  speculation,  and  may  often¬ 
times  prove  a  fortunate  investment.  But  where 
a  man  perils  his  livelihood  and  the  well-being  of 
his  dependents,  and  especially  where  he  perils 
other  people’s  property  by  borrowing  funds  and 
investing  them  in  speculations  he  commits  an 
egregious  crime.  Especially  in  the  latter  case, 
wherein  he  takes  his  neighbor’s  funds,  and  so  em¬ 
ploys  them  that  his  neighbor  runs  all  risks  and  he 
pockets  all  gains,  he  does  what  a  perfectly  honest 
man  will  never  do.  Is  it  said  his  creditors  in¬ 
trusted  their  funds  to  him  because  they  confided 
in  his  judgment  as  superior  to  their  own?  We 
reply,  his  creditors  knew  or  they  did  not  know 
that  all  risks  and  loss,  if  any,  were  theirs  ;  and  all 
gain,  if  any,  was  his  ;  if  they  did  not  know  he  took 
advantage  of  their  ignorance,  and  obtained  money 
on  false  pretenses ;  if  they  did  know  the  true 


MORALITY. 


141 

state  of  the  case,  and  still  intrusted  their  property 
to  his  disposal,  he  is  guilty  of  consenting  to  be 
the  guardian  of  incompetents  and  proving  unfaith¬ 
ful  to  his  trust. 

Betting  on  the  future  price  of  stocks  and  com¬ 
modities,  though  there  is  a  wide  margin  for  the 
exercise  of  judgment  and  the  use  of  the  know¬ 
ledge  of  commercial  affairs,  differs  not  at  all  from 
gambling,  since  it  is  an  exchange  of  property  by 
an  appeal  to  chance  without  an  equivalent.  The 
mention  of  stocks  or  commodities  in  the  transac¬ 
tion  does  not  vary  its  nature  ;  for,  in  the  cases  we 
suppose,  the  seller  has  nothing  for  sale,  and  the 
buyer  does  not  propose  to  purchase  any  thing ;  it 
is  simply  a  bet  that  the  market  price  of  the  com¬ 
modity  named  will,  at  the  given  date,  be  the  same, 
or  more  or  less  than  the  price  named  in  the  con¬ 
tract  ;  if  it  be  the  same,  there  is  no  loss  or  gain 
to  either  party  ;  if  more,  the  seller  loses  the  dif¬ 
ference  ;  if  less,  the  buyer  sustains  the  loss. 

Cheating. — This  is  in  buying  and  selling,  and 
consists  in  this  :  That  by  concealment  or  misrepre¬ 
sentation  one  party  induces  the  other  to  exchange 
his  property  for  less  than  its  market  value.  If  the 
seller,  by  deceit,  induce  the  buyer  to  pay  more 
than  the  market  price  for  what  he  purchases  ;  or 
if  the  buyer,  by  deceit,  induce  the  seller  to  take 
less  than  the  market  price  for  what  he  sells,  it  is 
cheating — in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  term, 


i42 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


it  is  a  fraud.  The  seller  is  morally  bound  to  fur¬ 
nish  his  goods  at  the  market  price  ;  for  this  is 
what  he  professes  to  do,  and  should  any  one  affirm 
that  he  does  not  do  this  he  would  consider  it  a 
slander.  If  his  goods  rise  on  his  hands,  the  profit 
is  his ;  if  they  fall,  he  must  sustain  the  loss. 
Whatever  he  paid  for  his  merchandise  he  is  al¬ 
lowed  and  required  to  sell  at  market  prices.  This 
applies  to  the  goods  in  which  he  professes  to  deal ; 
if  a  neighbor  desire  any  thing  else  he  may  have, 
it  is  his  privilege  to  ask  what  he  pleases — he  does 
not  profess  to  furnish  the  commodity  in  question 
at  market  prices.  The  seller  is  also  bound  to  ac¬ 
quaint  the  buyer  with  the  true  character  of  his 
goods  ;  if  there  be  hidden  defects  he  must  show 

them ;  if  there  be  peculiar  excellencies  he  may 

« 

exhibit  them.  Having  presented  his  goods  to  the 
buyer,  having  acquainted  him  with  their  true  char¬ 
acter,  and  asked  the  market  price  for  them,  his 
duty  is  done.  He  may  or  may  not  assist  the 
buyer’s  judgment  in  the  selection  ;  he  may  or  may 
not  explain  the  adaptation  of  his  goods  to  the 
buyer’s  peculiar  wants  ;  if  it  be  his  duty  to  do  so, 
it  is  a  duty  of  benevolence  and  not  a  demand 
of  justice.  When  goods  are  disposed  of  at  auc¬ 
tion  it  is  understood  that  the  buyer  takes  them  at 
his  own  risk ;  at  his  own  price  he  takes  the  goods 
for  what  he  judges  them  to  be. 

The  buyer  who  says,  It  is  naught,  it  is  naught, 


MORALITY. 


143 


and  then  goeth  his  way  and  boasteth,  is  a  cheat,  a 
fraud.  It  is  not  his  right  to  depreciate  the  value 
of  his  neighbor’s  goods  ;  it  is  especially  dishonest 
to  do  so  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  his  neighbor 
to  part  with  his  goods  for  less  than  their  market 
value.  The  buyer  who  uses  many  words  in  buy¬ 
ing,  whose  habit  is  to  “beat  down”  on  prices,  is  a 
great  demoralizer  in  matters  of  business,  since  his 
habit  is  a  temptation  to  the  seller  to  ask  a  price 
from  which  he  can  afford  to  fall ;  and  by  so  much 
as  this  habit  obtains,  the  market  price  is  made 
unstable,  and  honest  men  know  not  how  to  make 
their  purchases. 

If  a  capitalist  have  the  means  of  buying  all  of 
a  given  commodity  there  is  in  the  market,  espe¬ 
cially  if  the  commodity  be  one  of  the  necessaries 
of  life,  may  he  do  so,  and  demand  an  exorbitant 
price  for  the  same?  He  may  not;  for  he  can  not 
so  do  and  love  his  neighbor  as  himself.  Such  a 
monopoly  in  the  necessities  of  life  is  specially 
criminal,  since  it  infallibly  oppresses  the  poor.  A 
man  may  withhold  his  own  products  and  manufac¬ 
tures  at  his  pleasure,  and  government  may  for  a 
consideration  of  public  benefit  authorize  a  monop¬ 
oly.  If  a  man  have  knowledge  that  property  now 
in  his  neighbor’s  possession  will  soon  certainly  rise 
in  value,  and  his  neighbor  know  it  not,  may  he 
take  the  advantage  of  his  superior  knowledge  and 
purchase  the  property  at  the  present  price  ?  Most 


144 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


men  say  if  the  means  of  that  knowledge  is  equally 
open  to  all  he  may,  but  if  the  knowledge  was 
gained  by  secret  connivance  he  may  not ;  for  it  is 
said  the  owner  invested  his  capital  and  expended 
his  labor  to  produce  his  products,  with  the  expec¬ 
tation  that  all  advantages  from  unforeseen  events 
would  be  his ;  and  for  him  who  has  expended 
nothing  for  those  products  to  clandestinely  step  in 
and  appropriate  them  is  an  injustice  to  the  owner. 
If  a  scientist  who  has  spent  a  fortune  and  his  life 
in  the  pursuit  of  scientific  knowledge,  and  by  his 
knowledge  thus  gained  know  to  his  own  perfect 
satisfaction  that  a  valuable  mine  is  on  his  neigh¬ 
bor's  farm,  may  he  buy  that  farm  at  its  market 
value  for  agricultural  purposes  ?  Most  would  an¬ 
swer  yes.  But  suppose  by  mere  accident,  with¬ 
out  special  knowledge,  a  man  comes  to  know  cer¬ 
tainly  that  there  is  a  mine  on  his  neighbor’s  farm, 
may  he  buy  that  farm  and  say  nothing  of  the 
mine  ?  Doubtful.  It  would  be  more  in  accordance 
with  the  golden  rule  to  buy  the  farm,  and  then 
make  his  neighbor  a  partner  in  its  ownership. 

The  exchange  of  property  involves  not  only 
the  doctrine  of  the  buyer  and  seller,  but  also  that 
of  the  borrower  and  lender.  The  lender  is  bound 
to  furnish  the  article  he  professes  to  furnish,  and 
charge  the  market  price  for  its  use.  The  borrower 
is  obligated  to  use  the  property  borrowed  in  the 
manner  stipulated,  return  it  on  time,  and  pay  the 


MORALITY. 


145 


price  for  its  use.  If  the  property  is  injured  or 
destroyed  while  in  the  borrower’s  possession  it  is 
the  lender’s  loss,  provided  the  property  be  used  as 
stipulated ;  but  if  improperly  used,  or  used  in  a 
manner  different  from  agreement,  then  it  is  the 
borrower’s  loss.  If  the  lender  represent  his  prop¬ 
erty  different  from  what  it  is,  and  the  borrower 
sustain  a  loss  in  consequence  of  said  misrepre¬ 
sentation,  the  lender  is  liable  for  the  damages. 

Whether  rates  of  interest  should  be  determined 
by  law,  and  to  what  extent,  or  whether,  like  the 
use  of  all  other  property,  the  price  paid  for  the 
use  of  money  should  be  left  to  be  determined  by 
the  law  of  supply  and  demand,  is  a  question  for 
political  economists ;  but  the  moralist  has  to  do 
with  the  obligation  to  keep  the  law  when  one  ex¬ 
ists.  If  the  law,  in  the  judgment  of  the  citizen,  be 
not  wise,  it  is  plainly  his  duty  to  respect  it  while 
it  remains  among  the  statutes,  and  to  seek  its 
change  at  the  earliest  opportunity.  But  it  may  be 
said  the  law  allows  a  stipulation  within  limits  ; 
common  practice  allows  stipulation  without  limit ; 
and  cases  in  which  usury  is  pleaded  as  excuse  for 
non-payment  are  so  rare  that  it  may  be  taken  for 
granted  that  the  law  in  the  case  is  of  no  account. 
It  is  not  so  ;  a  Christian  man  ought  not  to  pay  or 
receive  unlawful  interest. 

Duties  to  men  as  men,  ( d )  As  to  their  Right 
to  Reputation .  Character  is  what  a  man' is;  repu- 

c  IO 


146 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


tation  is  what  others  think  he  is.  The  desire  for 
esteem  is  an  implanted  principle  ;  all  men  instinc¬ 
tively  desire  the  good  opinion  of  their  fellow-men. 
Recklessness  in  reference  to  reputation  is  possible 
only  in  extremely  depraved  minds ;  when  any  one 
comes  to  be  even  indifferent  as  to  what  others 
think  and  say  about  him  he  is  far  gone  in  the  way 
of  moral  ruin.  All  right-minded  people  regard 
their  reputation  as  dear  to  them  ;  well-nigh,  if  not 
equal  to,  life  itself;  far  more  dear  than  property, 
or  even  than  liberty.  A  man’s  reputation  is  fre¬ 
quently  his  entire  stock  in  trade,  all  upon  which 
he  may  depend  as  a  means  of  obtaining  his  liveli¬ 
hood.  To  deprive  a  man  of  a  possession  so  dear 
to  him,  and  of  such  inestimable  value,  without  just 
cause,  is  a  great  crime.  We  do  not  here  speak 
of  the  destruction  of  a  man’s  good  name  by  false 
hood — of  the  obligations  of  veracity  we  shall  speak 
further  on — but  of  depriving  one  of  his  good  name 
by  any  means  and  in  any  matter  whatever,  in  the 
absence  of  any  reason  or  just  cause  which  makes 
it  duty  so  to  do. 

The  Bible  requires  that  we  “  speak  evil  of  no 
man.”  This  it  does  with  no  intimation  of  any 
possible  exceptions.  From  this  we  infer  that  any 
variation  from  a  literal  observance  of  the  rule  must 
be  of  the  nature  of  very  rare  exceptions,  justified 
by  very  obvious  reasons,  so  much  so  that  it  was 
not  needful  that  the  exceptions  be  specified. 


MORALITY. 


147 


First,  it  is  wrong  to  minify  a  man’s  reputation  in 
our  own  minds  without  just  cause;  that  is,  to  think 
of  him  less  than  we  ought  to  think.  I  speak  not 
of  the  obligation  to  form  charitable  judgments,  but 
of  what  justice  and  equity  require.  We  are  bound 
to  think  that  our  neighbors  are  what  they  appear 
to  be  unless  we  have  positive  knowledge  to  the 
contrary.  Character  is  judged  by  conduct,  as  a 
tree  is  by  its  fruits  ;  but  in  determining  the  moral 
character  of  men’s  conduct  their  motives  must  be 
taken  into  account.  Of  motives,  however,  we  can 
not  often  know  certainly  what  they  were ;  God 
only  searcheth  the  heart.  We  are,  therefore,  in 
justice,  not  to  say  charity,  bound  to  refer  all  con¬ 
duct  to  right  motives,  unless  the  nature  of  the  case 
render  this  impossible.  That  is  to  say,  if  a  given 
action  may  be  referred  to  a  right  motive  it  belongs 
by  natural  right  that  the  actor  have  the  benefit  of 
such  reference ;  common  law  allows  the  accused  the 
benefit  of  a  doubt.  But  it  will  be  said  men  are 
not  so  good  as  they  seem  to  be  ;  all  men  present 
to  public  view  their  best  side.  So  that,  if  we  re¬ 
gard  and  treat  all  men  as  honest  till  compelled  to 
think  otherwise  of  them,  we  shall  be  deceived  in 
a  majority  of  cases.  We  reply,  On  the  principle 
that  it  is  better  to  suffer  wrong  than  to  do  wrong, 
it  is  better  that  we  be  deceived  by  even  many 
dishonest  persons  than  that  we  should  injure  one 
honest  man  by  judging  him  unjustly. 


148 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Secondly,  if  we  may  not  unnecessarily  think 
evil  of  our  neighbor,  much  more  are  we  under 
obligation  not  to  speak  evil  of  him  without  cause. 
But  suppose  we  know  his  reputation  is  better  than 
his  deserts,  suppose  we  know  him  to  be  guilty  in 
a  matter  where  the  public  judge  him  innocent, 
may  we  not  tell  the  truth  in  the  case?  We  an¬ 
swer,  Not  without  cause.  If  no  good  is  done  by 
telling,  if  no  harm  is  done  by  silence,  then  silence 
is  an  imperative  duty.  Is  it  said  the  man  has  a 
reputation  he  does  not  deserve  ?  the  reply  is,  He 
has  it,  it  is  his  by  possession,  and  no  man  without 
cause  may  take  it  from  him.  This  case  is  the 
same  as  when  property  is  held  by  right  of  posses¬ 
sion.  That  possession  may  have  been  unlawfully 
obtained ;  but  no  man,  unless  he  has  a  better  right, 
is  at  liberty  to  dispossess  the  holder.  Whatever  a 
man  holds  by  any  right  whatever  is  his  till  some 
one  shows  a  better  right. 

The  causes  or  reasons  which  require  that  we 
bear  witness  against  a  neighbor,  or  make  public 
his  evil  actions,  are  the  ends  of  public  justice , 
the  protection  of  the  innocent ,  and  the  good  of  the 
offender.  When  either  of  these  ends  may  be  se 
cured  it  is  not  only  allowable  that  the  truth  be 
made  public,  but  it  is  also  the  solemn  duty  of  him 
who  has  the  truth  to  declare  it.  If  a  citizen  knows 
that  his  neighbor  is  violating  the  laws  of  the  land, 
to  the  detriment  of  the  commonwealth,  it  is  as 


MORALITY. 


149 


much  his  duty  to  make  complaint  to  the  proper 
authorities  as  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  con¬ 
sider  and  adjudicate  the  case  when  presented  to 
them.  When  a  man  knows  that  another  is  a  vile 
seducer,  and  is  insinuating  himself  into  the  good 
graces  of  a  virtuous  woman,  there  can  be  no  duty 
binding  upon  a  human  being  more  imperative  than 
the  duty  in  such  a  case,  to  put  the  exposed  upon 
their  guard.  If  by  giving  information  to  parties 
having  power  or  influence  over  the  offender,  there 
is  a  probable  prospect  of  his  reformation,  then 
duty  requires  that  the  information  be  given.  It 
must  be  observed  that,  in  all  these  cases,  the  same 
rule  that  requires  that  information  be  given  at  all, 
requires  that  it  be  given  to  the  proper  person. 
For  the  violation  of  civil  law  complaint  is  to  be 
made  to  the  legal  authorities.  For  the  protec¬ 
tion  of  the  innocent  information  must  be  given  to 
the  party  exposed.  For  the  reformation  of  the 
offender  information  must  be  given  those  who  have 
the  power  to  use  it  for  that  purpose.  In  no  case 
is  it  morally  right  to  publish  for  the  mere  sake  of 
publishing,  or  to  blaze  evil  matters  abroad  for  the 
mere  excitement  of  doing  so  ;  nor  is  it  any  apology 
for  the  crime  of  slander  that  what  is  told  is  told 
under  a  pledge  of  secrecy.  Gossip  to  a  neigh¬ 
bor's  detriment,  in  all  its  forms  and  under  all  con- 

4 

ditions,  is  a  crime.  Blessed  is  the  man  that  so 
bridleth  his  tongue  as  never  to  speak  evil  of  any 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


150 

one  except  when  positive  duty  requires  it.  Oi 
course,  knowing  evil  of  a  neighbor,  though  the  cir¬ 
cumstances  require  silence,  they  do  not  require  us 
to  regard  and  treat  him  in  our  personal  inter¬ 
course  with  him  as  though  he  were  innocent.  We 
owe  it  to  him,  as  well  as  to  ourselves,  that  we 
avoid  him,  and  at  least  give  him  a  most  emphatic 
letting  alone  ;  if  he  will  not  hear  us,  repent  and 
reform,  then  it  is  our  duty  to  let  him  know  that  he 
can  not  sin  and  retain  the  good  opinion  and  neigh¬ 
borly  treatment  of  his  fellow-men. 

Duties  to  men  as  men, — 2.  As  to  their 
Wants. — The  duties  of  this  class,  so  far  consid¬ 
ered,  are  called  duties  of  reciprocity,  because  men 
are  morally  bound  reciprocally  to  respect  and  de¬ 
fend  each  other’s  rights.  The  underlying  prin¬ 
ciple  postulated  in  all  these  cases  is  the  doctrine 
of  equality,  equality  of  rights,  not  equality  of  con¬ 
dition.  That  is  to  say,  every  man  has  the  same 
right  to  use  the  means  of  happiness  providentially 
within  his  reach  as  any  other  man  has  to  use  the 
means  of  happiness  providentially  within  his  reach. 
These  rights  have  respect  to  life,  liberty,  prop¬ 
erty,  and  reputation.  Some  writers  add  truth 
and  character — these  last,  however,  we  prefer  to 
treat  of  in  another  connection.  These  duties  of 
reciprocity,  so-called,  are  also  usually  spoken  of  as 
duties  of  justice.  We  now  come  to  consider 
another  class,  usually  termed  duties  of  benevo- 


MORALITY. 


151 

lence.  These  have  respect  to  the  physical,  intel¬ 
lectual,  and  moral  needs  of  our  fellow-men.  What 
are  we  morally  bound  to  do  in  supplying  the  des¬ 
titute  with  food,  clothing,  shelter,  medicine,  pro¬ 
fessional  skill,  and  personal  care  ?  how  are  we  to 
do  it  ?  what  in  providing  means  of  instruction 
for  the  ignorant,  and  means  of  reformation  for 
the  vicious  ?  and  how  are  these  duties  to  be  dis¬ 
charged  ?  The  duties  of  benevolence  differ  from 
those  of  reciprocity  in  several  respects.  Our  fel¬ 
low-men  have  no  claim  upon  us,  so  that  they  may 
demand  of  us  benevolent  services,  and  censure  us 
if  we  do  not  render  them.  They  may  ask  for  our 
contributions ;  it  may  be  right  for  them  to  do  so, 
and  we  may  be  under  obligation  to  grant  what 
they  request :  but  our  duty  and  responsibility  is  to 
God  and  not  to  them  ;  they  have  no  rights  in  these 
regards  to  vindicate,  and  have  no  penalties  to 
inflict  when  their  wishes  are  not  complied  with. 

Again,  when  benefits  are  benevolently  con¬ 
ferred,  the  recipient  is  under  obligation  to  be  grate¬ 
ful  toward  the  donor :  not  so  in  duties  of  reci¬ 
procity  ;  no  gratitude  it  due  for  the  payment  of  an 
honest  debt  or  for  any  proper  respect  for  natural 
rights. 

Duties  of  reciprocity  may  be  enforced  by  civil 
laws,  but  not  duties  of  benevolence.  Taxes  levied 
for  the  support  of  the  poor  are  not  of  the  nature 
of  benevolent  contributions.  The  obligation  to 


x52 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


benevolence  rests  upon  the  good  it  may  accom¬ 
plish.  If,  according  to  the  best  judgment  I  am 
able  to  form  in  a  given  case,  I  can  produce  a 
greater  amount  of  good  by  the  charitable  bestow - 
ment  of  my  property  or  the  rendering  of  personal 
service  than  by  withholding  them,  I  am  morally 
bound  to  bestow  the  goods  or  render  the  service. 

It  is  obvious  that,  in  all  cases  where  our  fellow- 
men  are  able  to  supply  their  own  wants,  or  to  the 
extent  that  they  are  able,  to  supply  them  it  is  for 
their  good,  as  well  as  the  good  of  all  others  con¬ 
cerned,  that  they  should  do  so ;  it  is,  therefore, 
evident  that  benevolence  is  strictly  limited  to  the 
helpless.  To  help  those  who  are  able  to  help 
themselves  is  an  encouragement  to  idleness  and  all 
its  associated  vices.  Charities  bestowed  upon  the 
undeserving,  instead  of  being  productive  of  good, 
are  every  way  productive  of  evil ;  except  where  the 
donor  is  innocently  deceived,  and  distributes  his 
gifts  with  a  proper  motive,  he  will  receive  his  re¬ 
ward,  but  the  good  he  sought  to  do  will  never 
accrue  to  the  recipient.  We  are,  therefore,  to 
give  food  to  the  hungry,  clothing  to  the  naked, 
shelter  to  the  defenseless,  medicine  to  the  sick, 
personal  care  to  the  feeble,  books  and  instruction 
to  the  ignorant,  and  the  Gospel  of  the  grace  of 
God  to  the  vicious  ;  in  a  word,  the  means  of 
supplying  their  wants,  physical,  intellectual,  and 
moral,  as  we  have  ability  and  opportunity,  to  all, 


MORALITY. 


153 


according  to  their  needs,  provided  always  that  the 
recipients  of  our  bounty  are  not  able  to  supply 
those  wants  themselves.  It  is  better  to  give 
an  able-bodied  man,  who  is  destitute,  work  and 
wages,  than  to  give  money  as  a  charity.  It  is 
better  to  supply  schools  and  other  means  of  in¬ 
struction  at  a  price  which  a  poor  student,  with 
industry  and  economy,  can  pay,  or  to  loan  him 
funds  for  present  necessities,  than  to  give  him  free 
tuition  or  make  to  him  a  personal  contribution  that 
will  defray  all  of  his  expenses.  It  is  better  to 
place  religious  advantages,  the  means  of  grace, 
under  such  conditions  as  that  the  benefits  accruing 
therefrom  shall  be  at  some  kind  of  cost  to  those 
receiving  them,  than  it  is  to  make  salvation  so 
free  as  to  be  esteemed  of  no  value  by  those  to 
whom  it  is  offered.  It  very  frequently  happens 
that  the  most  deserving  through  natural  delicacy— 
I  do  not  say  pride,  for  oftentimes  the  fact  is  far 
otherwise — through  a  natural  and  praiseworthy 
delicacy,  much  prefer  to  suffer  rather  than  ask  an 
alms  ;  it  is,  therefore,  needful  that  we  imitate  the 
Master  in  “  going  about  to  do  good  that  is,  that 
we  seek  out  those  that  are  needy  and  helpless. 
It  is  sometimes  asked,  Must  I  give  to  every  appli¬ 
cant  for  alms  that  comes  to  my  door,  or  may  I 
turn  some  empty  away  ?  Great  caution  is  needed 
here  lest,  on  the  onet  hand,  we  turn  all  empty 
away ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  by  indiscriminate 


i54 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


bestowments  we  encourage  the  idle  and  the  vicious 
in  their  crimes.  No  rule  can  be  given,  each  one 
must  exercise  his  own  judgment.  If  we  must 
sometimes  err,  as  probably  most  persons  must,  it 
is  better  to  err  considerably  on  the  side  of  lib¬ 
erality  than  even  to  lean  towards  its  opposite. 

Duties  to  men  as  men, — 3.  As  to  their  Char¬ 
acter. — Of  all  works  of  benevolence  none  can 
compare  with  those  which  tend  to  improve  the 
character  of  our  fellow-men.  To  build  up  one’s 
self  in  holiness,  to  lead  forward  our  powers  toward 
perfection,  to  become  true  men — this  is  life’s  great 
work.  To  do  this  for  ourselves  is,  for  every  rea¬ 
son,  our  first  duty  ;  but  as  we  love  our  neighbor 
as  ourselves,  we  shall  strive  to  do  the  same  for 
them.  To  influence  them,  to  persuade  them,  to  aid 
them  as  we  have  ability  in  this  their  great  labor  of 
life  is  the  highest  duty  of  man  to  his  fellow-man. 
It  is  often  said  man’s  first  duty  to  his  neighbor  is 
to  supply  his  physical  necessities  ;  that  to  give  a 
basket  of  bread  is  a  higher  deed  of  charity  than 
to  give  a  Bible  or  any  other  useful  book.  We 
reply,  to  meet  the  wants  of  the  body  is  first  in 
the  order  of  time,  but  not  first  in  the  order  of 
importance.  If  a  neighbor  be  starving,  of  course 
he  were  a  fanatic  that  should  neglect  to  give  the 
things  needful  for  the  body  and  fall  to  praying  for 
the  good  of  the  soul  ;  but  that  is  not  saying  that 
physical  wants  solely  have  claims  upon  charity,  or 


MORALITY. 


155 


that  those  claims  are  any  more  imperative  than  are 
the  claims  that  come  from  the  needs  of  the  mind. 
Who  can  estimate  the  value  of  a  good  character 
or  real  goodness  ?  Money  is  valuable ;  but  he 
that  steals  it  steals  trash,  as  compared  with  a  good 
name  ;  and  what  is  a  good  name  as  compared  with 
a  mind  conscious  to  itself  of  right  ?  One  may  be 
blessed,  though  men  say  all  manner  of  evil  against 
him,  if  they  say  it  falsely  and  for  Christ’s  sake. 
What  is  liberty,  or  even  life  itself,  as  compared 
with  what  a  man  is  ?  If  a  man  be  nobody,  what 
does  it  matter  where  he  is,  whether  in  prison  or 
at  large  ?  and  if  he  be  nobody,  what  matters  it 
to  him,  or  to  any  one  else,  whether  he  be  dead  * 
or  alive  ? 

Since,  then,  character  is  a  possession  of  a  value 
too  great  for  estimation ;  what  duty  can  be  re¬ 
quired,  that  can  be  too  great  a  sacrifice  for  its  con¬ 
servation?  and  what  process  of  discipline  or  what 
expenditure  of  resources  can  be  too  great  for  its 
upbuilding  ?  Who  that  has  a  single  eye  to  the 
glory  of  God,  whose  governing  motive  is  the 
greatest  good,  who  loves  his  neighbor  as  himself, 
will  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  make  any  requisite 
contribution  of  means  and  services  for  the  perfec¬ 
tion  of  humanity  in  himself  and  others  ? 

But  how  shall  this  duty,  so  vastly  important, 
be  discharged  ?  First,  by  abstaining  from  evil  and 
avoiding  even  its  appearance.  Any  course  of  con- 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


156 

duct  which  tends  to  excite  or  stimulate  evil  pas¬ 
sions,  or  to  awaken  evil  imaginations,  or  to  con¬ 
tribute  to  the  gratification  of  lusts,  is  destructive 
of  character,  so  that  all  men  are  bound  by  the 
highest  obligation  by  which  duty  can  bind  them  to 
abstain  always  and  entirely  from  such  courses  of 
conduct.  Second,  we  contribute  to  the  upbuilding 
and  maintenance  of  good  character  among  men, 
especially  by  sustaining  institutions  of  learning 
and  religion.  The  family,  the  school,  the  State, 
and  the  Church  are  all  designed  to  be,  ought  to 
be,  and  to  some  extent  are,  means  of  intellectual, 
moral,  and  religious  education,  and  all  intelligent 
good  men  will  do  their  utmost  to  sustain  these 
institutions  in  such  conditions  as  will  secure  their 
highest  efficiency.  But,  lastly,  every  man  does 
more  in  the  way  of  influencing  others  by  what  he 
is  than  by  what  he  says  or  does  ;  hence,  the  most 
effectual  means  of  building  up  goodness  in  the 
character  of  others  is  to  be  good  ourselves.  Let 
us  be  true  men,  and  though  we  be  poor  and  have 
nothing  to  give  ;  yea,  though  we  be  dependent, 
and  are  ourselves  objects  of  charity ;  by  the  silent, 
secret  influences  of  good  character,  we  shall  do 
much  to  make  the  world  the  better  for  our  having 
lived  in  it.  Our  lives  shall  not  be  useless,  nor 
shall  we,  when  the  Master  makes  up  his  jewels,  be 
without  a  reward.  To  all  good  men  there  shall  be 
some  occasion  for  the  final  approval,  “thou  hast 


MORALITY.  1 5  7 

been  faithful  over  a  few  things,  I  will  make  thee 
ruler  over  many  things.” 

Duties  to  men  as  men, — 4.  As  to  their  De¬ 
mand  for  Truth. 

Duties  of  Veracity.  Dr.  Hopkins  places  truth 
in  the  category  of  natural  rights  ;  and  it  seems  to 
belong  there,  though  not  so  obviously  as  some 
others.  For  the  same  reason  that  we  call  prop¬ 
erty  and  reputation  natural  rights  we  may  call 
truth  a  right.  If  men  were  not  under  moral  obli¬ 
gation  to  tell  the  truth,  if  they  were  at  liberty  to 
speak  either  truth  or  falsehood  as  their  fancy  or  in¬ 
clination  might  dictate,  if  no  dependence  could  be 
placed  upon  men's  word,  every  interest  of  our 
earthly  life  would  thereby  be  constantly  in  peril, 
and  all  interests  would  suffer  incalculably.  Plainly, 
the  attainment  of  our  ends  in  life  requires  that 
when  men  communicate  their  thoughts  one  to  an¬ 
other  they  speak  the  truth.  Truth  is  a  natural 
right,  because  it  is  essential  to  the  attainment  of 
man’s  greatest  good.  A  very  large  part  of  human 
knowledge  is  derived  from  the  testimony  of  others. 
Most  of  the  confidence  or  faith  that  prompts  and 
sustains  the  enterprises  of  life  is  faith  in  the  truth¬ 
fulness  of  what  is  told  us,  and  for  which  truth¬ 
fulness  we  have  no  other  assurance  than  the 
credibility  of  those  from  whom  we  receive  our 
information.  Surely  truth  is  essential  to  the  at¬ 
tainment  and  security  of  life’s  ends. 


i58 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Again,  our  Creator  has  so  constituted  our  na 
tures,  and  so  adapted  our  circumstances  to  our  con¬ 
stitution,  that  it  is  more  natural  to  speak  the  truth 
than  it  is  to  deceive.  Deception  requires  inven¬ 
tion,  the  assuming  of  false  airs,  an  unnatural  ad¬ 
justment  to  surroundings,  and  the  lowest  degrees 
of  moral  depravity  and  impudence.  Again,  that 
truth  is  a  natural  right  may  be  inferred  from  the 
universal  convictions  of  mankind  respecting  its 
importance  and  value.  In  all  jurisprudence  author¬ 
ity  is  given  to  the  courts  to  place  men  under  pains 
and  penalties  as  an  inducement  or  motive  to  speak 
the  truth;  perjury  is  a  crime  before  the  law,  and 
is  punishable  with  severe  penalties.  Liars  are  held 
in  universal  detestation,  so  that  the  Scripture  dec¬ 
laration,  that  all  liars  have  their  part  in  the  lake 
that  burneth  with  fire  and  brimstone,  does  not 
grate  harshly  even  upon  the  sensibilities  of  unbe¬ 
lievers.  Many  will  say  that  if  there  is  no  hell 
there  ought  to  be  one  for  liars. 

The  law  of  veracity  requires,  when  men  profess 
to  convey  intelligence  to  others,  that  to  the  best 
of  their  ability  they  convey  precisely  the  impression 
they  have  in  their  own  minds.  They  are  bound  to 
tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth.  Truth  may  be  distinguished  as  real  or 
moral.  A  statement  is  really  true  when  it  repre¬ 
sents  the  fact  as  it  really  exists ;  it  is  morally  true 
when  the  relator  intends  to  convey  the  impression 


MORALITY. 


159 


of  the  fact  as  it  exists  in  his  own  mind.  Hence  it 
is  obvious  that  a  statement  may  be  both  really  and 
morally  true,  or  both  really  and  morally  false,  or 
really  true  and  morally  false,  or  really  false  and 
morally  true. 

Obligation  has  respect  to  moral  truth ;  it  refers 
to  the  intentions  of  the  relator,  and  requires  him 
universally  to  intend  the  conveyance  of  real  truth. 
A  logician  may  make  a  supposition,  if  he  put  it 
forth  as  such  ;  a  novelist  may  write  a  fiction  or  a 
fable,  if  he  give  it  as  such  ;  any  one  may  express 
an  opinion,  if  he  convey  the  idea  that  it  is  but  his 
opinion ;  but  no  one  may  state  as  truth  what  he 
does  not  know  to  be  the  truth.  It  is  obvious  that 
this  law  refers  not  merely  to  the  words  of  the 
lips,  but  also  to  whatever  conveys  thought,  such  as 
gestures,  looks,  intonations,  and  emphasis  of  the 
voice.  It  forbids  all  extenuations  and  exaggera¬ 
tions  ;  in  a  word,  it  requires  a  full  and  honest 
effort,  according  to  our  best  ability,  to  convey  the 
impression  existing  in  our  minds  precisely  as  it  is  ; 
or,  in  other  words,  it  requires  an  intention  full  and 
complete,  without  mental  reservations,  to  convey 
the  real  truth  as  we  understand  it. 

It  is  further  obvious  that  the  law  of  verac¬ 
ity  applies  to  intercourse  with  rational  beings. 
Whether  this  law  is  binding  to  any  extent  in  our 
conduct  towards  irrational  beings  is  a  matter  where 
there  is  room  for  difference  of  opinion.  It  is  said 


i6o 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


that  it  is  sometimes  necessary  to  use  deception  in 
the  management  of  brutes,  idiots,  and  insane  per¬ 
sons.  It  may  be  so ;  and  yet,  in  view  of  the  reflex 
influence  upon  our  own  character  of  the  frequent 
use  of  deception,  it  is  manifestly  better  never  to 
use  it  unless  necessity  require.  That  deception  is 
not  universally  sinful  seems  to  be  taught  by  the 
Scriptures ;  for  ancient  warriors  were  on  some 
occasions  divinely  authorized  to  use  it;  and  Christ 
himself  “made  as  if  he  would  go  farther,”  when 
he  intended  to  remain. 

In  what  sense  are  promises  and  contracts  bind¬ 
ing  ?  A  promise  or  a  contract  is  binding  upon  the 
one  party  in  the  sense  in  which  he  understood  the 
other  party  to  accept  it.  A.  makes  a  conditional 
contract  with  B.  A.  writes  the  contract,  and  in¬ 
tends  a  given  condition  ;  but  before  the  contract  is 
signed  he  knows  that  the  terms  in  which  that  con¬ 
dition  is  expressed  are  ambiguous,  and  also  knows 
that  B.  accepts  it  in  a  different  sense  from  what  he 
himself  intended.  A.  is  bound  to  fulfill  the  con¬ 
tract  according  to  B.’s  apprehension.  Promises 
and  contracts  are  not  binding  when  their  fulfill¬ 
ment  is  unlawful  or  impossible  ;  but  if  such  prom¬ 
ises  are  made,  and  those  to  whom  they  are  made, 
being  themselves  innocent,  sustain  losses  in  con¬ 
sequence  of  their  non-fulfillment,  the  parties  mak¬ 
ing  them  are  responsible  for  the  damages  incurred. 
If  both  parties  are  equally  guilty  no  obligation  to 


MORALITY. 


1 6 1 


the  other  is  binding  upon  either.  It  is,  however, 
sometimes  said  there  is  such  a  thing  as  “honor 
among  thieves ;”  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  there 
can  be. 

Oaths.  An  oath,  in  the  lowest  sense  admissi¬ 
ble,  is  a  thoughtful,  serious,  and  solemn  affirmation 
under  the  pains  and  penalties  of  perjury.  The 
form  used  in  the  courts,  “  So  help  you  God,”  is  by 
some  understood  to  be  an  appeal  to  God  as  a  wit¬ 
ness  of  the  truth  or  falseness  of  the  testimony  to 
be  given ;  by  others  it  is  a  prayer  to  God  for 
special  aid,  that  the  witness  may  then  and  there 
certainly  testify  according  to  truth  ;  by  others  it  is 
a  prayer  that  divine  favor  may  or  may  not  be 
granted  the  witness  as  he  shall  or  shall  not  testify 
truly,  “  So  help  me  God  as  I  tell  the  truth;”  by  which 
the  witness  is  understood  to  peril  his  present  and 
eternal  well-being  on  the  issue  of  his  present 
truthfulness  ;  and  still  others  so  interpret  the  ex¬ 
pression,  “So  help  you  God,”  as  to  make  it  include 
all  the  ideas  above  mentioned. 

The  legal  force  of  an  oath  is  exhausted  in  the 
penalties  of  perjury.  Without  doubt  the  common 
apprehension  adds  nothing  more  to  the  legal  idea 
than  that  an  oath  is  an  affirmation  made  under 
very  solemn  circumstances,  and  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  affirmation  that  an  oath  means  more 
than  this  is  well  sustained. 

If  this  be  the  true  interpretation  of  the  nature 


*6 2  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

of  oaths,  then  the  controversy  respecting  their 
lawfulness  disappears  ;  for  all  will  admit  that  such 
affirmations  may  be  lawfully  made.  The  New 
Testament  injunction  which  requires  that  our  com¬ 
munications  be  Yea,  yea,  and  Nay,  nay,  has  no  ref¬ 
erence  to  legal  oaths,  but  is  an  admonition  against 
the  too  free  use  of  solemn  affirmations,  and  is  not 
in  respect  to  these  an  absolute  prohibition ;  for 
our  Savior  himself  not  unfrequently  said,  “Verily, 
I  say  unto  you.” 

IV.  DUTIES  ARISING  OUT  OF  SPECIAL  RELATIONS. 

These  are  those  which  relate  to  the  sexes,  to 
husbands  and  wives,  to  parents  and  children,  to 
masters  and  servants,  to  magistrates  and  citizens, 
to  principals  and  agents.  We  classify  them  as 
domestic  and  civil. 

i.  Doctrine  of  Rights.  The  distinction  be¬ 
tween  “Rights  of  things”  and  “rights  of  persons” 
is  obvious.  To  consider  all  rights  as  founded  upon 
the  will  of  God  is  much  the  shortest  and  appar¬ 
ently  the  simplest  method  of  reaching  the  ultimate ; 
but  the  doctrine  of  ends,  and  of  the  greatest  good 
as  the  supreme  end,  finds  something  back  of  mere 
will,  and  a  something  contradictory  of  arbitrary 
will.  Dr.  Hopkins,  who  has  given  the  doctrine  of 
ends  the  most  scientific  and  philosophic  statement 
known  to  the  present  writer,  finds  the  foundation 
for  the  rights  of  things  in  the  ends  of  those  to 


MORALITY. 


163 

whom  the  right  belongs.  Thus,  I  have  a  right 
to  a  given  piece  of  property  because  the  use  of 
the  same  is  promotive  of  my  good  :  and  this  right 
is  exclusive,  provided  it  does  not  interfere  with  the 
corresponding  rights  of  others ;  that  is,  so  far  as  my 
fellow-men  are  concerned  I  have  a  right  to  do  with 
what  I  call  my  own  as  I  please  (though  as  toward 
God  I  have  no  right  to  use  the  same  except  for 
the  end  which  it  is  adapted  to  promote),  and  this 
right  is  mine  because  what  I  call  my  own  is  adapted 
to  promote  my  good.  Dr.  Hopkins  finds  the  foun¬ 
dation  for  the  rights  of  persons  in  the  ends  of 
those  over  whom  the  right  is  exercised.  Thus,  a 
parent  has  the  right  of  government  over  his  child, 
because  the  parent  has  the  power  to  secure  the 
ends  of  the  child  in  matters  wherein  the  child  has 
not  the  power  to  secure  his  own  ends.  The  rights 
of  civil  government  are  based  upon  the  same  foun¬ 
dation.  The  magistrate  has  the  right  to  command 
the  subject  because  the  government  can  do  for  the 
citizen  that  which  is  promotive  of  the  citizen’s 
good,  and  which  the  citizen  himself  can  not  do. 
The  right  of  the  divine  government  itself  has  the 
same  basis.  God  can  do  for  his  creatures  that 
which  is  essential  to  their  well-being,  and  which 
they  can  not  do  for  themselves ;  therefore,  he  has 
the  right  to  command  his  creatures.  And  as  this 
power  of  God  extends  to  our  whole  being,  to  all 
we  are  and  to  all  we  have,  we  are  under  obligation 


164 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


of  universal  obedience.  The  rights  of  parents  and 
the  rights  of  civil  magistrates  extend  only  to  those 
things  essential  to  the  good  of  the  child  or  subject 
in  respect  to  which  the  child  or  subject  is  helpless 
and  dependent.  No  being  has  any  rights  over 
God,  because  God,  being  all-powerful,  can  himself 
secure  his  own  ends  ;  no  being  has  power  to  do 
for  God  what  he  can  not  do  himself. 

The  rights  of  parents  are  not  founded  upon 
the  mere  relation  they  sustain  to  their  children  ; 
for  when  parents  become  imbecile,  idiotic,  or  in¬ 
sane,  or  in  any  way  become  incompetent  to  provide 
for  and  educate  their  children,  their  rights  over 
their  children  cease ;  the  civil  authorities  assume 
the  right,  and  appoint  guardians  and  teachers. 
This  theory,  which  founds  the  right  to  govern  on 
the  ability  to  benefit  the  governed,  on  the  power 
of  the  government  to  secure  the  ends  of  the  gov¬ 
erned  in  matters  wherein  the  governed  are  incom¬ 
petent  to  secure  their  own  ends,  avoids  the  unin¬ 
telligent  abstraction  of  an  eternal  right,  the 
objectionable  reference  to  an  arbitrary  will,  and 
the  unscientific  supposition  of  numerous  and  ever 
variable  relations  ;  it  is  in  itself  sufficiently  incom¬ 
plex,  and  wondrously  unifies  and  systematizes  the 
theory  of  morals,  of  rights,  and  of  obligations. 

Is  it  objected  that  this  theory  gives  scope  to 
the  assumption  of  tyrants  and  oppressors  that 
might  gives  right  ?  we  reply,  first,  the  theory 


MORALITY. 


165 

supposes  that  the  helplessness  of  the  subject  is 
obvious  ;  the  assistance  required  is  a  manifest  ne¬ 
cessity.  The  claim  of  slavery,  that  races  of  men 
are  thus  helpless,  and  that  other  races  can  by 
assuming  rights  over  them  do  for  them  what  is 
essential  to  their  best  good,  and  what  they  can  not 
do  for  themselves,  is  and  always  has  been  an  as¬ 
sumption.  There  never  was  such  a  race.  Sec¬ 
ondly,  the  right  conferred  is  limited  to  the  well¬ 
being  of  the  subject.  If  power  possessed  by  a 
superior  be  exercised  over  an  intelligent  moral 
being  for  any  purpose  antagonistic  to  the  ends  of 
that  moral  being  it  is  unlawful,  oppressive  ;  it  is  a 
violation  of  natural  rights.  Hard  masters,  tyrants, 
and  oppressors  find  no  license  in  this  theory. 

The  right  to  govern  is  a  right  to  control,  by 
force  if  necessary ;  and  correlative  with  it,  or 
founded  upon  it,  is  obligation  to  obey,  and,  in  case 
of  disobedience,  right  to  punish.  Thus  govern¬ 
ment  is  constituted.  A  precept  may  be  observed 
because  the  doer  sees  in  the  nature  of  the  case  a 
valid  reason  why  he  should  do  so.  The  person 
giving  the  precept  may  be  a  parent  having  the 
right  to  command,  and  the  one  receiving  the  pre¬ 
cept  may  be  a  child  under  obligation  to  obey ;  but 
if  the  child  do  the  thing  required  solely  because 
of  the  reasons  on  which  the  requirement  is  founded, 
and  wholly  irrespective  of  the  authority  by  which 
it  is  enjoined,  this  is  not  obedience  ;  nor  is  there 


1 66 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


any  government  in  the  case.  Obedience  is  when 
an  act  is  voluntarily  performed  because  righteous 
authority  requires  it ;  disobedience  is  a  voluntary 
refusal  to  yield  to  the  demands  of  righteous  au¬ 
thority — that  is,  to  authority  founded  in  rights  ;  pen¬ 
alty  is  that  which  results  from  such  disobedience — 
not  those  natural  necessary  consequences  resulting 
from  the  act  itself,  which  ensue  whether  the  act  be 
one  of  obedience  or  disobedience.  Penalty,  properly 
so  called,  is  threatened  and  executed  to  secure  the 
lawgiver’s  rights ;  and  these  rights  are  founded 
upon  the  good  of  the  subject.  Plainly,  then,  if  by 
any  means  the  authority  of  the  government  and 
the  good  of  the  subject  can  be  otherwise  secured, 
as  it  is  in  atonement,  the  penalty  may  be  omitted. 
There  is  no  abstract  justice  requiring  the  invaria¬ 
ble,  full,  and  perfect  execution  of  penalty.  But  it 
may  be  said  this  is  to  make  government  ignore 
man’s  rational  nature.  Surely,  man  must  be  gov¬ 
erned  as  a  rational  being,  or  he  is  a  mere  thing. 
We  answer,  Government  has  respect  to  authority, 
and  where  authority  is  ignored  there  is  no  gov¬ 
ernment.  But  a  proper  respect  for  authority  may 
be  accompanied  with  a  knowledge  of  the  ratioiiale 
of  its  requirements.  Authority  is  recognized  by  a 
recognition  of  rights  ;  the  reasonableness  of  re¬ 
quirements  may  be  another  thing.  And  yet  the 
ends  on  which  rights  are  founded  and  the  reasons 
for  the  command,  when  fully  understood,  will  be 


MORALITY. 


167 


found  to  be  the  same  thing.  Obedience,  properly 
so-called,  is  prompted  by  faith  or  confidence.  The 
subject  has  full  confidence  that  his  law-giver  is 
wise  and  benevolent,  and  therefore  he  obeys  him, 
even  though  he  does  not  see  either  the  wisdom  or 
the  benevolence  of  the  requirement.  The  more 
intelligent  and  rational  the  subject,  the  more  per¬ 
fectly  will  he  comprehend  the  ends  of  the  law  and 
the  wisdom  and  benevolence  of  the  law-giver  and 
the  more  perfect  will  be  his  faith  and  obedience  ; 
but,  we  repeat,  where  authority  is  ignored  there  is 
neither  faith  nor  obedience. 

2.  The  Duty  of  Chastity. — “Ye  have  heard 
that  it  was  said  by  them  of  old  time,  Thou  shalt 
not  commit  adultery ;  but  I  say  unto  you,  that 
whosoever  looketh  on  a  woman  to  lust  after  her, 
hath  committed  adultery  already  with  her  in  his 
heart.”  Much  of  our  Lord’s  sermon  on  the 
mount  was  designed  to  show  that  the  righteous¬ 
ness  of  the  Scribes  and  Pharisees,  which  consisted 
merely  in  external  rites,  ceremonies,  and  observ¬ 
ances  was  defective,  was  not  a  fulfilling  of  the  law. 
God  looks  at  the  thoughts  and  intents  of  the 
heart.  The  law  of  chastity,  given  in  the  above 
quotation  requires  not  only  abstinence  from  the 
outward  violation,  but  also  inward  purity.  A  man 
whose  thoughts,  imaginations,  and  desires  have 
become  corrupt,  will  certainly,  when  a  favorable 
opportunity  occurs,  outwardly  violate  the  com- 


i6S 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


mand.  Moral  character  consists  in  the  status  of 
mind,  not  in  the  aggregate  of  outward  actions. 
The  law  practically  considered,  or  our  duty  as 
enjoined  by  the  law,  requires  a  total  abstinence 
from  forbidden  sexual  intercourse,  from  all  conduct 
that  tends  to  excite  lewdness  in  ourselves  or  oth¬ 
ers,  from  consenting  to  witness  exhibitions  tending 
to  licentiousness,  be  they  either  conduct,  conversa¬ 
tion,  theatrical  performances,  books,  pictures,  or 
whatever  else  may  excite  unnatural  and  unlawful 
passions  and  desires.  Duty  here  requires  a  man 
to  keep  his  heart  with  all  diligence ;  inward  purity 
is  secured  and  maintained  in  no  other  way  than  by 
a  ceaseless  and  uncompromising  vigilance.  But 
inward  purity  is  attainable.  Under  the  grace  and 
providence  of  God  a  man  may  so  fully  purpose  a 
chaste  and  holy  life,  and  so  establish  habits  of 
purity  in  thought  and  desire  as  that  he  will,  for 
the  most  part,  avoid  even  the  thought  of  evil ;  and 
if  suddenly  an  unbidden  evil  thought  arise  in  his 
mind,  it  is  as  suddenly  dismissed,  he  turns  from  it 
as  from  deadly  poison,  and  it  fails  to  do  him  any 
harm ;  he  resists  the  devil  and  he  flees  from  him. 
However  strong  one’s  desire,  however  entangling 
the  snares  that  may  be  set  for  him,  he  may,  and 
therefore  he  ought  to,  keep  himself  pure. 

The  terms  used  to  designate  the  various  forms 
in  which  the  law  of  chastity  is  violated  are  de¬ 
fined  with  sufficient  accuracy,  and  are  commonly 


MORALITY. 


169 


well  understood.  Adultery  is  sexual  intercourse 
between  a  married  person  and  one  not  united 
to  him  or  her  for  life.  Polygamy  is  a  plurality  of 
wives  or  husbands.  Concubinage  is  temporary  co¬ 
habitation.  Fornication  is  intercourse  with  pros¬ 
titutes  or  with  others  under  any  conditions  other 
than  marriage.  Uncleanness  generally  refers  to 
the  character  or  to  the  habitual  condition  of  body 
and  mind — an  unchaste  or  licentious  person  is  an 
unclean  person. 

The  enormity  of  this  crime  may  be  inferred 
from  the  terribleness  of  its  consequences.  If  the 
licentious  have  not  lost  all  human  sensibility  and 
sunken  to  brutish  stupidity,  they  must  carry  with 
them  constantly  a  most  tormenting  sense  of  per¬ 
sonal  vileness.  Uncleanness  is  a  perpetual  bar  to 
self-respect,  and  must,  in  minds  not  wholly  lost, 
produce  a  most  revolting  sense  of  self-disgust. 

The  loathing  and  contempt  with  which  such  per 

% 

sons  must  know  others  regard  them  can  not  be 
otherwise  than  an  intolerable  burden.  The  wrath 
of  God  they  certainly  know  is  out  against  them, 
and  they  must  live  in  perpetual  and  fearful  appre¬ 
hension  of  the  day  when  all  secrets  shall  be  re¬ 
vealed,  and  each  one  receive  according  to  the 
deeds  done  in  his  body.  And  then  the  jealousies, 
contentions,  brawling,  fighting,  and  murders  which 
almost  invariably  accompany  or  follow  these  crimes 
are  too  terrible  for  adequate  description.  And, 


170 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


let  it  be  remembered,  that  these  things  come  not 
only  to  persons  in  low  life,  but  to  all,  whoever  they 
are,  or  under  whatever  circumstances  they  live, 
who  transgress  in  any  way  the  law  of  chastity. 

3.  Domestic  Duties:  Husbands  and  Wives . — 
“And  the  Lord  God  said,  It  is  not  good  that  the 
man  should  be  alone ;  I  will  make  a  help  meet 
for  him.  Male  and  female  created  he  them,  and 
blessed  them.  And  God  blessed  Noah  and  his 
sons,  and  sard  unto  them,  Be  fruitful  and  multiply 
and  replenish  the  earth.  Neither  is  the  man  with¬ 
out  the  woman,  neither  the  woman  without  the 
man,  in  the  Lord  ;  for  as  the  woman  is  of  the  man, 
even  so  is  the  man  also  by  the  woman,  but  all 
things  of  God.  Whoso  findeth  a  wife,  findeth  a 
good  thing  and  obtaineth  favor  of  the  Lord.  Mar¬ 
riage  is  honorable  in  all  and  the  bed  undefiled, 
but  whoremongers  and  adulterers  God  will  judge. 
Therefore  shall  a  man  leave  his  father  and  his 
mother  and  shall  cleave  unto  his  wife,  and  they 
shall  be  one  flesh. ” 

“  Holy  matrimony  is  an  honorable  estate,  insti¬ 
tuted  of  God  in  the  time  of  man’s  innocency, 
signifying  unto  us  the  mystical  union  that  is  be¬ 
tween  Christ  and  his  Church  ;  which  holy  estate 
Christ  adorned  and  beautified  with  his  presence 
and  first  miracle  that  he  wrought  in  Cana  of  Gali¬ 
lee,  and  is  commended  of  St.  Paul  to  be  honor¬ 
able  among  all  men.”  That  marriage  is  a  divine 

O  O 


MORALITY. 


171 

institution  and  not  merely  a  contract  between  the 
parties  regulated  by  the  civil  authorities,  is  abun¬ 
dantly  evidenced  not  only  by  the  above  quoted 
passages  of  Holy  Writ,  but  also  by  all  of  the  very 
abundant  references  to  it  in  the  whole  Word  of 
God.  This  is  also  clearly  taught  in  natural  relig¬ 
ion.  The  desire  for  sex  is  an  implanted  principle  ; 
the  perpetuity  of  the  race  depends  upon  its  grati¬ 
fication  ;  the  best  condition  of  human  society  de¬ 
pends  upon  the  proper  increase  of  population. 
The  unlimited  and  promiscuous  intercourse  of  the 
sexes  is  prohibited  by  the  certain  issue  of  innu¬ 
merable  and  terribly  destructive  calamities.  The 
number  of  the  sexes  is  nearly  equal ;  that  of  the 
males  is  greater,  about  in  the  proportion  requisite 
to  offset  the  greater  mortality  to  which  they  are 
exposed.  One  man  and  one  woman  will  usually 
have  as  many  children  as  they  can,  in  a  life-time, 
care  for  and  properly  educate.  The  family,  con¬ 
sisting  of  parents  united  for  life,  and  of  children 
united  by  a  common  parentage,  other  things  being 
equal,  is  by  far  the  happiest  earthly  circle  ;  from  it 
flow  the  purest,  highest,  holiest  of  earthly  pleas¬ 
ures  ;  no  other  good  under  the  sun  can  compare, 
for  a  moment,  with  its  blessedness.  The  whole 
constitution  of  human  life  and  the  whole  history 
of  the  human  race,  as  well  as  the  testimony  of  the 
whole  written  Word  of  God,  teach  that  the  law 
of  chastity  restricts  the  gratification  of  the  sexual 


172 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


appetite  to  individuals  who  are  exclusively  united 
to  each  other  for  life ;  that  the  marriage  cove¬ 
nant  is  a  contract,  having  all  the  solemnity  and 
binding  force  of  an  oath  between  two  persons  to 
observe  strictly  toward  each  other  this  law  of  chas¬ 
tity  ;  and  that  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  men  and 
women  thus  covenant  with  each  other  and  faith¬ 
fully  observe  the  obligations  of  their  contract. 

Celibacy,  under  some  circumstances,  may  be 
allowable  as  an  exception.  “There  are  some 
eunuchs  which  were  so  born  from  their  mother’s 
womb  ;  and  there  are  some  eunuchs  which  were 
made  eunuchs  of  men ;  and  there  be  eunuchs 
which  have  made  themselves  eunuchs  for  the  king¬ 
dom  of  heaven’s  sake.”  In  the  times  of  persecu¬ 
tion,  when  Christian  families  were  liable  to  be  sep¬ 
arated  by  violence,  St.  Paul  advised  those  who 
were  so  minded  not  to  marry, — this,  in  view  of 
the  present  distress,  might  be  better.  Soldiers, 
seamen,  missionaries,  and  others  may  be  called  to 
duties  to  which  marriage  might  be  a  detriment. 
In  all  cases  marriage  is  a  matter  of  personal 
choice  and  preference  ;  and  yet  we  hold  it  to  be  a 
divine  institution,  not  only  in  the  sense  that  who¬ 
ever  enters  the  marriage  state  must  do  so  accord¬ 
ing  to  God’s  ordinance  ;  but  also  in  the  sense  that, 
other  things  being  equal,  it  is  God’s  will  that  men 
choose  matrimony  rather  than  celibacy.  Marriage 
accords  better  with  our  nature,  and  as  being  more 


MORALITY. 


173 


natural  it  is  naturally  productive  of  good.  The 
idea  of  the  superior  sanctity  of  celibacy  is  a  Mani- 
chean  error  that  was  adopted  by  some  early  Chris¬ 
tians  when  Manicheism  was  a  power  in  the  world  ; 
and  the  Roman  Church  has,  among  its  other  follies, 
perpetuated  this  folly  also,  and  has  added  this  other 
erroneous  supposition  that  the  clergy  are  to  be 
more  holy  than  the  laity.  Hence  the  celibacy  of 
the  Romish  priesthood — an  error  and  a  sin,  as  has 
been  fully  evinced  by  the  corruptions,  recorded  in 
history,  which  have  evidently  issued  directly  from  it. 

Polygamy  was  not  prohibited  under  the  Mosaic 
law,  but  was  most  distinctly  discouraged.  Christ 
says  Moses  allowed  it  because  of  the  hardness  of 
their  hearts.  That  he  himself  and  all  his  apostles 
disallowed  it  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  no  Chris¬ 
tian  or  Christian  Church  or  council  was  ever  known 
to  sanction  it ;  but  on  the  contrary,  with  a  unani¬ 
mous  voice,  Christianity  denounces  it  as  a  sin 
against  God. 

Divorce  is  an  exception  to  that  part  of  the  law 
of  marriage  which  requires  that  the  union  be  for 
life.  Two,  and  only  two,  causes  are  allowed  by 
Scripture  authority  to  annul  the  marriage  con¬ 
tract — -adultery  and  willful  final  desertion.  The  act 
of  the  civil  authorities  has  no  moral  force  either  to 
make  or  unmake  a  marriage  covenant.  Its  power 
is  simply  to  recognize  the  legality  of  the  contract, 
and  thereby  determine  legal  questions  of  inherit- 


i74 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


ance,  etc.  The  parties  themselves  make  the  con¬ 
tract  ;  they  only  are  competent  to  break  it.  If 
either  party  commit  adultery,  or  take  final  leave 
of  the  other,  the  union  is  severed ;  the  injured 
party  is  morally  at  liberty  to  form  another  mar¬ 
riage  connection  ;  the  guilty  one  God  will  judge. 
The  supposition,  that  if  for  any  cause  a  decision 
of  the  court  can  be  obtained  ordering  the  dissolu¬ 
tion  of  the  contract  it  is  thereby  dissolved,  is  fa¬ 
tally  erroneous.  Terrible  distresses  have  come 
upon  domestic  circles  which  never  would  have 
come  if  the  parties  had  felt  themselves  bound  for 
life,  with  no  release  except  by  sins  against  God 
which  peril  eternal  destiny ;  but  they  have  come 
because  divorces  were  easily  obtainable  from  the 
courts,  and  the  supposition  has  been  indulged  that 
the  decree  of  the  court  was  itself  morally  a  release. 

Marriages  between  near  relatives  are  prohib¬ 
ited  ;  universal  humanity  instinctively  recognizes  a 
propriety  in  the  prohibition.  Some  affirm  that  the 
reason  for  the  prohibition  is  that  such  marriages 
tend  to  deteriorate  the  race.  More  obvious  rea¬ 
sons  are  found :  First,  in  the  manifest  fact  that 
the  natural  affection  subsisting  between  near  kin  is 
incongruous  with  the  special  affection  on  which  the 
marriage  relation  is  founded  ;  secondly,  if  sexual 
desire  were  lawful  and  considered  proper  between 
persons  living  on  such  terms  of  familiarity  as  sub¬ 
sist  among  near  relatives,  disastrous  results,  per- 


MORALITY.  175 

fectly  destructive  of  domestic  peace  and  harmony, 
could  not  fail  to  be  of  frequent  occurrence. 

Duties.  That  there  are  moral  obligations  bind¬ 
ing  upon  parties  while  forming  marriage  contracts 
would  seem  sufficiently  obvious  from  the  many 
and  vastly  important  interests  involved.  Perhaps 
these  can  not  be  very  distinctly  specified.  A  few 
suggestions,  however,  will  indicate  the  matters  to 
which  these  duties  relate.  Marriages  contracted 
on  love  at  first  sight  may  sometimes  chance  to  be 
fortunate,  but  the  hazard  is  too  great  to  be  trusted ; 
love  founded  on  at  least  a  tolerably  thorough  ac¬ 
quaintance  is  far  more  reliable.  Love  at  first  sight, 
indulged  without  restraint,  is  an  effectual  bar  to 
that  thorough  acquaintance  without  which  marriage 
should  never  be  contracted.  Cupid  is  said  to  be 
blind  ;  but  the  less  people  worship  a  blind  god  the 
better  will  it  be  for  them. 

When  an  engagement  has  been  made  the  par¬ 
ties  should  be  known  to  be  so  engaged,  that 
they  themselves  may  the  more  readily  cease  from 
such  intercourse  with  others  as  tends  to  excite 
affection,  and  that  all  others  may  cease  from  such 
intercourse  with  them.  The  ambition  to  surprise 
the  community  by  an  unexpected  marriage  is  great 
folly ;  concealment  in  a  matter  of  such  import  as 
the  marriage  relation  is  a  great  incongruity.  If, 
after  engagement,  either  or  both  are  fully  satisfied 
that  their  engagement  was  made  under  a  misap 


176 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


prehension,  so  that  marriage  would  not  be  a  means 
of  securing  their  mutual  happiness,  it  is  their  duty 
to  dissolve  the  connection.  In  this  the  woman  is 
allowed  a  larger  liberty  than  the  man ;  or,  rather, 
the  man  is  bound  to  be  the  more  scrupulous. 
When  both  parties  are  fully  satisfied  that  the 
union  proposed  will  be  for  their  mutual  good  it 
is  their  duty  to  consummate  it  by  the  marriage 
ceremony.  Short  engagements  are  by  far  pref¬ 
erable. 

Husbands  and  Wives.  The  law  governing  the 
married  is  the  law  of  special  love.  The  general 
law  which  requires  all  to  love  others  as  themselves 
does  not  meet  the  case.  Here  the  man  in  loving 
his  wife  loves  himself,  and  the  woman  in  loving 
her  husband  loves  herself.  And  reciprocally,  he 
in  loving  himself  loves  her,  and  she  in  loving  her¬ 
self  loves  him.  They  are  one ;  their  interests  are 
identified.  The  meum  and  the  tuum  has  but  a 
very  limited  application  in  a  happy  household. 
Separate  purses,  separate  associations,  social,  lit¬ 
erary,  or  religious  avocations,  disconnected  with  the 
welfare  of  the  household,  any  diverse  interests,  are 
an  obstruction  to  the  natural  flow  of  matrimonial 
affection. 

And  yet,  though  the  personality  of  the  parties 
is  mutually  absorbed  it  is  not  destroyed  ;  though 
in  most  respects  they  are  one,  yet  in  some  regards 
they  are  two.  Plainly  this  is  so  in  matters  of 


MORALITY. 


1 77 


conscience  ;  neither  has  the  right  to  interfere  with 
the  other’s  religious  convictions,  but,  contrariwise, 
is  bound  to  yield  all  needful  aids  in  assisting  the 
other  to  live  in  obedience  to  the  dictates  of  his 
own  conscience. 

Though  one  in  most  of  life’s  concerns,  yet 
individuality  still  exists,  and  differences  of  opinion 
and  apparent  differences  of  interests  will  some¬ 
times  arise.  Here,  if  love  be  arbiter,  no  difficulty 
will  appear ;  for  each  prefers  the  other’s  good  to 
his  own,  and  to  yield  will  be  no  sacrifice,  but 
rather  a  pleasure.  But  yet  again,  differences  will 
arise  where  yielding  will  be  a  sacrifice  of  individ¬ 
ual  preference.  What  then  ?  The  Bible  plainly 
answers  this  ;  and,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the  nature 
of  the  case  settles  it  as  well,  and  in  the  same  way. 
Both  can  not  have  their  preference.  There  is  no 
majority  in  the  case.  Reference  is  impossible ;  for 
strangers  must  not  meddle  with  such  affairs.  One 
must  yield,  must  sacrifice  preference,  and  submit 
to  the  other.  Which  shall  do  it?  For  many  ob¬ 
vious  reasons  the  man  is  the  head  of  the  house¬ 
hold,  and  the  woman  can  not  respect  and  love  him 
as  a  husband  unless  she  so  regard  him.  She 
honors  him,  and  in  so  doing  respects  herself  by  a 
cheerful  and  glad  obedience.  And  in  this  there  is 
no  inferiority,  no  subjugation,  but  the  contrary.  It 
is  obedience  where  obedience  is  naturally  due,  the 
most  honorable  and  holy  thing  one  rational  being 

C  12 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


•• 

can  render  to  another.  How  meagre  and  miserably 
supercilious  the  weakness  that  rejects  the  word 
“obey”  from  the  marriage  ceremony! 

Parents  and  Children.  “If  any  provide  not  for 
his  own,  and  specially  for  those  of  his  own  house,  he 
hath  denied  the  faith,  and  is  worse  than  an  infidel. 
He  that  spareth  his  rod  hateth  his  son  ;  but  he 
that  loveth  him  chasteneth  him  betimes.  And  ye 
fathers,  provoke  not  your  children  to  wrath  ;  but 
bring  them  up  in  the  nurture  and  admonition  of 
the  Lord.  Fathers,  provoke  not  your  children  to 
anger,  lest  they  be  discouraged.  Honor  thy  father 
and  thy  mother  as  the  Lord  thy  God  hath  com¬ 
manded  thee,  that  thy  days  may  be  prolonged,  and 
that  it  may  go  well  with  thee  in  the  land  which 
the  Lord  thy  God  giveth  thee.  Honor  thy  father 
and  mother,  which  is  the  first  commandment  with 
promise,  that  it  may  be  well  with  thee  and  thou 
mayest  live  long  on  the  earth.” 

The  doctrine  of  rights  has  here  an  obvious  ap¬ 


plication.  The  nature  of  the  case  furnishes  a  for¬ 
cible  as  well  as  a  beautiful  illustration  of  the  doc¬ 
trine,  and  perhaps  we  may  say  a  satisfactory  and 
full  demonstration  of  its  truthfulness. 

The  child  comes  into  being  in  a  condition  of 
entire  helplessness  and  dependence.  The  parents 
have  the  ability,  as  no  one  else  has,  to  furnish  the 
needed  assistance.  The  mother  especially,  by  the 
strength  and  intensity  of  the  maternal  affection — a 


MORALITY. 


179 


principle  implanted  in  her  nature — is  fitted  to  do 
for  the  child  what  no  one  else  can  ever  do.  This 
ability  and  disposition  to  secure  for  the  child  its 
greatest  good  is  the  ground  of  the  parent’s  right 
to  control  the  child,  and  correlative  is  the  obliga¬ 
tion  to  do  so  for  the  child’s  well-being.  While 
this  state  of  things  continues,  the  right  and  cor¬ 
responding  obligation  continue ;  but,  so  soon  as 
the  child  attains  an  ability  to  care  for  and  provide 
for  itself,  this  right  and  obligation  cease.  The 
duty  of  the  parent  requires  him  to  provide  for  the 
child  all  that  the  physical,  intellectual,  aesthetic, 
moral,  and  religious  wants  of  the  child  require  so 
far  forth  as  the  parent  can  and  the  child  can  not 
make  the  requisite  provision.  The  character  and 
extent  of  the  education  it  is  the  parent’s  duty  to 
provide  for  his  child  is  thus  determined  by  the 
child’s  requirements  and  the  parent’s  ability.  To 
educate  all  children  alike,  even  though  that  educa¬ 
tion  should  lead  some  to  the  attainment  of  their 
highest  possibility,  would  be  a  waste  of  resources 
as  to  many,  and  a  positive  detriment  to  not  a  few. 
Few  parents,  if  any,  are  qualified  to  give  their 
children  a  perfect  education,  and  the  best  that 
most  parents  can  do  will  be  but  an  imperfect  work. 
Physical,  intellectual,  and  aesthetic  training  must  be 
determined  by  the  parent’s  condition  in  life  and  so 
far  forth  as  possible  by  what  may  be  reasonably 
anticipated  as  to  the  future  of  the  child.  For  a 


i8o 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


poor  man  to  train  his  children  as  he  would  if  they 
were  to  inherit  a  fortune  is,  of  course,  a  great 
folly;  and  for  a  rich  man  to  train  his  for  a  life  of 
entire  dependence  upon  others,  is  not  only  a  great 
folly  but  a  positive  sin. 

To  find  the  limit  of  parental  control  in  matters 
of  religion  is  with  some  a  difficult  problem.  Be¬ 
yond  all  question,  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
parent  extend  to  the  religious  training  of  their 
children,  and  that  with  a  very  special  emphasis. 
As  religion  is  the  child’s  highest  interest,  so  is 
religious  training  the  parent’s  highest  duty  ;  they 
are  to  bring  up  their  children  in  the  nurture  and 
admonition  of  the  Lord.  This  plainly  extends  to 
an  authoritative  control  over  those  externals  of 
religion  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  parent,  tend 
to  the  proper  education  of  our  religious  nature, 
such  as  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath,  atten¬ 
dance  upon  family  and  public  worship,  the  reading 
and  study  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  a  total 
abstinence  from  profanity  and  other  immoralities. 
But  it  is  still  asked,  To  what  extent  may  a  parent 
press  upon  the  attention  of  his  child  the  pecul¬ 
iarities  of  denominational  Christianity?  We  an¬ 
swer,  it  is  for  the  child’s  good  in  all  things,  relig¬ 
ion  not  by  any  means  excepted,  that  he  follow  the 
footsteps  of  his  parents  till  he  has  what  is,  to  his 
own  mind,  a  good,  a  valid  reason  for  doing  other¬ 
wise — in  the  absence  of  a  better  reason  the  preju- 


MORALITY. 


181 


dices  of  education  are  man’s  best  guide  in  all 
things.  Therefore,  the  parent  should  teach  his 
child  all  things  whatsoever  he  himself  judges  is  for 
the  child’s  spiritual  good,  and  insist  upon  exter¬ 
nal  observances  as  far  forth  as  is  consistent  with 
the  child’s  personal  responsibility.  Religion  is  in 
itself  a  matter  of  the  personality,  and  consists  in 
the  free  choice  of  the  individual,  and,  of  course, 
can  not  be  interfered  with.  That  there  is  danger 
here  none  can  doubt ;  parents  may  so  insist  upon 
their  own  peculiar  notions  as  to  cause  their  chil¬ 
dren  to  revolt  against  all  religion,  and  thus  be 
the  occasion  of  indescribable  injury ;  but  evidently 
looseness  is  a  much  more  common  error  than 
rigor.  The  duty  of  parents  to  their  children  is 
most  effectually  performed  by  the  same  method  as 
that  by  which  more,  than  by  any  other,  each  one 
does  his  duty  to  his  fellow-man  ;  namely,  by  being 
himself  what  he  ought  to  be.  Example  is  more 
eloquent  than  speech ;  and  character,  though 
speaking  without  a  voice,  is  more  eloquent  than 
all  beside.  Without  good  character  all  else  is  no 
better  than  sounding-  brass.  The  duties  having 
special  reference  to  the  relation  of  parents  and 
children  may  be  summarized  on  the  part  of  par¬ 
ents  as  maintenance  and  education ;  and  on  the 
part  of  children  as  reverence  and  obedience. 
Maintenance  during  the  helplessness  of  childhood, 
education  as  required  by  the  child’s  wants  to  the 


182 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


extent  of  the  parents’  ability;  reverence  always 
and  obedience  during  minority — matters  of  con¬ 
science  only  excepted. 

Masters  and  Servants. — In  a  sense,  we  are  to 
call  no  man  master — one  is  our  master,  even 
Christ ;  that  is,  we  are  always  to  obey  God  rather 
than  man,  and  the  reverence  or  worship  due  to 
God  is  not  to  be  rendered  to  any  other  being. 
In  the  sense  of  domestic  slavery,  no  man  is  the 
master  of  another,  and  yet,  where  the  institution  of 
slavery  is  legalized,  the  relation  will  exist  and 
special  duties  will  arise.  Again,  the  relation  of 
master  and  servant  may  be,  and  often  must  be,  vol¬ 
untarily  entered  by  contract  between  the  parties. 
We  limit  ourselves  to  a  few  observations  respect¬ 
ing  the  duties  of  each  in  the  latter  case.  Of 
course  both  parties  are  morally  bound  to  fulfill  the 
contract,  unless  the  contract  itself  be  immoral  or  a 
contract  to  do  an  immoral  act,  and  to  fulfill  it  to 
the  letter  in  the  precise  sense  in  which  each 
understood  the  other  to  accept  it.  But  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  master  and  servant,  though  a  voluntary 
one,  often  is  and  must  be  a  relation  of  superior 
and  inferior,  of  power  and  dependence,  and  be¬ 
cause  of  this,  duty  is  not  unfrequently  difficult  and 
delicate.  As  a  man  has  no  right  to  make  a  con- 
tract  that  will  be  subversive  of  his  own  or  his 
neighbor’s  rights,  he  certainly  has  no  right  with  or 
without  such  a  contract,  because  his  neighbor 


MORALITY. 


183 

having  become  his  servant  is  in  his  power,  to 
require  him  to  do  that  which  is  destructive  of  the 
servant’s  best  good. 

Of  the  relations  and  duties  of  employers  and 
employes  I  shall  say  a  few  words  further  on.  I 
now  speak  of  servants  employed  in  and  about  a 
man’s  household.  To  require  a  service  which  is 
an  effectual  bar  to  the  servant’s  physical  health, 
mental  growth,  and  religious  culture,  is  to  deprive 
a  fellow-creature  of  natural  rights.  To  place  upon 
a  man  the  burden  of  a  brute,  or  to  require  what  is 
beneath  the  dignity  of  a  man,  or  to  demand  a  use¬ 
less  service,  merely  to  keep  servants  employed, 
or  to  prevent  them  from  enjoying  rest  and  recrea¬ 
tion,  is  tyrannical  and  subversive  of  all  good.  To 
oppress  the  hireling  in  his  wages,  to  fail  to  pay  the 
full  amount  on  time,  is  a  sin  against  which  the 
Scriptures  utter  unqualified  denunciation.  The  du¬ 
ties  of  servants  are  too  minute  and  numerous  for 
accurate  specification  in  a  contract,  hence  they  are 
employed  to  do  the  master’s  will,  and  within  the 
natural  and  obvious  limits  above  hinted  they  are 
bound  to  obey  their  master’s  orders ;  to  do  the 
master’s  will  rather  than  their  own,  where  the 
two  are  in  conflict.  In  case  of  unjust  and  tyran¬ 
nical  masters,  matters  of  conscience  excepted,  the 
Scriptures  teach  that  for  Christ’s  sake,  not  be¬ 
cause  it  is  due  the  masters  themselves,  the  serv¬ 
ant,  while  he  is  a  servant,  should  be  obedient;  that 


184 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


is,  as  I  understand  it,  the  servant  may  never  as¬ 
sume  to  be  the  master — the  master’s  will  is  law 
while  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  exists. 

Civil  Duties  :  Civil  Government. — What  is  in¬ 
tended  when  it  is  said  that  civil  government  is  a 
divine  institution  ?  Plainly  that  it  is  God’s  will 
that  such  institutions  should  exist ;  he  prefers  their 
existence  to  their  non-existence.  He  has  not  left 
this  matter  to  human  option,  in  any  such  sense  as 
that  man  may  or  may  not  form  such  associations, 
and  in  either  case  be  equally  acceptable  and  well 
pleasing  to  God.  Civil  government  is  not  a  vol¬ 
untary  association,  like  a  literary  society,  a  bank, 

1 

or  a  railroad  company.  How  is  the  divine  will  in 
this  case  indicated?  First,  by  the  written  Word. 
“The  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of  God;  the 
power  is  the  minister  of  God  to  thee  for  good.” 
Secondly,  by  the  constitution  of  things,  or  rather 
by  what  man  is  by  creation  and  by  the  circum¬ 
stances  of  his  earthly  life.  Man  is,  by  nature,  a 
social  being;  he  was  created  for  society;  without 
society  he  can  not  subsist ;  his  condition  is  a  con¬ 
dition  of  mutual  dependence  ;  in  some  portions  of 
his  life  he  is  absolutely  dependent  for  the  con¬ 
tinuance  of  his  life — at  all  times  he  is  dependent 
for  the  security  of  his  greatest  good.  God  has 
endowed  man  with  certain  inalienable  rights,  but 
man  has  not  the  power  to  secure  these  rights  by 
himself  alone,  and  when  deprived  of  them  he  has 


MORALITY. 


185 

no  power  to  redress  his  wrongs.  Hence  the  ne- 

« 

cessity  of  government  for  the  protection  of  life, 
liberty,  property,  character,  and  reputation. 

The  affirmation  that  “  the  powers  that  be  are 
ordained  of  God  ”  is  not  an  affirmation  that  the 
form  of  the  government  and  the  personnel  of  the 
administration  are  always  divinely  appointed.  And 
yet  divine  providence,  without  doubt,  has  much  to 
do  with  these  things  ;  for  it  is  by  the  divine  wis¬ 
dom  “that  kings  rule  and  princes  decree  justice. 
Promotion  cometh  neither  from  the  east,  nor  from 
the  west,  nor  from  the  south ;  but  God  is  the 
judge;  he  putteth  down  one  and  setteth  up  an¬ 
other.”  Human  wisdom  is  not  competent  to  draw 
the  line  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
between  human  agency  and  divine  sovereignty ; 
but  it  is  competent  to  see  both  clearly  manifest  in 
the  same  thing,  so  that  we  may  distinctly  recog¬ 
nize  a  divine  providence  in  disposing  of  the  dynas¬ 
ties  that  succeed  each  other  in  the  earth,  and  at 
the  same  time  recognize  the  agency  of  man  in 
determining  to  some  extent  what  shall  be  and 
what  shall  not  be.  And  the  histories  of  the  gov¬ 
ernments  that  are,  and  of  those  that  have  been, 
clearly  evince  that  the  consent  of  the  governed  is 
a  large  element  in  civil  affairs.  It  is  not  true  that 
governments  “derive  their  just  powers  from  the 
consent  of  the  governed,”  in  the  sense  that  the 
consent  of  the  governed  is  sole  source  of  pow^r 


1 86 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


or  the  chief  source.  Eminently  and  emphatically 
“the  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of  God;”  but 
yet  it  is  true  that  the  form  of  the  government, 
whether  monarchial  or  republican  or  otherwise, 
and  the  personnel  of  the  administration,  whether 
this,  that,  or  the  other  man  be  king  or  emperor, 
is  largely  determined  by  the  consent  of  the  gov¬ 
erned,  and  it  is  evident  that  God  designed  that  so 
it  should  be.  It  is  of  the  divine  will  that  men 
have  in  respect  to  these  things  a  large  liberty 
of  choice. 

By  what  principles  ought  men  to  govern  them¬ 
selves  in  determining  the  forms  of  government,  and 
in  selecting  their  rulers?  Unanimity  is  impossible. 
That  among  equals  wisdom  is  with  the  minority  is 
self-contradictory  ;  majorities  must  rule.  But  since 
before  a  majority  a  minority  is  defenseless,  consti¬ 
tutional  law  is  established  to  determine  the  limits 
within  which  majorities  may  and  beyond  which 
they  may  not  coerce  the  minority,  and  law  applies 
equally  to  all  the  individual  subjects  of  govern¬ 
ment,  irrespective  of  the  party  to  which  the  indi¬ 
vidual  belongs. 

The  form  of  the  government  is  discretionary, 
and  may  be  determined  by  the  condition  of  the 
society  for  which  it  is  organized.  Republics  re¬ 
quire  a  larger  amount  of  intelligence  and  a  higher 
standard  of  morals  among  the  people  than  mon¬ 
archies.  Hereditary  governments  are  more  stable 


MORALITY. 


I87 


than  those  that  are  elective,  but  the  probability  of 
an  imbecile  administration  is  greater  in  the  former 
than  in  the  latter. 

To  whom  does  the  right  of  suffrage  belong? 
It  belongs  to  none  by  natural  right.  It  must  be 
bestowed  by  convention,  and  should  he  bestowed 
upon  such  as  are  best  qualified  to  use  it.  The 
doctrine  that,  since  government  is  for  the  people, 
it  should  be  by  the  people,  can  not  be  applied  with¬ 
out  some  limitation.  Children,  the  sick,  the  infirm, 
the  insane,  criminals,  and  absentees  can  not  vote  ; 
some  must  vote  for  others.  The  doctrine  that  the 
family  is  the  unit  of  the  state,  and  that  therefore 
heads  of  families  are  the  proper  representatives, 
is  also  inapplicable,  because  frequently  persons  not 
heads  of  families  have  larger  interests  in  the  gov¬ 
ernment  and  are  better  qualified  to  administer  its 
affairs  than  many  that  are  heads  of  families.  In 
a  matter  where  interests  so  multifarious,  and  fre¬ 
quently  conflicting  interests,  are  involved,  no  per¬ 
fectly  equitable  arrangement  is  possible.  With  a 
large  margin  for  variation,  as  changes  in  the  con¬ 
ditions  and  circumstances  of  society  may  require, 
general  principles  must  determine  upon  whom  the 
right  of  suffrage  is  conferred.  As  the  present 
writer  sees  it,  intelligence,  at  least  common  moral¬ 
ity,  sympathy  with  the  government,  and  ability  to 
meet  governmental  responsibilities,  are  essential 
qualifications.  A  voter  should  be  twenty-one  years 


1 88 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


of  age,  should  have  at  least  a  common-school  edu¬ 
cation,  should  not  be  a  criminal  before  the  law, 
should  be  a  citizen  either  by  birth  or  by  naturali¬ 
zation  after  a  competent  number  of  years  of  res¬ 
idence  among  the  people,  should  pay  taxes,  should 
be  qualified  to  serve  the  government  as  a  juror, 
legislator,  soldier,  or  in  some  other  way,  as  the 
exigencies  of  the  government  might  require.  It 
would  seem  that  justice  requires  a  further  discrim¬ 
ination.  It  would  seem  that  the  soldier,  who  must 
fight  if  war  exist,  ought  to  have  greater  power  in 
determining  the  question  of  war  than  the  ordinary 
citizen,  who  may  remain  at  home  ;  but  the  history 
of  the  world  seems  to  indicate  that  this  is  either 
impossible  or  inexpedient.  Again,  it  would  seem 
that  a  man  who  has  large  property  to  be  protected 
should  have  a  voice  in  governmental  affairs  where 
he  who  has  no  property  need  not  have  a  voice. 
This,  however,  may  be  provided  for  by  a  property 
representation  in  the  legislature  probably  better 
than  by  a  property  qualification  in  the  voter. 
Again,  it  would  seem  that  women  having  prop¬ 
erty  in  their  own  right,  and  required  to  pay  taxes, 
ought  in  some  way  to  be  represented  in  prop¬ 
erty  legislation.  Perhaps  they  ought ;  and  yet 
the  difficulty  of  special  legislation  to  meet  such 
specific  cases  may  be  adequate  reason  for  disal¬ 
lowing  the  representation  required. 

Why  is  not  the  right  of  suffrage  conferred  on 


MORALITY. 


189 


women  ?  Perhaps  it  may  here  be  said — not  as  an 
answer  to  the  question,  but  as  the  statement  of  a 
fact — that  by  far,  very  far,  the  larger  number  of 
women  in  the  world,  and  by  far,  very  far,  the 
larger  number  in  any  part  of  the  world,  would  re¬ 
gard  it  as  a  very  unwelcome  responsibility  should 
the  law  of  the  land  require  them  to  vote,  and  to 
mingle  with  governmental  affairs  in  the  many  other 
ways  which  voting  implies.  But  to  our  answer  to 
to  the  question.  The  physical  constitution  their 
Creator  gave  them  disqualifies  them  for  service  as 
policemen,  sheriffs,  soldiers,  and  for  many  other 
duties  required  by  the  government.  Again,  the 
duties  of  the  home,  to  which  by  nature  they  are 
called,  are  sufficient  to  occupy  them  wholly,  and 
are  so  incongruous  with  political  affairs  that  any 
attempt  to  mingle  them  must  issue  in  a  neglect 
of  one  or  the  other,  or  both.  Again,  public  taste 
and  sentiment  being  what  it  now  is,  if  the  women 
of  the  land  should  vote,  take  the  rostrum  and 
harangue  public  assemblies  on  political  questions, 
become  candidates  for  public  offices,  manipulate 
and  maneuver  as  politicians- — in  a  word,  do  what 
voting  implies  —  it  would  be  an  effectual  laying 
aside  of  their  womanhood  ;  it  would  dismantle 
them  of  many  of  those  amiable  qualities  which 
now  constitute  their  chief  power  over  husbands 
and  children ;  it  would  tend  to  annihilate  the  home, 
and  to  banish  from  social  life  its  courtesies. 


190 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


What  are  the  functions  of  government  ?  To  do 
for  the  individual  good,  and  through  the  individual 
for  the  generahgood,  what  without  government  can 
not  be  done.  This  includes  the  protection  and  se¬ 
curity  of  natural  rights — the  rights  to  life,  liberty, 
property,  character,  and  reputation ;  and  in  case 
of  violation  of  these  rights  it  requires  that  indi¬ 
vidual  and  public  wrongs  be  redressed.  The  abil¬ 
ity  of  the  government  to  do  these  things  as  they 
can  not  be  done  without  government  constitutes 
its  right  to  govern — or,  if  it  please  better,  consti¬ 
tutes  the  reason,  as  we  may  suppose,  why  the 
divine  wisdom  has  ordained  that  governments 
shall  be.  These  functions  so  obviously  belong  to 
the  powers  that  be  that  we  may  pass  them  with¬ 
out  further  remark.  But  the  civil  authority  may 
promote  the  private  and  public  welfare  of  its  cit¬ 
izens  in  other  ways.  It  may  encourage  industries, 
arts,  science,  literature,  promote  morals  and  relig¬ 
ion,  in  all  ways  for  the  public  good,  provided  it  can 
do  so,  in  cases  where  neither  the  individual  citizen 
can  by  himself  alone,  nor  any  number  of  citizens 
by  voluntary  associations  do  those  things  for  them¬ 
selves.  For  the  encouragement  of  art,  science, 
and  literature  a  monopoly  of  their  products  is 
given  by  patent  laws  and  copyrights  to  inventors 
and  authors  ;  for  the  encouragement  of  industries 
acts  of  incorporation  granting  legal  privileges  are 
issued,  by  which  capital  is  aggregated,  machinery 


MORALITY. 


IQI 

employed,  and  a  division  of  labor  adopted  greatly 
for  the  public  good,  a  result  which  could  not  be 
without  legal  authority. 

But,  it  is  asked,  can  law  do  any  thing  for  mor¬ 
als  and  religion  ?  Of  course,  the  inquirer  does 
not  ask  whether  man  may  be  punished  for  im¬ 
moralities — this  is  taken  for  granted — but  may 
government  do  any  thing  to  promote  morals  and 
religion  ?  Not  directly,  for  men  are  not  made 
morally  good  by  force  or  power,  But  indirectly, 
by  diffusing  knowledge,  establishing  schools,  teach¬ 
ing  the  truth  in  many  ways  that  are  above  private 
means  and  the  means  of  voluntary  associations,  it 
may  contribute  greatly  to  the  moral  and  religious 
well-being  of  its  subject.  Some  Christian  nations 
affirm  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  support 
the  Church  ;  but  the  facts  of  history  prove  that 
the  Church  can  be  better  supported  by  the  vol¬ 
untary  contributions  of  its  members  than  by  tax¬ 
ations  levied  by  the  State.  I  repeat,  the  State  is 
not  called  to  do  what  the  subject  may  do  for 
himself.  May  not  temperance  laws  be  enacted  ? 
not  for  the  promotion  of  temperance,  but  for  the 
prevention  of  crime.  The  State  may  enact  pro¬ 
hibitory  laws,  because  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
intoxicating  drinks  tend  directly  to  the  produc 
tion  of  crimes,  pauperisms,  cruelties,  and  an  almost 
endless  catalogue  of  evils.  Self-preservation  here 
gives  the  right  of  prohibition. 


192 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Duties  of  Magistrates  and  Citizens. — Either 
because  the  necessities  of  the  case  require  it  or 
because  it  is  obviously  expedient,  government  is 
usually  divided  into  three  departments,  legislative, 
judiciary,  and  executive.  The  legislature  enacts 
the  laws,  the  judiciary  explains  and  applies  them, 
the  executive  executes  them.  These  are  distinct 
from  each  other — the  executive,  however,  usually 
has  the  power  of  a  veto  on  the  acts  of  the  legis¬ 
lature,  and  is,  therefore,  so  far  forth  a  branch  of 
that  department.  The  judiciary  is,  in  some  States, 
appointed  by  the  executive,  and  in  others  elected 
by  the  people ;  but  their  appointment  makes  no 
difference  as  to  their  functions  or  responsibility. 
The  legislative  department  is  divided  into  upper 
and  lower  house,  called  in  the  United  States, 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives.  It  has 
been  sometimes  thought  that  the  lower  house  rep¬ 
resents  the  people  and  the  upper  the  capital  of 
the  country ;  and,  again,  that  the  one  represents 
the  common  people  and  the  other  the  aristocracy ; 
but  neither  of  these  is,  either  in  theory  or  prac¬ 
tice,  true.  The  two  houses  are  co-ordinate,  and 
operate  merely  as  mutual  checks ;  the  joint  action 
of  both  bodies,  acting  separately,  being  required, 
is  a  healthy  check  upon  hasty  legislation. 

The  duty  of  officers  of  government  has  re¬ 
spect  first  to  their  own  qualifications  for  the  office 
they  hold.  They  are  to  acquaint  themselves  thor- 


MORALITY. 


193 


oughly  with  constitutional  and  common  law,  and 
very  generally  with  the  specific  laws  of  the  country 
they  serve  ;  they  are  to  know  well  the  character, 
habits,  and  wants  of  the  people  ;  their  possibilities 
and  those  of  the  land  they  inhabit.  Being  well 
informed,  they  are,  secondly,  to  do,  according  to 
their  best  judgment,  what  is  for  the  good  of  the 
whole  people,  without  fear  or  favor.  The  repre¬ 
sentative  of  a  given  State  may  not  do  what  is  for 
the  advantage  of  his  immediate  constituents  to  the 
detriment  of  the  whole  people ;  he  is  an  official, 
not  for  those  who  elected  him,  but  for  the  whole 
people ;  he  is  bound  to  do,  not  what  accords  with 
the  wishes  of  his  constituents,  but  what,  in  his  own 
judgment,  is  best  for  the  whole.  If  he  were 
elected  on  an  issue  judged  of  by  the  people,  be¬ 
cause  he  was  known  to  be  of  their  opinion,  and 
before  the  time  of  action  came  his  judgment  in 
the  case  is  changed,  a  proper  respect  for  the  opin¬ 
ions  of  the  people,  as  well  as  regard  for  his  own 
implied  pledge,  would  make  it  proper  for  him  to 
resign  ;  but  if  the  issue  arose  after  his  election,  he 
ought  not  to  resign,  though  he  knows  that  his  con¬ 
stituents  differ  with  him  in  opinion.  In  no  case 
ought  a  legislator  or  judge  to  do  what,  in  his  judg¬ 
ment,  ought  not  to  be  done.  Executive  officers, 
sheriffs,  soldiers,  policemen,  are  appointed  to  obey 
orders  ;  they  are  not  supposed  to  have  an  opinion  ; 

they  are  not  responsible  for  their  judgment  of  what 
c  13 


194 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


ought  to  be  ;  but  for  their  efficiency  and  faithful¬ 
ness  in  executing  the  laws  as  they  exist.  The 
citizen  is  bound  to  obey  all  the  laws  of  the  land, 
matters  of  conscience  only  excepted,  to  pay  his 
taxes  promptly,  and  hold  himself  in  readiness  to 
render  any  personal  service  the  common  weal  may 
require.  If  the  law  require  what  conscience  for¬ 
bids,  he  must  disregard  the  law  and  submissively 
accept  the  penalty. 

Employers  and  Employes  —  Principals  and 
Agents. — Under  the  head  of  domestic  duties  we 
made  a  few  remarks  referring  to  the  duties  of  mas¬ 
ters  and  servants,  having  special  reference  to  serv¬ 
ants  employed  in  and  about  the  homestead.  Above, 
under  the  head  of  civil  duties,  reference  has  been 
made  to  the  duties  of  magistrates,  considered  as 
agents  employed  by  society.  There  are  a  few 
general  considerations  involved  in  the  relations  of 
principals  and  agents  deserving  notice,  and  not  as 
yet  receiving  it,  which  may  be  introduced  in  this 
connection  as  well  as  any.  Agencies  are  of  two 
kinds  ;  in  the  one  the  agent  is  employed  to  do  the 
will  of  his  employer ;  to  this  class  belong  all  com¬ 
mon  laborers,  and  most,  if  not  all,  operatives  in 
agricultural  and  mechanical  pursuits :  in  the  other, 
the  agent  is  employed  to  secure  an  end  desired  by 
his  principal,  but  is  left  to  his  own  option  as  to 
the  means  by  which  to  attain  the  end  proposed. 
To  this  class  belong  all  professional  agents,  of 


MORALITY. 


195 


whatever  kind  ;  agents  employed  because  they  are 
supposed  to  have  a  knowledge  and  skill  for  effect¬ 
ing  the  end  desired,  that  their  employers  do  not 
possess.  Physicians  are  not  employed  to  give  the 
medicine  the  patient  may  prefer,  but  to  administer 
what,  in  his  judgment,  will  remove  disease  and 
promote  health.  For  convenience  we  designate 
all  principals  and  employers,  of  whatever  class,  by 
the  general  term  employers,  and  all  agents  and 
laborers  by  the  term  operatives. 

The  employer  is  under  obligation  to  make  an 
equitable  division  of  the  profits  of  labor,  and  pay 
his  operatives  their  full  share  of  such  profits.  In 
general,  this  requires  that  labor  of  all  kinds  be 
sufficiently  remunerative  to  enable  the  operative  to 
secure  all  the  ends  that  properly  belong  to  his 
normal  relations  in  life.  Is  he  the  head  of  a 
family,  his  wages  must  be  adequate  to  the  mainte¬ 
nance  and  education  of  his  children  ;  he  must  have 
wherewith  to  give  all  the  members  of  his  house¬ 
hold  what  advantages  for  culture  their  natures  re¬ 
quire.  I  say  in  general,  and  by  this  qualification  I 
mean  that  the  rule  indicates  a  general  principle  in 
theory,  and  not  a  dead  level  in  practice,  for  some 
employments  are,  and  for  all  that  appears  to  the 
contrary  must  be,  more  remunerative  than  others. 
When  an  employer,  totally  unmindful  of  the  good 
of  his  operatives  and  the  good  of  their  families, 
adopts  as  his  motto  for  business,  the  largest  pos- 


196 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


sible  amount  of  the  best  possible  work  for  the 
least  possible  wages,  to  the  extent  of  his  power 
he  will  be  an  oppressor — “a  hard  master,  reaping 
where  he  has  not  sown,  and  gathering  where  he 
has  not  strewed.’ ’  It  is  obviously  morally  binding 
upon  all  employers  to  seek,  and,  so  far  as  possible, 
to  provide  for,  the  greatest  good  of  those  in  their 
employ  with  all  dependent  upon  them. 

Frequently,  especially  in  large  cities,  this  obli¬ 
gation  is  practically  violated,  where  the  fault  is 
mostly,  if  not  entirely,  chargeable  upon  the  opera¬ 
tive.  Some  products  may  be  very  cheaply  manu¬ 
factured  by  labor-saving  machinery,  or  persons 
of  leisure  not  dependent  on  daily  toil  for  a  suste¬ 
nance  may,  as  a  pastime,  perform  certain  kinds 
of  work  for  a  small  remuneration.  Such  products 
are  always  sold  for  a  price  that  will  not  allow  the 
manufacturer  to  pay  for  their  production,  by  hand 
labor,  wages  sufficient  for  the  adequate  livelihood 
of  the  operative  ;  yet  multitudes  hang  about  large 
cities  and  entreat,  beg,  and  beseech  manufacturers 
to  give  them  this  very  kind  of  work  ;  and  taking 
it  they  rise  early,  sit  up  late,  work  hard  every 
day,  and  not  unfrequently  stitch,  stitch  the  livelong 
night  for  a  pittance  merely  sufficient  to  perpetuate 
for  a  brief  life  a  most  miserable  existence  ;  hence 
come  strikes,  labor  riots,  and  wholesale  denuncia¬ 
tion  of  capitalists,  of  capital  and  of  labor-saving 
machinery.  Now,  if  laborers  insist  upon  living 


MORALITY. 


197 


where  there  is  no  labor  to  be  done  or  none  that  they 
can  do,  or  if  they  insist  upon  doing  a  kind  of  work 
for  which  there  is  no  demand,  I  see  not  to  the 
contrary  but  that  the  consequences  belong  to  them 
and  to  no  one  else.  If  a  young  girl  who  is  com¬ 
petent  to  do  house  work,  and  is  wanted  at  remu¬ 
nerative  wages,  prefers  to  stick  on  shop-work  at 
starvation  prices,  and  persists  in  doing  so,  whom 
shall  she  blame  when  want  and  sickness  and  sor¬ 
rows  come  ?  Let  laborers  be  content  to  be  em¬ 
ployed  at  work  for  which  they  are  competent,  and 
for  which  there  is  a  demand;  if  there  is  no  de¬ 
mand  where  they  are,  let  them  go  where  there  is  ; 
let  them  do  such  work  faithfully  and  well,  and,  as 
a  rule,  they  will  surely  receive  adequate  remunera¬ 
tion — the  laborer  is  worthy  of  his  hire,  and  under 
Providence  he  will  be  quite  certain  to  receive  it. 
As  a  rule,  when  he  receives  that  for  which  he 
agreed  to  labor  it  is  his  duty  to  be  content ;  but 
whatever  oppression  may  come  to  him  from,  as  he 
judges,  a  maladjustment  of  the  relations  of  capital 
and  labor,  no  good  can  come  from  the  use  of 
violence,  or  from  attempts  to  coerce  capitalists ; 
strikes  and  labor  riots  are  worse  than  follies — they 


are  sins. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Duties  to  God,  or  Piety. 

Is  there  any  such  thing  as  morality  without 
religion  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  depends 
upon  definitions.  If  by  the  term  morality  nothing 
more  is  meant  than  external  conduct,  and  that  is 
called  morally  good  which  has  a  beneficial  effect, 
then  the  answer  is  affirmative,  and  there  is  no 
room  for  controversy  or  discussion.  Beyond  ques¬ 
tion,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  automatic  excellence, 
which  may  exist  where  there  is  no  moral  desert. 
A  watch,  a  knife,  may  be  good  in  this  sense ;  and 
a  man  may  perform  an  act  by  pure  accident  which 
may  produce  beneficial  results.  If  the  term  mo¬ 
rality  is  made  to  include  the  motive,  and  that  is 
called  morally  good  which  is  done  with  a  good 
motive,  then  the  question  may  assume  this  form  : 
May  an  act  be  morally  acceptable  which  is  prompted 
by  a  good  but  a  subordinate  motive,  without  any 
reference  to  a  supreme  end,  and  entirely  irrespec¬ 
tive  of  authority  or  of  God?  We  answer:  On 

the  supposition — if  the  supposition  is  admissible — 
198 


PIETY. 


199 


that  the  agent  does  not  know,  and  is  not  respon¬ 
sible  for  his  ignorance,  of  any  higher  motive  than 
that  which  prompted  him,  then  he  is  both  morally 
good  and  religious  in  the  highest  sense  he  is  ca¬ 
pable  of  being;  but  all  will  agree  that  his  morality 
is  very  defective,  and  his  religion  well-nigh  a  nul¬ 
lity.  Nothing  valuable  either  in  philosophy  or  re¬ 
ligion  can  be  deduced  from  such  a  case.  If  morality 
is  made  to  include  the  supreme  end,  and  is  deter¬ 
mined  by  the  end  chosen  as  supreme,  then  there 
is  no  morality  without  religion  ;  or  perhaps  it  is 
better  to  say  a  perfect  morality  and  religion  are 
the  same  thing.  But  it  will  be  asked,  May  we  not 
define  morality  as  the  duties  we  owe  to  men,  and 
religion  as  the  duties  we  owe  to  God,  and  then 
say  a  man  may  be  moral  and  not  religious  ?  Not 
if  his  governing  motive  determines  his  character. 

But  if  a  man  may  be  moral  and  not  religious, 
he  can  not  be  religious  and  not  moral.  If  we  love 
not  him  whom  we  have  seen  we  can  not  love  Him 
whom  we  have  not  seen.  If  we  bring  a  gift  to 
the  altar,  and  remember  that  our  brother  has 
aught  against  us,  we  must  first  be  reconciled  to 
our  brother,  and  then  we  may  come  and  offer  our 
gift.  In  this  sense  religion  is  conditioned  upon 
morality,  and  according  to  all  analogies  is  therefore 
higher ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  two  are- 
separable,  and  that  morality  is  first  in  the  order 
of  time.  Though  judging  from  appearances  we 


200 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


would  naturally  say  that  the  sense  of  obligation  to 
our  fellow-men  is  developed  earlier  in  life  than  the 
sense  of  obligation  to  God,  yet  it  can  not  be  af¬ 
firmed  that  it  is  so.  Contrariwise,  it  may  be  rea¬ 
sonably  inferred  from  man’s  religious  nature  that 
the  intuitive  sense  of  dependence,  which  is  the  oc¬ 
casion  on  which  the  sense  of  obligation  arises,  has 
respect  to  a  superior  power,  is  a  recognition  of 
God,  is  the  occasion  of  the  mind’s  earliest  intuitive 
apprehension  of  supreme  power  and  infinite  bein^. 
If  this  be  so  there  can  be  no  form  of  duty  without 
some  reference  to  God. 

We  have  said  above  that  a -perfect  morality  and 
religion  are  the  same  thing.  This  requires  some 
qualification  or  explanation.  It  is  not  identically 
the  same  thing  to  say  to  good,  Be  thou  my  God, 
as  to  say,  O  God,  be  thou  my  good  ;  and  yet  a  full 
apprehension  of  what  is  meant  and  implied  being 
supposed,  the  two  forms  of  expression  would  be 
exponential  of  the  same  state  of  mind.  The  same 
thing  may  be  said  of  unreserved  submission  to  the 
will  of  God,  entire  consecration  to  the  service 
of  God.  When  a  man  adopts  the  will  of  God  as 
his  law  —  or,  in  other  words,  when  he  purposes 
universal  obedience  to  the  divine  commandments — 
he  may  do  so  in  view  of  the  good,  which  the  will 
of  God  seeks,  which  the  commandments  secure, 
which  constitutes  the  reason  why  the  will  of  God 
is  what  it  is,  and  why  the  commandments  are  what 


PIETY. 


201 


they  are  ;  or  he  may  do  so  simply  and  solely  be¬ 
cause  God  has  commanded.  In  the  former  case 
his  submission  to  God’s  will  is  a  rational  accept¬ 
ance  of  the  highest  motive  ;  in  the  latter  it  is  a 
trusting  acceptance  of  lawful  authority.  The  first  is 
a  recognition  of  the  righteousness  of  the  law  itself ; 
the  other,  a  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  lawgiver 
to  command.  In  both  it  is  a  recognition  of  the  ob¬ 
ligation  to  obey.  When  perfect  they  are  nothing 
more  than  different  phases  of  the  same  state  of  mind. 
The  former  is  specially  exponential  of  loyalty  to  law ; 
and  the  latter  of  loyalty  to  the  giver  of  the  law. 
The  one  may  be  considered  a  higher  style  of  vir¬ 
tue  ;  but  the  other  must  be  regarded  as  a  better 
test  of  loyalty  to  the  person  of  the  sovereign. 
Whatever  view  be  taken  of  it,  it  is  eminently  that 
that  all  his  creatures  owe  to  God.  It  is  the  first 
great  duty,  and  is  in  its  nature  such  that  it  involves 
all  duty.  Our  duties  to  ourselves  and  our  duties 
to  our  fellow-men  are  duties  to  God. 

But  there  are  duties  which  have  special  refer¬ 
ence  to  God,  and  these  are  usually  spoken  of  as, 
I.  The  Cultivation  of  a  Devotional  Spirit ;  II. 
Prayer;  and,  III.  The  Observance  of  the  Sabbath. 

I.  THE  CULTIVATION  OF  A  DEVOTIONAL  SPIRIT. 

“  Man  shall  not  live  by  bread  alone,  but  by 
every  word  that  proceedeth  out  of  the  mouth  of 
God.”  Man  has  another  life  besides  his  natural 


202 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


physical  life ;  it  is  a  higher  life,  the  life  of  the 
spirit,  or  spiritual  life.  This  is  sustained  by  other 
food  than  material  bread,  by  every  word  that  pro¬ 
ceeded!  out  of  the  mouth  of  God.  “To  know 
God,  and  Jesus  Christ  whom  he  hath  sent,  is 
eternal  life.”  The  knowledge  of  God  is  the  life 
of  the  soul,  or  is  the  means  by  which  soul  life  is 
nourished  and  sustained.  Words  are  the  media 
of  thoughts,  channels  for  the  communication  of 
ideas.  Every  method  by  which  God  makes  him¬ 
self  known  to  his  creatures  is  a  word  of  God. 
Chiefly  these  may  be  classified  as  nature,  provi¬ 
dence,  and  revelation — the  divine  works,  ways,  and 
words.  To  cultivate  a  devotional  spirit,  to  seek 
communion  with  God,  is  to  use  those  means  of 
acquiring  a  knowledge  of  him  which  he  has  placed 
in  our  power.  It  is,  first,  to  study  his  works  spe¬ 
cially  with  a  view  to  find  out  his  thoughts.  The 
mere  naturalist  is  content  to  ascertain  facts  and 
observe  second  causes  ;  the  devout  man  looks  be¬ 
yond  these  in  search  of  first  cause,  of  purpose,  or 
intentional  design,  of  wisdom,  of  power,  and  of 
goodness.  “  I  will  speak  of  the  glorious  honor 
of  thy  majesty,  and  of  thy  wondrous  works.  Unto 
thee,  O  God,  do  we  give  thanks  ;  unto  thee  do  we 
give  thanks  ;  for  that  thy  name  is  near  thy  won¬ 
drous  works  declare.  One  generation  shall  praise 
thy  works  to  another,  and  shall  declare  thy  mighty 
acts.  The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God,  and 


PIETY. 


203 


the  firmament  sheweth  his  handiwork.”  Secondly, 
a  devotional  spirit  is  cultivated  by  studying  God  in 
his  providence  or  his  ways.  The  mere  historian, 
like  the  naturalist,  looks  wholly  at  events  and  the 
connection  of  successive  events ;  but  the  devout 
observer  of  the  things  that  are  done  under  the 
sun  constantly  inquires  after  the  purposes  of  God. 
Why,  for  what  purpose,  with  what  intent,  did  he 
do  this,  or  permit  his  creatures  to  do  it  ?  is  the 
pious  man’s  inquiry  in  all  the  events  that  interest 
him.  He  is  constantly  searching  that  he  may  find 
out  God ;  he  is  feeling  after  him,  if  haply  he  may 
find  him.  Clouds  and  darkness  are  round  about 
him,  but  enough  of  his  ways  may  be  known  to 
assure  us  that  righteousness  is  the  habitation  of 
his  throne.  Now  we  see  but  in  a  glass  darkly  ; 
but  the  perfection  of  our  nature  requires  that  we 
see  him  face  to  face,  and  a  devotional  spirit  tends 
towards  that  perfection  with  all  possible  speed. 
His  wisdom  is  unsearchable,  and  his  ways  past 
finding  out ;  but  we  may  know  his  ways  in  part, 
and  by  such  knowledge  come  to  love  and  adore. 
He  doeth  his  will  in  the  armies  of  heaven  and 
among  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth  ;  it  is  his  glory 
to  conceal  a  matter,  and  yet  the  secret  of  the  Lord 
is  with  them  that  fear  him.  They  that  seek  him 
shall  find  him ;  and  to  him  that  knocketh  the  door 
shall  be  opened  into  a  saving  knowledge  of  his 
will.  “And  the  Lord  said,  Shall  I  hide  from 


204 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Abraham  that  thing  which  I  do  ?  I  know  him, 
that  he  will  command  his  children  and  his  house¬ 
hold  after  him,  and  they  shall  keep  the  way  of  the 
Lord  to  do  justice  and  judgment.”  To  his  friends 
God  makes  known  the  secret  of  his  ways.  “  Hence¬ 
forth  I  call  you  not  servants,  for  the  servant  know- 
eth  not  what  his  lord  doeth  ;  but  I  have  called  you 
friends ;  for  all  things  that  I  have  heard  of  my 
Father  I  have  made  known  unto  you.”  Thirdly, 
a  devotional  spirit  is  most  directly  and  effectually 
cultivated  by  searching  in  the  Scriptures  to  find 
God ;  to  learn  his  nature,  his  attributes,  his 
thoughts,  mind,  and  will.  “Hear,  O  Israel;  the 
Lord  our  God  is  one  Lord.  And  thou  shalt  love 
the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thine  heart,  and  with  all 
thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy  might.  And  these  words 
which  I  command  thee  this  day  shall  be  in  thine 
heart,  and  thou  shalt  teach  them  diligently  unto 
thy  children,  and  shalt  talk  of  them  when  thou 
sittest  in  thine  house,  and  when  thou  walkest  by 
the  way,  and  when  thou  liest  down,  and  when  thou 
risest  up  ;  and  thou  shalt  bind  them  for  a  sign 
upon  thine  hand,  and  they  shall  be  frontlets  be¬ 
tween  thine  eyes,  and  thou  shalt  write  them  upon 
the  posts  of  thy  house  and  on  thy  gates.  Search 
the  Scriptures,  for  in  them  ye  think  ye  have  eter¬ 
nal  life,  and  they  are  they  which  testify  of  me.  All 
Scripture  is  given  by  inspiration  of  God,  and  is 
profitable  for  doctrine,  for  reproof,  for  correction, 


PIETY. 


205 


for  instruction  in  righteousness.  We  have  also  a 
more  sure  word  of  prophecy  whereunto  we  do  well 
to  take  heed,  as  unto  a  light  that  shineth  in  a  dark 
place.  Sanctify  them  through  thy  truth  :  thy  word 
is  truth.”  Dr.  Wayland  remarks,  in  substance, 
that  to  study  God  in  the  light  of  nature  and  provi 
dence  is  like  learning  the  laws  of  light  with  our 
backs  to  the  sun  ;  by  observing  the  phenomena  of 
reflected  rays  much  valuable  information  may  be 
obtained ;  but  to  study  the  divine  character  as 
revealed  in  the  Word  of  God,  is  to  study  optics 
with  one’s  face  to  the  sun,  observing  the  phe¬ 
nomena  of  direct  rays,  by  which  knowledge  may 
be  gained  incomparably  more  certain  and  incalcu¬ 
lably  superior.  Fourthly,  a  devotional  spirit  is 
cultivated  by  the  exercise  of  devotion.  As  all  • 
our  faculties  are  improved  by  proper  use,  and 
weakened  by  abuse  or  disuse,  so  the  ability  to  find 
God  by  searching,  and  to  hold  communion  with 
him  when  found,  is  acquired  and  strengthened  by 
exercise,  by  actual  converse  with  him  in  medita¬ 
tion,  in  reading  the  inspired  Word,  and  in  prayer. 

II.  PRAYER. 

Prayer,  in  its  most  specific  sense,  is  paramount 
desire.  When  one  desires  any  object  more  than 
any  thing  and  every  thing  else  that  would  be  a 
bar  to  the  possession  of  that  object,  he  prays  for 
it.  The  desire  is  itself  prayer,  whether  expressed 


20  6 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


or  unexpressed,  whether  existing  in  conscious  or 
unconscious  thought.  When  prayer  is  considered 
in  this  sense,  its  form  is  entirely  non-essential. 
The  term  is,  however,  more  commonly  used  in  a 
more  extended  sense,  and  includes  all  acts  of  wor¬ 
ship.  In  this  signification  it  is  the  soul’s  commu¬ 
nion  with  God — the  spirit  of  man  in  intercourse 
with  the  invisible  spirit  of  God.  It  is  the  outgo¬ 
ings  of  the  soul  in  ineffable  adoration  and  compla¬ 
cent  love  towards  a  being  possessed  of  all  possible 
perfections  in  an  infinite  degree — the  soul’s  out¬ 
goings  in  ascriptions  of  praise  and  thanksgiv¬ 
ing  for  the  innumerable  benefits  of  being  and 
its  blessings,  especially  for  the  unspeakable  grace 
and  mercy  of  redemption,  pardon,  and  salvation 
through  the  merits  and  atonement  of  deity,  incar¬ 
nated  in  the  person  of  God’s  Son — the  soul’s  out¬ 
goings  in  supplications  and  intercessions  for  the 
well-being  and  happiness  of  all  mankind  through 
the  work  and  office  of  God’s  Holy  Spirit  and 
through  gracious  interferences  of  an  all-pervading 
and  overruling  Providence.  This  is  prayer.  Can 
any  sane  man  suggest  that  such  a  service  is  a 
superstition  ?  On  the  contrary,  will  not  all  well- 
disposed  persons  at  once,  from  the  very  nature  of 
prayer  itself,  regard  it  as  at  the  same  time  both 
an  exalted  privilege  and  a  most  rational  duty  ? 
The  rationalist  readily  concedes  that  it  is  rea¬ 
sonable  and  right  in  itself  that  excellence  should 


PIETY. 


207 


be  admired  ;  that  supreme  excellence  should  even 
be  adored ;  that  the  recipient  of  blessings  should 
be  grateful ;  and  that  the  dependent  should  ask 
for  the  favors  he  needs  ;  and  hence  it  is  conceded 
that  prayer  is  so  far  forth  a  rational  exercise,  and 
is  useful  in  its  reflex  influence  upon  him  that 
prays  ;  but  it  is  said  that  adoration  and  gratitude 
can  in  no  way  affect  the  infinite  and  the  absolute, 
so  that  to  suppose  it  makes  any  difference  with 
the  Almighty  whether  worship  be  offered  him  or 
be  withheld  is  simply  to  make  a  very  silly  suppo¬ 
sition  ;  and  especially  to  suppose  that  the  asking 
of  blessings  at  the  hand  of  him  who  is  infinite, 
absolute,  and  immutable  will  make  any  difference 
in  his  bestowments  is  self-contradictory,  as  it  sup¬ 
poses  that  there  are  changes  in  the  unchangeable. 
Now  all  this  assumes  to  affirm  of  the  infinite, 

4 

absolute,  and  immutable  what  no  finite  mind  is 
authorized  to  affirm,  for,  whatever  the  infinite  may 
be  it  is  not  competent  to  affirm  that  it  is  such  as 
renders  the  co-existence  of  free  will  impossible. 
Free  will  exists  in  fact;  it  exists  in  man,  and  must 
exist  in  God.  There  is  nothing  self-contradictory, 
and  nothing  inconsistent  with  the  infinite,  so  far 
as  finite  thought  is  able  to  assert,  in  the  affirma¬ 
tion  that  the  immutable  God  immutably  answers 
prayer.  But  it  is  said  law  governs  all  events,  and 
law  is  uniform.  Law,  so  far  as  it  applies  to  events, 
is  a  form  of  expression  denoting  an  order  of  se- 


208 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


quence,  or  the  succession  of  the  conditioning  and 
the  conditioned  ;  in  other  words,  it  is  an  affirma¬ 
tion  that  if  this  is,  that  will  be.  Now  we  affirm 
that  the  law,  If  ye  ask,  ye  shall  receive  ;  or,  He 
that  asketh  receiveth,  is  as  much  a  law,  and  is  as 
uniform,  as  any  other  law.  But  it  is  still  objected 
that  law  is  force  acting  uniformly.  It  is  so,  but 
force  acts  uniformly  to  an  intelligent  end,  and 
therefore  has  its  origin  in  volition.  Since  force 
originates  in  volition  it  must  be  manifest  that  infi¬ 
nite  will  is  competent  to  keep  all  force  in  constant 
control.  The  existence  of  force  in  the  universe  is, 
then,  no  bar  to  the  idea  that  the  law  of  the  con¬ 
ditioned  prevails  extensively,  and  may  even  govern 
all  events.  God  can  then  (may  the  philosophers 
who  compel  us  to  use  such  language  be  forgiven  ! ) 
God  can  then  suspend  the  reception  of  his  bless¬ 
ings  on  such  conditions  as  he  may  choose  ;  he  may 
ordain  that  he  who  asks  shall  receive  ;  shall  receive 
what  he  would  not  receive  if  he  did  not  ask.  Ra¬ 
tionalism  aside,  let  us  to  the  law  and  the  testimony. 
Whatever  philosophy  teaches  on  the  subject,  the 
Scriptures  teach  that  “  men  ought  always  to  pray 
and  not  to  faint.”  “Pray  without  ceasing,  continue 
in  prayer  and  watch  in  the  same,  with  thanksgiv¬ 
ing.  I  will,  therefore,  that  men  pray  every-where, 
lifting  up  holy  hands  without  wrath  and  doubting. 
Commit  thy  way  unto  the  Lord,  trust  also  in  him  ; 
and  he  shall  bring  it  to  pass.  If  ye  abide  in  me 


PIETY. 


209 


and  my  words  abide  in  you,  ye  shall  ask  what  ye 
will,  and  it  shall  be  done  unto  you.  The  Lord  is 
nigh  unto  all  them  that  call  upon  him,  to  all  that 
call  upon  him  in  truth.  The  eyes  of  the  Lord  are 
upon  the  righteous,  and  his  ears  are  open  unto 
their  cry.  After  this  manner,  therefore,  pray  ye, 
Our  Father  which  art  in  heaven,  hallowed  be  thy 
name ;  thy  kingdom  come ;  thy  will  be  done  in 
earth  as  it  is  in  heaven  ;  give  us  this  day  our  daily 
bread,  and  forgive  us  our  debts  as  we  forgive  our 
debtors  ;  and  lead  us  not  into  temptation,  but  de¬ 
liver  us  from  evil :  for  thine  is  the  kingdom,  and 
the  power,  and  the  glory,  forever.  Amen.” 

We  have  said  prayer  is  worship.  Acceptable 
worship  implies  all  those  states  of  mind  that  make 
up  right-mindedness  towards  God  :  such  as  peni¬ 
tence  for  our  sins ;  a  fixed  purpose  of  amendment 
and  of  universal  obedience  to  the  divine  command- 
*  ments ;  an  intense  desire  for  spiritual  blessings,  or 
heavenly  mindedness ;  a  profound  reverence  for 
the  divine  character  ;  an  unreserved  submission  to 
the  divine  will ;  unshaken  confidence  in  his  ve¬ 
racity,  or  trust  in  his  promises  ;  gratitude  for  bless¬ 
ings  received ;  an  unreserved  forgiveness  of  all 
who  trespass  against  us,  and  peace  with  all  man¬ 
kind.  While  prayer  implies  these  states  of  mind, 
it  is  itself  a  specifically  paramount  desire  for  the 
blessings  sought.  Being  thus,  in  its  essential  na¬ 
ture,  a  mental  state,  its  outward  expression  has 
c  14 


210 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


no  importance  beyond  the  idea  of  suitableness. 
But  evidently  there  is  here  a  matter  of  interest. 
If  a  mortal  man  may  appear  in  the  divine  pres¬ 
ence,  and  be  permitted  to  speak  to  deity,  to  ad¬ 
dress  the  king  eternal  as  a  man  speaks  to  his 
fellow-man,  surely  it  is  of  some  importance  that 
the  form  and  manner  „of  the  address  be  appro¬ 
priate  to  the  relations  subsisting  between  man  and 
his  Maker,  and  to  the  ends  and  purposes  for 
which  the  privilege  of  intercourse  with  God  is  per¬ 
mitted.  But  evidently  no  rules  can  be  prescribed 
and  learned  and  practiced  as  rules  or  directions 
to  be  observed  by  him  who  draws  near  to  God. 
Real  worship  existing  in  the  mind  will  naturally 
seek  and  employ  its  appropriate  expression  ;  and 
whatever  influences  present  surroundings  should 
or  may  have  in  any  given  case,  a  pious  mind  will 
readily  apprehend.  He  that  prays  without  ceas¬ 
ing,  prays  in  all  actual,  and  if  the  actual  equals 
the  possible,  in  all  possible  positions  of  the  body, 
circumstances  dictating  the  position  at  any  particu¬ 
lar  time  and  place.  Not  without  cause  does  the 
common  apprehension  recognize  kneeling  as  the 
most  suitable  posture,  when  circumstances  corre¬ 
spond  ;  but  if  any  one  supposes  he  can  not  pray 
unless  he  kneel,  he  evinces  more  of  subserviency 
to  custom  than  of  intelligent  piety  or  cultured 
taste.  Under  some  circumstances,  kneeling  is  ex¬ 
ponential,  more  of  sluggishness  than  of  devotion. 


PIETY. 


21 1 


If  the  question  be  asked  whether  prayers 
should  be  extempore  or  liturgical,  the  Scripture 
answer  would  be,  They  may  be  either.  Our  Lord 
taught  his  disciples  a  form  of  prayer.  So  much 
for  a  liturgy.  But  he  and  the  apostles,  and  the 
whole  Church  under  their  authority,  also  used  ex¬ 
tempore  prayer.  If  it  be  asked  when  the  one  is 
to  be  used,  and  when  the  other,  the  Scriptures 
furnish  no  answer ;  indicating  thereby  that  this  is 
left  to  the  judgment  of  him  that  prays.  The  idea 
that  the  worshiper,  by  using  a  ritual,  necessarily 
falls  into  formality,  that  for  worship  to  be  in  spirit 
and  in  truth  it  must  of  necessity  be  extempore,  is 
evidently  a  superstition  ;  for  no  one  would  say  that 
hymns  of  praise,  sung  by  the  congregation,  are 
necessarily  formal  because  the  poetry  and  the  mu¬ 
sic  were  prepared  for  them  beforehand.  If  a 
written  hymn,  set  to  music,  may  be  sung  with  the 
spirit  and  with  the  understanding,  so  also  may  a 
written  prayer  be  pronounced  or  recited  in  spirit 
and  in  truth.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally 
superstitious  to  affirm  that  all  extempore  prayer  is 
fanatical,  or  unsuitable  for  the  solemnity  and  dig¬ 
nity  of  divine  worship ;  for  with  however  much 
previous  study  and  preparation,  and  with  however 
much  of  help  from  the  superior  talents  of  others, 
we  may  approach  the  divine  presence,  it  is  mani¬ 
fest  that  no  offering  we  can  bring  will  in  itself 
comport  with  the  majesty  of  him  in  whose  pres- 


2  I  2 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


ence  we  bow.  If  man  finds  access  to  God,  and 
holds  communion  with  his  Maker,  the  Spirit  divine 
must  help  his  infirmities  ;  the  blood  of  the  cov¬ 
enant  must  give  him  access.  His  own  poor  words, 
be  they  the  best  possible,  are  as  nothing. 

Prayer,  considered  as  to  its  external  form — the 
external  form  being  always  prompted  by,  and  ex¬ 
ponential  of,  the  internal  spirit — and  regarded  as 
a  duty  owed  to  God,  may  be  distinguished  into 
private,  domestic,  and  social  prayer. 

That  it  is  man’s  duty  to  his  Maker  to  enter 
his  closet,  shut  to  the  door,  place  himself  in  a  de¬ 
votional  posture,  form  his  thoughts  in  modes  of  wor¬ 
ship,  and  express  his  thoughts  in  words,  is  plainly 
taught  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  it  is  also  pos¬ 
itively  affirmed  that  he  that  does  this  will  be  re¬ 
warded  openly ;  that  is,  he  will  receive  blessings 
which  he  would  not  receive  if  he  did  not  thus  pray 
to  God.  Private  prayer  is  also  obviously  com¬ 
mended  by  the  natural  and  gracious  relations  sub 
sisting  between  man  and  his  Maker.  Man  is  a 
being  endowed  with  powers  to  know,  love,  serve, 
and  enjoy  God ;  he  has  his  being  and  his  blessings 
from  God ;  he  has  sinned  against  God,  but  has 
been  graciously  redeemed,  and  may  be  restored 
to  the  divine  favor.  God  is  a  being  possessed  of 
infinite  perfections  ;  he  has  created  man,  and  has 
redeemed  him  by  the  precious  death  of  his  incar¬ 
nate  Son ;  he  preserves  man  constantly  by  his 


PIETY. 


213 


power,  and  blesses  him  with  all  things  needful  for 

* 

his  good.  These  relations  indicate  most  emphat¬ 
ically  the  propriety  of  uninterrupted  intercourse 
between  God  and  man,  and  at  the  same  time  make 
it  man’s  highest  privilege  and  most  imperative 
duty  to  cultivate  this  intercourse  by  such  acts  of 
special  worship  as  private  prayer  implies. 

The  relations  of  the  family  to  God,  and  the 
relations  of  the  head  of  the  household  to  those 
dependent  upon  him,  indicate  that  domestic  wor¬ 
ship  is  not  only  an  appropriate  exercise,  but  also 
a  solemn  duty  binding  upon  the  heads  of  fam¬ 
ilies.  Under  the  patriarchal  dispensation  the  fa¬ 
ther  of  the  family  was  the  divinely  appointed 
priest,  whose  duty  it  was  to  offer  daily  sacrifices 
in  the  name  of  the  family  and  in  their  behalf,  and 
in  no  subsequent  dispensation  is  this  office  abol¬ 
ished  ;  the  sacrifice  is  changed,  but  the  service 
remains.  Nothing  is  more  useful,  religiously,  than 
that  the  obligations  of  religion  be  associated  with 
the  endearments  of  home.  No  associations  are 
more  powerful  restraints  from  vice,  or  more  power¬ 
ful  stimulants  to  virtue,  than  those  connected  with 
the  devotions  of  the  family  circle. 

The  same  things  may  be  said  of  public  wor¬ 
ship  that  we  have  said  of  private  and  domestic 
devotion.  It  is  God’s  will  that  the  people  forsake 
not  the  assembling  of  themselves  together ;  but 
that  they  meet  at  stated  and  appointed  times,  to 


214 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


hear  the  Word  of  God  read  and  expounded,  and 
to  unite  their  hearts  and  voices  in  praise  and 
prayer,  with  thanksgivings  and  intercessions.  So¬ 
cial  blessings  demand  social  praise ;  public  sins 
require  public  humiliation,  confession,  and  contri¬ 
tion  ;  and  social  dependence  should  lead  to  social 
supplications  and  intercessions. 

III.  THE  SABBATH. 

“Thus  the  heavens  and  the  earth  were  finished, 
and  all  the  host  of  them.  And  on  the  seventh  day 
God  ended  his  work  which  he  had  made  ;  and  he 
rested  on  the  seventh  day  from  all  his  work  which 
he  had  made.  And  God  blessed  the  seventh  day, 
and  sanctified  it ;  because  that  in  it  he  had  rested 
from  all  his  work  which  God  created  and  made. 
And  the  Lord  said  unto  Moses,  How  long  refuse 
ye  to  keep  my  commandments  and  my  laws  ?  See, 
for  that  the  Lord  hath  given  you  the  Sabbath, 
therefore  he  giveth  you  on  the  sixth  day  the  bread 
of  two  days :  abide  ye  every  man  in  his  place,  let  no 
man  go  out  of  his  place  on  the  seventh  day.  So 
the  people  rested  on  the  seventh  day.  Keep  the 
seventh  day  to  sanctify  it,  as  the  Lord  thy  God 
hath  commanded  thee.  Six  days  shalt  thou  labor 
and  do  all  thy  work  ;  but  the  seventh  day  is  the 
Sabbath  of  the  Lord  thy  God  ;  in  it  thou  shalt  not 
do  any  work,  thou,  nor  thy  son,  nor  thy  daughter, 
nor  thy  man-servant,  nor  thy  maid-servant,  nor 


PIETY. 


2I5 


thine  ox,  nor  thine  ass,  nor  any  of  thy  cattle,  nor 
thy  stranger  that  is  within  thy  gates ;  that  thy 
man-servant  and  thy  maid-servant  may  rest  as  well 
as  thou.  And  remember  thou  that  thou  wast  a  serv¬ 
ant  in  the  land  of  Egypt,  and  that  the  Lord  thy 
God  brought  thee  out  thence  through  a  mighty 
hand  and  by  a  stretched-out  arm  ;  therefore  the 
Lord  thy  God  commanded  thee  to  keep  the  Sab¬ 
bath  day.  Wherefore  the  children  of  Israel  shall 
keep  the  Sabbath  to  observe  the  Sabbath  through¬ 
out  their  generations  for  a  perpetual  covenant :  it 
is  a  sign  between  me  and  the  children  of  Israel 
forever.  Six  days  shall  work  be  done  ;  but  on  the 
Sabbath  there  shall  be  to  you  a  holy  day,  a  Sab¬ 
bath  of  rest  to  the  Lord.  Whosoever  doeth  work 
therein  shall  be  put  to  death.  At  that  time  Jesus 
went  on  the  Sabbath  day  through  the  corn,  and 
his  disciples  were  a-hungered,  and  began  to  pluck 
the  ears  of  corn,  and  to  eat.  The  Pharisees  said 
unto  him,  Behold,  thy  disciples  do  that  which  is 
not  lawful  to  do  upon  the  Sabbath  day.  But  he 
said  unto  them,  Have  ye  not  read  what  David  did 
when  he  was  a-hungered,  and  they  that  were  with 
him?  If  ye  had  known  what  this  meaneth,  I  will 
have  mercy  and  not  sacrifice,  ye  would  not  have 
condemned  the  guiltless.  The  Sabbath  was  made 
for  man,  and  not  man  for  the  Sabbath.  Upon  the 
first  day  of  the  week,  when  the  disciples  came 
together  to  break  bread,  Paul  preached,  ready 


21 6 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


to  depart  on  the  morrow.  Upon  the  first  day  of 
the  week  let  every  one  lay  by  him  in  store  as  the 
Lord  has  prospered  him.  I  was  in  the  spirit  on 
the  Lord’s  day.” 

That  the  Sabbath  was  made  for  man — that  is, 
that  it  is  an  institution  ordained  for  man’s  good — 
is  evidenced  by  its  effects  upon  his  physical  nature. 
He  will  enjoy  better  health,  be  stronger,  and  per¬ 
form  more  labor  by  resting  one  day  in  seven  than 
if  he  practice  continuous  toil.  This  has  been  sat¬ 
isfactorily  determined  by  careful  observation  ;  and 
the  same  thing-  has  been  found  to  be  true  of  beasts 
of  burden.  The  induction  has  been  so  extensive, 
and  the  result  so  uniform,  that  the  argument 
amounts  .to  demonstration.  Man  and  beast  re¬ 
quire  rest,  and  the  ordinary  daily  rest  is  not  suffi¬ 
cient  to  meet  this  demand  of  nature.  Natural 
consequences,  therefore,  indicate  that  the  Sabbath 
has  the  sanction — or,  rather,  is  an  appointment — of 
him  who  established  the  present  order  of  things. 
But  as  there  is  no  other  natural  indication  that  the 
Sabbath  is  an  institution  of  divine  appointment, 
especially  as  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  one- 
seventh  of  time  rather  than  one-sixth  or  one-eighth 
is  demanded  for  rest,  the  institution  is  regarded  as 
one  of  positive  rather  than  of  moral  law,  and  as 

having  its  reason  or  ground  of  obligation  wholly 
« 

in  revelation. 

The  Scriptures  above  quoted  express  or  imply 


PIETY. 


217 


most,  if  not  all,  of  the  general  facts  and  underly¬ 
ing  principles  involved  in  the  Bible  testimony  on 
the  subject. 

They  teach  first,  that  the  Sabbath  was  insti¬ 
tuted  at  the  time  of  the  creation.  It  matters  not 
what  may  have  been  the  length  of  the  days  of 
creation  ;  they  may  have  been  geological  periods 
of  indefinite  length.  Whatever  they  were  the 
plain  affirmation  is,  that  when  the  earth  was  pre¬ 
pared  as  a  habitation  for  man,  God  created  man 
and  then  ceased,  in  some  sense,  from  the  work 
of  creation;  or,  as  it  is  said,  “God  rested  from 
all  his  work  he  had  created  and  made” — and  be¬ 
cause  he  so  rested,  he  then  ordained  that  his 
creatures  should  do  likewise ;  that  through  all 
time,  after  six  days  of  toil  they  should  take  one 
day  of  rest. 

The  record  in  Genesis  teaches,  secondly,  that 
the  Sabbath  is  not  only  a  season  of  respite  from 
toil,  a  time  of  rest,  but  also  is  eminently  a  religious 
institution.  God  sanctified  the  day  ;  that  is,  he  set 
it  apart  for  holy  purposes. 

Thirdly,  the  fact  that  the  Sabbath  was  insti¬ 
tuted  at  that  time,  and  for  a  religious  purpose, 
plainly  indicates  that  it  is  monumental  in  its  nature 
and  design.  It  is  designed  and  adapted  to  perpet¬ 
uate  among  all  peoples,  by  whom  it  is  observed, 
the  memory  of  the  creation.  It  is  a  monument, 
bearing  witness  to  all  beholders  that  this  material 


2  I  8 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


universe  is  the  product  of  a  special  creation  ;  was 
brought  into  being  by  the  will  and  power  of  an 
extra-mundane  personal  First  Cause — eternal,  in¬ 
dependent,  all-powerful,  and  infinite  in  wisdom  and 
goodness.  The  Sabbath,  then,  proclaims  an  infi¬ 
nite,  personal  Creator. 

Fourthly,  this  same  record  in  Genesis  teaches 
what  Christ  repeated,  that  the  Sabbath  was  made 
for  man ;  that  is,  for  man  as  man,  and  is  there¬ 
fore  an  institution  for  all  times  and  for  all  peo¬ 
ples — never  to  be  abrogated,  never  to  be  super¬ 
seded.  The  only  objection  to  this  view  worthy 
of  notice,  in  this  connection,  is  made  by  those 
who  affirm  that  the  Sabbath  is  a  Mosaic  insti¬ 
tution.  The  reason  given  is,  that  there  is  not 
sufficient  evidence  of  its  existence  prior  to  the 
time  of  Moses  to  warrant  the  affirmation  that  it 
did  exist.  The  record  in  Genesis,  they  say,  was 
made  by  Moses  in  anticipation,  is  an  anachronism, 
a  prolepsis.  The  common  answers  to  this  objec¬ 
tion  are,  to  our  thought,  decisive.  The  absence 
of  any  extended  notice  of  the  Sabbath  in  such  a 
history  as  the  one  we  have  of  times  antecedent  to 
Moses  is  determinative  of  nothing — so  brief  a  his¬ 
tory  could  not  record  every  thing.  An  hebdoma¬ 
dal  division  of  time  prevailed  extensively  among 
the  nations  of  antiquity,  a  fact  wholly  unaccounted 
for  and  unaccountable  on  any  other  supposition 
than  that  the  Sabbath  was  instituted  in  the  begin- 


PIETY. 


219 


nin g.  It  may  be  admitted  that  during  the  bond¬ 
age  in  Egypt  the  Sabbath  had  fallen  into  very 
general  disuse  or  neglect ;  but  that  it  was  un¬ 
known,  is  plainly  contradicted  by  the  record  con¬ 
cerning  the  falling  and  gathering  of  the  manna  on 
the  sixth  day,  and  its  absence  on  the  seventh. 
The  Sabbath  is  here  spoken  of  as  an  institution 
well  known,  and  this  was  previous  to  the  giving 
of  the  law  on  Mount  Sinai. 

The  Scriptures  above  quoted  teach,  fifthly, 
that  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  was  re-enacted  by 
Moses  with  an  additional  purpose  and  intent,  and 
with  an  additional  reason  for  its  observance ;  its 
violation  was,  at  the  same  time,  by  the  civil  code, 
made  punishable  with  death.  Besides  being  a 
monument  to  the  glory  of  the  Creator,  the  Sab¬ 
bath  was  now  made  a  sign  or  seal  of  the  cove¬ 
nant  between  God  and  his  people.  It  was,  on 
the  part  of  the  Israelites,  an  oath  of  allegiance 
to  the  Lord  their  God,  a  pledge  of  perpetual 
obedience  to  his  commandments ;  and,  on  the 
part  of  God,  it  was  a  seal  to  his  promises  of 
blessings  made  to  the  children  of  Israel,  as  pecul¬ 
iarly  his  people.  The  special  and  new  reason 
now  urged  as  a  motive  to  the  observance  of  the 
Sabbath  was  their  deliverance  from  the  bondage 
of  Egypt.  “Remember  that  thou  wast  a  servant 
in  Egypt,  and  the  Lord  thy  God  brought  thee 
out ;  therefore,  the  Lord  thy  God  commanded  thee 


220 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


to  keep  the  Sabbath-day.”  Moreover,  the  observ¬ 
ance  of  the  Sabbath  was  appointed  to  be  a  distin¬ 
guishing  mark  between  the  Israelites  and  other 
peoples ;  and  as  such  the  civil  authority  made 
the  violation  of  the  Sabbath  law  a  capital  offense. 
When  it  is  assumed  that  the  law  of  the  Sab¬ 
bath  was  first  instituted  by  Moses,  and  is  there¬ 
fore  wholly  a  Jewish  institution,  it  is  inferred  that 
with. the  abrogation  of  the  Jewish  polity  this  law 
passed  away  and  ceased  to  be  binding.  What  per¬ 
tained  to  the  Sabbath  that  was  peculiarly  Jewish 
did  pass  away  with  the  termination  of  the  Jewish 
economy;  the  sacramental  character  of  the  insti¬ 
tution  ceased ;  it  was  no  longer  a  sign  between 
God  and  Israel ;  the  deliverance  from  Egypt  was 
no  longer  a  reason  for  its  observance ;  its  desecra¬ 
tion  was  no  longer  a  capital  offense ;  but  the 
obligation  imposed  by  its  original  institution  and 
the  monumental  character  of  its  purpose  and  in¬ 
tent  remained.  Further,  the  fact,  that  the  Sab¬ 
bath  law  is  one  among  the  ten  commandments,  is 
proof  positive  that  it  is  not  of  the  nature  of  a 
ceremonial  law,  and  does  not  belong  to  that  part 
of  the  Mosaic  code  which  pertained  wholly  to  the 
Jewish  people.  The  question  is  frequently  asked, 
Does  the  Sabbath  law  belong-  to  the  moral  code  ? 

O 

If  the  question  refers  to  the  distinction  between 
moral  and  ceremonial  law  we  have  just  said  that  it 
does,  and  that  the  fact  that  it  stands  among  the 

o 


PIETY. 


221 


ten  commandments  is  sufficient  reason  for  the 
affirmation.  If  the  question  refers  to  the  distinc¬ 
tion  between  moral  and  positive  law,  and  be  asked 
with  a  view  to  determine  whether  the  law  be 
obligatory,  we  answer  :  The  question  is  nugatory, 
for  whether  the  Sabbath  law  be  positive  or  moral, 
while  it  is  a  law  it  obligates  the  conscience  by  all 
the  authority  of  the  law-giver:  “He  that  is  guilty 
of  one  is  guilty  of  all that  is,  the  transgression 
of  any  one  law  is  a  disregard  of  the  authority  by 
•  which  the  whole  code  is  enacted  and  sustained. 
Moral  law,  as  it  is  sometimes  distinguished  from 
positive,  is  law  whose  reason  is  obvious  ;  so  that 
the  subject  knows  why  it  was  enacted :  positive 
law,  according  to  this  distinction,  is  such  that  the 
subject  sees  no  reason  for  obedience  beyond  the 
authority  of  the  law-giver.  In  the  light  of  this 
distinction  we  should  place  the  Sabbath  law  in  the 
category  of  moral  laws.  Of  course,  the  reasons 
why  the  law  says,  Remember  the  Sabbath-day  to 
keep  it  holy,  are  not  so  obvious  as  are  the  rea¬ 
sons  why  the  law  says,  Thou  shalt  not  kill ;  and 
yet,  in  the  benefits  accruing  from  rest  and  relig¬ 
ious  devotions,  all  may  see  good  reason  why  the 
law  should  be  observed.  But  the  term  moral 
code  has  sometimes  another  meaning.  In  the 
sense  now  in  view,  a  moral  law  is  one  whose  rea¬ 
son  is  found  in  the  unchangeable  nature  of  things, 
so  that  the  law  is  one  and  the  same  forever ; 


222 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


binding  alike,  at  all  times  and  upon  all  persons  ; 
and  a  positive  law  is  one  whose  reason  is  found  in 
peculiar  and  changeable  circumstances,  so  that  the 
circumstances  changing  the  law  changes,  and  may 
be  binding  at  some  times  and  not  at  other  times, 
upon  some  persons  and  not  upon  other  persons. 
If  this  distinction  be  limited  to  laws  that  pertain  to 
the  actual  of  human  life,  it  does  not  differ  from  the 
distinction  between  moral  and  ceremonial  law,  and 
we  have  answered  above ;  if  it  be  between  the 
eternal  and  the  temporal,  the  question  may  be 
too  metaphysical  for  definite  answer,  but  probably 
most  persons  would  agree  that  the  Sabbath  law 
does  not  belong  to  the  category  of  laws  that  are 
binding  by  an  eternal  necessity — if  there  be  any 
such  laws.  As  we  see  it,  the  question  under  con¬ 
sideration,  namely,  Does  the  Sabbath  law  belong 
to  the  moral  code  ?  has  no  significance  of  any  im¬ 
portance  except  it  assume,  in  substance,  the  fol¬ 
lowing  form :  The  existence  of  such  beings  as  men 
are,  under  such  relations  and  circumstances  as 
those  under  which  men  exist,  being  presupposed, 
would  such  a  law  as  the  Sabbath  law  be  always 
and  every-where  morally  binding?  and  we  answer, 
yes,  because  such  a  law  would  be  essential  to  the 
highest  good  of  such  beings  under  such  relations 
and  circumstances. 

Sixthly,  the  Bible  doctrine  of  the  Sabbath 
teaches  that,  in  the  time  of  Christ,  the  interpre- 


PIETY. 


223 


tation  of  the  Sabbath  law  had  been  corrupted  by 
Pharisaical  exactions,  that  innocent  and  virtuous 
acts  were  denounced  as  desecration  of  the  Sab¬ 
bath,  and  that  the  Savior’s  teachings  on  this  sub¬ 
ject  were  mostly,  if  not  entirely,  corrections  of 
these  errors.  Nothing  approaching  even  the  ap¬ 
pearance  of  an  abrogation  of  the  Mosaic  law  can 
be  found  in  the  teachings  of  Christ.  He  taught 
that  works  of  necessity,  such  as  preparing  neces¬ 
sary  food,  and  works  of  mercy,  such  as  healing 
the  sick,  were  not  desecrations  of  the  Sabbath 
day.  He  rebuked  the  Pharisees  for  their  excess¬ 
ive  scrupulousness,  for  their  over-righteous  exac¬ 
tions  ;  but  never  intimated  that  the  Sabbath  law 
was  abolished.  The  specification  of  an  act  such 
as  the  healing  of  a  man  who  had  a  withered  hand 
as  no  desecration  of  the  Sabbath  implies  that  the 
day  itself  is  sacred  ;  but  for  the  implied  sacredness 
of  the  day  there  is  no  significance  in  any  of  Christ’s 
teachings  on  the  subject. 

Seventhly,  the  practice  of  the  apostolic  Church 
teaches  that  on  and  after  the  resurrection  of 
Christ  from  the  dead  the  day  was  changed  from 
the  seventh  to  the  first,  and  that  the  Sabbath  be¬ 
came  a  monument  to  perpetuate  the  memory  not 
only  of  the  work  of  creation,  but  also  specially  of 
the  resurrection  of  Christ  and  the  pentecostal  out¬ 
pouring  of  the  Spirit,  and  through  these  of  the 
whole  work  of  redemption  and  salvation. 


224 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Many  of  the  Jews  who  believed  in  Christ — 
that  is,  accepted  him  as  their  promised  Messiah — 
retained  their  attachment  to  the  rites  and  ceremo¬ 
nies  of  the  Mosaic  law.  Some  of  them  even  con¬ 
tended  that  it  was  necessary  to  be  circumcised, 
and  to  keep  the  whole  law  of  Moses.  And  they 
made  the  Church  not  a  little  trouble  on  this  ac¬ 
count.  The  Ebionites  were  especially  zealous  in 
these  matters.  Of  course,  such  professed  Chris¬ 
tians  would  naturally  consider  the  seventh  as  a 
holy  day,  and  probably  many  others  not  so  zealous 
as  they  would  join  them  in  the  temple  or  syna¬ 
gogue  service  on  Saturday,  and  also  attend  the 
assembly  of  Christians  on  the  first  day  of  the 
week.  The  history  of  the  times  plainly  indicates 
that  this  was  the  fact.  But  from  the  first  it  is 
patent  that  the  Christian  Church  met  on  the  first 
day  of  the  week  in  commemoration  of  Christ’s 
resurrection  and,  after  Pentecost,  of  the  outpour¬ 
ing  of  the  Spirit,  Their  services  consisted  of 
“prayer  to  Christ  as  to  God,”  of  hymns  of  praise 
and  thanksgiving,  of  preaching  the  Gospel,  and 
of  breaking  of  bread  ;  in  a  word,  of  religious  de¬ 
votions.  The  first  day  of  the  week  was  called  the 
Sabbath,  but  more  frequently  it  was  called  the 
Lord’s  day,  meaning  Christ’s  day.  It  is  recorded 
in  profane  history  that  when  Christians  were  ar¬ 
raigned  before  civil  tribunals  under  accusations  of 
disturbing  the  public  peace  it  was  common  to  ask 


PIETY. 


225 


them  if  they  kept  the  Lord’s  day,  and  that  their 
uniform  answer  was,  “  I  am  a  Christian  ;  I  can  not 
omit  it.” 

The  observance  of  the  first  day  of  the  week 
as  the  Sabbath  passed  so  speedily  and  so  univer¬ 
sally  into  the  custom  of  the  Christian  Church,  and 
has  continued  to  the  present  time  so  generally 
throughout  Christendom,  that  the  practice  is  itself 
adequate  justification,  and  a  sufficient  answer  to 
all  seventh-day  argumentation.  The  idea  that  any 
definite  hours  of  time  are  in  themselves  holy,  and 
are  to  be  observed  because  of  their  inherent  sa¬ 
credness,  is  manifest  folly ;  for  the  observance  of 
any  such  definite  set  of  hours  is  wholly  impracti¬ 
cable.  Hours  of  the  day  are  every-where  chang¬ 
ing  with  the  rapidity  of  the  earth’s  revolution ;  and 
absolute  time,  if  such  an  expression  is  admissible, 
can  not  be  every-where  observed.  The  only  thing 
essential  is  that  one-seventh  of  time  be  religiously 
observed.  The  purpose  of  the  Sabbath  requires 
that  persons  living  in  the  same  and  nearly  the 
same  longitude  observe  the  same  time.  If,  there¬ 
fore,  a  Christian  man  live  in  a  community  where 
the  seventh  day  is  observed,  he  will  better  accom¬ 
plish  the  purpose  for  which  he  keeps  holy  day  by 
making  the  seventh  day  his  Sabbath  ;  and  he  may 
do  so  unless  his  conscience  require  him  to  rebuke 
the  superstition  which  makes  the  seventh  day  sa¬ 
cred  and  the  first  secular, 
c  1 5 


226 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


What  obligation  does  the  Sabbath  law  impose 
upon  civil  authorities  ?  Before  answering  this 
question  directly  let  us  state  the  case.  It  has  been 
satisfactorily  demonstrated  that  man  and  beast 
will  be  physically  the  better  for  resting  one  day 
in  seven.  Business  activities  develop  intellectual 
power  in  those  who  engage  in  them  ;  but  in  life, 
as  it  is,  only  a  few  are  so  engaged  as  to  attain 
unto  a  very  appreciable  development.  And  this 
would  be  very  greatly  improved  by  an  occasional 
cessation  of  business,  and  attention  to  moral  and 
religious  subjects.  The  mass  of  mankind  are  em¬ 
ployed  in  a  plodding  routine  of  the  same  duties, 
repeated  over  and  over,  requiring  but  little  thought, 
and  furnishing  a  very  stinted  and  limited  intellec¬ 
tual  development.  The  most  efficient  educational 
advantage  available  for  the  masses  is  found  where 
one  day  in  seven  they  assemble  themselves  to¬ 
gether  to  hear  the  Word  of  God  read  and  ex¬ 
pounded  ;  and  if  they  have  the  same  Word  in  their 
houses,  and  are  stimulated  to  read,  to  study,  to 
inwardly  digest  and  judge  for  themselves,  they  are 
found  to  be  more  intelligent  than  the  same  class 
of  people  in  any  community  under  the  sun.  Com¬ 
pare  the  Scotch  with  the  Irish  peasantry.  What 
we  here  say  of  intellectual  improvement  may  also 
be  said  of  aesthetic  culture.  The  purpose  and 
intent  of  the  Sabbath  is  specially  moral  and  relig¬ 
ious  culture;  and  results,  as  shown  by  the  history 


PIETY. 


227 


of  mankind,  fully  demonstrate  that  the  Sabbath  is% 
a  divinely  appointed  and  divinely  employed  instru¬ 
mentality  for  the  purpose  of  moral  and  religious 
education. 

These  affirmations  are  so  obviously  true  that 
further  remark  is  superfluous.  The  Sabbath  is 
promotive  of  man’s  physical,  intellectual,  aesthetic, 
moral,  and  religious  well-being ;  it  is  therefore  es¬ 
sential  to  the  highest  good  of  the  individual  and 
of  society.  To  secure  its  object  it  must  be  pro¬ 
tected  and  defended.  Business  and  amusements, 
and  any  avocation  or  employment  which  would 
prevent  or  disturb  its  proper  observance,  must  be 
prohibited.  An  individual,  and  any  number  of  in¬ 
dividuals  voluntarily  associated,  are  incompetent, 
have  not  the  power  to  enforce  the  necessary  pro¬ 
hibition  ;  the  whole  society,  represented  in  its  civil 
authorities,  is  alone  adequate  for  this  protection 
and  defense.  The  civil  authorities,  then,  have  the 
power  to  aid  society  and  the  individuals  of  which 
society  is  composed  in  securing  their  end,  their 
highest  good,  in  a  matter  wherein  neither  the  so¬ 
ciety  nor  the  individuals  can  secure  that  end  for 
themselves.  Therefore  we  affirm  that  governments 
have  a  right  to  exercise  that  power,  and,  having 
the  right,  are  under  obligations  so  to  do. 

But  it  is  objected  that  governments,  especially 
those  under  which  Church  and  state  have  no  legal 
connection,  have  not  a  right  to  restrain  Atheists, 


228 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Jews,  and  Mohammedans  for  the  benefit  of  Chris¬ 
tians.  The  objection  may  be  answered  by  a  retort. 
Governments  have  not  a  right  to  restrain  Chris¬ 
tians — or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  deprive  them  of 
their  religious  privileges — at  the  dictate  of  atheists 
and  infidels.  The  answer  is  as  good  as  the  objec¬ 
tion  :  neither  meets  the  case.  The  fact  is,  govern¬ 
ment  can  not  ignore  the  religious  character  of  its 
subjects.  All  men  have  some  religious  opinions  ; 
they  affirm  or  deny.  Infidelity  is  an  affirmation 
of  unbelief.  And  it  is  as  impossible  to  maintain  a 
government  on  the  supposition  that  man  has  not  a 
religious  nature  as  it  is  to  maintain  a  government 
on  the  supposition  that  man  has  not  a  rational 
nature.  The  idea  of  government  is  as  incongru¬ 
ous  with  the  idea  that  its  subjects  are  absolutely 
irreligious  as  it  is  incongruous  with  the  idea  that 
its  subjects  are  brutes  or  idiots. 

But  it  is  asked,  What  religion  shall  the  gov¬ 
ernment  recognize  in  a  heterogeneous  population? 
The  answer  is  obvious.  Republics  are  governed 
by  majorities.  The  government  of  these  United 
States  was  organized  when  almost  the  entire  pop¬ 
ulation  were  Protestant  Christians.  The  great 
majority  has  been,  through  the  whole  history  of 
the  country,  and  it  now  is,  both  Christian  and 
Protestant.  The  government  always  did,  and  now 
does,  recognize  Protestant  Christianity  as  the  re¬ 
ligion  of  the  country.  For  Irish  Catholics  to  come 


PIETY. 


229 


hither  and  demand  that  the  Bible  shall  be  excluded 
from  the  public  schools,  and  for  German  rational¬ 
ists  to  come  hither  and  demand  that  all  Sabbath 
laws  shall  be  abrogated — on  the  ground  in  the  one 
case  that  the  Bible  is  a  Protestant  version,  and  in 
the  other  that  the  Sabbath  is  a  Christian  institu¬ 
tion,  and  in  both  cases  under  the  further  pretense 
that  a  republican  government  should  recognize  no 
religion,  is  simply  preposterous.  As  well,  since 
monogamy  is  a  Christian  institution,  might  polyg¬ 
amists  and  free-lovers  require  that  the  marriage 
laws  be  unconditionally  repealed.  Yea,  in  a  word, 
as  well  might  disorganizing  atheists  demand  that 
the  government  become  at  once  positively  and 
actively  atheistic. 


Book  Seventh. 


♦ 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Church. 

Definition  of  Term. — i.  What  it  expresses. 
2.  What  it  implies.  The  term  ecclesia ,  usually, 
in  the  New  Testament  translated  by  the  term 
Church,  in  its  generic  sense  signifies  an  assem¬ 
bly.  The  promiscuous  gathering  of  the  people  at 
Ephesus,  called  together  by  the  complaints  of 
Demetrius  and  his  fellow-craftsmen,  is  in  the  origi¬ 
nal  called  an  ecclesia ,  and  the  term  is,  in  our 
English  version,  properly  translated  by  the  term 
assembly. 

To  this  generic  idea  we  must  add  the  idea  of 
a  religious  purpose ;  and  yet  this  does  not  make  the 
definition  complete,  for  the  assembly  on  Mars  Hill 
was  a  gathering  for  a  religious  purpose,  but  was 
not  a  Church.  We  must  add  the  idea  of  organiza¬ 
tion.  We  have,  then,  an  assembly  organized  for 
a  religious  purpose ;  which  implies  a  government 
with  officers  for  its  administration,  and  the  actual 
performance  of  the  acts  for  which  the  government 

was  organized.  “The  visible  Church  of  Christ, ” 

233 


234 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


says  the  thirteenth  of  our  Articles  of  Religion, 
“is  a  congregation  of  faithful  men,  in  which  the 
pure  Word  of  God  is  preached,  and  the  sacraments 
duly  administered  according  to  Christ’s  ordinance, 
in  all  those  things  that  of  necessity  are  requisite 
to  the  same.”  A  Christian  Church  is  an  assem¬ 
bly  of  Christian  believers,  of  persons  who  believe 
in  Christ  as  the  Son  of  God  and  the  Savior  of 
men.  The  number  is  not  essential,  agreement 
and  association  are  all  that  is  requisite ;  where 
two  or  three  are  gathered  in  Christ’s  name,  there 
his  presence  is  manifested  and  his  promised  bless¬ 
ing  bestowed.  A  single  assembly  of  Christian 
believers,  properly  organized,  with  officers  suffi¬ 
cient  in  number  to  discharge  the  functions  contem¬ 
plated  in  the  organization,  is  a  Church,  and  is 
called  the  Church  of  the  locality  in  which  it  is  sit¬ 
uated  ;  such  as  the  Church  at  Jerusalem,  at  An¬ 
tioch,  in  Ephesus,  Smyrna,  Pergamos,  et  cetera. 

The  entire  body  of  Christian  believers  on  earth 
is  called  the  Church.  “Thou  art  Peter,  and  upon 
this  rock  will  I  build  my  Church,  and  the  gates  of 
hell  shall  not  prevail  against  it.”  This  may  in¬ 
clude  all  those  who  have  been  baptized  in  the 
name  of  Christ  throughout  the  whole  world,  and 
who  believe  in  the  doctrines  of  Christianity :  this 
is  usually  called  the  visible  Church  ;  or  it  may  be 
restricted  to  those  who  are  real  believers  ;  are 
united  to  Christ  by  true  and  saving  faith ;  are, 


THE  CHURCH. 


235 


through  faith  in  Christ,  adopted  as  the  children  of 
God,  and  heirs  of  eternal  life  :  this  is  called  the  in¬ 
visible  Church.  In  modern  parlance,  we  speak 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  the  Protestant 
Church,  the  Greek  Church ;  and  again,  of  the 
Episcopal,  the  Presbyterian,  the  Congregational, 
the  Baptist,  the  Methodist,  and  other  Churches  ; 
and  by  these  terms  we  designate  the  aggregate 
of  all  those  Christian  believers  who  agree  with 
each  other  in  special  points  of  doctrine  or  discip¬ 
line,  and  in  which  they  differ  from  others — these 
are  called  denominational  Churches. 

The  aggregate  of  the  local  and  denominational 
Churches  of  any  country  is  sometimes  distin¬ 
guished  by  the  national  name  of  the  country  in 
which  those  Churches  are  located — as  the  Church 
of  America  ;  but  more  commonly  the  plural  form 
is  used,  the  nationality  being  distinguished  by 
an  adjective — as  the  American  Churches.  The 
term  English  Church  is  more  denominational  than 
national. 

When  we  speak  of  the  Church  as  we  do  of 
the  family  or  the  State,  we  have  an  abstract  idea 
of  what  is  essential,  omitting  what  is  local  and 
what  is  denominational.  This  differs  not  essen- 
dally  from  the  visible  Church,  and  may  be  defined 
as  above,  “a  congregation  of  faithful  men,  in 
which  the  pure  Word  of  God  is  preached,  and 
the  sacraments  duly  administered,  according  to 


236 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Christ’s  ordinance,  in  all  those  things  that  ot  ne¬ 
cessity  are  requisite,  to  the  same.”  “Thou  art 
Peter,  and  upon  this  rock  will  I  build  my  Church, 
and  the  gates  of  hell  shall  not  prevail  against  it ; 
and  I  will  give  unto  thee  the  keys  of  the  king¬ 
dom  of  heaven ;  and  whatsoever  thou  shalt  bind 
on  earth  shall  be  bound  in  heaven  ;  and  whatso¬ 
ever  thou  shalt  loose  on  earth  shall  be  loosed  in 
heaven.  Now  ye  are  the  body  of  Christ,  and  mem¬ 
bers  in  particular  ;  and  God  hath  set  some  in  the 
Church,  first  apostles,  secondarily  prophets,  thirdly 
teachers  ;  after  that  miracles,  then  gifts  of  heal¬ 
ings,  helps,  governments,  diversities  of  tongues. 
And  hath  put  all  things  under  his  feet,  and  gave 
him  to  be  the  head  over  all  things  to  the  Church, 
which  is  his  body,  the  fullness  of  him  that  filleth 
all  in  all.  Christ  is  head  of  the  Church.  Christ 
also  loved  the  Church  and  gave  himself  for  it ;  that 
he  might  sanctify  and  cleanse  it  and  present  it  to 
himself  a  glorious  Church  ;  for  we  are  members 
of  his  body,  of  his  flesh,  and  of  his  bones.  This 
is  a  great  mystery  ;  but  I  speak  concerning  Christ 
and  his  Church.  And  he  is  before  all  things,  and 
by  him  all  things  consist,  and  he  is  the  head  of 
the  body,  the  Church  ;  who  is  the  beginning,  the 
first-born  from  the  dead,  that  in  all  things  he  might 
have  the  pre-eminence.  Ye  are  come  unto  Mount 
Zion  and  unto  the  city  of  the  living  God,  the  heav¬ 
enly  Jerusalem,  and  to  an  innumerable  company 


THE  CHURCH. 


237 


of  angels,  to  the  general  assembly  and  Church  of 
the  first-born,  which  are  written  in  heaven  ;  and  to 
God  the  Judge  of  all,  and  to  the  spirits  of  just  men 
made  perfect,  and  to  Jesus  the  mediator  of  the 
new  covenant.  Wherefore,  we  receiving  a  king¬ 
dom  which  can  not  be  moved,  let  us  have  grace 
whereby  we  may  serve  God  acceptably,  with  rever¬ 
ence  and  godly  fear.” 

The  Christian  Church  is  a  divine  institution  ;  in 
other  words,  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  such  an  organ¬ 
ization  should  exist  among  men.  The  above  pas¬ 
sages  make  this  evident  beyond  controversy  ;  and  it 
is  also  evident  from  the  terms  employed  to  charac¬ 
terize  the  Church,  and  from  the  affirmations  made 
concerning  it,  that  it  is  an  institution  peculiarly  dear 
to  God — eminently  sacred — and  more  emphatically 
divine  than  any  other  institution  existing  among 
men.  The  will  of  God  concerning  the  existence 
of  a  visible  Church  refers  not  merely  to  the  Chris¬ 
tian  dispensation ;  the  Church  is  common  to  all 
times  ;  has  existed  in  all  the  ages  of  human  his¬ 
tory,  and  will  exist  to  the  end  of  time.  The  record 
concerning  the  offerings  brought  unto  the  Lord 
by  Cain  and  Abel  implies  an  appointed  time  for  a 
solemn  assembly  and  for  religious  services.  The 
offering  of  sacrifices,  which  was  common  to  all 
patriarchal  times,  evinces  the  same  thing.  There 
was  a  revival  of  religion  in  the  time  of  Seth,  and. 
its  description  is  that  “then  began  men  to  call  on 


238 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


the  name  of  the  Lord.”  Noah  was  a  just  man, 
perfect  in  his  generations ;  he  walked  with  God, 
and  built  an  altar  unto  the  Lord,  and  took  of  every 
clean  beast  and  of  every  clean  fowl  and  offered 
burnt-offerings  on  the  altar.  Melchisedec  was  a 
priest  of  the  most  high  God.  From  the  time  of 
Abraham  to  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  and,  in 
some  sense,  even  until  now,  the  descendants  of 
Abraham  have  been  a  people  chosen  of  the  Lord  ; 
separate  from  the  other  peoples  of  the  earth,  and 
that  for  a  religious  purpose.  No  man  having  any 
respect  for  the  Word  of  God,  having  faith  in  any 
thing  earthly  as  of  divine  appointment,  will,  for  a 
a  moment,  question  whether  the  Jewish  Church 
under  the  Mosaic  dispensation  was  an  organization 
of  divine  appointment.  The  Church  in  the  wilder¬ 
ness,  with  its  services  in  the  tent  of  the  tabernacle, 
and  the  Church  at  Jerusalem,  with  its  solemnities, 
in  the  temple  built  by  Solomon,  were  divinely 
ordered.  Its  high  priest,  its  urim  and  thummim, 
its  ark  of  the  covenant  beneath  the  wings  of  cher¬ 
ubim,  its  manifestation  of  divine  glory  in  the  she- 
kinah,  all  its  sacrifices,  both  ceremonial  and  pro¬ 
pitiatory,  its  solemn  forms  of  prayer,  its  psalms  of 
praise,  its  supplications  and  benedictions,  all  evinc¬ 
ing  that  out  of  Zion  the  perfection  of  beauty  God 
had  shined,  all  were  according  to  the  fashion 
which  God  showed  unto  Moses  in  the  mount. 

That  the  Christian  Church  is  a  divine  institu- 


THE  CHURCH. 


239 


tion  may  be  argued  from  the  nature  and  necessi¬ 
ties  of  the  case.  All  divine  ends,  so  far  as  is 
known  to  man,  are  secured  by  instrumentalities. 
Any  way,  we  do  not  know  of  any  moral  and  relig¬ 
ious  ends  that  are  secured  without  the  employ¬ 
ment  of  what  may  be  called  second  causes  ;  or 
if  the  terms  be  preferred,  we  may  say  without 
agents  and  instruments.  The  end  to  be  secured  in 
the  employment  of  moral  and  religious  forces  is 
the  salvation  of  men  from  the  evils  and  perils  of 
sin.  We  have  no  record  of  any  instance  of  con¬ 
scious  salvation  that  was  secured  by  a  purely 
divine  efficiency.  Cornelius  was  visited  by  an 
angel,  and  by  him  assured  that  his  prayers  and 
alms  had  come  up  as  a  memorial  before  the  Lord  ; 
but  for  the  completed  salvation  proffered  by  the 
Gospel  of  Christ  it  was  needful  that  Cornelius  send 
for  Peter.  When  Peter  came  and  preached  sal¬ 
vation  through  Christ,  the  Holy  Ghost  fell  on  all 
them  that  heard  the  Word.  Saul  of  Tarsus  was 
met  on  his  way  to  Damascus  by  Christ  himself, 
he  saw  a  light  above  the  brightness  of  the  sun, 
and  heard  the  voice  of  Jesus,  saying,  “I  am  Jesus 
whom  thou  persecutest this  divine  manifestation 
was  a  call  to  and  a  qualification  for  the  apostle- 
ship  and  ministry  ;  but  for  his  own  personal  salva¬ 
tion  he  was  instructed  to  inquire  for  Ananias. 
Under  the  ministry  of  this  holy  man  the  scales 
at  once  fell  from  his  eyes,  and  being  justified  by 


240 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


faith  he  found  peace  with  God  through  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ. 

It  is  not  pertinent  to  burden  this  discussion 
with  an  inquiry  into  the  methods  by  which  pagans 
may  attain  unto  eternal  life ;  it  is  sufficient  to 
speak  of  Gospel  salvation.  This  is  conditioned 
upon  faith  ;  but  faith  cometh  by  hearing,  and  hear¬ 
ing  by  the  Word  of  God  ;  how  then  can  they  hear 
without  a  preacher,  and  how  can  he  preach  except 
he  be  sent  ?  An  organized  Church,  then,  is  a  pre¬ 
requisite  to  the  accomplishment  of  Gospel  pur¬ 
poses  ;  a  Church  to  authorize  and  sustain  a  min¬ 
istry  by  whom  the  Word  may  be  preached; 
that  Word  which  is  essential  to  the  hearing,  by 
which  faith  and  its  conditioned  salvation  are  made 
possible. 

From  the  doctrine  that  the  Church  is  a  divine 
institution,  it  is  necessarily  to  be  inferred  that 
the  Church  must  be  organized  and  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  divine  will.  As  says  our 
ritual  respecting  matrimony,  “  So  many  as  are 
coupled  together  otherwise  than  God’s  Word  doth 
allow  are  not  joined  together  by  God,  neither  is 
their  matrimony  lawful,”  so  we  may  say  of  any 
institution,  that  to  be  divine  it  must  be  according 
to  God’s  will,  as  declared  in  his  Word.  As  the 
Church  is,  in  some  respects,  a  voluntary  associa¬ 
tion,  some  have  inferred  therefrom  that  its  char¬ 
acter  and  modes  of  operation  may  be  wholly  deter- 


THE  CHURCH. 


241 


mined  by  the  consent  of  its  members  ;  but  it  is  not 
so,  for  though  a  voluntary  association  in  the  sense 
that  its  members  are  not  constrained  to  enter  into 
it,  but  do  so  or  not  at  their  own  option,  it  is  also  a 
divine  association,  because,  among  other  reasons, 
it  is  God’s  will  that  men  do  thus  associate  them¬ 
selves  together.  Our  Puritan  forefathers,  when 
they  came  to  these  shores,  to  secure  for  them¬ 
selves  and  their  children  civil  and  religious  lib¬ 
erty,  judged  that  it  was  their  right  to  organize 
and  administer  both  State  and  Church  in  all  re¬ 
spects  according  to  their  own  will ;  and  hence  they 
established  laws  and  executed  them,  by  which 
they  became  tyrants  and  persecutors  of  God’s 
people.  It  is  ,  obvious  that  both  in  State  and 
Church  much  is  left  to  be  determined  by  the  con¬ 
sent  of  the  governed.  No  specific  and  definite 
form  of  either  civil  or  ecclesiastical  government  is 
prescribed  in  the  sacred  Scriptures.  But  it  is 
equally  obvious  that  principles  governing  these 
organizations  are  specified,  and  that  it  is  required 
that  these  principles  be  observed.  An  association 
of  individual  persons  that  ignores  or  contravenes 
the  requirements  of  God’s  Word,  no  matter  by 
what  name  it  may  be  called,  is  not  a  Church  of 
God,  can  not  claim  his  sanction,  nor  expect  his 
promised  blessing.  It  is  essential  to  a  divine  insti¬ 
tution  that  it  be  fashioned  after  the  divine  pattern 

in  all  respects  wherein  the  divine  will  is  revealed  ; 
c  16 


2\2 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


in  matters  concerning  which  there  is  no  revelation, 
the  discretion  of  the  Church  in  determining  what 
the  exigencies  of  the  case  require,  is  the  author¬ 
ized  tribunal ;  and  to  its  authority  the  individual 
member  is  bound  to  submit. 

An  organization  implies  a  purpose,  a  some-  • 
thing  to  be  done,  an  act  or  acts  to  be  performed, 
persons  appointed  to  do  the  thing  or  things  pro¬ 
posed,  and  a  prescribed  method  by  which  the 
purpose  or  end  may  be  accomplished.  The  Chris¬ 
tian  Church  is  an  organization  whose  end  or  pur¬ 
pose  is  the  establishment  and  continuance  of  the 
means  of  grace.  The  means  of  grace  are  chiefly 
the  preaching  of  the  Gospel  and  the  sacraments. 
The  preaching  of  the  Gospel,  with  its  accompani¬ 
ments,  we  call  the  ordinary  means  of  grace,  and 
shall  devote  a  chapter  to  their  discussion.  The 
sacraments  are  means  of  grace,  but  because  of 
their  special  character,  we  shall  speak  of  them 
distinctly  in  a  separate  chapter.  The  discussion 
of  the  ministry  as  to  the  methods  of  appointment, 
as  to  the  nature  and  functions  of  the  office,  in¬ 
volves  the  discussion  of  the  general  subject  of 
Church  Polity.  This  will  constitute  the  conclud¬ 
ing  chapter  of  the  present  work  on  Systematic 
Theology. 


CHAPTER  II. 


The  Ordinary  Means  of  Grace. 

In  apostolic  times  the  preaching  of  the  Gospel 
consisted  of  a  rehearsal  of  the  narrative  of  the 
life,  death,  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ.  Dur¬ 
ing  the  lives  of  the  apostles  many  took  it  in  hand 
to  set  forth  in  order  a  declaration  of  those  things 
which  were  most  surely  believed  among  them ; 
and  from  the  many  gospels  thus  written  the 
Church,  by  common  consent,  adopted  the  Gospels 
of  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  and  John  as  canonical. 
Early  in  the  days  of  the  fathers  the  Acts  and 
Epistles  were  added  to  the  Gospels,  and  the  whole 
was  received  as  the  recognized  standard  of  Chris¬ 
tian  faith  and  practice.  Thence  until  now  the 
public  service  of  the  Church  has  consisted  very 
largely  of  the  reading  and  expounding  of  the 
Jewish  and  Christian  Scriptures. 

The  preaching  of  the  Gospel,  or,  more  com¬ 
prehensively,  the  preaching  of  the  Word  of  God, 
is  by  divine  appointment  a  prominent  means  of 

grace,  a  divinely  appointed  and  divinely  employed 

243 


244 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


instrumentality  for  the  enlightenment  and  salva¬ 
tion  of  men.  “  I  am  not  ashamed  of  the  Gospel 
of  Christ ;  for  it  is  the  power  of  God  unto  salva¬ 
tion  to  every  one  that  believeth,  to  the  Jew  first, 
and  also  to  the  Greek.  After  that  in  the  wisdom 
of  God  the  world  by  wisdom  knew  not  God,  it 
pleased  God  by  the  foolishness  of  preaching  to 
save  them  that  believe.  For  the  Jews  require  a 
sign  and  the  Greeks  seek  after  wisdom  :  but  we 
preach  Christ  crucified,  unto  the  Jews  a  stumbling 
block  and  unto  the  Greeks  foolishness ;  but  unto 
them  that  are  called,  both  Jews  and  Greeks,  Christ 
the  power  of  God  and  the  wisdom  of  God.  Our 
Gospel  came  not  unto  you  in  word  only,  but  also 
in  power,  and  in  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  in  much 
assurance.  When  ye  received  the  Word  of  God, 
which  ye  heard  of  us,  ye  received  it  not  as  the 
word  of  men,  but,  as  it  is  in  truth,  the  Word  of 
God,  which  effectually  worketh  also  in  you  that 
believe.” 

A  divine  power  which  is  unto  salvation  in 
some  way  attends  the  preaching  of  the  .Word. 
We  speak  here,  of  course,  of  Gospel  salvation. 
By  what  means  pagans  are  brought  to  fear  God 
and  work  righteousness,  what  degrees  of  moral 
and  religious  culture  may  have  been  attained  in 
this  life  by  those  who  in  the  final  issue  shall  come 
from  north,  south,  east,  and  west,  and  sit  down  in 
the  kingdom  with  Abraham,  Isaac,  and  Jacob,  we 


THE  ORDINARY  MEANS  OF  GRACE.  245 

do  not  here  attempt  to  describe  or  define.  The 
unequal  distribution  of  religious  privileges  among 
men,  as  well  as  the  unequal  distribution  of  natural 
talent,  means  of  intellectual  culture,  wealth,  social 
advantages,  civil  liberty,  and,  in  a  word,  all  earthly 
good,  is  a  mystery  of  divine  providence  we  shall  not 
attempt  to  explain.  We  know  that  the  scales  of 
justice  are  evenly  balanced  ;  ability  equals  obliga¬ 
tion  ;  man  is  responsible  only  for  what  he  has,  and 
not  at  all  for  what  he  has  not.  We  know  that  the 
Lord  reigneth  ;  and,  though  clouds  and  darkness 
are  round  about  him,  we  know  that  righteousness 
and  judgment  are  the  habitation  of  his  throne. 
Though  the  explanation  be  not  obvious  to  the 
human  intellect,  the  fact  is  patent  that  where  the 
Gospel  of  the  grace  of  God  has  free  course  it  is 
glorified  in  the  regeneration  and  sanctification  of 
men.  Christian  nations  attain  to  a  higher  degree 
of  moral  and  religious  culture  than  other  nations  ; 
and  among  Christian  nations  believers  are  better 
men  than  unbelievers — they  live  better  lives,  enjoy 
more  of  real  good,  and  die  with  better  hopes. 
This  regenerating  force  is  manifested  more  through 
the  preaching  of  the  Word  than  through  any  other 
or  all  other  means.  The  Gospel  is  the  power  of 
God  unto  salvation  ;  it  pleased  God  by  the  foolish¬ 
ness  of  preaching  to  save  them  that  believe.  The 
preaching  of  Christ  crucified  is  to  them  that  are 
called,  the  power  of  God  and  the  wisdom  of  God. 


246 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


In  what  does  the  power  of  the  Word  consist? 
On  this  question  there  are  three  theories  deserv¬ 
ing  attention :  first,  the  rationalistic ;  second,  the 
Augustinian  ;  and,  third,  the  Arminian. 

The  rationalistic  theory  affirms  that  the  power 
of  the  Word  read  and  expounded  to  convert  men, 
to  change  their  character,  opinions,  sympathies,  ex¬ 
periences,  and  hopes,  consists  in  the  natural  power 
of  the  truth  itself.  The  theory  denies  that  in  the 
conversion  of  men,  in  their  moral  and  religious  cul¬ 
ture,  there  is  any  thing  supernatural.  Religious 
experience  is  wholly  a  matter  of  education.  The 
Gospel  is  a  powerful  educational  force ;  its  sub¬ 
lime,  soul  -  stirring  truths  have  power  to  awaken 
thought,  to  excite  desire,  to  modify  and  change 
opinion,  to  transform  intellections  and  sensibilities, 
and  to  control  volitions. 

This  theory  is  partly  true  in  what  it  affirms, 
wholly  false  in  what  it  denies.  The  truth  it  affirms 
may  be  emphasized,  and  the  emphasis  can  not 
well  be  too  strong.  The  Gospel  is  itself  a  power. 
If  the  preaching  of  the  Word  had  in  itself  no 
better  adaptation  to  improve  the  moral  and  relig¬ 
ious  character  of  the  hearer  than  an  ointment  of 
clay  has  to  the  bestowment  of  sight  upon  one 
born  blind,  yet  if  it  pleased  the  Omnipotent  One 
to  employ  it  for  that  purpose  it  would  be  made 
effectual,  it  would  accomplish  that  whereunto  it 
was  sent.  In  no  case  can  God’s  Word  return 


THE  ORDINARY  MEANS  OF  GRACE.  247 

unto  him  void.  But  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  in 
advance  that  the  instruments  which  infinite  wis¬ 
dom  adopts,  and  infinite  power  employs,  for  the 
accomplishment  of  any  purpose  are  wisely  chosen, 
and  well  adapted  to  their  proposed  end.  The 
Gospel  is  itself  a  powerful  agency  for  the  moral 

renovation  of  sinful  men.  Let  this  be  illustrated. 

_  * 

The  Gospel  is  a  declaration  that  Christ  Jesus 

came  into  the  world  to  save  sinners.  Now,  let 
this  thought,  in  its  Gospel  breadth  and  depth  and 
height,  so  far  as  man’s  feeble  intellect  is  compe¬ 
tent  to  apprehend  it,  become  a  theme  of  earnest 
thought  and  intense  interest ;  let  faith  become  the 
substance  of  things  hoped  for,  the  evidence  of 
things  not  seen  ;  let  the  hearer  come  to  feel  in  the 
depths  of  his  consciousness  that  he  who  was  in 
the  beginning,  who  was  with  God,  and  was  God, 
by  whom  all  things  were  made,  and  without  whom 
was  not  any  thing  made  that  was  made  —  the 
divine  logos,  became  flesh  ;  that  in  the  person  of 
Jesus  Christ  God  was  manifest  in  the  flesh  ;  that 
this  incarnation,  with  the  life  Jesus  lived  and  the 
death  he  died,  was  solely  for  the  purpose  and  in¬ 
tent  that  through  his  incarnation,  life,  and  death  it 
might  become  possible  for  God  to  be  just  and  the 
justifier  of  him  that  believeth  in  Jesus  ;  or  briefly, 
as  above,  let  him  believe  that  Jesus  Christ  came 
into  the  world  to  save  sinners  ;  and  it  is  manifest 
that  to  such  a  hearer,  thus  taught  and  thus  im- 


248 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


pressed,  the  exceeding  sinfulness  and  infinite  peril 
of  sin  becomes  a  most  profound  and  all-absorbing 
conviction.  The  Gospel  naturally  convinces  men 
of  sin  ;  and  this  is  the  first  step  in  the  progress 
of  a  sinner’s  salvation.  For,  as  a  man  would  not 
employ  a  physician  at  great  expense,  and  take 
nauseating  medicines,  unless  he  thought  himself 
sick ;  so  no  man  will  deny  himself,  take  up  his 
cross,  or  follow  Christ  in  obedience  to  his  com¬ 
mandments,  as  a  means  of  salvation  from  sin,  until 
he  is  first  convicted  of  sin  ;  until  he  think  himself 
a  sinner,  and  helplessly  exposed  by  his  sins  to 
their  fearful  consequences. 

Again  :  suppose  a  man  profoundly  convicted 
of  the  exceeding  sinfulness  and  fearful  peril  of  sin, 
so  that  from  the  depths  of  his  nature  he  cries, 
“God  be  merciful  to  me,  a  sinner!”  Suppose  the 
Gospel  be  preached  to  him,  and  in  trustful  obedi¬ 
ence  he  looks  to  behold  the  Lamb  of  God  that 
taketh  away  the  sin  of  the  world.  If  through  the 
Word  he  come  to  see  this  hope  set  before  him  in 
the  Gospel,  it  is  manifest  that  the  Gospel  will  be 
to  him  good  news,  glad  tidings  of  great  joy.  The 
Gospel  presents  him  such  a  savior  as  in  his  deep¬ 
est  consciousness  he  feels  he  needs — a  God-man, 
who  can  put  his  hand  upon  both  and  be  a  days¬ 
man  between  him  and  the  just  one  whom  he  has 
offended.  God  manifest  in  the  flesh  is  evidently 
an  all-sufficient  Savior. 


THE  ORDINARY  MEANS  OF  GRACE. 


249 


These  illustrations  may  be  continued  through 
all  the  wants  and  woes  to  which  man  is  heir.  The 
Gospel  is  wondrously  adapted  to  all  the  experi¬ 
ences  of  human  life.  There  is  here  a  balm  for 
every  wound,  a  cordial  for  every  fear;  and  the 
rationalist  is  right  in  saying  there  is  power  in  the 
truths  themselves  adapted  to  enlightenment,  con¬ 
viction,  faith,  trust,  hope,  and  to  all  that  man  needs 
for  godliness  here  and  eternal  life  hereafter.  And 
yet  he  is  fatally  in  error  when  he  affirms  that 
the  Word  alone  is  itself  adequate  to  even  the 
beginnings  of  salvation;  the  Word  is  adapted  as  an 
instrument,  but  is  not  efficient  as  an  agent.  “  Go 
ye  into  all  the  world,  and  teach  all  nations  ;  and 
lo  I  am  with  you  alway,  even  unto  the  end  of  the 
world.  Behold,  I  send  the  promise  of  my  Father 
upon  you;  but  tarry  ye  in  the  city  of  Jerusalem 
until  ye  be  endued  with  power  from  on  high.  I 
have  planted  and  Apollos  watered,  but  God  gave 
the  increase.  So  then  neither  is  he  that  planteth 
any  thing,  neither  he  that  watereth  ;  but  God,  that 
giveth  the  increase.  We  have  this  treasure  in 
earthen  vessels,  that  the  excellency  of  the  power 
may  be  of  God,  and  not  of  us.  God  hath  not 
given  us  the  spirit  of  fear,  but  of  power,  of  love, 
and  of  a  sound  mind.  If  any  man  speak,  let  him 
speak  as  the  oracles  of  God  :  if  any  man  minister, 
let  him  do  it  as  of  the  ability  which  God  giveth  ;  * 
that  God  in  all  things  may  be  glorified,  through 


250 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


Jesus  Christ,  to  whom  be  praise  and  dominion  for 
ever  and  ever.  Amen.” 

If  the  question  be  asked,  Why  is  it  that  in  the 
same  community,  in  the  same  congregation  of 
persons  who  hear  the  same  Gospel,  some  are 
saved  and  some  are  not  ?  the  rationalistic  answer 
is  that  it  is  wholly  of  the  will  of  the  hearer.  Those 
who  are  benefited  by  the  preached  Word  are  those 
who  give  attention  thereto,  meditate  upon  it,  in¬ 
wardly  digest  its  import,  become  cognizant  of  its 
nature  and  design,  of  their  relations  to  it  and  in¬ 
terest  in  it,  and  yield  a  voluntary  obedience  to  its 
dictates.  Those  who  hear,  but  are  not  saved, 
either  refuse  to  give  attention  to  what  they  hear, 
give  no  voluntary  thoughtfulness  to  the  subject, 
and  remain  well-nigh  as  ignorant  of  what  the  Gos¬ 
pel  is  as  though  they  had  never  heard  it ;  or,  giv¬ 
ing  some  attention,  and  knowing  somewhat  of  its 
claims,  they  voluntarily  refuse  to  yield  obedience 
thereto.  In  both  cases,  and  in  every  case,  the 
difference  in  results  is  wholly  referable  to  the  vol¬ 
untary  action  of  the  hearers  themselves. 

The  Augustinian  theory  does  not  necessarily 
ignore  the  adaptation  of  the  Gospel  as  a  system 
of  truths  to  the  work  of  human  reformation,  nor 
the  agency  of  the  human  will  in  giving  attention 
to  truth  declared,  and  in  yielding  obedience  to  its 
dictates ;  nay,  more,  it  affirms  that  these  things 
are  ordained  to  be  in  all  cases  where  Gospel 


THE  ORDINARY  MEANS  OF  GRACE.  25  I 

salvation  occurs,  but  it  denies  that  there  is  any 
efficiency  in  either.  The  Word,  read  or  expounded, 
is  a  flow  of  sound,  and  the  ideas  words  are  em¬ 
ployed  to  convey  are  dead  things,  considered 
with  reference  to  spiritual  life.  And  even  the 
human  will  itself  is  as  impotent  for  any  working 
towards  salvation  as  is  the  Word  or  the  truth. 
The  whole  and  sole  efficiency  is  in  the  agency  of 
the  Divine  Spirit.  The  reason  why  one  is  saved 
and  another  is  not  is  wholly  and  solely  because 
God  designs  that  so  it  shall  be  ;  and  in  carrying 
out  his  own  purpose  of  election  he  gives  to  the 
elect  an  efficient  influence  of  the  Spirit,  by  which 
the  man  gives  saving  attention  to  the  Word  and 
yields  himself  in  submissive  obedience  to  the 
Spirit’s  effectual  working.  To  the  man  not  saved 
God  does  not  give  this  office  of  the  Spirit ;  and 
because  he  has  it  not  he  does  not,  yea,  he  can  not, 
hear,  believe,  and  be  saved. 

It  may,  it  does,  seem  strange  that  thinkers  who 
center  every  thing  in  the  sovereignty  of  grace 
should  attach  any  importance  whatever  to  means  ; 
but  a  stranger  thing  than  this  actually  exists. 
Some  Augustinians  have,  and  perhaps  some  now 
do  hold  so  firmly  to  the  doctrine  that  the  divine 
decree  of  election  includes  not  only  the  persons 
elected,  but  also  the  time,  means,  and  circum¬ 
stances  of  their  salvation,  and  the  fact  that  the 
saved  are  to  be  saved  through  faith  in  a  preached 


252  ECCLESIOLOGY. 

Gospel  that  they  have  catalogued  the  whole  pagan 
world  among  the  non-elect.  God  has  decreed  the 
salvation  of  the  elect  as  an  end,  and  the  preaching 
of  the  Gospel  as  a  means  to  that  end  ;  therefore, 
where  the  means  do  not  exist  the  end  can  not 
ensue.  The  whole  doctrine  of  Augustinian  elec¬ 
tion  has  been  sufficiently  discussed  in  previous 
pages  of  this  work ;  the  particular  phase  of  it  now 
under  consideration  need  not  therefore  be  specially 
examined.  The  truth  in  the  theory  is  that  with¬ 
out  Christ  man  can  do  nothing  effectually  towards 
his  salvation.  Its  antagonism  to  the  Pelagian  idea 
that  man’s  unaided  will  is  competent  to  make  such 
use  of  Gospel  truth  as  will  issue  in  his  salvation 
from  sin  and  the  attainment  of  eternal  life  is  well 
put ;  its  arguments  adduced  to  prove  that  the  will 
of  man  unaided  by  grace  is  entirely  impotent  for 
any  work  of  salvation  are  unanswerable  ;  the  doc¬ 
trine  itself  is  a  Bible  doctrine.  If,  therefore,  man 
so  hear  the  Word  of  life  and  salvation  as  to  profit 
thereby  it  is  because  the  Spirit  of  God  helps  his 
infirmities.  But  the  Augustinian  affirmation  that 
the  human  will  is  wholly  antagonistic  or  inactive 
in  the  work  of  salvation,  so  that  the  issue  is  wholly 
of  the  Spirit  and  not  at  all  of  the  man,  is  an  un¬ 
warranted  and  erroneous  affirmation. 

The  Arminian  answer  to  the  question,  In  what 
does  the  power  of  the  preached  Gospel  consist  ? 
is  that  it  consists,  primarily,  chiefly,  and  efficiently, 


THE  ORDINARY  MEANS  OF  GRACE.  253 

in  the  agency  and  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  con¬ 
joined  with  the  consenting  and  co-operating  agency 
of  man’s  free  will.  Whenever  the  Gospel  is  faith¬ 
fully  preached  the  omnipresent  Spirit  gives  to  the 
natural  force  of  the  truth  uttered  a  supernaturally 
enlightening  power.  The  hearer  is  convinced, 
convicted.  If  he  yield  himself  subject  to  the  force 
of  truth  the  Spirit  through  the  Word  shows  him 
Christ  and  invites  him  to  come  ;  if  he  come  the 
Spirit  gives  him  power  to  trust,  to  believe  ;  if  he 
believe  he  is  saved.  The  Spirit  regenerates,  com¬ 
forts,  bears  witness  of  adoption  and  heirship,  fills 
him  with  the  love  of  God  shed  abroad  in  his  heart, 
and  inspires  good  hope  of  eternal  life. 

The  Calvinian  objection  to  this  theory,  as  stated 
by  Dr.  Hodge,  is  that  according  to  it  “man,  and 
not  God,  determines  who  shall  be  saved.”  We 
reply,  A  fairer  statement  of  the  theory  would  be 
that  each  individual  man  determines  for  himself 
whether  he  will  permit  God  to  save  him  ;  and  in 
this  form  we  accept  the  objection,  and  are  willing 
to  abide  by  it.  But  again,  it  is  said  salvation, 
according  to  the  theory,  depends  upon  what  man 
does,  hnd  this  is  salvation  by  works,  and  not  by 
grace.  We  reply,  Salvation  is  conditioned  upon 
faith,  an  act  of  voluntary  choice  in  man  ;  and  if  this 
be  called  salvation  by  works  we  shall  not  contend 
about  the  terms,  but  reply  further  that  it  is  by 
grace  that  man  has  the  power  to  choose,  so  that 


254 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


we  are  saved  by  grace,  though  it  be  through  faith, 
since  faith,  or  the  power  to  believe,  is  the  gift  of 
God.  But  again,  says  Professor  H.  B.  Smith, 
“  Calvinism  may  be  a  sharp  and  hard  system;  but 
it  takes  no  position  from  which  it  can  fairly  be  in¬ 
ferred  that  we  are  damned  by  grace.”  This  is 
saying  that  according  to  Arminianism,  since  it 
teaches  that  it  is  by  grace  that  man  has  power  to 
choose  or  refuse  life,  if  he  refuse,  and  by  his  re¬ 
fusal  bring  damnation  upon  himself,  then  he  is 
damned  by  grace.  We  reply,  As  well  might  it  be 
said  that  the  lost  are  damned  by  creation ;  for 
without  creation  there  would  be  no  power  to  sin, 
and  of  course  no  sinning,  and  no  damnation. 

We  have  written  of  the  genuineness,  authen¬ 
ticity,  and  inspiration  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  under 
the  head  of  Apologetics ;  of  the  Bible  as  a  means 
of  grace,  to  be  read,  diligently  studied,  taught  unto 
the  children,  for  the  cultivation  of  a  devotional 
spirit,  under  the  head  of  Ethics  ;  in  this  chapter 
we  have  spoken  of  the  Word  as  read  and  ex¬ 
pounded  in  the  congregation  of  the  people,  and 
of  the  supernatural  power  by  the  Spirit  which 
accompanies  its  faithful  exposition, —  from  all  of 
which  it  is  manifest  that  the  Bible  in  the  hands  of 
all  the  people,  faithfully  taught  unto  the  children 
and  expounded  in  the  congregation,  is,  par  emi¬ 
nence,  the  instrumentality  of  the  Church  for  the 
religious  well-being  of  mankind.  A  competent 


THE  ORDINARY  MEANS  OF  GRACE.  255 

knowledge  of  its  sacred  contents  is  so  essentially 
a  means  of  grace,  so  indispensable  to  the  attain¬ 
ment  of  Gospel  salvation  by  any  appreciable  por¬ 
tion  of  the  community,  that  its  wide  diffusion,  and 
a  diligent  industry  in  giving  to  the  public  gener¬ 
ally  suitable  instruction  therein,  becomes  one  of 
the  most  responsible  and  solemn  obligations  of  the 
Church. 

Of  prayer,  another  of  the  ordinary  means  of 
grace,  we  have  also  made  mention  elsewhere,  and 
need  not  advert  to  it  further  in  this  connection. 
The  other  accompaniments  of  public  worship,  such 
as  the  hymns-  of  praise,  adoration,  and  thanksgiv¬ 
ing,  the  mutual  exhortations  of  the  people  one  to 
another,  and  the  testimony  for  Christ,  since  they 
are  of  their  nature  incidental  and  subsidiary,  and 
are  variable  as  circumstances  require,  though 
vastly  influential  for  good,  do  not  furnish  topics 
requiring  discussion  in  works  like  the  present. 


CHAPTER  III. 


The  Sacraments. 

Ritualistic  observances  are  essential  to  a  visi¬ 
ble  Church — it  is  by  them,  to  a  great  extent,  that 
the  Church  becomes  visible.  Godliness  has  an 
external  form  as  well  as  an  internal  power— an 
outward  manifestation  as  well  as  an  inner  life. 
Prayer  is  paramount  desire,  but  he  who  never 
forms  his  thoughts  in  forms  of  prayer  never  prays. 
Love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law ;  but  if  a  man 
never  manifest  love  by  outward  acts,  it  may  be 
fairly  inferred  that  he  is  a  stranger  to-  benevolent 
affections.  They,  therefore,  err  greatly  who  re¬ 
gard  rites  and  ceremonies  as  non-essential,  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  whether 
they  be  observed  or  neglected.  If  God  say,  do 
this ,  though  the  thing  to  be  done  be  such,  in  itself, 
that  it  is  a  matter  of  perfect  indifference  whether 
it  be  done  or  not,  yet,  by  the  commandment  it  has 
become  a  matter  of  as  much  importance  as  is 
obedience  to  righteous  authority.  A  divine  com¬ 
mand  must  be  obeyed,  though  there  be  no  reason 
256 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


257 


for  obedience  except  that  it  is  commanded.  But 
divine  requirements  are  always  founded  in  good 
reasons,  and  thoughtful  piety  will  very  generally, 
if  not  universally,  be  able  to  discover  what  those 
reasons  are.  It  is,  therefore,  a  reasonable  anticipa¬ 
tion  that  all  divinely  required  observances  have  a 
significance  ;  that  they  are  exponential  of  opinions 
and  sentiments  which  are  of  real  value  in  religion  ; 
that  they  are  grounded  in  rational  considerations ; 
and  that  their  validity  consists  chiefly,  if  not  en¬ 
tirely,  in  an  intelligent  apprehension,  on  the  part 
of  those  participating  in  them,  of  their  purpose 
and  intent.  But  as,  on  the  one  hand,  some  err 
greatly  in  attaching  too  little  or  no  importance  to 
ritualistic  observances,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  many 
err  vastly  more  in  ascribing  to  them  an  impor¬ 
tance  that  does  not  belong  to  them.  When  ob¬ 
servances  are  foisted  into  the  services  of  the 
Church,  which  have  no  Scripture  warrant  either 
expressed  or  implied,  or  when  a  form  or  man¬ 
ner  of  discharging  a  real  Christian  duty  is  in¬ 
sisted  upon,  which  form  is  not  prescribed  in  the 
Word  of  God,  those  who  insist  upon  such  observ¬ 
ances  or  such  modes  are  guilty  of  teaching  for 
doctrine  the  commandments  of  men  ;  and  not  un- 
frequently  such  transgress  the  commandment  of 
God  by  their  own  traditions ;  they  pharisaically 
tithe  mint  and  rue  and  all  manner  of  herbs,  and 
omit  the  weightier  matters  of  the  law. 


258 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


The  sixteenth  of  our  Articles  of  Religion  is  as 
follows:  “Sacraments  ordained  of  Christ  are  not 
only  badges  or  tokens  of  Christian  men’s  profes¬ 
sion,  but  rather  they  are  certain  signs  of  grace  and 
God’s  good  will  toward  us,  by  the  which  he  doth 
work  invisibly  in  us,  and  doth  not  only  quicken, 
but  also  strengthen  and  confirm  our  faith  in  him. 
There  are  two  sacraments  ordained  of  Christ  our 
Lord  in  the  Gospel ;  that  is  to  say,  Baptism  and 
the  Supper  of  the  Lord.  Those  five  commonly 
called  sacraments — that  is  to  say,  confirmation, 
penance,  orders,  matrimony,  and  extreme  unction — 
are  not  to  be  accounted  for  sacraments  of  the 
Gospel ;  being  such  as  have  partly  grown  out  of 
the  corrupt  following  of  the  apostles,  and  partly 
are  states  of  life  allowed  in  the  Scriptures  ;  but 
yet  have  not  the  like  nature  of  Baptism  and  the 
Lord’s-supper,  because  they  have  not  any  visible 
sign  or  ceremony  ordained  of  God.  The  sacra¬ 
ments  were  not  ordained  of  Christ  to  be  gazed 
upon,  or  to  be  carried  about ;  but  that  we  should 
duly  use  them.  And  in  such  only  as  worthily  re¬ 
ceive  the  same,  they  have  a  wholesome  effect  or 
operation  ;  but  they  that  receive  them  unworthily 
purchase  to  themselves  condemnation,  as  St.  Paul 
saith:” — “Lie  that  eateth  and  drinketh  unworthily 
eateth  and  drinketh  damnation  to  himself,  not  dis¬ 
cerning  the  Lord’s  body.” 

No  valuable  information  as  to  the  nature  of  the 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


259 


ordinances  can  be  derived  from  the  meaning  of 
the  term  sacrament ;  for  in  both  classical  and 
ecclesiastical  use  it  is  ambiguous.  It  signifies,  in 
classical  use,  something  sacred ;  sometimes  the 
money  deposited  by  parties  contending  at  court ; 
sometimes  the  judicial  process  itself.  Again,  the 
obligation  of  a  soldier,  and  then  the  oath  he  takes, 
and  again  any  oath.  In  ecclesiastical  use,  besides 
any  thing  sacred,  it  signifies  whatever  has  a  hidden 
meaning,  any  rite,  ceremony,  or  sign  which  has  a 
secret  import ;  a  sacrament  is  a  mystery.  In 
modern  Protestant  use  a  sacrament  is  an  ordi¬ 
nance  instituted  by  Christ ;  has  a  religious  signifi¬ 
cance  ;  its  observance  is  to  be  perpetuated  ;  and, 
properly  observed,  is  a  means  of  grace,  a  channel 
of  spiritual  blessings. 

In  theological  language,  a  sacrament  is  a  sign 
and  a  seal.  As  a  sign,  the  scholarly  technical 
definition  is  “  signum  significans.  This  means, 
in  plain  terms,  that  the  service  has  a  signifi¬ 
cance — it  signifies  something.  Not  to  say  this 
would  be  to  say  that  it  is  a  senseless  ceremony, 
or,  at  most,  it  is  a  mere  badge  of  a  Christian’s 
profession.  Of  what  Baptism  and  the  Lord’s-sup- 
per  are  significant,  of  what  they  declare,  show 
forth,  or  represent,  we  shall  speak  further  on 
when  we  come  to  treat  of  them  specifically. 

As  a  seal,  the  technical  term  is  “  signum  con - 
finnans .”  This  implies  the  existence  of  a  cove- 


26o 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


nant  or  contract  between  parties,  in  which  it  is 
stipulated  that,  on  conditions  to  be  performed  by 
one  of  the  parties,  the  other  promises  to  confer 
certain  specified  benefits.  The  covenant  here  is 
the  covenant  of  grace,  in  which,  on  condition  of 
repentance  toward  God  and  faith  in  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ,  God  promises  pardon,  regeneration, 
and  adoption.  As  men  are  accustomed  to  set 
their  seal  to  legal  documents,  thereby  confirming 
the  conditions  and  promises  of  the  contract,  so,  in 
this  case,  God  has  ordained  Baptism  and  the 
Lord’s-supper  as  seals  of  his  covenant  with  men. 
Again,  slightly  different  from  this  view,  though 
involved  in  it,  the  covenant  is  considered  as  relat¬ 
ing  to  the  visible  Church,  to  membership  in  it, 
and  the  privileges  pertaining  to  it ;  and,  in  this 
view,  circumcision  is  regarded  as  the  seal  of  the 
Abrahamic  covenant,  in  which  membership  in  the 
Church  and  the  privileges  pertaining  thereto  were 
conditioned  upon  lineal  descent ;  and  baptism  is 
the  seal  of  the  Christian  covenant  under  which  a 
profession  of  faith  in  Christ  is  the  condition  upon 
which  admission  to  Church  fellowship  is  promised. 

In  respect  to  all  this  we  have  to  say  the  sacra¬ 
ments  are  signs,  or  they  are  nothing ;  perhaps 
they  are  appropriately  illustrated  by  the  figure  of 
a  seal — there  seems  to  be  some  rhetorical  advan¬ 
tage  gained  by  the  use  of  the  figure.  And  more, 
perhaps,  in  the  divine  mind,  these  ordinances  were 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


261 


ordained  to  be  perpetually  a  visible  reminder  of 
God’s  good  will  and  gracious  promises,  and  thus 
be  a  perpetual  confirmation  of  his  covenant,  and 
an  assurance  of  fidelity  in  the  fulfillment  of  his 
promises.  The  present  writer,  however,  fears  he 
does  not  fully  appreciate  this  idea  of  a  seal ;  he  is 
sure  he  does  not  see  as  much  importance  in  the 
thought  itself  as  he  finds  in  the  common  theolog¬ 
ical  treatises  on  the  subject. 

The  Roman  Catholic  Church  adds  to  Baptism 
and  the  Lord’s-supper,  confirmation,  penance,  or¬ 
ders,  matrimony,  and  extreme  unction.  Confirm¬ 
ation  is  a  service  by  which  those  baptized  in 
infancy  ostensibly  take  upon  themselves  the  obli¬ 
gations  of  the  baptismal  covenant,  and  by  which 
the  candidate  is  recognized  as  a  member  of  the 
visible  Church.  The  essential  of  the  service  is 
the  imposition  of  hands  by  those  having  episcopal 
authority.  The  thing  done  is  a  Christian  service, 
and  the  doing  it  by  the  imposition  of  hands  con¬ 
travenes  no  Christian  practice,  and  does  not  dese¬ 
crate  any  sacred  rite.  Something  which  is  the 
equivalent  must  be  practiced  wherever  there  is  a 
Christian  Church ;  and  certainly  the  recognition 
of  membership  in  the  body  of  Christ  is  an  interest 
of  sufficient  value  to  justify  imposing  ceremonials. 
But  though  high  consideration  of  the  service  of 
confirmation  is  not  only  allowable,  but  also  emi¬ 
nently  appropriate,  there  is  nothing  in  the  thing 


262 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


itself,  and  there  is  no  warrant  in  the  Word  of  God 
that  justifies  or  allows  that  confirmation  be  placed  in 
the  same  category  with  baptism  and  the  eucharist. 
Calling  it  a  sacrament  may  be  merely  a  matter  of 
lexicography;  but  if  by  so  naming  it,  it  is  intended 
to  affirm  that  imposition  of  hands  is  a  divinely 
appointed  method  of  introduction  into  the  visible 
Church,  we  deny,  and  wait  the  proof.  The  same 
thing  may  be  said  of  orders  and  of  matrimony. 
Some  solemn,  impressive  ceremony  on  the  occa¬ 
sion  of  the  induction  of  candidates  into  the  Chris¬ 
tian  ministry,  and  on  the  occasion  of  the  joining 
together  of  persons  in  holy  matrimony,  is  not  only 
a  demand  of  good  taste,  but  also  has  the  sanction 
of  Christ’s  example  and  the  practice  of  the  wise 
and  good  in  all  the  ages.  But  this. does  not  invest 
any  service  that  may  be  adopted  for  these  occa¬ 
sions  with  the  same  or  similar  sanctions  and  im¬ 
portance  that  attach  to  the  divinely  constituted 
ordinances  of  the  Christian  Church.  Penance, 
according  to  the  Roman  Church,  is  a  service  by 
which  on  condition,  on  the  part  of  the  penitent, 
of  sorrow  for  sin,  a  purpose  of  amendment,  of 
satisfaction  to  God,  and  auricular  confession,  the 
priest  grants  pardon  for  sins  committed  after  bap¬ 
tism.  This  is  based  upon  what  is  wholly  an 
assumption  of  the  Church  of  Rome  ;  namely,  that 
in  the  power  of  the  keys  committed  to  Peter  and 
his  successors,  and  through  them  to  the  priesthood 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


263 


generally,  is  the  power  to  forgive  sin,  and  that  for 
sins  committed  after  baptism  there  is  no  remis¬ 
sion  except  on  condition  of  confession  to  a  priest. 
That  these  are  most  unwarranted  assumptions 
and  gross  corruptions  of  the  Gospel  of  God,  we 
assume  without  discussion.  Extreme  unction  is 
anointing  with  oil  those  dangerously  ill  (they  hav¬ 
ing  been  baptized),  accompanied  with  prayer,  by 
which  sins  are  forgiven  and  grace,  strengthening 
the  soul,  is  imparted.  It  is  very  proper  that 
prayer  should  be  offered  at  the  bedside  of  the 
dying,  and  anointing  with  oil  has  the  sanction  of 
apostolic  practice.  The  chief  trouble  here,  and  in 
penance  as  well,  is  found  in  the  preposterous  claim 
of  the  priesthood  that  these  services,  of  them¬ 
selves,  confer  grace. 

Why  under  the  Gospel  dispensation  are  there 
two  sacraments,  and  only  two  ?  Bishop  Merrill,  in 
his  work  on  “Christian  Baptism,”  in  illustration 
of  another  topic,  gives  us  an  answer  which,  in  sub¬ 
stance  with  additions,  is  as  follows  :  The  work  of 
salvation  may  be  regarded  in  two  aspects,  justifi¬ 
cation  and  sanctification — the  former  God  accom¬ 
plishes  in  the  person  of  his  Son,  the  latter  in  the 
person  of  his  Spirit.  Under  the  Jewish  dispensa¬ 
tion  the  former  was  represented  by  bloody  sacri¬ 
fices,  and  the  latter  by  circumcision  and  watery 
ablutions.  Under  the  Gospel  dispensation  the 
work  of  Christ  in  providing  by  his  death  for  the 


264 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


justification  of  believers  is  symbolized  by  the  sac¬ 
rament  of  the  Lord’s  -  supper ;  and  the  work  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  in  regenerating  the  souls  of  be¬ 
lievers  is  symbolized  by  water  baptism. 

The  symbols  under  the  old  covenant,  having 
become  obsolete  by  the  introduction  of  the  new, 
might  have  been  all  laid  aside,  and  others  entirely 
new  substituted  in  their  place.  Sacrifices  and  cir¬ 
cumcisions  were  laid  aside  ;  but  the  Savior  seized 
upon  and  consecrated  two  existing  ceremonies — 
the  supper  of  the  Passover  and  baptism  ;  the  for¬ 
mer  to  show  forth  his  death  till  his  coming  again, 
and  the  latter  to  symbolize  the  work  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  regeneration.  Under  the  dispensation  of 
types  and  shadows  many  sacrifices  and  divers 
washings  were  of  service ;  for  they  not  only  repre¬ 
sented  the  two  leading  aspects  of  the  work  of  sal¬ 
vation,  but  were  also  a  shadow  of  better  ceremonies, 
of  good  things  to  come.  The  antitypes  of  those 
types  and  shadows  having  come,  there  was  no 
longer  any  need  for  their  continuance.  Hence¬ 
forth  ceremonies  were  requisite  only  for  the  prom¬ 
inent  leading  purposes  of  salvation,  and  the  two 
adopted  are  in  this  respect  exhaustive.  They  rep¬ 
resent  justification  and  regeneration.  These,  with 
what  is  inseparable  from  them,  with  what  are  their 
invariable  accompaniments,  include  the  whole  work 
of  God  in  the  salvation  of  the  human  soul.  Two 
sacraments  are  needful  —  one  to  show  forth  the 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


265 


work  of  Christ,  the  other  to  represent  the  work 
of  the  Spirit.  The  nature  of  the  case  shows  that 
these  have  a  natural  significance.  For  more  than 
these  no  good  reason  is  apparent,  and  the  folly  of 
the  Church  of  Rome  in  inventing  five  others  is 
obvious. 


THE  EFFICACY  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS. 

The  Roman  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  forms 
a  not  very  unnatural  ground  for  the  inference  that 
the  sacraments,  especially  the  Supper  of  the  Lord, 
are  in  themselves  efficacious  for  the  purposes  for 
which  they  are  administered.  If  the  bread  and 
wine  in  the  act  of  consecration  become,  or  partake 
of  the  substance  of,  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ, 
and  if  in  the  incarnation  the  body  and  blood  of 
Christ  became  a  divine-human  body,  so  that  the 
blood  of  Christ  is  the  blood  of  God,  then  he  that 
eats  the  flesh  of  Christ  and  drinks  his  blood  eats 
and  drinks  divinity,  and  the  sacrament  becomes 
itself  an  impartation  of  the  divine  nature.  This 
seems  to  me  to  be  a  fair  representation  of  the 
Romish  doctrine  of  the  presence  of  Christ  in  the 
communion.  By  transubstantiation  the  bread  and 
wine  become  a  divine  substance  and  have  saving 
power,  just  as  fire  has  the  power  to  burn,  poison 
to  kill,  and  medicine  to  cure.  The  efficacy  of  the 
sacraments,  then,  consists  in  a  power  inhering  in 
the  elements  themselves,  and  is  dependent  upon 


266 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


nothing  else.  Consistently,  however,  an  exception 
is  made  in  the  case  where  the  communicant  is 
guilty  of  mortal  sin.  By  mortal  sin  is  meant  a  sin 
unto  death,  a  sin  for  which  there  is  no  redemption, 
an  incurable  sin.  To  say  that  an  incurable  sin  can 
be  cured  is  of  course  a  contradiction ;  even  the 
blood  of  Christ  can  not  wash  away  such  a  sin. 
Inconsistently  another  exception  is  made.  It  is 
said  to  be  essential  to  the  efficacy  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  that  the  administrator  intend  to  communi¬ 
cate  to  the  recipient  the  blessings  the  Church  de¬ 
signs  to  be  communicated.  And  again,  equally 
inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  a  saving  power 
inhering  in  the  elements  themselves,  is  an  alleged 
prerequisite  that  the  recipient  do  not  oppose  an 
obstacle.  With  these  exceptions,  it  is  alleged  that 
the  sacraments,  duly  administered  by  the  priest¬ 
hood  having  authority  by  divine  appointment,  do 
of  the  efficiency  inhering  in  themselves  confer  grace 
and  salvation.  The  technicality  by  which  this 
doctrine  of  efficacy  is  commonly  expressed  in  the¬ 
ological  treatises  is,  “ex  opere  operato” — an  effi¬ 
cacy  from  a  force  operating. 

Luther  was  a  man  of  strong  impulses.  His 
educational  prejudices  were  intense,  and  he  was 
emancipated  from  the  Roman  yoke  by  a  slow  and 
gradual  process.  He  had  heard  from  his  child¬ 
hood,  doubtless  with  a  thrilling  interest  in  his  fer¬ 
vent  spirit,  the  unquestioned  announcement,  “  Hoc 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


267 


est  meum  corpus/’  and  his  faith,  without  a  waver¬ 
ing  of  doubt,  had  accepted  the  Roman  doctrine 
of  the  “real  presence.”  Such  an  association  could 
not  be  easily  broken,  nor  could  such  a  faith  be 
readily  eradicated.  Therefore,  when  Zwingle  an¬ 
nounced  that  the  sacraments  were  not  “means 
of  grace,”  that  they  were  merely  significant  em¬ 
blems  of  great  Gospel  truths,  Luther  strenuously 
opposed  him.  He  wrote  with  chalk  upon  the 
platform  floor  of  the  convention,  “  This  is  my 
body;”  and  placing  his  feet  upon  what  he  had 
written  he  literally  stood  upon  the  words  of  the 
Master,  and  announced  that  his  opinions  would 
abide  by  the  affirmation  of  a  “real  presence.” 
He,  however,  renounced  the  doctrine  of  a  tran- 
substantiation,  and  affirmed  a  ^^-substantiation; 
that  is,  the  bread  and  wine  were  not  changed  into 
the  substance  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ, 
but  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  as  to  substance 
was  with,  accompanied,  the  elements  of  the  com¬ 
munion.  The  bread  and  wine  remained  bread  and 
wine,  not  only  as  to  their  qualities,  but  also  as 
to  their  essence  or  substance,  but  the  body  of 
Christ  was  substantially  there.  It  is  evident  from 
this  history  that  Luther  himself  and,  as  we  under¬ 
stand  it,  the  Lutherans  generally  after  him,  to  this 
day,  by  their  doctrine  of  the  real  presence,  mean 
more  than  that  all-pervading  presence  which  or¬ 
thodox  Christianity  ascribes  to  Christ  as  a  divine 


268 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


person,  and  more  than  that  manifested  presence 
of  Christ,  through  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  prom¬ 
ised  to  the  Church  in  all  her  assemblies,  and 
specially  in  the  solemn  services  of  the  sacraments. 
Lutheranism  teaches  a  real  presence  akin  to  the 
real  presence  of  the  Roman  Church.  It  avoids 
some  of  the  monstrously  preposterous  inconsis¬ 
tencies  which  attach  to  the  Roman  doctrine.  As 
for  example,  transubstantiation  is  contradicted  by 
the  testimony  of  the  senses.  The  bread  and  wine 
after  consecration,  as  before,  are  to  sight,  taste, 
smell,  and  touch  bread  and  wine  ;  hence  the  ne¬ 
cessity  of  affirming  that  a  given  thing  may  have 
the  qualities  of  one  kind  of  matter  and  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  another.  This  silly  assertion  is  avoided 
by  consubstantiation.  But  in  the  light  of  common 
sense  both  the  trans  and  the  con  are  alike  con¬ 
trary  to  truth  and  sober  reason. 

The  Lutheran  doctrine  of  the  efficacy  of  the 
sacraments  is  an  improvement  upon  the  Roman,  at 
least  in  one  respect  very  valuable  and  important. 
It  rejects  the  “ex  opere  operato,”  and  affirms  an 
“ex  opere  operands;”  that  is,  the  sacrament  is 
efficacious  from  the  work  of  the  recipient,  of  him 
operating  or  receiving  it.  The  benefits  of  the 
service  accrue  to  the  communicant  on  condition  of 
his  penitence,  faith,  and  good  intent ;  and  yet, 
though  rejecting  the  idea  of  an  inhering  efficacy 
in  the  sense  of  the  Roman  Church,  the  Lutherans 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


269 


still  adhere  to  it  in  some  sense,  as  their  doctrine 
of  a  real  presence  would  seem  to  require.  The 
old  writers  were  wont  to  say,  “  Fire  will  not  cause 
the  wood  to  burn  unless  the  wood  be  dry  ;  but  its 
dryness  does  not  give  fire  its  power.”  So  the  ele¬ 
ments  in  the  sacraments  will  not  purify  and  save 
an  unbelieving  soul  ;  but  if  purification  and  salva¬ 
tion  ensue  the  power  to  save  issues  from  an  effi¬ 
cacy  inhering  in  the  sacrament  itself. 

The  antipodes  of  the  Romanists  on  this  subject 
are  the  rationalists.  They  deny  in  effect  that  the 
sacraments  have  any  efficacy  whatever.  Baptism 
is  a  ceremony  appropriate  to  the  initiation  of 
members  into  the  visible  Church,  and  the  Lord’s- 
supper  is  a  memorial  service,  and  nothing  more. 
Both  are  appropriate  and  expressive  exponents  of 
the  opinions  and  sentiments  of  those  participating 
in  them,  and  not  at  all  channels  by  which  any 
thing  is  communicated  to  them.  Whatever  good 
may  be  derived  from  them  is  the  same  as  the 
good  any  one  receives  when  he  does  a  good  thing. 
Right  and  proper  conduct  of  all  kinds  and  at  all 
times  has  a  beneficial  reflex  influence.  As  in  alms¬ 
giving  and  in  prayer,  so  in  the  sacraments,  the 
communicant  is  naturally  made  better  by  what  he 
does ;  but  the  service  itself  has  no  power  in  itself 
or  in  its  accompaniments  to  confer  a  benefit — it  is 
not  a  means  of  grace  in  any  such  sense  as  is 
affirmed  by  orthodox  Christians. 


270 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


As  most  Protestant  Christians  regard  the  sac¬ 
raments,  the  truth  lies  somewhere  between  the 
extremes  of  ritualism  and  rationalism.  On  the 
one  hand,  Baptism  and  the  Lord’s-supper  are 
services  which,  when  properly  observed,  are  at¬ 
tended  with  a  very  valuable  and  important  relig¬ 
ious  benefit ;  on  the  other,  the  external  services, 
considered  in  themselves,  have  no  natural  adapta¬ 
tion  to  any  spiritual  purposes. 

In  what,  then,  does  the  efficacy  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  consist?  Plainly  in  the  agency  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  When  the  Gospel  is  preached  there  is 
some  obvious  adaptation  in  the  truth  declared  to 
produce  the  state  of  mind  desired,  but  that  is 
wholly  inadequate  for  purposes  of  salvation.  To 
be  effectual,  the  Word  must  be  preached  with  an 
unction  from  the  Holy  One — in  the  power  and 
demonstration  of  the  Spirit.  Much  more  is  this 
requisite  in  the  sacraments,  for  here,  if  there  be 
any  special  adaptation,  it  is  not  obvious.  In  bap¬ 
tism,  the  thing  signified  is  the  cleansing  of  the 
inner  spirit  from  the  pollutions  of  sin.  Water  has 
a  cleansing  power,  but  so  has  fire  ;  and  if,  beyond 
the  mere  idea  of  purifying,  there  be  any  resem¬ 
blance  between  the  cleansing  of  the  outward  man 
from  material  pollution  and  the  purification  of  the 
inner  spirit  from  the  impurities  of  sin,  that  resem 
blance  is  wholly  concealed  from  human  apprehen¬ 
sion.  In  the  Supper,  regarded  as  a  badge  of  a 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


271 


Christian  profession,  we  have  what  is  appropriate, 
but  any  thing  else  would  be  equally  so.  So,  also, 
considered  as  a  memorial  service,  the  act  done  is 
suitable  for  the  purpose,  but  any  other  act  would 
serve  this  same  purpose  quite  as  well.  Therefore, 
we  affirm  that  if,  in  the  sacraments,  there  be  any 
power  or  efficacy  to  effect  a  spiritual  result,  to 
save  or  be  promotive  of  salvation,  to  communicate 
or  confer  grace — if,  in  a  word,  the  sacraments  be 
means  of  grace,  it  is  because  they  are  not  only 
divinely  appointed  for  this  purpose,  but  are  also 
divinely  employed.  Their  whole  efficacy  is  super¬ 
natural,  it  is  external  to  themselves.  It  is  the 
accompanying  presence  and  power  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  of  God. 

THE  NECESSITY  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS. 

For  what  purpose  or  purposes  are  the  sac¬ 
raments  necessary  ?  They  are  not  essential  to 
a  state  of  grace  on  earth,  or  to  eternal  life  in 
heaven.  Salvation  has  but  one  condition.  There 
is  only  one  thing  the  which  if  a  man  have,  of  what¬ 
ever  else  he  may  be  destitute,  he  can  not  be  lost ; 
and  the  which,  if  he  have  it  not,  whatever  else  he 
may  have,  he  can  not  be  saved,  and  that  one  thing 
is  faith.  “He  that  believeth  shall  be  saved,  and 
he  that  believeth  not  shall  be  damned.”  To  affirm 
that  the  pardon  of  sin  and  the  salvation  of  the 
soul  is  impossible  without  water  baptism,  and  that 


272  ECCLESIOLOGY. 

post-baptismal  sin  can  not  be  forgiven  without 
confession  to  a  priest,  is  ritualism  run  mad,  is  to 
make  the  moral  relations  of  an  immortal  spirit  to 
the  government  of  God,  and  the  eternal  destinies 
of  God’s  image,  dependent  upon  trifles — the  whole 
thing  is  abhorrent  to  common  sense  and  sound 
reason. 

When  God  says,  “repent  and  be  baptized,”  or, 
“do  this  in  remembrance  of  me,”  he  utters  a  com¬ 
mand.  If  he  to  whom  the  commandment  comes 
voluntarily  refuse  obedience,  he  thereby  perils 
eternal  life.  This  act  of  disobedience  may  be  the 
beginning  of  a  life-time  of  persistence  in  sin — it 
even  involves  in  itself  alone  the  spirit  of  rebel¬ 
lion,  which  excludes  from  the  kingdom  of  heaven. 
The  innocent  absence  of  water,  bread,  and  wine 
can  never  damn  a  soul ;  but  the  intelligent  rejec¬ 
tion  of  the  holy  sacraments  in  voluntary  disobe¬ 
dience  to  a  divine  command  may. 

Again,  salvation  and  degrees  of  advancement 
in  the  scale  of  moral  being  are  not  the  same  thing. 
The  former  is  conditioned  upon  faith.  He  that  so 
believes  in  the  divine  existence,  and  in  the  reward- 
ableness  of  worship  as  to  come  unto  God,  he  that 
has  the  spirit  of  faith  and  a  purpose  of  righteous¬ 
ness,  is  saved.  The  latter  is  conditioned  upon  a 
proper  improvement  of  the  means  of  moral  cul¬ 
ture.  Degrees  of  advancement  in  moral  growth 
may  be  attained  by  persons  enjoying  and  improv- 


THE  SACRAMENTS. 


273 


ing  means  of  grace,  that  are  not  attainable  by 
those  deprived  of  these  privileges.  Eminently 
among  the  means  of  grace  are  the  sacraments. 
Upon  them  certain  blessings  are  conditioned ;  for 
the  attainment  of  those  blessings  they  are  essen¬ 
tial,  they  are  necessary.  What  those  blessings 
are  need  not  be,  perhaps  can  not  be,  definitely 
specified.  The  more  specific  discussion  of  the 
sacraments,  which  will  soon  be  entered  upon  in 
these  pages,  will  naturally  point  the  reader  in  the 
direction  in  which  those  blessings  are  to  be  found. 


THE  VALIDITY  OF  THE  SACRAMENTS. 


What  is  necessary  to  render  the  sacraments 
what  they  purport  to  be  ?  Evidently,  that  they  ac¬ 
cord  with  the  teachings  of  the  Scriptures.  What¬ 
ever  directions  respecting  them  are  given  in  the 
Word  of  God  must  be  observed.  Without  water 
authoritatively  applied  in  the  name  of  the  Trinity, 
there  is  no  baptism ;  without  the  eating  of  bread 
and  drinking  of  wine  in  memory  of  Christ  there  is 
no  Supper  of  the  Lord.  But  it  is  manifest  that 
these  outward  acts  of  using  water,  pronouncing  the 
names  of  the  holy  Three,  eating  bread  and  drink¬ 
ing  wine,  may  be  performed  in  mockery  and  be 
sacrilegious.  It  is,  therefore,  requisite  that  the 
persons  both  administering  and  being  administered 
to  must  intend  to  do  what  Christ  commanded. 

Again,  Christ  commanded  his  disciples,  whom  he 
c  18 


274 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


had  ordained  for  this  purpose,  to  baptize  and  ad¬ 
minister  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper ;  hence,  it 
seems  requisite  that  the  ordinances  be  adminis¬ 
tered  by  persons  set  apart  and  authorized  so  to 
do  ;  so  that  the  forms  of  the  sacraments  being  ob¬ 
served  by  persons  not  regularly  authorized  would 
not  only  be  a  violation  of  the  order  and  harmony 
of  the  Church,  but  also  such  a  neglect  of  the  di¬ 
vine  ordinance  as  would  entirely  vitiate  the  serv¬ 
ice  ;  and  yet  where  the  offices  of  the  ministry 
can  not  be  obtained,  it  would  seem  to  be  unques¬ 
tionably  the  right  and  privilege  of  the  laity  to 
administer  the  ordinances  in  the  best  way  possible 
to  them,  and  that  in  that  case  the  service  would 
be  entirely  valid.  We  say,  then,  whenever  the 
sacraments  are  observed  by  doing  the  things 
plainly  prescribed  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  with  a 
pure  intention  on  the  part  of  those  participating 
therein  to  do  what  Christ  commanded — the  man¬ 
ner  of  the  administration  and  all  the  attending 
circumstances  being  made  to  conform,  so  far  as 
possibilities  allow,  to  what  the  evident  spirit  and 
intent  of  the  ordinance  require — these  services  are 
valid  sacraments,  and  will  certainly  be  attended 
and  followed  by  the  spiritual  blessings  promised. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Baptism. 

I.  ITS  NATURE. 

i.  Baptism  is  a  sign  of  regeneration.  “Ye  are 
complete  in  him,  which  is  the  head  of  all  princi¬ 
pality  and  power ;  in  whom  also  ye  are  circum¬ 
cised  with  the  circumcision  made  without  hands,  in 
putting  off  the  body  of  the  sins  of  the  flesh  by 
the  circumcision  of  Christ.  Buried  with  him  in 
baptism,  wherein  also  ye  are  risen  with  him 
through  the  faith  of  the  operation  of  God,  who 
hath  raised  him  from  the  dead ;  and  you,  being 
dead  in  your  sins  and  the  uncircumcision  of  your 
flesh,  hath  he  quickened  together  with  him,  having 
forgiven  you  all  trespasses.” 

It  is  patent  upon  the  surface  of  this  passage 
that  the  writer  considered  the  ancient  circumcision 
as  an  outward  sign  of  the  inner  purification  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  a  sign  of  “the  circumcision  made 
without  hands,”  a  sign,  beyond  all  possible  ques¬ 
tion,  of  regeneration.  It  is  equally  obvious  that 
the  writer  of  this  passage  considered  baptism  as 


2  j6 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


a  sign  of  the  same  thing.  They  who  had  been 
dead  in  sins  had  also  through  “  the  operation  of 
God  ”  been  quickened,  and  this  quickening  was 
represented  in  their  baptism.  Mention  is  here 
made  of  justification  having  “  forgiven  you  all 
trespasses.’’  Of  this  we  shall  speak  definitely 
further  on.  At  present  we  direct  our  attention 
solely  to  regeneration  as  the  thing  signified,  rep¬ 
resented,  symbolized,  by  the  ordinance  of  baptism. 
On  this  point  let  another  passage  of  Holy  Writ 
be  considered.  “  Know  ye  not  that  so  many  of  us 
as  were  baptized  into  Jesus  Christ  were  baptized 
into  his  death  ?  Therefore  we  are  buried  with 
him  by  baptism  into  death ;  that  like  as  Christ 
was  raised  up  from  the  dead  by  the  glory  of  the 
Father,  even  so  we  also  should  walk  in  newness 
of  life  :  knowing  this,  that  our  old  man  is  crucified 
with  him,  that  the  body  of  sin  might  be  destroyed, 
that  henceforth  we  should  not  serve  sin.” 

In  respect  to  the  precise  point  now  before  us  it 
is  manifest  that  this  passage  is  perfectly  parallel 
with  the  one  quoted  above.  Regeneration  is  a 
resurrection  from  the  dead,  and  that  is  represented 
by  baptism.  The  testimony  of  John  the  Baptist 
respecting  Christian  baptism  affirms  the  same 
thing:  ‘‘I  indeed  baptize  you  with  water  unto  re¬ 
pentance,  but  he  that  cometh  after  me  shall  bap¬ 
tize  you  with  the  Holy  Ghost  and  fire.”  The 
baptism  of  the  Holy  Ghost  is  in  some  cases  spe- 


BAPTISM. 


277 


cific — has  reference  to  special  bestowments,  such 
as  apostolic  endowments ;  but  in  all  cases  it  im¬ 
plies  that  renewal  of  our  nature  we  call  regenera¬ 
tion.  And  here  in  the  testimony  of  the  Baptist  it 
may  be  taken  as  having  special  and  sole  reference 
to  that  work  of  the  Spirit.  Any  way,  the  text  is 
proof  that  baptism  is  an  outward  sign  of  the 
Spirit’s  inward  work  on  the  souls  of  men ;  that 
circumcision  under  the  patriarchal  and  Mosaic  dis¬ 
pensations  served  the  same  purpose ;  that  its  office 
was  to  represent  the  inner  purification  of  the  soul 
by  the  Spirit’s  regenerating  work,  is  evident  from 
the  following  passage  :  “  He  is  not  a  Jew  which  is 
one  outwardly ;  neither  is  that  circumcision  which 
is  outward  in  the  flesh  ;  but  he  is  a  Jew  which  is 
one  inwardly :  and  circumcision  is  that  of  the  heart, 
in  the  spirit  and  not  in  the  letter,  whose  praise  is 
not  of  men,  but  of  God.” 

2.  Baptism  is  a  recognition  of  justification. 

The  common  method  of  presenting  the  thought 
here  intended  is  to  say  that  baptism  is  the  seal 
of  our  justification  before  God  ;  or  it  is  the  seal 
of  the  covenant  between  God  and  man,  wherein 
God  has  promised,  on  condition  of  repentance 
and  of  faith  in  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  to  pardon 
our  sins  and  accept  us  as  his  children.  This 
view  is  sustained  by  several  Scriptural  consid¬ 
erations  and  forms  of  expression.  The  promise 
made  to  Abraham  that  in  his  seed  all  nations 


278 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


should  be  blessed,  which  promise  was  renewed 
unto  Isaac,  Jacob,  and  David,  is  frequently  called 
in  Scripture  a  covenant.  This  covenant,  as  typi¬ 
cally  fulfilled  in  the  Mosaic  dispensation  is  called 
the  old  covenant,  and,  as  literally  fulfilled  by 
Christ,  is  called  the  new  covenant.  Circumcision 
is  called  the  sign  and  seal  of  the  old  covenant. 
Now,  as  baptism,  under  the  new  covenant,  has  the 
same  office  as  circumcision  under  the  old,  it  seems 
perfectly  proper  to  call  it  the  sign  and  seal  of  the 
new  covenant.  To  our  thought  the  important 
thing  to  be  considered  here  is  the  thing  signified 
by  circumcision,  whether  it  be  called  a  sign  or  a 
seal,  or  both,  and  that  that  thing  is  justification,  is 
manifest  from  the  following  passage  :  Romans  iv, 
7-12,  “Blessed  are  they  whose  iniquities  are  for¬ 
given,  and  whose  sins  are  covered  ;  blessed  is  the 
man  to  whom  the  Lord  will  not  impute  sin.  Com¬ 
eth  this  blessedness  then  upon  the  circumcision 
only,  or  upon  the  uncircumcision  also  ?  for  we  say 
that  faith  was  reckoned  to  Abraham  for  righteous¬ 
ness.  How  was  it  reckoned  ?  when  he  was  in  cir¬ 
cumcision  or  in  uncircumcision  ?  Not  in  circumcis¬ 
ion,  but  in  uncircumcision ;  and  he  received  the  sign 
of  circumcision,  a  seal  of  the  righteousness  of  faith 
which  he  had  yet  being  uncircumcised :  that  he 
might  be  the  father  of  all  them  that  believe, 
though  they  be  not  circumcised,  that  righteousness 
might  be  imputed  unto  them  also  ;  and  the  father 


BAPTISM. 


279 


of  circumcision  to  them  who  are  not  of  the  circum¬ 
cision  only,  but  who  also  walk  in  the  steps  of  that 
faith  of  our  father  Abraham,  which  he  had  being 
yet  uncircumcised. ” 

This  passage  requires  no  exegetical  explana¬ 
tions  ;  it  speaks  for  itself.  Abraham  was  justified 
by  faith  long  before  he  was  circumcised.  That  rite 
in  his  case  was  simply  an  external  recognition  of 
his  justification  ;  of  the  fact,  that  his  sins  were  for¬ 
given,  that  faith  was  imputed  to  him  for  righteous¬ 
ness,  that  his  sins  were  covered,  that  he  was 
pardoned,  justified — all  of  which  expressions  mean 
the  same  thing. 

That  baptism,  under  the  new  covenant,  has 
reference  to  justification,  as  circumcision  did  under 
the  old,  will  appear  from  the  following  Scriptures  : 
“  Go  ye  into  all  the  world  and  preach  the  Gospel  to 
every  creature.  He  that  beiieveth  and  is  baptized 

shall  be  saved.  Men  and  brethren,  what  shall  we 

( 

do  ?  Then  said  Peter  unto  them  :  repent  and  be 
baptized,  every  one  of  you,  in  the  name  of  Jesus 
Christ,  for  the  remission  of  sins,  and  ye  shall 
receive  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  Now  why 
tarriest  thou ;  arise  and  be  baptized,  and  wash 
away  thy  sins,  calling  on  the  name  of  the  Lord.” 
John’s  baptism  was  unto  repentance.  Christ  and 
the  apostles  preached  unto  the  people  that  they 
should  repent,  believe,  and  be  baptized.  All  refer¬ 
ences  to  the  ordinance  either  expressly  or  im- 


28o 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


pliedly  connect  it  with  initial  salvation  ;  it  is  always 
exponential  of  what  results  from  the  soul’s  first 
motions  towards  God,  or  is  in  recognition  of  salva¬ 
tion  already  begun. 

3.  Baptism  is  a  recognition  of  adoption,  or, 
more  specifically,  it  is  a  ceremonial  recognition  of 
membership  in  the  visible  Church.  Abraham  was 
the  father  of  the  faithful ;  all  believers  were  his 
spiritual  seed,  members  of  his  household.  “He 
received  the  sign  of  circumcision,  a  seal  of  the 
righteousness  of  faith  ;  that  he  might  be  the  father 
of  all  them  that  believe,”  whether  circumcised  or 
uncircumcised.  Baptism  is  the  sign  of  regenera¬ 
tion — this  is  its  primary  import.  It  is  also  a 
recognition  of  the  concomitants  or  prerequisites 
of  regeneration ;  namely,  justification  and  adop¬ 
tion.  Frequently,  in  the  New  Testament  Scrip¬ 
tures,  believers,  considered  in  the  aggregate,  are 
called  the  body  of  Christ,  of  which  he  is  the  head. 
“Now  are  ye  the  body  of  Christ  and  members  in 
particular.  And  he  gave  some  apostles,  prophets, 
evangelists,  pastors,  and  teachers,  for  the  perfect¬ 
ing  of  the  saints,  for  the  edifying  of  the  body  of 
Christ.  From  whom  the  whole  body  fitly  joined 
together  maketh  increase  of  the  body  unto  the 
edifying  of  itself  in  love.”  In  1  Corinthians  xii, 
13,  we  are  said  to  become  members  of  this  body 
by  baptism.  “For  by  one  spirit  are  we  all  bap¬ 
tized  into  one  body,  whether  we  be  Jews  or  Gen- 


BAPTISM. 


281 


tiles,  whether  we  be  bond  or  free  ;  and  have  been 
all  made  to  drink  into  one  spirit.”  Membership 
in  the  body  of  Christ  and  in  the  family  of  God  is 
the  same  thing.  Adoption  as  the  children  of  God 
is  symbolized  by  initiation  in  the  visible  Church, 
and  baptism  is  the  ceremonial  recognition  of  that 
initiation.  “As  many  as  believed,  to  them  gave 
he  power  to  become  the  sons  of  God.  Ye  have  not 
received  the  spirit  of  bondage  again  to  fear,  but 
ye  have  received  the  spirit  of  adoption,  whereby 
we  cry  Abba,  Father;”  and  this  is  that  one  Spirit 
by  which  we  are  baptized  into  the  body  of  Christ, 
and  become  members  one  of  another. 

4.  Baptism  is  a  profession  of  faith.  “See, here 
is  water ;  what  doth  hinder  me  to  be  baptized  ? 
Philip  said,  If  thou  believest  with  all  thine  heart 
thou  mayest ;  and  he  answered  and  said,  I  believe 
that  Jesus  Christ  is  the  Son  of  God;  and  they 
went  down  both  into  the  water,  both  Philip  and 
the  eunuch,  and  he  baptized  him.”  This  profes¬ 
sion  of  faith  in  Jesus  Christ  as  the  Son  of  God  has, 
in  all  the  ages  of  Christian  history,  been  the  con¬ 
dition  on  which  baptism  has  been  administered. 
But  more  than  this  is  obviously  implied.  The 
candidate  professes  to  be  justified  or  to  be  seek¬ 
ing  justification,  to  be  regenerated,  born  again,  or 
to  be  seeking  renewal  and  the  baptism  of  the 
Holy  Spirit.  Now,  such  a  profession  is  a  pro¬ 
fession  of  faith  in  all  the  fundamental  doctrines 


282 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


of  salvation  by  Christ.  It  is  a  profession  of  faith 
in  the  doctrine  of  actual  guiltiness,  of  natural  de¬ 
pravity,  of  atonement,  of  pardon,  and  regenera¬ 
tion  through  the  merits  of  Christ,  and  of  salva¬ 
tion  as  conditioned  upon  repentance  and  faith. 
Again,  the  candidate  is  seeking  membership  in  the 
Church,  and  thereby  professes  faith  in  the  Church 
as  a  divine  institution,  and  in  the  obligations  it 
imposes  as  divine  requirements  ;  in  a  word,  bap¬ 
tism  is  a  profession  of  Christian  faith. 

5.  Baptism  is  a  recognition  of  covenant  obliga¬ 
tions.  If  the  idea  of  a  seal  is  to  be  insisted  on, 
then,  as  on  the  one  hand,  God  by  baptism  sets 
his  seal  to  his  promise  of  pardon,  adoption,  regen¬ 
eration,  and  all  the  offices  of  the  Spirit  needful 
for  salvation,  so,  on  the  other,  the  candidate,  by 
the  same  ordinance,  sets  his  seal  to  the  covenant, 
and  thereby  pledges  his  fidelity  ;  he  promises  to 
“renounce  the  devil  and  all  his  works;  the  vain 
pomp  and  glory  of  the  world,  with  all  covetous  de¬ 
sires  of  the  same  ;  and  the  carnal  desires  of  the 
flesh,  so  that  he  will  not  follow  or  be  led  by 
them.”  He  further  promises  to  “obediently  keep 
God’s  holy  will  and  commandments,  and  walk  in 
the  same  all  the  days  of  his  life.”  That  baptism 
is  a  ceremonial  by  which  the  candidate  acknowl¬ 
edges  his  obligations  of  Christian  duty  to  God 
and  man,  by  which  he  voluntarily  accepts  those 
obligations,  and  professes  a  purpose  to  keep  them 


BAPTISM. 


283 


diligently  all  the  days  of  his  life,  is  not  a  matter 
of  doubt  or  controversy ;  that  the  ordinance  is  sig¬ 
nificant  of  covenant  obligations,  of  promises  of 
spiritual  blessings  on  the  part  of  God,  and  of 
pledges  of  faithfulness  in  duty  on  the  part  of  man, 
is  as  manifest  as  that  it  has  any  significancy  what¬ 
ever.  As  I  see  it,  the  idea  of  its  being  a  seal  to 
a  covenant  may  or  may  not  be  accepted  as  impor¬ 
tant.  The  thing  intended  is  obvious  and  obviously 
true,  and  this  is  sufficient. 

6.  Baptism  is  a  means  of  grace.  The  worship 
of  God  in  spirit  and  in  truth  by  any  persons,  at 
any  time,  in  any  place,  under  any  circumstances, 
is  religiously  profitable  to  those  who  participate 
therein.  The  services  of  God’s  house,  either  of 
prayer  or  praise  ;  of  reading  and  expounding  the 
Word  of  God,  or  hearing  it  read  and  expounded; 
all  devotional  exercises,  ordinary  as  well  as  ex¬ 
traordinary,  general  as  well  as  special,  are  means 
of  grace  to  those  who  use  them  with  a  Christian 
purpose  and  intent.  But  baptism  is  a  special  serv¬ 
ice,  in  that  it  has  a  special  and  definite  intent,  in 
that  it  is  never  to  be  repeated.  It  is  a  service  once 
for  a  life-time,  in  that  it  is  significant  of  what  is  a 
crisis  in  the  history  of  an  immortal  spirit.  It,  more 
than  any  other  one  service  of  man’s  earthly  history 
signifies  what  is  determinative  of  eternal  destiny. 
Its  condition  is  a  profession  of  that  act  of  will 
which  chooses  God  and  truth  and  duty,  which 


284 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


rejects  self,  error,  and  disobedience,  which  makes 
choice  of  the  greatest  good  as  the  supreme  end 
of  being;  that  act  of  voluntary  choice  which  sur¬ 
renders  all  to  Christ ;  that  believing  which  if  a 
man  do  he  shall  be  saved,  and  if  he  do  it  not, 
he  will  be  damned.  Now,  it  may  be  reasonably 
anticipated  that  that  service  of  religion  which  is  di¬ 
vinely  appointed  and  ordained  to  be  exponential  of 
such  vastly  important  acts  and  interests,  is  not  only 
a  service  in  itself  profoundly  solemn  and  impressive, 
but  also  one  that  is  productive  of  results  commen¬ 
surate  with  its  momentous  significance  ;  and  such, 
without  doubt,  is  ever  true  of  it  in  all  cases  where 
the  service  is  properly  observed.  “Believe  and  be 
baptized  and  ye  shall  receive  the  Holy  Ghost.  I 
indeed  baptize  you  with  water,  but  he  shall  baptize 
you  with  the  Holy  Ghost  and  with  fire/’  Water 
baptism  is  emblematic  of  baptism  with  the  Spirit, 
and  is,  when  accordant  with  divine  intent,  either 
attended  or  speedily  followed  by  the  outpouring 
of  the  Spirit.  Spiritual  supernatural  blessings, 
even  the  blessings  of  salvation  and  good  promise 
of  eternal  life,  come  to  the  trusting,  believing  one 
who  is  Scripturally  baptized  in  the  name  of  the 
Father  and  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

7.  Baptism  is  an  act  of  obedience.  The  apos¬ 
tles  ever  exhorted  their  congregations  to  repent 
and  be  baptized.  Having  been  inspired  and  au¬ 
thorized  to  inaugurate  the  Gospel  dispensation, 


BAPTISM. 


2^5 

their  injunctions  have  a  divine  authority,  and  their 
command  is  a  divine  command.  The  commission 
given  them  by  our  Lord  to  disciple  all  nations, 
baptizing  them  in  the  name  of  the  Father  and  the 
Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  implies  a  command  to 
the  people  to  be  baptized.  It  is  in  this  sense  that 
baptism  is  “the  answer  of  a  good  conscience;”  it 
is  an  act  that  obligates  the  conscience,  an  act  in 
respect  to  which  the  subject  has  a  sense  of  duty. 
Of  course  these  remarks  have  no  applications  to 
persons  who  are  ignorant  of  the  Gospel;  and  it  is 
not  intended  to  say  that  there  can  be  no  excep¬ 
tions  among  persons  having  a  Christian  education. 
For  though  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  person  with 
common  intelligence,  educated  in  a  Christian  land, 
with  the  Bible  in  his  hands,  can  fail  to  understand 
that  it  is  his  duty  to  enter  the  Christian  Church 
by  its  initiatory  rite,  yet  it  is  not  competent  for 
man  to  affirm  the  impossibility  of  such  a  case. 
Possibly  an  honest  man  may  fail  to  see  that  it  is 
his  duty  to  be  baptized.  We  are,  however,  war¬ 
ranted  by  the  nature  of  the  case  in  affirming  that, 
though  there  may  be  exceptions,  those  excep¬ 
tions  can  not  be  very  numerous.  This  view  of 
the  matter  makes  it  one  of  momentous  interest. 
When  God  says,  Do  this,  or  Do  that,  whether  the 
reasons  for  the  command  be  obvious,  or  whether 
the  only  reason  known  to  the  subject  for  the  doing 
is  that  it  is  enjoined  by  a  divine  command,  there 


286 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


is  nothing  left  but  implicit  obedience  or  positive 
rebellion.  It  may  be  affirmed,  in  a  judgment  of 
charity  even,  that  unbaptized  persons,  living  in  a 
Christian  community,  having  the  common  means 
of  attaining  a  knowledge  of  duty,  are  living,  in 
respect  to  this  one  thing  at  least,  in  disobedience 
to  a  divine  command.  On  the  other  hand,  he  who 
intelligently,  believingly,  and  sincerely  takes  upon 
himself  the  obligations  of  the  baptismal  covenant, 
and  receives  the  consecrated  water,  administered 
by  an  authorized  administrator,  devoutly  applied 
in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  performs  an  act 
of  reverent  pious  duty,  an  act  of  positive  obedi¬ 
ence  to  a  divinely  given  command. 

II.  THE  EFFICACY  OF  BAPTISM. 

We  have  said  above  that  the  efficacy  of  the 
sacraments  is  wholly  supernatural.  The  impor¬ 
tance  of  this  thought  to  the  cause  of  Christian 
truth  requires  that  the  reader  be  reminded  thereof 
distinctly  in  this  connection,  and  justifies  articulate 
statement  even  at  the  expense  of  some  repetition. 

There  is  nothing  saving  in  externals.  Neither 
the  water  nor  the  words  of  the  administrator  nor 
the  professions  of  the  candidate  have  any  power 
in  themselves.  The  whole  doctrine  of  efficacy 
“  ex  opere  operato  ”  is  a  fiction.  The  intentions 
of  the  administrator,  when  the  ordinance  is  con¬ 
sidered  abstractly,  may  be  regarded  as  an  element 


BAPTISM. 


287 


in  the  validity  of  the  ordinance,  but  it  can  not  be 
a  bar  to  its  efficacy.  The  purpose  and  intent  of 
the  candidate  is  a  condition,  but  not  the  cause  of 
efficacy.  The  faith  of  the  recipient  is  an  essential 
indispensable  condition  on  which  the  Holy  Spirit 
makes  the  ordinance  a  channel  for  the  communi¬ 
cation  of  his  blessings  ;  but  it  is  not  the  source  or 
cause  of  any  beneficial  results.  In  no  good  sense 
is  the  doctrine  of  efficacy  “ex  op  ere  operantis ” 
true.  With  the  above  explanation — or,  in  other 
words,  when  it  is  affirmed  that  the  candidate’s 
faith  is  a  condition  of  efficacy — there  may  be  no 
harm  in  the  expression  ;  but  standing  alone  it  is 
liable  to  be  understood  in  a  sense  in  which  the 
doctrine  is  not  true.  It  is  of  but  little  or  no  service 
any  way,  is  an  embarrassment  at  best,  and  there¬ 
fore,  though  sustained  by  high  authority,  it  ought 
to  be  rejected. 

Whenever  there  are  any  saving  results  from 
the  administration  of  the  ordinance  of  baptism, 
those  results  come  directly  and  wholly  from  the 
work  of  the  Spirit,  and  not  at  all  as  cause  from 
any  force  inhering  in  the  ordinance  itself,  or  from 
any  work,  either  of  the  Church  or  its  officers  ad¬ 
ministering  it,  or  of  the  person  receiving  it. 

III.  VALIDITY  OF  BAPTISM. 

The  question  of  the  validity  of  an  ordinance  is 
the  question  whether  it  be  administered  in  accord- 


288 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


ance  with  the  requirements  of  the  revealed  will 
of  God.  Baptism,  to  be  baptism,  must  be  such  as 
the  Bible  requires.  All  agree  that  it  is  essential 
to  Christian  baptism  that  water  be  applied  in  the 
name  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  by  Christian  believers, 
with  the  purpose  and  intent  to  do  what  God  com¬ 
manded  when  he  said,  “  Go,  teach  all  nations, 
baptizing  them  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  and  of 
the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost.” 

Such  a  service  performed  in  mockery,  or  by  a 
a  heathen  to  a  heathen  in  ignorance,  would  not  be 
Christian  baptism.  All  agree  that  the  order  and 
harmony  of  the  Church  require  that  baptism  be 
administered  by  persons  chosen  and  ordained  for 
this  purpose  ;  so  that  where  the  services  of  the 
ministry  are  available  it  would  be  wrong  for  others 
to  obtrude  themselves  into  this  office  by  attempt 
ing  to  administer  this  ordinance.  And  yet  all 
agree  that  where  the  services  of  the  ministry  can 
not  be  obtained  the  ordinance  would  be  valid, 
though  administered  by  a  layman. 

The  only  controversies  in  the  Church  worthy 
of  special  notice  as  to  the  validity  of  baptism  have 
respect  to  the  subjects  or  persons  baptized  and  to 
the  mode.  These  have  assumed  such  importance, 
and  have  occupied  so  large  a  place  in  Christian 
discussions,  that  they  require  special  treatment. 
They  will  be  discussed  in  the  two  following  chap¬ 
ters. 


CHAPTER  V. 


Subjects  of  Christian  Baptism. 

All  are  agreed  that  persons  of  sufficient  age 

to  understand,  and  who  have  been  instructed  suf- 

■*» 

ficiently  to  know  the  nature  and  design  of  the 
ordinance;  who  profess  to  believe  in  Jesus  Christ 
as  the  Son  of  God  and  the  Savior  of  men  ;  who 
desire  to  receive  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Holy 
Trinity;  and  promise  to  renounce  the  world,  and 
to  keep  God’s  commandments,  are  proper  persons 
to  receive  this  holy  ordinance  and  may  be  bap¬ 
tized.  The  baptism  of  such  persons  by  the  proper 
officers  of  the  Church,  and  in  a  proper  manner  or 
mode,  will  be  recognized  by  all  Christians  as  valid. 
So  far,  then,  as  the  subjects  of  baptism  are  con¬ 
cerned,  the  only  question  left  for  discussion  is, 
Whether  infants  are  proper  subjects  of  Chris¬ 
tian  baptism.  We  affirm  that  they  are;  and,  in 
support  of  this  affirmation  adduce  the  following 
considerations  : 

Argument  First. — Infants  are  entitled  to  Chris¬ 
tian  baptism,  because  they  are  entitled  to  that 
c  19  289 


290 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


which  is  signified  by  it.  The  posterity  of  the  first 
‘pair  come  into  conscious  being  under  redemption. 
For  the  sake  and  merits  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ 
every  son  and  daughter  of  Adam  is  born  into  the 
world  in  a  condition  to  be  justified,  regenerated, 
adopted,  and  made  an  heir  of  eternal  life,  and 
those  dying  in  infancy  come  into  actual  possession 
of  all  these  blessings.  This  is  sufficiently  evi¬ 
denced  by  our  Lord’s  words:  “Suffer  the  little  chil¬ 
dren  to  come  unto  me  and  forbid  them  not,  for  of 
such  is  the  kingdom  of  heaven.”  Now  we  argue 
that  if,  for  any  cause,  they  are  entitled  to  the  thing 
itself,  are  entitled  to  that  which  is  symbolized, 
represented,  they  certainly,  and  for  a  stronger 
reason,  are  entitled  to  the  sign  or  symbol  thereof. 
If  infant  children,  by  the  sufferings  and  death  of 
our  Lord  and  Savior  Jesus  Christ,  are  subjects 
for  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  are  entitled  to,  and,  in 
case  of  death,  come  into  the  actual  possession  of 
regeneration  and  its  concomitant  blessings  of  justi¬ 
fication  and  adoption ;  then,  certainly,  they  are 
entitled  to  that  baptism  which  is  the  visible  out¬ 
ward  sign  of  these  benefits  of  atonement  prom¬ 
ised  and  secured  to  them  in  the  covenant  of 
grace. 

If  it  please  better,  instead  of  saying  “  born  in  a 
condition we  will  say  born  into  the  world  sustain- 
ing  such  relations  that  they  may,  by  the  grace 
of  God,  be  prepared  for  and  admitted  to  the 


SUBJECTS  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  29 1 

kingdom  of  heaven.  Then  the  argument  stands 
thus :  Children  are  born  into  the  world  sustaining, 
through  the  atonement,  such  relations  to  the  moral 
government  of  God  as  that  they  are  proper  sub¬ 
jects  for  God’s  regenerating  grace.  They  may 
now,  without  any  condition  required  on  their  part, 
be  actually  regenerated,  may  be  born  anew  by  the 
Holy  Ghost,  may  be  sanctified  and  admitted  to 
heaven — being  thus  proper  subjects  for  regenera¬ 
tion,  they  are  proper  subjects  for  baptism,  the 
outward  sign  by  which  regeneration  is  signified, 
represented,  symbolized.  Now,  it  is  obvious  that 
this  argument  is  determinative  or  it  is  nothing ; 
and  if  it  is  nothing,  then  there  is  no  other  argu¬ 
ment  that  can  be  of  any  avail,  for,  if  the  sig¬ 
nificance  of  the  ordinance  has  no  application  to 
infants,  then,  in  their  case,  the  ordinance  would 
have  no  meaning,  and  would  be  only  a  senseless 
service,  and  no  argument  can  make  a  senseless 
service  a  service  of  any  sense. 

Is  the  premise  admitted?  Are  infants  dying 
in  infancy  admitted  to  heaven  ?  Is  their  inherited 
nature  such  as  that  they  require  to  be  born  again 
in  order  to  fit  them  for  their  heavenly  inheritance  ? 
If  so,  then  they  are  born  into  the  world,  sustaining 
such  relations  as  that  they  are  proper  subjects  for 
regeneration.  So  much  for  the  premise.  Is  the 
inference  valid  ?  Admitting  that  they  are  proper 
subjects  for  the  thing  signified,  does  it  follow  that 


292 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


they  are  proper  subjects  for  the  sign  thereof?  To 
our  thought  the  conclusion  is  resistless. 

The  probable  reason  why  this  argument  is  not 
determinative  with  some  is  the  assumption  that 
baptism  supposes  the  actual  existence  of  the  thing 
signified  at  the  time  of  its  administration.  It  is 
assumed  that  all  persons  to  whom  a  valid  baptism 
is  administered  have  been  regenerated  previous  to 
baptism — in  other  words,  it  is  assumed  that  none 
are  proper  subjects  of  Christian  baptism  but  re¬ 
generated  persons.  This  assumption  is  favored  by 
the  common  custom.  In  our  times  most  adult  per¬ 
sons  delay  their  baptism  till  some  time  after  their 
conversion,  and,  as  a  consequence,  there  is  a  wide¬ 
spread  impression  in  the  public  mind  that  for  a  per¬ 
son  not  assured  of  his  regeneration  to  assume  the 
solemn  responsibilities  of  the  baptismal  covenant 
is  presumptuous.  Some  theologians,  even,  have 
carried  this  impression  to  the  extent  of  infer¬ 
ring  from  the  validity  of  infant  baptism  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  infant  regeneration.  Again,  perhaps  from 
the  obvious  fact  that  the  apostles  did  baptize 
persons  whose  mental  status  as  to  regeneration 
they  did  not  and  could  not  know,  the  Roman 
Church  and  the  high-churchmen  of  the  English 
establishment  infer — any  way,  whether  it  is  an 
inference  from  the  apostolic  practice  or  not,  they 
do  affirm — that  baptism  “ex  opere  operato  effects 
regeneration  ;  and  others,  prominently  the  Camp- 


SUBJECTS  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


293 


bellites  of  our  times,  affirm  that  baptism  is  itself 
regeneration. 

Now  all  this  we  affirm  is  an  assumption.  Bap¬ 
tism  and  circumcision  may  as  well  be  anticipatory 
as  reflexive.  In  the  case  of  Abraham,  “circum¬ 
cision  was  a  seal  of  the  righteousness  he  had 
being  yet  uncircumcised  he  was  justified  years 
before  he  was  circumcised.  Most  adult  persons 
receiving  the  ordinance  of  baptism  in  our  times 
are  supposed  to  be  regenerated  and  born  anew  ; 
and  their  birth  by  water  is  the  sign  of  their  birth 
by  the  Spirit,  which  they  have  enjoyed,  being  yet 
unbaptized.  Baptism  is  sometimes  reflexive,  and 
we  affirm  that  it  may  as  well  be  anticipatory.  But 
the  question  is,  Is  it  ?  We  affirm  it  is,  for  the 
following  reasons  : 

First.  The  Scriptures  frequently  speak  of  bap¬ 
tism  as  the  antecedent  of  saving  grace:  “He  that 
believeth  and  is  baptized  shall  be  saved.  Then 
Peter  said  unto  them,  Repent  and  be  baptized 
every  one  of  you  in  the  name  of  Jesus  Christ  for 
the  remission  of  sins,  and  ye  shall  receive  the  gift 
of  the  Holy  Ghost.  Save  yourselves  [or,  be  ye 
saved]  from  this  untoward  generation.  Then  they 
that  gladly  received  his  word  were  baptized  ;  and 
the  same  day  there  were  added  about  three  thou¬ 
sand  souls.  And  the  Lord  added  to  the  Church 
daily  such  as  should  be  saved  [or,  such  as  were 
saved].  Now  why  tarriest  thou  ?  arise,  and  be 


294 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


baptized,  and  wash  away  thy  sins,  calling  on  the 
name  of  the  Lord.” 

Second.  If  regeneration  be  a  sine  qua  non 
prerequisite  to  valid  baptism,  then  baptism  is  con¬ 
ditioned  upon  what  God  does,  and  not  upon  what 
man  does.  Again,  it  is  such  that  the  administrator 
can  never  know  whether  it  has  been  fulfilled  or 
not,  and  therefore  to  him  it  is  the  same  as  no  con¬ 
dition  whatever.  And  again,  the  candidate  can  not 
himself  know  whether  he  is  a  proper  subject  for 
baptism  unless  the  Spirit  of  God  specially  reveal  to 
him  that  fact.  It  is  true  that  whatever  be  the  con¬ 
dition  of  baptism  there  is  a  liability  to  mistake  in 
judging  of  it.  Philip  baptized  Simon  the  Sorcerer, 
to  whom  Peter  said:  “Thou  hast  neither  part  nor 
lot  in  this  matter.  I  perceive  that  thou  art  in  the 
gall  of  bitterness  and  in  the  bond  of  iniquity.” 
But  if  regeneration  be  a  prerequisite  to  valid  bap¬ 
tism,  then  baptisms  not  valid  must  be  of  fearfully 
frequent  occurrence. 

Thirdly.  The  apostles  baptized  persons  whose 
status  as  to  regeneration  they  could  not  know. 
They  uniformly  preached  that  the  people  every 
one  should  repent  and  be  baptized,  and  in  all  cases 
they  immediately  baptized  all  whose  hearts  the 
Lord  had  touched  so  that  they  gave  heed  to  the 
apostles’  words.  The  three  thousand  on  the  day 
of  Pentecost  is  an  example.  If  such  as  Nicode- 
mus  marveled  at  the  announcement  of  the  doctrine 


SUBJECTS  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


295 


of  the  new  birth,  certainly  it  is  not  supposable 
that  the  multitudes  to  whom  the  apostles  preached 
were  so  instructed  as  to  enter  fully  into  the  salva¬ 
tion  of  the  Gospel  on  the  first  proclamation 
thereof;  nor  is  it  supposable  that  by  any  cate¬ 
chetical  instruction  they  could  so  speedily  be  pre¬ 
pared  for  baptism,  if  they  must  before  its  admin¬ 
istration  give  to  the  administrator  satisfactory  evi¬ 
dence  of  their  having  been  born  of  the  Spirit. 

Fourthly.  A  profession  of  faith  in  Jesus  Christ 
and  of  a  purpose  of  righteousness,  with  a  desire 
to  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity, 
and  not  a  profession  of  regeneration,  was,  always 
has  been,  and  is,  the  condition  and  the  only  con¬ 
dition  required  of  candidates  for  baptism.  This 
is  so  obviously  a  matter  of  fact  that  it  requires 
no  discussion. 

Baptism  is  the  sign  of  regeneration.  The  new 
birth  which  baptism  symbolizes  may  be  antecedent, 
contemporary,  or  subsequent  to  the  sign  which 
outwardly  represents  it.  Any  adult  person  who 
believes  on  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  with  a  heart 
unto  righteousness,  and  thus  places  himself  in  a 
condition  to  be  justified,  regenerated,  and  adopted 
as  a  child  of  God — in  other  words,  any  person 
who  is  a  sincere  believing  seeker  of  salvation 
through  our  Lord  and  Savior  Jesus  Christ  —  is  a 
proper  subject  for  Christian  baptism. 

Infants  are  in  the  same  condition,  or,  if  it 


296 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


pleases,  sustain  the  same  relations  as  do  adult 
candidates  for  baptism.  Therefore  they  are  proper 
candidates  for  the  same  ordinance.  The  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  two  is,  the  one  is,  and  the  other 
is  not,  guilty  of  actual  voluntary  sin  ;  and  there¬ 
fore  the  one  has,  and  the  other  has  not,  need  of 
voluntary  repentance  and  faith  in  order  to  pardon. 
When  the  one,  by  repentance  towards  God  and 
faith  in  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  has  returned  to  his 
infantile  conditions  and  relations,  has  been  con¬ 
verted  and  has  become  as  a  little  child,  then  both 
are  alike  entitled  to  salvation  through  Christ. 
Dying  in  that  state,  they  would  alike  ascend  to 
heaven.  Living,  they  may  alike  receive  the  sign 
of  regeneration  ;  and  living  faithful  to  its  obliga¬ 
tions,  they  will  alike  sooner  or  later  come  into 
actual  possession  of  the  thing  signified  by  their 
baptism.  If  the  adult  believer  has  received  the 
new  birth  previous  to  his  baptism,  this  makes  no 
difference  as  to  the  significancy  of  the  rite,  nor  as 
to  the  conditions  on  which  the  rite  may  be  admin¬ 
istered. 

We  have  said  above  that  this  argument  is  de¬ 
terminative  or  it  is  nothing.  To  our  thought 
infant  baptism  is  not  only  adequately  authorized, 
but  also  divinely  required  by  our  Lord’s  words, 
“  Suffer  the  little  children  to  come  unto  me,  and 
forbid  them  not ;  for  of  such  is  the  kingdom  of 
heaven.”  Here  is  the  warrant  and  authority  for 


SUBJECTS  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  297 

the  baptism  of  infants  and  for  their  admission  to 
Church  fellowship.  If  this  be  not  enough  nothing 
more  need  be  said. 

But  in  conformity  to  custom  we  proceed  to 

Argument  Second.  It  is  a  universal  conviction 
of  mankind  that  children  are  born  into  the  civil,  ec¬ 
clesiastical,  and  social  status  of  their  parents  ;  that 
all  the  obligations  imposed,  and  all  the  rights  and 
privileges  conferred,  by  the  civil,  ecclesiastical,  and 
social  relations  of  the  parents  are,  in  the  absence 
of  any  thing  to  the  contrary,  naturally  transmitted 
to  their  children.  This  conviction  among  the  Jews 
was  confirmed  and  strengthened  by  positive  stat¬ 
ute,  divinely  enjoined.  Their  children  were  by 
birthright  entitled  to  all  the  common  privileges  of 
the  Jewish  Church.  They  were  circumcised  on 
the  eighth  day  after  birth ;  and,  except  in  cases 
of  forfeiture  by  bad  conduct,  they  were  considered 
as  members  of  the  Church,  and  entitled  to  all  its 
privileges  from  birth  to  death.  Now,  if  our  Lord 
had  instituted  a  religion  and  a  Church  from  whose 
privileges  children  were  excluded,  it  is  reasonable 
to  expect  that  such  an  exclusion  would  have  been 
distinctly  stated,  and  that  its  reception  among  the 
people  would  have  been  such  as  would  have  re¬ 
ceived  some  notice  in  history. 

The  abrogation  of  circumcision  caused  a  com¬ 
motion  among  Jewish  believers,  of  which  we  have 
ample  record.  Now,  if  with  the  rite  the  thing 


298 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


signified  by  it  had  also  been  taken  away  and 
nothing  substituted  in  its  place,  and  if  even  the 
baptism  given  to  Gentile  proselytes  were  refused 
to  their  own  children,  it  is  most  obvious  that  a 
change  so  abhorrent  to  a  parent’s  religious  regards 
for  his  children  would  have  received  an  attention 
of  which  history  would  have  given  some  informa¬ 
tion.  In  the  absence  of  any  such  notice  in  the 
history  of  the  times,  it  is  fairly  inferable  that 
children  sustained  a  relation  to  the  Christian 
Church  similar  and  equivalent  to  that  they  sus¬ 
tained  in  the  Jewish  Church.  As  in  the  one  they 
received  in  infancy  the  rite  of  circumcision,  which 
recognized  their  relation  to  God  and  his  Church, 
so  in  the  other,  without  doubt,  they  received  the 
rite  of  baptism,  which  under  the  new  dispensation 
signified  the  same  thing  that  circumcision  did 
under  the  old. 

Argument  Third.  It  is  highly  probable  that 
the  apostles  baptized  infants  ;  it  is  extremely  im¬ 
probable  that  they  did  not. 

The  arguments  above,  to  our  thought,  render 
it  certain  that  they  did  ;  but  here  we  claim  only 
high  probability,  and  add  to  the  probability  derived 
from  the  considerations  given  above  the  recorded 
fact  that  they  baptized  whole  households.  Three 
families  are  distinctly  mentioned- — Lydia’s,  the 
jailer’s,  and  that  of  Stephanas ;  and  they  are  men¬ 
tioned  in  a  manner  that  indicates  that  the  practice 


SUBJECTS  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  299 

was  a  common  one.  Of  course,  it  is  possible  that 
there  were  no  young  children  in  any  of  these  fam- 
lies  ;  but  it  is  manifestly  probable  that  there  were 
young  children  at  least  in  some  of  them — possibly 
in  all.  It  is  obviously  a  very  preposterous  assump¬ 
tion  to  affirm  that  there  were  none  ;  and  to  sup¬ 
pose  there  were  none  is  to  make  an  extremely 
improbable  supposition. 

*  But  again  :  infant  baptism  in  the  Christian 
Church  had  a  beginning  some  time.  When  was 
it?  If  not  in  the  time  of  the  apostles,  then,  when 
it  was  introduced  it  was  an  innovation,  and  would 
have  excited  a  controversy  of  which  we  should 
have  heard  something ;  but  the  pages  of  history 
do  not  furnish  even  the  appearance  of  an  intima¬ 
tion  that  the  practice  of  infant  baptism  was  an 
innovation.  On  the  contrary,  there  was  not  a 
Christian  Church  on  earth  for  eleven  hundred 
years  after  the  birth  of  Christ  that  did  not  prac¬ 
tice  infant  baptism,  and  for  fifteen  hundred  years 
it  was  never  opposed  by  the  considerations  that 
are  now  urged  against  it.  The  first  opposition  of 
which  ecclesiastical  history  informs  us  was  made 
by  Tertullian,  who  lived  and  labored  as  a  Christian 
minister  in  the  beginning  of  the  third  century. 
But  he  never  suggested  that  the  rite  was  at  any 
time  an  innovation ;  never  intimated  that  it  was 
not  practiced  by  the  apostles.  He  assumed  that 
baptism  is  a  condition  of  pardon,  and  that  post- 


3°° 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


baptismal  sins  are  eminently  heinous,  if  not  unpar¬ 
donable,  and  on  these  assumptions  he  based  an 
inference  that  baptism  should  be  deferred  to  a  late 
period  in  life ;  but  he  himself  did  not  practically 
adhere  to  his  conclusions  ;  he  practiced  and  urged 
the  baptism  of  children  who  were  of  sufficient  age 
to  receive  instruction.  All  agree  that  infant  bap¬ 
tism  was  a  prevalent  practice  in  the  time  of  Ter- 
tullian,  A.  D.  200,  and  that  there  is  a  total  absence 
of  any  evidence  that  its  introduction  was  an  inno¬ 
vation  at  any  time  between  the  days  of  the  apos¬ 
tles  and  the  times  of  Tertullian.  Irenaeus,  A.  D. 
125,  alludes  to  the  practice  in  a  manner  implying 
its  unquestioned  existence ;  and  Justin  Martyr, 
who  wrote  within  forty  years  after  the  death  of  the 
Apostle  John,  who  doubtless  lived  and  received  his 
youthful  education  before  the  apostle’s  death,  and 
who  must  have  conversed  with  many  of  those  who 
had  had  personal  knowledge  of  apostolic  times, 
customs,  and  usages,  says,  “Many  persons  among 
us,  of  both  sexes,  some  sixty  and  some  seventy 
years  old,  who  had  been  made  disciples  to  Christ 
in  their  infancy,  do  continue  uncorrupted.” 

Now,  in  view  of  all  these  considerations,  we  in¬ 
sist  that  the  probability  that  the  apostles,  both  by 
precept  and  example,  did  authorize  infant  baptism 
in  the  Christian  Church,  amounts  to  a  moral 
certainty. 

W e  close  this  discussion  by  repeating  what  we 


SUBJECTS  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  30 1 

have  said  above,  that  the  consideration  which  de¬ 
termines  that  infants  are  entitled  to  baptism  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  by  virtue  of  their  relation  to 
the  atonement  they  are  entitled  to  that  which  the 
rite  signifies.  They  are  in  a  condition  to  be  regen¬ 
erated  by  the  Holy  Ghost ;  therefore  they  are  in  a 
condition  to  receive  the  outward  sign  of  that  in¬ 
ward  regeneration. 

Whose  children  may  be  baptized  ?  The  idea 
that  baptism  is  the  seal  of  a  covenant  whose  terms 
are  “to  you  and  your  children,  and  to  all  that  are 
afar  off,  even  as  many  as  the  Lord  our  God  shall 
call,”  gives  countenance  to  the  idea  that  none  but 
the  children  of  believers  are  entitled  to  baptism  ; 
and  the  idea  of  a  believer,  in  the  minds  of  many, 
is  the  equivalent  to  the  idea  of  a  Church  member  ; 
so  that  the  practice  of  many  Christian  Churches 
limits  the  baptism  of  children  to  those  whose  par¬ 
ents,  one  or  both,  are  members  of  the  Church. 
However,  adopted  children  and  orphans,  though 
not  the  children  of  believing  parents,  are  admitted 
to  baptism  in  case  believing  sponsors  assume  the 
responsibility  of  their  religious  education.  It  is 
manifest,  that  if  the  idea  of  a  seal  be  nothing  more 
than  a  rhetorical  illustration ;  and  if  baptism  be 
considered  as  to  its  essential  character  as  an  out¬ 
ward  sign  of  an  inward  regeneration  ;  and  if  chil¬ 
dren  are  entitled  to  the  sign  because  they  are 
entitled  to  the  thing  signified,  then  this  restriction 


302 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


is  groundless.  Children  are  to  be  baptized  be¬ 
cause  of  their  relation  to  Christ,  and  not  because  of 
their  relations  to  their  parents.  If  infidel  parents 
were  to  present  their  children  for  baptism  in  mock¬ 
ery — a  very  unsupposable  supposition — any  Chris¬ 
tian  minister  would  refuse  to  administer  the  ordi¬ 
nance  ;  not  because  the  wickedness  of  the  parents 
deprived  their  children  of  the  children’s  interest  in 
Christ,  but  because  their  wickedness  would  be  a 
bar  to  a  proper  administration.  If  parents  of  a 
good  moral  character  desiring,  with  apparent  sin¬ 
cerity,  Christian  baptism  for  their  children,  and 
honestly  prepared  to  promise,  as  required  by  the 
ritual,  to  give  due  attention  to  their  religious 
education,  though  they  themselves  are  not  mem¬ 
bers  of  any  Christian  Church,  and  are  not  pro¬ 
fessors  of  saving  faith,  should  present  their  chil¬ 
dren  for  baptism — a  not  very  supposable  sup¬ 
position — I  see  not  to  the  contrary  but  that,  in 
such  a  case,  the  children  may  be  baptized,  and 
that  because  baptism  belongs  to  them  for  Christ’s 
sake,  and  because  the  purpose  of  the  parents  in 
a  judgment  of  charity  being  supposed  to  be  sin¬ 
cere  and  honest,  every  bar  to  a  proper  adminis¬ 
tration  is  removed. 


f 


CHAPTER  VI. 


Mode  of  Christian  Baptism. 

“  Let  every  adult  person  and  the  parents  of  every  child  to  be 
baptized  have  the  choice  either  of  immersion,  sprinkling,  or 
pouring.’’  (Methodist  Discipline.) 

Does  the  validity  of  baptism  depend  at  all  upon 
the  mode  of  its  administration  ?  Suppose  it  be 
admitted  that  the  manner  in  which  the  apostles 
baptized  their  disciples  is  with  sufficient  distinct¬ 
ness  described  in  the  New  Testament ;  again,  let 
us  suppose  that  persons  honestly  interpret  the 
given  descriptions  incorrectly,  and  find  in  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  a  mode  different  from  the  true  one  ;  and  again, 
suppose  such  persons  do  administer  the  ordinance 
in  their  incorrect  method,  honestly  intending  to 
do,  and  supposing  that  they  do  do,  the  thing  com¬ 
manded  in  the  words  “  repent  and  be  baptized,” — 
is  such  a  baptism  invalid  ?  Are  the  persons  so 
baptized  unbaptized  persons,  and  not  within  the 
pale  of  the  visible  Church  ?  Who  will  affirm  that 
they  are  ?  If,  then,  immersionists  will  concede  to 
those  who  differ  from  them  honesty  in  their  differ¬ 
ence,  they  ought  to  admit  them  to  fellowship  in 

303 


304 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


the  Church  ;  they  ought  on  the  ground  of  a  mis¬ 
taken  judgment  to  excuse  the  error.  Again,  if 
we  concede,  as  above,  that  the  mode  of  baptism  is 
prescribed  in  the  New  Testament,  and  suppose 
that  certain  persons  do  clearly  and  correctly  inter¬ 
pret  the  given  instructions,  then  it  is  plain  that 
such  persons  are  not  baptized  unless  they  follow 
the  given  prescriptions ;  to  them  nothing  else  is 
baptism  but  that  thing  which  they  find  in  the 
Word  of  God. 

But  why  would  a  so-called  baptism  by  any 
other  method  be  to  them  invalid  ?  Plainly,  because 
the  service  performed  would  not  be  the  answer  of 
a  good  conscience  ;  it  would  not  be  doing  what 
they  thought  was  their  duty ;  nay,  more,  it  would 
be  a  positive  refusal  to  obey  a  divine  command. 
But  does  this  make  the  mode  itself  essential  to 
the  validity  of  the  ordinance?  Plainly  not,  on  any 
other  supposition  than  that  the  mode  is  so  clearly 
and  definitely  prescribed  that  it  can  not  be  inno¬ 
cently  mistaken.  Is  the  mode  so  revealed  in  the 
Scriptures  that  to  mistake  it  is  censurable  ?  that  to 
mistake  it  justly  forfeits  the  rights  and  privileges 
of  the  visible  Church?  To  ask  this  question  is  to 
our  thought  to  answer  it.  It  is  so  palpably  patent 
that  men  equally  intelligent  and  equally  honest  do 
differ  as  to  the  question  whether  the  apostles  uni¬ 
formly  practiced  one  method,  and  if  so  what  that 
method  was,  that  we  deem  it  impertinent  even  to 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  305 

suggest  that  the  question  of  mode  is  determinative 
of  the  question  of  validity. 

What  excuse  is  there  for  exclusiveness  in  such 
a  matter  as  this  ?  Baptism  is  a  sign  of  regenera¬ 
tion.  Water  is  essential  to  bodily  cleanliness  ;  the 
agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  essential  to  moral 
purity.  Here  is  a  resemblance  which  renders  the 
sign  a  suitable  representative  of  the  thing  signi¬ 
fied  ;  but  if  there  be  any  resemblance  between  the 
manner  in  which  water  is  applied  to  the  body  and 
the  manner  in  which  the  Spirit  operates  on  the 
mind  no  mortal  is  able  to  discover  it.  W e  have, 

a 

then,  this  case  :  there  is  nothing  in  the  ordinance 
itself,  beyond  the  resemblance  between  a  sign  and 
the  thing  signified,  that  renders  it  at  all  important. 
The  only  reason  why  it  is  in  any  way  connected 
with  the  individual’s  personal  salvation  is  that  it  is 
divinely  commanded,  and  is,  therefore,  the  answer 
of  a  good  conscience. 

A  person  who  so  reads  his  Bible  as  to  come  to 
a  conviction  that  baptism  is  immersion  does  right 
to  be  immersed  ;  he  does  wrong  if  he  refuses,  be¬ 
cause  in  so  doing  he  refuses  to  do  what  he  under¬ 
stands  is  required.  He  does  right  in  endeavoring 
to  convince  his  fellow-men  that  it  is  their  duty  to 
be  immersed.  If  it  is  right  that  the  Christian 
Church  should  be  divided  into  denominations 
founded  upon  difference  of  opinion  in  minor  mat¬ 
ters,  then  it  may  be  right  that  immersionists  should 
c  20 


3°6 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


separate  themselves  and  form  a  denominational 
Church  upon  the  single  affirmation  that  baptism  is 
immersion  ;  but  for  such  to  assume  that  none  oth¬ 
ers  are  members  of  Christ’s  visible  Church  is  pre¬ 
posterous.  Exclusiveness  founded  upon  difference 
of  opinion  in  such  a  matter  as  the  mode  of  bap¬ 
tism  is  wholly  without  excuse  ;  yea,  more,  in  the 
light  of  Christian  charity  and  of  mutual  good  will 
among  the  members  of  Christ’s  body,  it  is  emi¬ 
nently  censurable. 

blow  much  must  be  conceded  to  immersionists 
as  to  the  merits  of  the  question  whether  or  not 
the  apostles  uniformly  practiced  immersion?  To 
a  reader  of  the  common  version  of  our  English 
Bible  the  fact  that  John  baptized  in  Jordan,  that 
he  is  said  to  have  baptized  in  Enon  because  there 
was  much  water  there  ;  that  it  is  said  that  when 
Jesus  was  baptized  he  went  up  straightway  out  of 
the  water  ;  that  Philip  and  the  eunuch  are  said  to 
have  gone  down  both  into  the  water,  and  to  have 
come  up  out  of  the  water ;  and  that  all  baptized 
persons  are  said  to  be  buried  with  Christ  in  bap¬ 
tism,— very  naturally  suggests  the  idea  that  bap¬ 
tism  required  a  large  quantity  of  water.  And  if 
the  idea  of  immersion  be  in  the  reader’s  mind 
previous  to  his  reading,  this  language  is  well 
adapted  to  impress  his  mind  with  the  idea  that 
baptism  and  immersion  are  synonymous  terms. 
So  much  is  conceded  ;  but  it  is  not  conceded  that 


I 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  307 

a  thorough  examination  of  all  the  facts  involved  in 
these  several  cases,  and  of  all  the  facts  involved 
in  the  merits  of  the  case  itself,  necessitates  in 
every  honest  mind  a  conviction  that  immersion 
was  the  only  mode  of  baptism  practiced  in  apos¬ 
tolic  times. 

Was  the  apostolic  practice  uniform?  were  the 
New  Testament  baptisms  always  the  same  as  to 
the  mode  of  their  administration  ?  An  a  priori 
judgment  would  naturally  affirm  that  they  were  ; 
in  the  light  of  thought,  it  would  be  an  unwarranted 
assumption  to  affirm  that,  beyond  slight  variations 
in  unimportant  particulars  to  accommodate  vary¬ 
ing  circumstances,  the  apostles  practiced  different 
modes  of  baptism.  In  the  absence  of  any  thing 
to  the  contrary,  an  a  priori  judgment  would  affirm 
that  all  probabilities  favor  the  idea  of  a  uniform 
mode.  But  on  the  supposition  that  baptism,  as  to 
its  form,  was  always  the  same  during  apostolic 
times,  we  are  at  once  met  with  this  difficult  ques¬ 
tion,  When,  how,  by  whom,  in  what  manner,  came 
the  practice  to  vary  ?  what  is  the  history  of  the 
innovation  ?  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  in 
such  a  case  the  pages  of  history  would  furnish 
the  means  of  settling  the  question.  Added  to 
this,  we  know  that  among  the  Jewish  ceremonies 
there  were  what  St.  Paul  calls  “divers  baptisms/’ 
We  know  also  that  at  least  the  purification  of 
things,  such  as  vessels,  tables,  couches,  must  have 


3°8 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


differed  as  to  mode  from  the  purification  of  per¬ 
sons,  unless  all  was  done  by  sprinkling ;  and  that 
all  these  ceremonial  religious  purifications  were 
alike  called  baptisms,  whether  they  were  of  per¬ 
sons  or  of  things. 

In  view  of  these  last  mentioned  considerations, 
the.  antecedent  probability  of  a  uniform  method 
disappears,  and  it  becomes  quite  probable  that  the 
apostles  varied  their  mode  of  applying  the  bap¬ 
tismal  water  as  convenience  required  ;  or,  in  other 
words,  it  is  highly  probable  that  in  apostolic  times 
the  mode  of  baptism  was  not  considered  essential 
to  the  validity  of  the  ordinance.  It  is  not,  there¬ 
fore,  required  of  those  who  deny  that  immersion 
was  the  only  mode  to  prove  that  some  other  mode, 
as  sprinkling  or  pouring,  was  solely  practiced.  It 
may  be  that  then,  as  now,  different  modes  were 
common.  The  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  those 
who  affirm  a  uniform  practice. 

Did  the  apostles  immerse  the  whole  body 
of  their  candidates  in  water  ?  or  did  they  from 
small  vessels  pour  water  upon  them  ?  or  did  they 
from  their  own  hands  or  from  a  hyssop  branch 
sprinkle  water  upon  them  ?  or  did  they  sometimes 
baptize  their  candidates  in  one  of  these  ways  and 
sometimes  in  another  ?  Immersionists  affirm  that 
the  evidence  in  the  case  proves  not  only  the  fact 
that  the  apostles  did  uniformly  immerse,  but  also 
that  immersion  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


309 


ordinance  ;  so  that  it  is,  as  they  affirm,  universally 
true  that  where  there  is  no  immersion  there  is  no 
baptism. 

The  other  party  to  this  controversy  do  not 
affirm  a  uniform  method,  nor,  indeed,  a  diversity 
of  method,  but  affirm  that  the  evidence  in  the  case 
is  not  adequate  to  prove  the  position  of  the  im- 
mersionist ;  specially  do  they  deny  that  any  mode 
is  essential  to  validity.  Among  those,  allowing 
the  validity  of  either  method,  probably,  most  have 
a  personal  preference — some  preferring  one  mode, 
and  others  another.  No  Church,  as  such,  except 
the  Baptist,  requires  any  particular  form  of  bap¬ 
tism  as  a  sine  qtia  non  condition  of  membership  ; 
all,  at  least  in  theory,  allow  the  candidate  a 
choice  of  the  manner  in  which  he  will  receive  the 
ordinance. 

We  have  now  come  face  to  face  on  the  ques¬ 
tion  at  issue.  Does  the  evidence  in  the  case  prove 
immersion?  Is  the  New  Testament  word  baptize 
a  synonym  of  the  English  word  immerse?  Is  the 
formula,  baptism  equals  immersion,  true  ?  In  all 
cases  where  it  is  doubtful  what  a  writer  or  speaker 
means  by  the  words  he  uses,  the  question  must 
be  determined,  if  at  all,  by  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  or  by  his  use  of  the  same  words  in  other 
places,  or  by  both  of  these  methods.  If  the 
meaning  of  New  Testament  terms  be  determined 
decisively  it  must  be  by  New  Testament  use. 


3io 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


Collateral  and  confirmatory  evidence  may  be  de¬ 
rived  from  classical  use,  from  use  in  the  Septua- 
gint,  and  in  the  Apocrypha. 

As  the  main  issue  has  respect  to  New  Testa¬ 
ment  use,  and  because,  as  we  see  it,  the  issue  is 
the  same,  whether  we  consult  the  Septuagint  or 
the  New  Testament,  we  shall  content  ourselves 
with  only  a  few  illustrations  from  these  other 
sources,  and  depend  wholly  upon  the  argument 
from  the  New  Testament  for  the  support  of  the 
positions  we  shall  attempt  to  maintain.  Perhaps 
another  remark,  before  proceeding,  may  not  be 
useless.  To  our  thought  the  question  at  issue 
receives  no  essential  aid  from  scholarly  attain¬ 
ments — it  is  a  question  of  plain  common  sense. 
The  man  who  understands  common  English,  and 
is  competent  to  form  a  correct  judgment  from  the 
facts  in  a  given  case,  is  qualified  to  sit  in  judg¬ 
ment  on  the  case  before  us.  For  instance,  all 
the  facts  attending  the  conversion  and  admission 
to  Church  membership  of  the  three  thousand  on 
the  day  of  Pentecost  being  considered,  we  affirm 
that  it  is  competent  for  a  man  of  ordinary  power 
of  judgment  to  determine  for  himself,  from  these 
facts  themselves,  whether  it  is  probable  or  possible 
that  those  three  thousand  persons  were,  one  by 
one,  wholly  immersed  in  water. 

There  can  be  no  question  as  to  whether  the 
words  bapto  and  baptizo  are  or  are  not  both  of 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  31  I 

them  used  in  different  senses  in  the  classics.  The 
former  signifies  to  dip  ;  to  dye  by  dipping ;  or  to 
dye  without  regard  to  the  mode — as  when  a  lake 
is  said  to  be  baptized  by  the  blood  shed  in  it,  or 
a  garment  baptized  by  coloring  matter  dropping 
on  it ;  to  gild  ;  to  glaze  ;  to  wet,  moisten,  or  wash ; 
to  temper,  as  when  hot  iron  is  tempered  by  plung¬ 
ing  it  in  water,  or  by  pouring  oil  upon  it ;  to  imbue, 
as  when  the  mind  is  said  to  be  baptized  with 
fantasies.  The  latter  signifies  to  immerse ;  to 
overflow  with  water  ;  the  seashore  is  baptized  by 
the  rising  tide  ;  to  wet  thoroughly ;  to  overwhelm, 
as  when  men  are  said  to  be  baptized  with  wine, 
that  is,  intoxicated,  or  when  a  boy  is  baptized  with 
puzzling  questions.  There  is,  then,  no  dispute  as 
to  whether  these,  with  their  paronymous  words, 
are  used  differently ;  but  the  question  is,  In  what 
does  the  difference  consist  ?  or  how  is  this  differ¬ 
ence  in  use  to  be  accounted  for  ?  Immersionists 
affirm  that  the  terms  are  specific,  that  their  pri¬ 
mary  and  literal  sense  is  to  immerse,  and  that  all 
other  uses  are  secondary  and  figurative.  Anti- 
immersionists  affirm  that  the  terms  are  generic, 
like  the  terms  wet,  wash,  dye,  moisten,  and 
many  others.  As  the  word  wet  does  not,  in  itself, 
express  the  method  by  which  a  drenched  con¬ 
dition  was  produced,  whether  by  plunging  into 
water,  or  whether  by  water  being  poured  or  sprin¬ 
kled  upon  the  wet  person  or  thing ;  so  the  word 


31 2 


ECCLI’SIOLOGY. 


baptize  does  not,  in  itself,  express  -the  method 
by  which  the  person  baptized  came  into  the  con¬ 
dition  of  being  baptized.  If  the  sentence  con¬ 
taining  the  word  specify  the  method,  it  must  be 
by  other  words  than  the  word  itself.  In  this  way 
of  putting  the  question,  the  parties  to  the  contro¬ 
versy  stand  as  before,  face  to  face  on  the  merits 
of  the  case  ;  and  the  only  method  of  settlement  is 
a  common  sense  examination  of  the  passages  in 
which  the  words  occur,  and  the  inquiry  whether 
their  contexts  favor  the  one  theory  or  the  other. 

Illustrations  from  the  Septuagint. — In  Leviticus 
xiv  we  have  “the  law  of  the  leper  in  the  day  of 
his  cleansing.”  The  priest  is  required  to  com¬ 
mand  that  a  bird  be  killed,  and  that  cedar  wood, 
scarlet,  hyssop,  and  a  living  bird  be  dipped  in  the 
blood  of  the  bird  that  was  killed.  The  word  here 
rendered  dipped  is,  in  the  Septuagint,  rendered 
baptized,  and  this  proves  that  the  translator  of 
that  version  did  not  consider  baptism  the  same  as 
immersion,  for  it  is  preposterous  to  suppose  that 
all  the  things  mentioned  could  be  immersed  in 
the  blood  of  a  single  bird.  In  the  story  of  Nebu¬ 
chadnezzar  the  same  translators  say  that  his  body 
was  baptized  with  the  dews  of  heaven.  Elisha 
sent  a  messenger  to  Naaman,  the  Syrian  leper,  in¬ 
structing  him  to  wash  seven  times  in* Jordan,  and 
the  Septuagint  says  he  went  and  baptized  himself 
seven  times  in  Jordan.  This  might  have  been 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  313 

by  immersion,  but  it  shows  that  the  words  wash 
and  baptize  are  here  used  synonymously. 

In  the  Apocrypha,  Judith,  a  Jewish  lady,  young, 
beautiful,  and  wealthy,  is  said  to  have  gone  to  the 
Assyrian  camp  and  promised  to  aid  the  com¬ 
mander  in  the  conquest  of  her  country.  The  As¬ 
syrian  general  treated  her  with  favor.  At  night 
she  was  permitted  to  resort  to  the  fountain  for 
purification;  and  the  text  says,  “she  baptized  her¬ 
self  in  the  camp  at  a  fountain  of  water.”  This 
proves  nothing  positively ;  but  it  is  quite  improb¬ 
able  that  lady  of  distinction  used,  as  a  bathing 
place,  a  public  fountain  in  the  midst  of  a  camp 
filled  with  soldiers.  Those  who  gave  the  Greek 
rendering  to  the  Apocrypha  without  doubt  here 
used  the  word  baptized  in  a  generic  sense — the 
method  of  purifying  is  not  specifically  given,  but 
the  probabilities  are  all  against  immersion.  Again, 
in  Ecclesiasticus,  chapter  xxxiv,  we  have  this  pas- 
'sage:  “He  that  washeth  himself  from  a  dead 
body,  and  toucheth  it  again,  what  availeth  his 
washing?”  In  the  Greek  version  this  passage 
is  rendered,  “He  that  baptizeth  himself.”  The 
law  of  cleansing  from  contact  with  a  dead  body  is 
given  in  Numbers,  chapter  xix,  from  which  it  is 
evident  that  the  ceremony  of  purification  in  this 
case  consisted  chiefly  in,  or  rather  the  essential 
part  of  the  ceremony  was  performed  by,  sprinkling 
with  a  hyssop  branch.  Put  these  two  things  to- 


3H 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


gether  —  the  ceremony,  a  service  of  purification 
according  to  the  Mosaic  law,  was  performed  by 
sprinkling  water  upon  the  persons  and  things  to  be 
purified,  and  the  translators  called  this  a  baptism. 
A  notable  example  of  the  use  of  the  words  in  ques¬ 
tion  may  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Origen.  He 
called  the  pouring  of  the  barrels  of  water  upon 
the  altar  in  the  contest  between  Elijah  and  the 
prophets  of  Baal,  a  baptism  of  the  wood.  Origen 
was  born  at  Alexandria,  A.  D.  185.  He  is  said 
to  be  “  the  father  of  Biblical  criticism  and  exegesis 
in  Christendom. ”  He  certainly  knew  how  to  use 
the  Greek  language,  and  could  not  mistake  the 
proper  use  of  so  prominent  a  Chriistan  term  as 
baptizo.  The  wood  was  thoroughly  drenched — 
this  is  the  primary  meaning  of  the  word.  The 
mode  of  its  becoming  drenched,  was  not  the  im¬ 
mersion  of  the  wood  in  water,  but  the  pouring  of 
water  upon  the  wood. 

NEW  TESTAMENT  USE. 

i.  Johns  Baptism. — “John  did  baptize  in  the 
wilderness,  and  preach  the  baptism  of  repentance 
for  the  remission  of  sins:  And  there  went  out  unto 
him  all  the  land  of  Judea,  and  they  of  Jerusalem, 
and  the  region  round  about  Jordan,  and  were 
baptized  of  him  in  the  river  of  Jordan,  confessing 
their  sins.  And  many  Pharisees  and  S&dducees 
came  to  his  baptism;  and  John  preached,  saying, 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  3  15 

There  cometh  one  mightier  than  I  after  me. 
I  indeed  have  baptized  you  with  water,  but  he 
shall  baptize  you  with  the  Holy  Ghost.  And 
Jesus  came  from  Nazareth  to  Galilee  and  was  bap¬ 
tized  of  John  in  Jordan  ;  and  straightway  coming 
up  out  of  the  water  he  saw  the  heavens  opened, 
and  the  Spirit,  like  a  dove,  descending  upon  him. 
After  these  things”  [occurrences  at  Jerusalem,  the 
cleansing  of  the  temple,  the  conversation  with  Nico- 
demus,  et  ceteros\  “came  Jesus  and  his  disciples 
into  the  land  of  Judea,  and  there  he  tarried  with 
them  and  baptized,  and  John  also  was  baptizing 
in  Enon,  near  to  Salem,  because  there  was  much 
water  there,  and  they  came  and  were  baptized. 
Then  there  arose  a  question  between  some  of 
John’s  disciples  and  the  Jews  about  purifying,  and 
they  came  unto  John,  and  said  unto  him,  Rabbi,  he 
that  was  with  thee  beyond  Jordan,  baptizeth,  and 
all  men  come  unto  him.  When,  therefore,  the 
Lord  knew  how  the  Pharisees  had  heard  that 
Jesus  baptized  more  disciples  than  John  (though 
Jesus  himself  baptized  not,  but  his  disciples)  he 
left  Judea  and  departed  again  into  Galilee.”  The 
above  quotations  give  us  all  the  information  we 
have  respecting  John’s  baptisms  and  the  baptisms 
administered  by  Christ  through  his  disciples  pre¬ 
vious  to  his  crucifixion.  These,  whether  by  John 
or  by  the  disciples  of  Christ,  were  evidently  the 
same  as  to  nature,  intent,  and  form.  They  are  im- 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


3l6 

portant,  inasmuch  as  it  is  evident,  that  so  far  as  the 
mode  is  concerned,  they  were  the  same  as  was  prac¬ 
ticed  afterward  by  the  Church  in  apostolic  times. 

Respecting  John’s  baptism,  we  affirm,  first, 
That  whatever  it  was,  it  was  in  general  accordance 
with  some  sort  of  baptism  practiced  by  the  Jews  in 
those  times  and  previously.  More  briefly,  John’s 
baptism  was  a  Jewish  rite.  John  was  a  Jew,  and 
had  no  thought  of  being  any  thing  else  ;  he  was  a 
reformer,  but  not  an  innovator.  He  knew,  to  be 
sure,  that  he  was  the  forerunner  of  the  promised 
Messiah — but  the  coming  Messiah  was  an  object 
of  Jewish  hopes — to  his  own  thought  he  was 
wholly  in  the  line  of  the  Jewish  religion.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  supposable  that  so  prominent  a  part 
of  his  ministrations  as  baptism  was  an  innovation. 
Whatever,  therefore,  his  baptism  might  have  been, 
it  was  a  religious  ceremonial  of  common  practice 
among  the  Jews.  This  is  made  still  more  evi¬ 
dent  from  the  popularity  of  his  baptism.  All  the 
people,  with  some  Pharisees  and  Sadducees,  were, 
without  demur  or  question,  baptized  of  him.  The 
only  controversy  of  which  we  have  any  record  is 
that  between  ‘‘some  of  John’s  disciples  and  the 
Jews”  (the  best  manuscripts  use  the  singular — a 
Jew)  about  purifying;  that  is,  as  we  understand  it, 
about  the  baptisms  by  John  and  by  Christ’s  disci¬ 
ples  ;  and  the  point  in  controversy  had  respect  to 
the  question  which  was  superior.  John’s  disciples 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  317 

reported  the  controversy  to  their  master,  and  he 
at  once  decided  it  by  reminding  them  that  he  had 
himself  told  them  that  Christ  was  mightier  than 
he.  With  this  exception,  which  has  no  bearing  at 
all  on  the  point  now  before  us,  no  objections  were 
ever  made  to  John’s  baptism — all  the  people  be¬ 
lieved  him  to  be  a  prophet  of  Jehovah,  sent  to 
reform  the  people  and  bring  them  back  from  their 
wanderings  to  the  proper  observance  of  the  Mo¬ 
saic  law.  That  John’s  baptism  was  a  Jewish  rite 
is  further  evident  from  the  fact  that  Christ  himself 
received  it ;  and  gave  as  a  reason  why  he  should 
do  so,  that  “thus  it  becometh  us  to  fulfill  all  right¬ 
eousness.”  Jesus,  as  a  Jew,  was  circumcised,  he 
attended  the  Passover,  worshiped  in  the  temple, 
and  received  John’s  baptism.  The  righteousness 
which  he  fulfilled  by  this  service  could  be  nothing 
else  than  the  righteousness  of  fulfilling  the  require¬ 
ments  of  the  Jewish  code.  Christ’s  baptism,  then, 
was  in  conformity  with  a  Jewish  right. 

We  remark,  secondly,  in  respect  to  John’s 
baptism,  that  there  is  a  strong  probability  that 
it  was  not  by  immersion,  because  there  is  nothing 
in  the  Old  Testament  that  even  intimates  that 
the  Jews  were  ever  baptized  by  such  a  mode. 
There  was  no  provision  either  in  the  tabernacle, 
in  the  wilderness,  or  in  the  temple  at  Jerusalem, 
for  a  baptistery.  A  brazen  laver  was  provided, 
in  which  the  priests  were  to  wash  their  hands 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


3I8 

and  their  feet  before  offering  sacrifices.  There  is 
no  allusion  in  the  ceremonial  law  to  any  practice 
bearing  even  a  remote  resemblance  to  any  thing 
like  modern  immersions.  On  the  contrary,  we 
know  that  “purifying” — the  name  given  to  John’s 
baptism  in  the  controversy  above  alluded  to  be¬ 
tween  his  disciples  and  the  Jews,  in  the  case  of 
purification  from  contact  with  a  dead  body  (see 
Numbers  xix) — was  performed  by  sprinkling  water 
with  a  hyssop  branch.  The  purifying  of  the  leper 
was  also  by  sprinkling  the  blood  of  the  slain  bird 
upon  the  person  to  be  cleansed.  The  Psalmist 
says,  “  Purge  me  with  hyssop  and  I  shall  be 
clean;”  and  St.  Paul  says,  “When  Moses  had 
spoken  every  precept  to  all  the  people  according 
to  the  law,  he  took  the  blood  of  calves,  and  of 
goats,  with  water,  and  scarlet  wool,  and  hyssop, 
and  sprinkled  both  the  book  and  all  the  people  ; 
moreover,  he  sprinkled  with  blood  both  the  taber¬ 
nacle  and  all  the  vessels  of  the  ministry ;  and 
almost  all  things  are,  by  the  law,  purged  with 
blood.”  The  point  made  here  is,  that  “puri¬ 
fying,”  which  was  the  idea  of  John’s  baptism, 
whether  it  be  by  water  or  by  blood,  was  performed 
by  sprinkling.  So  far  as  the  mode  of  purifying, 
according  to  Jewish  customs,  was  concerned,  there 
was  nothing  that  even  looked  towards  a  modern 
immersion.  But  it  may  be  said  that  immersion 
was  introduced  into  the  practice  of  proselyte  bap- 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  3  19 

tism  some  time  during  the  four  hundred  years  that 
intervened  betweeen  the  time  of  Malachi  and  the 
coming  of  Christ.  Perhaps  it  was  ;  but  there  is 
no  proof  to  that  effect,  and  it  is  therefore  an  un¬ 
warranted  assumption  to  affirm  it.  And  besides, 
those  who  came  to  John’s  baptism  were  not  pros¬ 
elytes,  but  natural-born  Jews. 

That  John’s  baptism  was  not  immersion  I  infer, 
thirdly,  from  the  vast  number  he  is  said  to  have 
baptized.  Dr.  Hibbard,  in  his  work  on  Baptism, 
quotes  reliable  authorities  on  the  population  of 
Palestine  in  the  times  of  John,  and  determines 
that  it  could  not  be  less  than  six  millions.  He 
maintains  that  “Jerusalem,  and  all  Judea,  and  all 
the  region  round  about  Jordan,”  must  mean  a 
major  part  of  the  people,  but  puts  it  at  one-half — 
three  millions.  John’s  ministry  did  not  last  more 
than  nine  months  ;  the  Doctor  puts  it  at  ten.  He 
allows  six  hours  a  day  for  six  days  in  the  week 
during  which  John  baptized  ;  and  from  these  data 
makes  it  appear  that  there  were  two  thousand 
two  hundred  and  two  persons  baptized  each  hour, 
or  more  than  one  every  two  seconds.  Now,  we 
may  divide  this  number  by  two,  and  then  by  two 
again,  and  the  result  will  still  remain  an  impossi¬ 
bility  ;  for  no  man  can  immerse  one  by  one  five 
hundred  persons  in  an  hour.  But  these  figures 
aside,  and  allowing  that  the  words  of  the  evan¬ 
gelists,  namely,  “  There  went  out  unto  him  all  the 


320 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


land  of  Judea,  and  they  of  Jerusalem,  and  all  the 
region  round  about  Jordan,  and  were  all  baptized 
of  him  in  the  river  Jordan,  confessing  their  sins,” 
are  an  indefinite  hyperbole ;  yet  we  affirm  that 
those  words  are  criminally  misleading  if  there  were 
not  more  persons  baptized  by  John  than  one  man 
could  by  any  possibility  immerse  within  the  time 
given  to  those  baptisms.  Deduct  the  Sabbaths, 
the  time  of  bad  weather,  the  time  necessary  for 
rest,  food,  and  other  personal  attentions,  and  the 
time  necessary  for  public  preaching  and  private 
counsel ;  or  take  the  time  any  man  can  endure  to 
stand  in  three  feet  of  water  and  constantly  im¬ 
merse  the  people  by  plunging  them  wholly  under 
water  and  then  lifting  them  up  out  of  it ;  and  in 
either  case  you  will  obtain  a  result  that  renders  it 
impossible  that  an  accurate,  not  to  say  inspired, 
historian  should  say  that  all  the  people  of  Judea 
were  one  by  one  baptized  in  this  manner  by  one 
single  man. 

That  John’s  baptism  was  not  immersion  I 
infer,  fourthly,  from  the  fact  that  he  himself 
compared  it  unto  the  baptism  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 
“  I  indeed  have  baptized  you  with  water ;  but  he 
shall  baptize  you  with  the  Holy  Ghost.”  It  is 
not  claimed  here  that  John  foresaw  the  scenes  of 
Pentecost ;  but  it  is  claimed  that  he  knew  some¬ 
thing  of  the  Spirit’s  influence  upon  the  hearts  and 
minds  of  men.  And  beyond  all  doubt  it  is  of  this 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  32  I 

baptism,  the  Spirit’s  saving,  purifying  presence 
and  power  in  the  human  heart,  that  he  here 
speaks.  But  suppose  him  to  speak  of  the  Spirit’s 
baptism  in  any  sense  in  which  it  is  real  and  actual, 
the  argument  is  the  same.  There  is  no  such  thing 
as  an  application  of  man  to  the  Spirit ;  but  in  any 
spiritual  baptism  the  Spirit  is  applied  to  the  man. 
John  said,  I  indeed  have  administered  to  you  the 
outward  sign  of  purification  ;  but  he  shall  admin¬ 
ister  the  inward  cleansing.  Is  it  said  that  the 
preposition  “  en”  should  have  been  translated 
“in?”  we  reply,  The  use  of  “  en”  before  the 
words  “  Holy  Ghost  ”  proves  that  here  and  else¬ 
where  “with”  properly  translates  the  particle  en 
in  all  such  construction  as  is  here  used. 

To  suggest  that  the  baptism  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
is  by  immersion  is  to  strain  a  point  to  an  extent 
that  is  positively  ludicrous.  The  thing  signified 
bears  no  resemblance  to  the  sign  employed  if  that 
sign  was  immersion.  Perhaps  John’s  comparison 
did  not  relate  at  all  to  the  mode  of  the  baptisms  ; 
if  so,  this  argument  goes  for  nothing.  But  to  our 
thought  there  is  upon  the  surface  of  the  compari¬ 
son  such  a  parallelism  as  includes  the  mode  ;  if  so, 
John’s  baptism  was  not  immersion. 

Objections.  It  is  asked,  Why  did  John  bap¬ 
tize  in  Jordan?  And  how  do  you  account  for  it 
that  it  is  said  that  he  baptized  in  Enon  because 
there  was  much  water  there,  if  baptism  does  not 


322 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


require  a  large  quantity  of  water,  or  if  it  is  by 
sprinkling  or  pouring?  We  reply,  Large  out-door 
assemblies,  remote  from  home,  and  continuing  to¬ 
gether  for  days,  require  abundant  water  for  drink¬ 
ing,  for  cooking,  and  for  cleanliness ;  and  especially 
are  large  quantities  required  for  die  beasts  that 
bear  the  people  and  their  burdens  from  their 
homes  to  the  place  of  gathering  on  such  occa¬ 
sions.  In  Palestine  places  sufficiently  supplied 
with  water  for  large  encampments  were  not  nu¬ 
merous.  During  the  height  of  John’s  popularity, 
probably  no  locality  except  the  banks  of  Jordan  fur¬ 
nished  a  sufficient  supply  of  water  for  so  large  an 
assembly.  As  soon,  however,  as  the  many  waters 
of  Enon,  though  not  so  abundant  as  those  of  Jor¬ 
dan,  were  sufficient  for  the  diminishing  crowds  that 
attended  his  ministry  (the  people  were  now  attend¬ 
ing  Christ’s  ministry,  and  being  baptized  by  his 
disciples)  he  removed  to  Enon,  because  its  spring 
water  was  purer  than  the  turbid  waters  of  Jordan. 
Quality,  and  not  quantity,  was  the  cause  of  his 
removal,  which  clearly  indicates  that  the  “  much 
water  there”  was  chosen  because  of  its  adapta¬ 
tion  to  culinary,  rather  than  its  necessity  for  bap¬ 
tismal,  purposes. 

Well,  but  how  about  their  going  down  into 
Jordan?  Jordan  is  a  variable  stream;  its  swell¬ 
ings  are  proverbially  great.  It  has  banks  within 
banks,  so  that  for  a  large  part  of  the  year  a  large 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


323 


multitude  of  people  might  stand  dry-shod  in  the 
bed  of  the  river.  Going  “down  into  Jordan,”  or 
“baptized  in  Jordan,”  does  not  necessarily  mean 
going  down  wholly  under  water,  nor  even  into  the 
water  at  all.  If  the  people  passed  in  procession 
by  the  Baptist,  he  himself  standing  where  he  could 
frequently  dip  his  hyssop  branch  in  the  running 
stream,  and  if  he  sprinkled  them  as  they  passed, 
historical  accuracy  would  be  preserved  if  the  his¬ 
torian  should  say  they  were  all  baptized  in  Jordan. 
This  construction,  of  course,  presupposes  that  the 
baptism  was  by  sprinkling.  If  it  were  antece¬ 
dently  proved  that  baptism  equals  immersion,  then 
it  must  be  admitted  the  form  of  the  expression 
would  correspond,  and  the  history  must  be  so  in¬ 
terpreted.  But  conceiving  as  we  do  that  it  was 
impossible  for  John  to  immerse  the  multitude  he 
is  said  to  have  baptized,  the  above  construction  is, 
to  say  the  least,  not  only  possible,  but  also  plausi¬ 
ble.  The  form  of  the  expression,  taken  by  itself 
alone,  appears  to  give  the  case  to  the  Baptists  ; 
but  all  the  facts  taken  into  account  make  it  neces¬ 
sary  to  give  another  construction  to  the  record. 
The  whole  question  in  a  nutshell  is,  Do  the  words, 
“they  were  all  baptized  in  Jordan,”  prove  immer¬ 
sion  so  conclusively  that  all  antagonizing  consid¬ 
erations  must  give  place  ?  or  may  these  words  be 
satisfactorily  explained  otherwise?  We  deem  the 
above  an  answer. 


324 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


“And  Jesus,  when  he  was .  baptized,  went  up 
straightway  out  of  the  water.”  Every  mere  tyro 
in  Greek  knows  that  the  word  “  apo"  here  trans¬ 
lated  “out  of,”  ought  to  be  “from;”  and  with  this 
translation  the  passage  proves  nothing  in  favor 
of  immersion.  “  Having  been  baptized,  Jesus  went 
straightway  from  the  water,”  is  a  literal  translation 
of  the  passage,  and  therefore  nothing  more  need 
be  said  in  this  connection  about  it. 

2.  The  Pentecostal  Baptisms.  “And  they  were 
all  filled  with  the  Holy  Ghost.  This  is  that  which 
was  spoken  by  the  prophet  Joel;  It  shall  come 
to  pass  in  the  last  days,  saith  God,  I  will  pour 
out  of  my  Spirit  upon  all  flesh ;  on  my  servants 
and  on  my  handmaidens  I  will  pour  out  in  those 
days  of  my  Spirit,  and  they  shall  prophesy.  Then 
Peter  said  unto  them,  Repent,  and  be  baptized 
every  one  of  you  in  the  name  of  Jesus  Christ  for 
the  remission  of  sins,  and  ye  shall  receive  the  gift 
of  the  Holy  Ghost.  Then  they  that  gladly  received 
his  word  were  baptized  ;  and  the  same  day  there 
were  added  unto  them  about  three  thousand 
souls.”  There  are  here  four  distinct  things,  each 
of  which,  both  here  and  in  other  Scriptures  refer¬ 
ring  to  what  is  here  recorded,  is  called  a  baptism. 
‘They  were  all  filled  with  the  Holy  Ghost.”  This 
is  a  fulfillment  of  what  Christ  had  said  to  them  a 
few  days  previously,  after  his  resurrection  and  be¬ 
fore  his  ascension,  “John  truly  baptized  with  water, 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  325 

but  ye  shall  be  baptized  with  the  Holy  Ghost  not 
many  days  hence.”  “  And  there  appeared  unto 
them  cloven  tongues  like  as  of  fire.”  This  is  a 
fulfillment  of  John’s  prophecy,  “  He  shall  baptize 
you  with  the  Holy  Ghost  and  with  fire;"  or  that 
prophecy  was  never  fulfilled,  so  far  as  we  know 
These  two  evidently  have  special  and  direct  refer¬ 
ence  to  miraculous  gifts ;  for  it  is  said  in  imme¬ 
diate  connection,  “And  they  began  to  speak 
with  other  tongues  as  the  Spirit  gave  them  utter¬ 
ance.”  Then  there  is  the  baptism  with  water, 
which  Peter  exhorted  the  people  every  one  of 
them  to  receive.  This  was  the  initiatory  rite 
which  Christ  commissioned  his  disciples  to  ad¬ 
minister  to  all  disciples  unto  the  end  of  the 
world.  Lastly,  Peter  said,  “Repent,  and  be  bap¬ 
tized  every  one  of  you,  and  ye  shall  receive  the 
gift  of  the  Holy  Ghost.”  This  refers,  beyond 
doubt,  to  the  saving  influence  of  the  Spirit,  which 
is  vouchsafed  unto  all  believers  throughout  the 
world  unto  the  end  of  time.  These  are  each  of 
them  called  a  baptism.  The  one,  the  reception  of 
the  gift  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  is  that  in  which  all 
believers  are  more  especially  interested,  and  it  is 
that  which  is  signified  by  the  baptism  with  water. 
Now,  this  baptism  with  the  Holy  Ghost,  whether 
it  refer  to  the  bestowment  of  miraculous  gifts  or 
to  the  saving,  regenerating  influence  exerted  in 
the  minds  of  men,  is  here  and  elsewhere  spoken 


326 


ECCLESiOLOGY. 


of  as  a  somewhat  “poured  out,”  “shed  forth,” 
“sprinkled  upon;”  but  never  as  a  somewhat  in 
which  the  people  are  immersed.  “This  is  that 
which  was  spoken  by  the  prophet  Joel.  And  it 
shall  come  to  pass  in  the  last  days,  saith  God,  I 
will  pour  out  of  my  Spirit  upon  all  flesh ;  and  on 
my  servants  and  on  my  handmaidens  I  will  pour 
out  in  those  days  of  my  Spirit.  Therefore,  being 
by  the  right  hand  of  God  exalted,  and  having  re¬ 
ceived  of  the  Father  the  promise  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  he  hath  shed  forth  this  which  ye  now  see 
and  hear.”  All  these  forms  of  speech,  “pour 
out,”  “shed  forth,”  “sprinkle  upon,”  are,  of 
course,  figurative  illustrations.  The  Holy  Ghost 
is  a  person,  and  he  enlightens,  persuades,  and 
sanctifies  men  by  a  direct  exertion  of  personal 
powers  and  influences  ;  and,  so  far  as  we  know, 
the  manner  of  his  operations  has  no  analogy  in 
any  thing  material.  But  the  Holy  One  has  chosen 
water  baptism  as  a  sign  or  representative  of  the 
Spirit’s  work,  and  has  frequently  spoken  of  the 
Spirit  as  poured  out,  shed  forth,  sprinkled  upon, 
and  never  as  a  somewhat  to  be  immersed  in ;  so 
that,  so  far  forth  as  the  relation  of  the  signified 
and  the  signifier  has  any  bearing  upon  the  mode 
of  the  latter,  the  argument  is  wholly  against  im¬ 
mersion.  Other  passages  of  Scripture,  in  which 
the  Spirit’s  baptism  is  spoken  of,  will  be  briefly 
referred  to  further  on. 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  327 

The  remark,  that  at  the  Pentecostal  baptism 
the  people  were  immersed  in  the  Spirit,  put  forth, 
because  it  is  said  all  the  house  in  which  they  were 
sitting  was  filled,  is  a  manifestly  desperate  resort. 
It  would  be  unworthy  of  respect,  even  if  the  record 
had  said  that  the  house  was  filled  with  the  Spirit  ; 
but  it  does  not  so  say.  The  house  was  filled 
“with  a  sound  as  of  a  rushing,  mighty  wind” — it 
was  the  people  who  were  “filled  with  the  Spirit.” 

In  respect  to  the  pentecostal  baptism  with 
water  nothing  more  than  has  been  already  said  in 
these  pages  bears  upon  the  question  of  mode. 
Since  in  regeneration  that  which  is  signified  in 
baptism,  the  Spirit,  is  said  to  be  poured  out  upon 
us,  it  seems  appropriate  that  in  water  baptism  that 
which  is  the  sign  of  regeneration,  the  water,  should 
be  poured  upon  the  persons  baptized — all  analogy 
or  resemblance  in  this  case  is  adverse  to  the  idea 
of  immersion.  What  was  said  about  the  impossi¬ 
bility  of  John’s  baptizing  by  immersion  the  multi¬ 
tudes  he  did  baptize  is  applicable  here.  It  is  not 
possible  for  twelve  men  to  baptize  three  thousand 
persons,  one  by  one,  immersing  them  wholly  under 
water  in  the  time  the  record  allows  for  the  admin¬ 
istration  of  the  ordinance.  Fix  a  reasonable  time 
for  the  assembling  of  the  hundred  and  thirty, 
allow  some  time  for  their  sitting  together  of  one 
accord  in  that  one  place,  then  compute  the  time 
necessary  for  the  circulation  of  the  report  through 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


328 

the  city  concerning  the  marvelous  events  which 
had  occurred,  add  the  time  necessary  for  the 
assembling  of  the  thousands,  for  the  arrangements 
necessary  to  bring  the  audience  within  the  hearing 
of  Peter’s  voice,  for  the  sermon  preached,  for  the 
inquiries  of  the  convicted,  for  Peter’s  instructions 
to  them,  and  for  their  separation  from  the  multi¬ 
tude,  and  then  see  if  it  is  conceivable  that,  on  that 
same  day,  after  all  these  occurrences,  the  adminis¬ 
trators  and  the  candidates  could  make  the  neces¬ 
sary  preparations  for  a  proper  administration  of 
baptism  by  immersion,  and  then  resort  to  some 
place  where  there  was  sufficient  water  and  other 
conveniences  necessary  for  the  baptism  of  such  a 
multitude,  and,  I  say,  see  if  it  is  conceivable  that 
then  and  there,  at  that  late  hour  of  the  day,  twelve 
men  could  immerse  three  thousand  persons. 

Again,  what  evidence  is  there  that  there  was 
any  place  in  Jerusalem  where  so  many  people  could 
be  immersed  ?  Do  you  say  the  pools  ?  What  is 
the  probability,  supposing  that  they  were  ade¬ 
quate,  that  the  authorities  would  have  allowed 
them  to  be  used  for  such  a  purpose  ?  Why  does 
not  the  record  contain  some  intimation  of  so  im¬ 
portant  a  part  of  the  movement  ?  How  many 
went  to  Siloam  and  how  many  to  Bethesda  ?  By 
what  arrangement  was  the  company  divided  ?  If 
one  pool  was  sufficient,  which  was  it?  Did  all  go 
to  Bethesda  ?  Is  it  not  strange  that  so  prominent 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


329 


an  event,  so  sublime  a  scene,  a  part  of  the  trans¬ 
action  so  essential,  according  to  the  doctrine  of 
the  exclusive  immersionists,  to  the  validity  of  the 
ordinance,  a  mention  of  which  would  have  settled 
this  question  for  all  time  ;  is  it  not  strange  that 
there  is  a  total  absence  of  even  the  remotest  allu¬ 
sion  to  any  thing  of  the  kind  ?  Is  it  said  that 
possibly  the  baptism  took  place  on  some  subse¬ 
quent  day  ?  we  reply,  that  the  record  says  the 
same  day  there  were  added  about  three  thousand 
souls  ;  of  course  were  added  to  the  Church,  and 
that  by  the  initiatory  rite — no  other  idea  is  admis¬ 
sible.  And,  again,  it  is  said  the  Lord  added  daily 
such  as  should  be  saved  ;  so  that  soon  after  it  is 
said  that  the  number  of  the  men  was  about  five 
thousand  ;  beyond  doubt  the  converts  of  each  day 
were  discipled  on  the  day  of  their  conversion. 

3.  The  Baptism  of  the  Eunuch . — “  And  they 
went  down  both  into  the  water,  both  Philip  and  the 
eunuch,  and  he  baptized  him ;  and  when  they  were 
come  up  out  of  the  water  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord 
caught  away  Philip.”  The  point  at  issue  in  re¬ 
spect  to  this  passage  is,  as  to  the  meaning  of  the 
terms  “went  down  into  the  water”  and  “come  up 
out  of  the  water.”  Plainly,  neither  of  these  terms 
describes  the  act  of  baptism  or  any  part  of  it,  for 
the  baptism  took  place  after  both  had  “  gone  down 
into  the  water,”  and  before  they  “  came  up  out  of 
the  water.”  And,  again,  both  went  down  and 


330 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


both  came  up,  so  that  if  these  expressions  describe 
baptism,  Philip  must  have  baptized  himself  as  well 
as  the  eunuch.  This  is  so  evident  that  probably 
no  one  would  claim  that  the  expressions  themselves 
prove  any  thing  as  to  the  mode  of  baptism ;  but  it 
is  claimed  that  they  imply  immersion,  since  they 
teach  that  both  went  farther  than  would  be  needful 
for  sprinkling  or  pouring.  No  Greek  scholar  would 
rely  upon  this  :  for  the  word  eis,  translated  “into,” 
when  used  as  it  is  used  hi  this  passage,  properly 
and  generally  signifies  “to” — simply  direction  to¬ 
ward  a  place;  and  the  word  ek,  translated  “out 
of,”  should  be  translated  “from,”  as  direction  from 
a  place  is  its  proper  meaning.  Where  entrance 
into  is  signified,  the  particle  eis  is  prefixed  to  the 
verb,  and  repeated  after  it  as  a  preposition  ;  where 
simply  direction  towards  is  the  idea,  the  word  is 
used  alone  as  a  preposition,  precisely  as  it  is  used 
in  the  passage  under  discussion.  John  xx,  i— 8, 
illustrates  and  proves  this  rule.  When  the  disci¬ 
ples  went  to  the  sepulcher  and  did  not  go  in,  the 
word  eis  is  used  precisely  as  it  is  here  used,  when 
it  is  said  Philip  and  the  eunuch  went  down  to 
the  water  ;  and  when  it  is  said  that  they  went  into 
the  sepulcher,  the  other  form  of  speech,  eiselthen 
eis ,  is  employed ;  the  particle  is  prefixed  to  the 
verb  and  is  repeated  after  it.  The  term  ek  in  the 
antithesis  of  eis  corresponds  with  this  difference ; 
thus,  when  eis  means  “to,”  ek  means  “from;” 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  331 

when  eis  is  repeated,  and  the  idea  of  “into”  is 
expressed,^  means  “out  of.”  The  passage  then 
simply  affirms  that  both  Philip  and  the  eunuch 
went  down  out  of  the  chariot  to  the  water,  and 
Philip  baptized  the  eunuch  ;  and  when  they  were 
come  from  the  water,  and  were  about  to  take  seats 
in  the  chariot,  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  caught  away 
Philip,  and  the  eunuch  went  on  his  way  rejoicing. 
There  is  no  immersion  here,  neither  in  the  forms 
of  expression  in  the  text,  nor  in  the  circumstances 
of  the  case ;  contrariwise,  the  probabilities  are 
against  a  chance  finding  in  that  desert  of  a  quan¬ 
tity  of  water  sufficient  for  immersion  ;  and  also 
against  the  supposition  that  the  parties  had  any 
change  of  apparel  or  other  preparation  for  such 
an  exercise. 

4.  Miscellaneous  References  to  Baptism — Buried 
in  Baptism. — Romans  vi :  “Know  ye  not  that  so 
many  of  us  as  were  baptized  into  Jesus  Christ 
were  baptized  into  his  death  ?  Therefore,  we 
are  buried  with  him  by  baptism  into  death.” 
Colossians  ii :  “  In  whom  also  ye  are  circumcised 
with  the  circumcision  made  without  hands  ;  buried 
with  him  in  baptism,  wherein  also  ye  are  risen  with 
him  through  the  faith  of  the  operation  of  God.” 

These  two  passages  are  parallel ;  they  speak 
of  the  same  thing.  What  that  thing  is,  is  obvious 
from  the  passages  themselves  and  from  their  con¬ 
texts.  In  Romans  the  topic  of  discourse  is  the 


332 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


doctrine  of  justification  by  faith.  The  passage 
quoted  is  a  part  of  Paul’s  reply  to  the  objection 
that  this  doctrine,  by  offering  forgiveness  on  easy 
terms,  is  an  encouragement  to  “  continue  in  sin;" 
and  the  reply  in  substance  is  that  Christians  in 
baptism  renounce  sin,  become  dead  to  it,  and  enter 
covenant  obligations  to  keep  all  God’s  holy  com¬ 
mandments.  Those  who  are  baptized  into  Christ — 
that  is,  Christians — are  dead  to  sin  and  alive  unto 
God.  In  Colossians  Christians  are  declared  to  be 
complete  in  Christ,  in  whom  they  are  circumcised 
without  hands,  which  consists  in  putting  off  the 
body  of  sins,  becoming  dead  to  sin  ;  that  is,  regen¬ 
erated — which  regeneration  is  represented  by  bap¬ 
tism.  Now,  it  is  obvious  that  the  idea  of  a  burial 
is  figurative,  for  there  is  no  literal  burial  in  the 
case.  Is  it  said  that  the  burial  of  Christ  is  literal, 
and  that  that  is  the  thing  represented  by  baptism  ? 
We  reply,  There  is  no  such  thing  in  the  text. 
The  thing  represented  is  a  spiritual  circumcision, 
a  putting  off  of  the  body  of  sins.  Again,  Christ’s 
'  body  never  was  so  buried  as  to  be  represented 
by  immersion ;  again,  baptism  never  represents 
Christ’s  death — the  Supper  does  that :  and  again, 
the  planting  of  the  next  verse,  and  the  crucifixion 
of  the  verse  following,  must  be  just  as  literal  as 
the  burial  of  the  passage  in  discussion.  The  ob¬ 
vious  fact  is,  that  all  are  figures.  Is  there  any 
argument  for  immersion  in  the  rhetoric  of  the  text  ? 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


333 


Let  us  see.  The  real  thing  said  is  in  substance, 
They  that  are  Christians  have,  by  what  baptism 
represents,  as  effectually  separated  themselves  from 
sin  as  a  dead  and  buried  body  is  separated  from 
the  affairs  of  this  world;  shall  such  a  one  “con¬ 
tinue  in  sin?”  Surely,  there  is  no  immersion  in 
that.  The  mistake  by  which  this  passage  is  made 
to  support  immersion  consists  in  making  baptism 
represent  Christ’s  death.  This  is  evidently  erro¬ 
neous,  and  of  course  the  inference  from  it  is  so  also. 

Baptism  of  Suffering. — “  But  Jesus  said  unto 
them,  Ye  know  not  what  ye  ask:  can  ye  drink  of 
the  cup  that  I  drink  of,  and  be  baptized  with  the 
baptism  that  I  am  baptized  with  ?  With  the  bap¬ 
tism  that  I  am  baptized  withal  shall  ye  be  bap¬ 
tized.”  In  this  passage  the  words  in  question  are 
used  figuratively  to  represent  the  persecutions  and 
martyrdoms  that  Christ  and  his  apostles  would  be 
called  to  endure.  The  idea  expressed  by  the  fig¬ 
ure  is  the  idea  of  being  overwhelmed.  So  that  the 
figure  looks  towards  immersion  in  the  sense  of  a 
large  quantity  of  water  ;  but  it  fails  to  apply  fully, 
because  afflictions  are  waters  into  which  we  do  not 
go  willingly  and  plunge  ourselves,  but  are  waters 
which  come  upon  us.  And  very  great  afflictions 
overwhelm  us.  The  likeness  is  nearer  to  a  drown¬ 
ing  than  to  a  modern  immersion.  Exclusive  im- 
mersionists  are  welcome  to  all  the  argument  there 
is  in  this  figure. 


334 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Baptism  unto  Moses  in  the  Cloud.  “  Moreover, 
brethren,  I  would  not  that  ye  should  be  ignorant, 
how  that  all  our  fathers  were  under  the  cloud  and 
all  passed  through  the  sea ;  and  were  all  baptized 
unto  Moses  in  the  cloud  and  in  the  sea.”  If  the 
apostle  here  affirms  that  the  passage  through  the 
sea  was  a  literal  baptism,  then  our  opponents  must 
give  us  this  text  for  infant  baptism.  Beyond  doubt 
all  the  members  of  all  the  families  of  Israel  were 
alike  under  the  cloud  and  in  the  sea.  If  the  pas¬ 
sage  through  the  sea  were  a  literal  baptism  it  was 
not  immersion,  for  they  were  dry-shod;  if  the 
baptism  were  from  the  cloud  then  the  text  favors 
sprinkling  or  pouring,  since  the  water,  if  it  was 
water,  came  down  upon  the  people  from  above 
them.  They  were  not  plunged  into  the  cloud. 
But,  soberly,  we  see  no  literal  baptism  here  at  all. 
The  word  baptized  is  u§*hd  for  the  thing  it  repre¬ 
sents,  the  consecration  of  one’s  self  to  a  religion. 
The  Israelites,  all  of  them,  when  in  the  sea  and 
under  the  cloud,  that  cloud  which  was  their  shade 
by  day  and  their  light  at  night,  baptized  them¬ 
selves  (the  original  has  this  sense)  unto  Moses  ; 
that  is,  became  disciples  of  that  form  of  religion 
which  Moses  taught. 

Divers  Washings. — Hebrews  ix,  io:  ‘‘Only  in 
meats  and  drinks,  and  divers  washings,  and  carnal 
ordinances.”  The  word  here  translated  “  wash¬ 
ings  ”  is  in  the  original  “baptisms.”  It  refers  to 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


335 


the  water  ablutions  of  the  Jewish  religion.  They 
are  here  said  to  be  diverse  ( diaphorois ),  differing 
from  each  other.  These  water  ablutions,  of  course, 
differed  as  the  subjects  to  which  they  applied  dif¬ 
fer.  Cups  were  not  cleansed  as  the  books,  the 
altar,  the  people  were.  For  the  purifying  of  lepers 
it  was  required  that  they  wash  their  clothes  and 
themselves,  besides  the  sprinkling  with  the  hyssop 
by  the  priest  ;  but  this  was  not  done  at  the  tem¬ 
ple,  but  at  their  homes.  The  purifying  of  the 
people  in  the  temple  was  by  sprinkling :  their 
cleansing  at  home  was  of  the  whole  person,  and 
might  have  been  by  immersion.  So  that,  if  this 
passage  teaches  any  thing  as  to  the  mode  of  bap¬ 
tism  or  purifying,  it  authorizes  the  use  of  such 
modes  as  are  best  adapted  to  the  objects  or  per¬ 
sons  purified,  and  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
purification.  And  this  is  common  sense.  The 
mode  is  nothing  essential.  Any  thing  that  by 
convention  is  understood  to  represent  purification 
is  the  thing  wanted.  That  secured,  all  else  is  cir¬ 
cumstantial,  not  essential. 

The  Washing  of  Cups  and  Pots ,  Brazen  Vessels , 
and  of  Tables. — “The  Pharisees  and  all  the  Jews, 
except  they  wash  their  hands  oft,  eat  not,  holding 
the  traditions  of  the  elders  :  and  when  they  come 
from  the  market,  except  they  wash,  they  eat  not. 
And  many  other  things  there  be  which  they  have 
received  to  hold,  as  the  washing  of  cups  and  pots, 


336 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


brazen  vessels,  and  of  tables.”  In  the  original 
the  first  word  in  this  passage,  translated  “wash,” 
is  nipsontai ;  the  second  is  baptisontai.  The 
word  translated  “washing”  is  in  the  original  bap- 
tismous.  This  proves  conclusively  that  the  word 
bciptizo  and  all  its  derivatives  are  generic  terms,  of 
precisely  the  same  import  as  the  word  wash  and 
its  derivatives.  The  mode  of  the  washing  is  not 
indicated  by  the  term  itself.  This  fact  of  itself  is 
decisive  of  the  whole  controversy  as  to  the  mode. 
But  more  than  this  is  deducible  from  this  pas¬ 
sage.  The  word  translated  “tables”  is  klinon;  this 
means  the  couches  on  which  the  Jews  reclined  at 
their  meals.  That  these  were  not  washed  by  im¬ 
mersion  is  evident  from  the  nature  of  the  case. 
The  cups  were  doubtless  immersed,  as  that  is  the 
most  convenient  method  of  washing  them.  So, 
again,  we  have  here  both  modes  of  baptism.  Again, 
it  is  said  that  when  the  Jews  returned  from  the 
market  they  eat  not  except  they  baptize  them¬ 
selves.  It  is  not  supposable  that  they  fasted  every 
time  they  returned  home  from  business  until  after 
they  had  had  an  opportunity  to  take  a  bath.  And 
again,  the  complaint  of  the  Pharisees  here  against 
Christ’s  disciples  was  not  that  they  had  not  bathed 
their  whole  person,  but  that  they  had  not  washed 
their  hands.  The  water-pots  spoken  of  at  the 
wedding  in  Cana  will  explain  the  method  of  these 
personal  purifications. 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


337 


The  Baptism  at  the  House  of  Cornelius . — “  While 
Peter  yet  spake  these  words,  the  Holy  Ghost  fell 
on  all  them  which  heard  the  word.  Then  Peter 
answered,  Can  any  man  forbid  water,  that  these 
should  not  be  baptized  which  have  received  the 
Holy  Ghost  as  well  as  we?  and  he  commanded 
them  to  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Lord. 
And  as  I  began  to  speak  the  Holy  Ghost  fell  on 
them  as  on  us  at  the  beginning ;  then  remembered 
I  the  word  of  the  Lord,  how  that  he  said,  John 
indeed  baptized  with  water,  but  ye  shall  be  bap¬ 
tized  with  the  Holy  Ghost.”  Here,  as  in  many 
other  places,  water  baptism  is  paralleled  with  the 
baptism  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  the  latter  is  said 
to  fall  upon,  to  be  poured  out  upon,  the  people. 
The  argument  here  is  in  favor  of  effusion. 

The  Vesture  Dipped  in  Blood.— Rev .  xix,  13  : 
“And  he  was  clothed  with  a  vesture  dipped  in 
blood,  and  his  name  is  called  The  Word  of  God.” 
Here  the  word  translated  “dipped”  is  “ bebam- 
menonf  perfect  passive  participle  from  bapto.  If, 
as  is  quite  certain,  there  is  an  allusion  to  Isaiah, 
where  he  that  cometh  from  Edom  with  dyed  gar¬ 
ments  from  Bozrah  says,  “Their  blood  shall  be 
sprinkled  upon  my  garments,  and  I  will  stain  all 
my  raiment,”  then  the  passage  teaches  the  same 
as  above  that  bapto  is  generic.  And  as  a  warrior 
never  immerses  his  garments  in  the  blood  of  his 

enemies,  but  in  the  conflict  is  frequently  besprinkled 
c  22 


33» 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


therewith,  the  use  of  the  term  bapto  in  this  pas¬ 
sage  favors  sprinkling. 

The  Promise  of  the  Spirit ,  and  its  Fulfillment . — 
“  I  will  pour  water  upon  him  that  is  thirsty,  and 
floods  upon  the  dry  ground ;  I  will  pour  my  Spirit 
upon  thy  seed,  and  my  blessing  upon  thine  off¬ 
spring.  It  is  time  to  seek  the  Lord  till  he  come 
and  rain  righteousness  upon  you.  He  shall  come 
down  like  rain  upon  the  mown  grass.  Then  will 
I  sprinkle  clean  water  upon  you,  and  ye  shall  be 
clean ;  and  from  all  your  filthiness  and  your  idols 
will  I  cleanse  you.  Wash  me  thoroughly  from 
mine  iniquity,  and  cleanse  me  from  my  sin.  Purge 
me  with  hyssop,  and  I  shall  be  clean  ;  wash  me, 
and  I  shall  be  whiter  than  snow.  The  washing 
of  regeneration  and  the  renewing  of  the  Holy 
Ghost  which  he  shed  on  us  abundantly  through 
Jesus  Christ/’  In  these  and  many  other  passages 
of  Holy  Writ  the  renewing  of  the  soul  in  regen¬ 
eration  by  the  Holy  Ghost  is  figuratively  repre¬ 
sented  by  the  use  of  water — always  sprinkled  or 
poured  or  shed  upon  the  people,  never  by  the 
people  immersed  in  water. 

POST-APOSTOLIC  PRACTICE. 

It  is  conceded  that  immersion  was  sometimes 
practiced  in  Christian  Churches  in  very  early 
times.  To  account  for  this  satisfactorily,  on  the 
supposition  that  it  was  never  practiced  during  the 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM. 


339 


apostolic  age,  is  of  course  impossible  ;  for  if  the 
records  of  history  furnished  reliable  and  conclu¬ 
sive  testimony  as  to  the  origin  of  the  practice 
there  could  be  no  controversy  or  difference  of 
opinion  respecting  it.  The  absence,  however,  of 
any  note  of  an  innovation  on  this  subject  has  not 
the  same  bearing  as  such  an  absence  in  the  case 
of  infant  baptism  ;  for  a  change  in  mode,  it  being 
conceded  that  it  was  non-essential,  is  a  very  dif¬ 
ferent  thing  from  the  admission  to  the  ordinance 
itself  of  a  whole  class  of  persons  previously  ex¬ 
cluded.  Again,  let  it  be  remembered  that  admit¬ 
ting  that  something  very  like  immersion,  or  even 
the  thing  itself,  was  sometimes  practiced  in  apos¬ 
tolic  times,  is  not  the  same  as  admitting  that  it 
was  the  only  mode  of  baptism,  and  therefore  es¬ 
sential  to  the  validity  of  the  ordinance.  If  this  be 
admitted,  then  of  course  the  difficulty  in  account¬ 
ing  for  the  fact  of  immersion  in  the  early  Chris¬ 
tian  Church  disappears,  and  the  difficulty  in  the 
case  assumes  another  form. 

It  is  contrary  to  all  a  priori  probabilities  that 
the  practice  of  the  same  persons  in  such  an  ordi¬ 
nance  as  baptism  should  be  different  in  any  prom¬ 
inent  particular  at  different  times ;  yet  greater 
improbabilities  than  this  are  sometimes  actual 
facts.  There  is  at  least  no  absurdity  in  the  sup¬ 
position  that  something  very  like  to  immersion  was 
in  some  way  connected  with  the  baptismal  service 


I 


34O  ECCLESIOLOGY. 

in  apostolic  times,  and  that  at  the  same  time  the 
service  itself  in  its  essential  particular  was  some¬ 
thing  else — -was  not  immersion,  but  sprinkling  or 
pouring,  or  either.  But  again,  this  difficulty  of 
accounting  for  the  existence  of  immersion  in  the 
Church  on  the  supposition  that  it  is  not  essential 
to  baptism  may  be  retorted.  On  the  supposition 
that  it  is  essential,  how  is  the  origin  of  sprinkling 
and  the  belief  in  its  validity  to  be  accounted  for  ? 
Here  is  a  balance  of  difficulties,  and  perhaps  it 
were  well  to  leave  it,  but  not  quite  yet.  Once 
again :  in  very  early  times  baptism  was  trinal ;  the 
candidate  was  naked  during  the  service,  and  wore 
white  garments  till  the  Sabbath  following ;  the 
priest  caused  him  to  taste  salt,  anointed  him  with 
oil,  and  gave  him  milk  and  honey,  and  exorcism 
and  abjuration  was  used  to  drive  evil  spirits  both 
from  the  water  and  also  from  the  candidates.  If 
such  things  could  be  early  introduced  into  the 
practice  of  the  Church  without  any  record  of  oppo¬ 
sition  to  the  innovation,  perhaps  even  immersion 
might  have  been.  Again,  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  for  hundreds  of  years  of  Christian  history 
immersion  has  been  the  practice  of  but  a  small 
minority  of  the  Christian  Church. 

We  have  endeavored  to  condense  this  discus¬ 
sion  within  as  narrow  limits  as  seemed  suitable  in 
view  of  the  interest  which  the  subject  has  actually 
awakened  in  the  Church,  and  think  we  have  done 


MODE  OF  CHRISTIAN  BAPTISM.  34 1 

so.  And  yet  we  have  at  least  a  slight  conviction 
that  an  apology  is  due  for  the  amount  of  attention 
given  to  it.  For  to  our  own  thought,  unless  it  can 
be  clearly  shown  that  immersion  is  divinely  com¬ 
manded,  it  is  evident  that  the  mode  is  not  an 
essential  element  in  the  ordinance. 

We  conclude  that  water  applied  in  the  name  of 
the  Trinity  by  a  proper  administrator  to  a  proper 
candidate,  with  a  proper  purpose  and  intent  on 
the  part  of  all  parties  concerned,  is  Christian 
baptism. 

We  also  conclude  that  the  mode  may  be  de¬ 
termined  by  the  Church  in  convention  as  circum¬ 
stances  may  seem  to  require,  or,  as  things  are 
now  in  these  our  times,  by  each  individual  for 
himself.  “  Let  every  adult  person  and  the  parents 
of  every  child  to  be  baptized  have  the  choice  either 
of  immersion,  sprinkling,  or  pouring.  It  is  not 
necessary  that  rites  and  ceremonies  should  in  all 
places  be  the  same,  or  exactly  alike ;  for  they  have 
been  always  different,  and  may  be  changed  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  diversity  of  countries,  times,  and 
men’s  manners,  so  that  nothing  be  ordained  against 
God’s  Word.  Whosoever,  through  his  private 
judgment,  willingly  and  purposely  doth  openly 
break  the  rites  and  ceremonies  of  the  Church  to 
which  he  belongs,  which  are  not  repugnant  to  the 
Word  of  God,  and  are  ordained  and  approved  by 
common  authority,  ought  to  be  rebuked  openly, 


342 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


that  others  may  fear  to  do  the  like,  as  one  that 
offendeth  against  the  common  order  of  the  Church, 
and  woundeth  the  consciences  of  weak  brethren. 
Every  particular  Church  may  ordain,  change,  or 
abolish  rites  and  ceremonies,  so  that  all  things 
may  be  done  to  edification. ”  (Methodist  Disci¬ 
pline.) 


CHAPTER  VII. 


The  Lord’s-supper. 

“And  as  they  were  eating,  Jesus  took  bread 
and  blessed  it,  and  brake  it,  and  gave  it  to  the  dis¬ 
ciples,  and  said,  Take,  eat,  this  is  my  body.  And 
he  took  the  cup  and  gave  thanks,  and  gave  it  to 
them,  saying,  Drink  ye  all  of  it,  for  this  is  my 
blood  of  the  new  testament,  which  is  shed  for 
many,  for  the  remission  of  sins.  But  I  say  unto 
you,  I  will  not  drink  henceforth  of  the  fruit  of  the 
vine,  until  that  day  when  I  drink  it  new  with  you 
in  my  Father’s  kingdom.  And  when  they  had 
sung  a  hymn,  they  went  out  into  the  mount  of 
Olives.”  (Matt,  xxvi,  25-30.) 

“And  as  they  did  eat,  Jesus  took  bread,  and 
blessed,  and  brake  it,  and  gave  to  them,  and 
said,  Take,  eat ;  this  is  my  body.  And  he  took 
the  cup,  and  when  he  had  given  thanks,  he  gave  it 
to  them  :  and  they  all  drank  of  it.  And  he  said 
unto  them,  This  is  my  blood  of  the  new  testament, 
which  is  shed  for  many.  Verily  I  say  unto  you,  I 

will  drink  no  more  of  the  fruit  of  the  vine,  until 

343 


344 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


that  day  that  I  drink  it  new  in  the  kingdom  ot 
God.  And  when  they  had  sung  a  hymn,  they 
went  out  into  the  mount  of  Olives.”  (Mark 
xiv,  22—26.) 

“  And  he  took  bread,  and  gave  thanks,  and 
brake  it,  and  gave  unto  them,  saying,  This  is  my 
body  which  is  given  for  you  :  this  do  in  remem¬ 
brance  of  me.  Likewise  also  the  cup  after  supper, 
saying,  This  cup  is  the  new  testament  in  my  blood, 
which  is  shed  for  you.”  (Luke  xxii,  19,  20.) 

“  I  have  received  of  the  Lord  that  which  also  I 
delivered  unto  you,  That  the  Lord  Jesus,  the  same 
night  in  which  he  was  betrayed,  took  bread  :  and 
when  he  had  given  thanks  he  brake  it,  and  said, 
Take,  eat ;  this  is  my  body,  which  is  broken  for 
you  :  this  do  in  remembrance  of  me.  After  the 
same  manner  also  he  took  the  cup,  when  he  had 
supped,  saying,  This  cup  is  the  new  testament  in 
my  blood  :  this  do  ye,  as  oft  as  ye  drink  it,  in  re¬ 
membrance  of  me.  For  as  often  as  ye  eat  this 
bread  and  drink  this  cup,  ye  do  show  the  Lord’s 
death  till  he  come.  Wherefore,  whosoever  shall 
eat  this  bread  and  drink  this  cup  of  the  Lord,  un¬ 
worthily,  shall  be  guilty  of  the  body  and  blood  of 
the  Lord.  But  let  a  man  examine  himself,  and  so 
let  him  eat  of  that  bread,  and  drink  of  that  cup ; 
for  he  that  eateth  and  drinketh  unworthily,  eateth 
and  drinketh  damnation  to  himself,  not  discerning 
the  Lord’s  body.”  (1  Cor.  xi,  23-29.) 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


345 


“The  Supper  of  the  Lord  is  not  only  a  sign  of 
the  love  that  Christians  ought  to  have  among 
themselves,  one  to  another,  but  rather  i-s  a  sacra¬ 
ment  of  our  redemption  by  Christ’s  death  ;  inso¬ 
much  that,  to  such  as  rightly,  worthily,  and  with 
faith  receive  the  same,  the  bread  which  we  break 
is  a  partaking  of  the  body  of  Christ ;  and  likewise 
the  cup  of  blessing  is  a  partaking  of  the  blood  of 
Christ.  Transubstantiation,  or  the  change  of  the 
substance  of  bread  and  wine  in  the  Supper  of  the 
Lord,  can  not  be  proved  by  Holy  Writ,  but  is 
repugnant  to  the  plain  word  of  Scripture,  over- 
throweth  the  nature  of  a  sacrament,  and  hath 
given  occasion  to  many  superstitions.  The  body 
of  Christ  is  given,  taken,  and  eaten  in  the  Sup¬ 
per  only  after  a  heavenly  and  spiritual  manner. 
And  the  means  whereby  the  body  of  Christ  is  re¬ 
ceived  and  eaten  in  the.  Supper  is  faith.  The  sac¬ 
rament  of  the  Lord’s-supper  was  not  by  Christ’s 
ordinance  reserved,  carried  about,  lifted  up,  or 
worshiped.  The  cup  ol  the  Lord  is  not  to  be 
denied  to  the  lay  people  ;  for  both  the  parts  of  the 
Lord’s-supper,  by  Christ’s  ordinance  and  com¬ 
mandment,  ought  to  be  administered  to  all  Chris¬ 
tians  alike.  The  offering  of  Christ,  once  made,  is 
that  perfect  redemption,  propitiation,  and  satisfac¬ 
tion  for  all  the  sins  of  the  whole  world,  both  origi¬ 
nal  and  actual,  and  there  is  none  other  satisfaction 
for  sin  but  that  alone.  Wherefore  the  sacrifice  of 


346 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


masses,  in  which  it  is  commonly  said  that  the  priest 
doth  offer  Christ  for  the  quick  and  the  dead  to 
have  remission  of  pain  or  guilt,  is  a  blasphemous 
fable  and  dangerous  deceit.”  (Methodist  Disci¬ 
pline,  Articles  of  Religion.) 

The  Scriptures  above  quoted  show  that  the 
Lord’s-supper  is  a  divine  institution,  appointed  to 
be  perpetuated,  observed,  and  repeated  in  the 
Church  until  the  end  of  time.  This  is  evident 
upon  the  surface  of  the  passages  themselves.  The 
purpose  and  intent  thereof  require  its  repetition. 
The  circumstances  attending  its  institution,  espe¬ 
cially  the  obvious  intent  that  it  should  be  sub¬ 
stituted  for  the  passover,  a  Jewish  institution  annu¬ 
ally  observed,  plainly  show  the  same  thing.  That 
it  was  a  divine  requirement,  a  command  of  the 
Master,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  apostles 
so  understood  it,  and  accordingly  adopted  it  imme¬ 
diately  as  a  part  of  divine  service.  It  is  said  of 
the  disciples,  after  the  day  of  Pentecost,  that 
“they  continued  steadfastly  in  the  apostles’  doc¬ 
trine  and  fellowship,  and  in  breaking  of  bread  and 
prayers.”  It  is  quite  probable  that  a  communion 
service  was  at  first  observed  at  every  meeting. 
The  declaration  of  Paul  that  he  had  received  of  the 
Lord  his  instructions  respecting  the  Supper,  seems 
most  conclusively  to  indicate  the  divine  authority 
for  this  sacrament.  Some  commentators  think  it 
possible  that  Paul  received  his  knowledge  of  the 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


347 


history  of  the  Supper,  not  by  an  immediate  revela¬ 
tion,  but  through  those  who  were  present  on  that 
memorable  night ;  but  to  our  thought  had  that 
been  so,  he  would  not  have  said,  “I  received  of 
the  Lord” — an  expression  which  can  not  be  well 
interpreted  to  mean  any  thing  less  than  an  imme¬ 
diate  revelation. 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  SUPPER. 

I.  The  Lord’s-supper  is  a  co7nmemoration.  It  is 
more  than  a  mere  memorial  service  ;  but  it  is  that. 
“Take,  eat;  this  is  my  body  which  is  broken  for 
you  ;  this  do  in  remembrance  of  me.  This  do  ye,  as 
oft  as  ye  drink  it,  in  remembrance  of  me .”  Spe¬ 
cially  in  the  service  of  the  Supper  the  communi¬ 
cant  is  to  call  to  mind  the  sufferings  and  death  of 
our  crucified  Lord  and  Savior,  and  those  sufferings 
and  that  death  are  to  be  thought  of  and  dwelt 
upon  as  an  exhibition  and  demonstration  of  the 
great  love  wherewith  he  has  loved  us.  “Greater 
love  hath  no  man  than  this,  that  a  man  lay  down 
his  life  for  his  friends.”  In  the  Supper,  then, 
Christ  is  specially  thought  of  as  man’s  friend,  as 
our  elder  brother,  who  in  our  behalf  and  for  our 
salvation  hath  taken  upon  him  our  nature  and  sub¬ 
mitted  himself  to  the  death  of  the  cross.  This 
love,  so  commemorated,  is  not  the  mere  passionate 
fondness  of  an  indiscreet  friend  ;  it  is  the  love  of 
one  infinitely  wise  and  all-powerful :  a  love  that 


34§ 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


had  all  possible  resources  at  command,  and  all 
wisdom  needful  for  the  selection  of  the  most  ef¬ 
ficient  and  effectual  means.  It  is  not  only  true, 
that  in  saving  us  he  died  ;  but  it  is  also  true,  that 
he  died  to  save  us  ;  it  is  not  only  true,  that  there 
is  no  other  name  given  among  men  whereby  we 
must  be  saved  ;  but  it  is  also  true,  that  no  other 
name  could  be  given  by  which  we  might  be  saved. 
What  an  occasion  for  an  impressive  memento ! 
If  love  prompts  the  remembrance  of  friends,  and 
fondly  cherishes  the  mementos  of  a  valued  friend¬ 
ship,  with  what  affectionate  delight  must  the  lovers 
of  Jesus  commemorate  such  love  as  his! 

2.  The  Lord’s- supper  is  a  monument.  This 
service  not  only  perpetuates  the  memory  of  Christ’s 
death  in  the  minds  of  his  friends,  but  it  also 
proclaims  that  death,  and  perpetuates  the  evi¬ 
dence  of  its  actuality  throughout  the  world,  to  all 
men,  until  the  end  of  time.  The  existence  of 
the  Christian  Church,  with  its  visible  rites  and 
ceremonies,  is  a  demonstration  to  the  successive 
generations  of  men  that  the  record  with  which 
these  services  are  associated,  upon  which  they  are 
founded,  is  a  record  of  actual  facts  in  history. 
These  services  exist ;  they  had  a  beginning ;  they 
are  inseparably  connected  with  the  history  of  their 
origin  and  import ;  that  history  is  such ,  that  unless 
true,  it  could  never  become  the  foundation  of  such 
a  Church,  and  the  commencement  of  such  rites 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


349 


and  ceremonies.  The  Lord’s-supper  could  never 
have  been  erected  as  a  monument  to  the  memory 
of  Christ’s  death  unless  Christ  had  lived  and 
died,  as  is  recorded.  The  Supper,  then,  is  the 
keystone  of  apologetics,  a  constantly  recurring 
evidence  and  demonstration  of  the  authenticity  of 
the  Gospel  history. 

Behold  here  the  wisdom  of  the  Master  as 
evinced  in  the  selection  of  such  a  monument. 
Marbles  crumble  to  dust ;  the  everlasting  hills 
are  made  low;  all  material  ‘  things  are  perishable; 
but  an  act  done,  a  service  performed,  has  in  itself 
no  element  of  destruction.  The  disciples  of  our 
Lord  in  that  last  memorable  night  ate  bread  and 
drank  wine  ;  their  successors  through  the  centu¬ 
ries  since,  until  the  present,  have  imitated  their 
example  ;  and  those  that  come  after  us,  who  love 
our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  unto  the  latest  born  of  the 
race,  will  repeat  this  solemn  service,  a  commemo¬ 
ration  of  the  Savior’s  love,  and  a  monument  to  his 
life  and  death. 

3.  The  Supper  is  a  profession  of  faith.  “As 
often  as  ye  eat  this  bread  and  drink  this  cup,  ye 
do  show  the  Lord’s  death  till  he  come.”  The  serv¬ 
ice,  as  a  commemoration  and  monument,  shows  the 
Lord’s  death.  What  we  have  now  in  view  is  the 
implied  thought ;  namely,  that  the  communicants 
have  each  a  personal  faith  in  the  truth  of  the  doc¬ 
trines  which  are  thus  shown  forth.  In  all  orthodox 


350 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Churches,  whenever  one  intelligently  joins  in  the 
communion  he  thereby  professes  to  believe  in 
Christ’s  death  as  a  necessary  vicarious  propitia¬ 
tion  and  satisfaction  for  the  sins  of  the  world. 
Plainly,  therefore,  unless  one  have  such  a  faith  he 
can  not  consistently  join  in  such  a  service.  In 
Unitarian  Churches  the  service  is  professedly 
merely  memorial ;  it  is  an  acknowledgment  of  obli¬ 
gation  to  Christ,  and  a  grateful  remembrance  of  his 

t- 

love  ;  but  it  is  not  a  profession  of  faith  in  the  pro¬ 
pitiatory  character  of  his  death.  If,  therefore, 
these  two  classes  of  professed  Christians  join  in 
the  holy  communion  it  must  be  by  an  understood 
compromise,  in  which  only  a  generic  faith  is  pro¬ 
fessed  and  all  specific  faith  is  ignored.  To  our 
thought  that  service  is  no  Lord’s-supper  which  does 
not  show  the  death  of  Christ  as  indispensably  nec¬ 
essary  to  the  life  of  man  ;  that  does  not  show  the 
shedding  of  blood  as  a  sine  qtta  non  to  the  remis¬ 
sion  of  sin. 

4.  The  Supper  is  a  sacrament.  The  word  sac¬ 
rament,  as  signifying  that  which  is  both  a  sign 
and  a  seal,  has  a  theological  use  of  peculiar  sig¬ 
nificance.  In  this  sense  baptism  and  the  Lord’s- 
supper  are  sacraments,  but  confirmation,  marriage, 
orders,  penance,  and  extreme  unction  are  not. 
The  idea  of  a  seal  involves  the  idea  of  a  covenant, 
and  that  involves  the  idea  of  obligations  assumed 
by  the  parties.  And  here  another  sense  of  the 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


351 


word  sacrament  is  applicable.  The  promise  or 
obligation  assumed  may  be  solemnly  affirmed  ;  the 
contract  may  be  confirmed  and  strengthened  by 
the  solemnities  of  an  oath.  The  sacrament  of  the 
Supper  may  be  regarded  as  a  promise,  a  renewal 
of  the  baptismal  covenant,  to  renounce  the  world 
and  live  in  obedience  to  all  God’s  holy  command¬ 
ments.  This  renewal  of  the  covenant  is  made 
under  the  solemn  sanctions  of  an  oath.  He  who 
receives  the  holy  communion  thereby  promises 
under  solemn  circumstances  to  endeavor,  by  God’s 
help,  to  live  a  holy  Christian  life. 

5.  The  Supper  is  a  communion.  To  be  “in 
love  and  charity  with  our  neighbors,”  in  the  sense 
of  the  ritual,  does  not  require  that  we  believe  that 
all  our  neighbors  are  Christians,  nor  even  that  all 
who  appear  at  the  communion  are  such ;  it  is  rather 
a  judgment  of  our  own  Christian  character  than  a 
judgment  of  the  Christian  character  of  our  neigh¬ 
bors.  The  import  of  the  invitation  is,  Ye  that  are 
conscious  to  yourselves  of  good  will  and  charitable 
sentiments  towards  others,  and  intend  to  lead  a 
new  life,  draw  near.  But  yet  the  nature  of  the 
case  implies  a  faith  and  confidence  in  the  general 
purity  of  the  Churcn,  a  preference  for  and  a 
pleasure  in  the  society  of  the  Church,  a  sympathy 
in  its  joys  and  sorrows,  and  especially  a  holy  de¬ 
light  in  its  assemblies  and  devotional  services. 
At  the  Supper,  more  than  elsewhere,  the  Church 


352 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


sits  together  as  in  a  heavenly  place  in  Christ 
Jesus.  The  goodly  fellowship  of  the  saints  is  here 
specially  manifest,  and  is  peculiarly  precious. 

6.  The  Supper  is  an  act  of  obedience.  “  Do  this 
in  remembrance  of  me,”  is  a  positive  command  ; 
as  much  so  as,  “  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy 
God  with  all  thine  heart.”  The  rational  ground 
of  this  is  not  as  manifest  as  is  that  of  the  other; 
but  the  authority  whence  they  both  proceed  is  the 
same,  and  filial  love  and  confidence  is  more  mani¬ 
fest  by  an  implicit  obedience  to  this  than  to  the 
other.  Whoever  reverently,  piously,  with  good  in¬ 
tent,  receives  the  broken  bread  and  poured  out 
wine  in  commemoration  of  his  Savior’s  love,  as 
manifest  in  his  death,  obeys  a  divine  command ; 
and  whoever  refuses  to  join  in  this  holy  service 
when  a  suitable  opportunity  is  afforded,  especially 
if  he  refuse  out  of  any  opposition  to  the  service 
itself,  refuses  to  obey  the  Lord  that  bought  him. 
To  neglect  the  Lord’s  -  supper  is  not  a  trifling 
matter;  nor  is  an  attendance  in  a  careless,  thought¬ 
less  manner  much,  if  any,  less  censurable  than  a 
total  neglect. 

7.  The  Supper  is  a  eucharist .  It  is  an  offering 
of  grateful  praise,  a  tribute  of  thanks  to  God  for 
his  unspeakable  gift ;  for  the  love  wherewith  he 
has  loved  us,  manifest  in  the  gift  of  his  only 
begotten  son  ;  and  for  all  the  blessings  and  bene¬ 
fits  of  our  being ;  all  of  which  are  at  the  table 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


353 


recognized  as  coming  down  from  the  Father  of 
lights  through  the  mediation  and  death  of  our 
Lord  Jesus  Christ.  Without  that  death  we  had 
not  been.  How  naturally,  then,  when  that  death 
is  commemorated,  does  gratitude  for  all  we  have 
and  all  we  are  arise  to  the  Giver  of  every  good 
and  perfect  gift. 

8.  The  Supper  is  a  means  of  grace.  “  I  am  the 
bread  of  life.  This  is  the  bread  which  cometh 
down  from  heaven,  that  a  man  may  eat  thereof 
and  not  die.  I  am  the  living  bread  which  came 
down  from  heaven  :  if  any  man  eat  of  this  bread 
he  shall  live  forever ;  and  the  bread  which  I  will 
give  is  my  flesh,  which  I  will  give  for  the  life  of 
the  world.  Except  ye  eat  the  flesh  of  the  Son 
of  man,  and  drink  his  blood,  ye  have  no  life  in  you : 
whoso  eateth  my  flesh  and  drinketh  my  blood  hath 
eternal  life/’  It  is  not  certain  that  in  these  words 
our  Lord  had  any  reference  to  the  Supper  which 
he  would  afterwards  institute.  But  whether  he 
did  or  not,  the  Supper  symbolizes  that  of  which 
he  here  speaks.  In  the  language  of  our  Articles 
of  Faith,  quoted  above,  “  to  such  as  rightly, 
worthily,  and  with  faith  receive  the  same,  the 
bread  which  we  break  is  a  partaking  of  the  body 
of  Christ ;  and  likewise  the  cup  of  blessing  is  a 
partaking  of  the  blood  of  Christ. ”  Always  remem¬ 
bering,  as  expressed  in  the  further  language  of  the 
article,  that  “the  body  of  Christ  is  given,  taken, 


354 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


and  eaten  in  the  Supper  only  after  a  heavenly  and 
spiritual  manner,  and  the  means  whereby  the  body 
of  Christ  is  received  and  eaten  in  the  Supper,  is 
faith.”  The  symbol  and  the  figure  aside,  the  literal 
truth  taught  is  :  First,  that  Christ’s  death  is  that 
event  by  which  spiritual  life  in  man  became  possi¬ 
ble  ;  and,  second,  that  faith  in  that  death  is  that 
by  which  spiritual  life  in  man  becomes  actual ;  so 
that  “he  that  believeth  on  the  Son  of  God  hath 
everlasting  life  ;  and  he  that  believeth  not  hath  not 
life.”  This  giving  of  his  flesh  for  the  life  of  the 
world — that  is,  his  death  ;  the  eating  of  his  flesh 
and  drinking  of  his  blood — that  is,  the  appropria¬ 
tion  of  the  merits  of  his  death  by  faith ;  and 
the  having  eternal  life — that  is,  remission  of  our 
sins,  the  regeneration  of  our  nature,  and  the  title 
to  eternal  life,  are  symbolized  in  the  sacrament  of 
the  Supper.  Whenever,  therefore,  the  Supper  is 
valid  and  efficacious,  the  communicant  receives 
saving  grace.  The  principle  of  spiritual  and  eter¬ 
nal  life,  the  soul’s  real  life,  moral  and  religious 
qualities  and  excellencies  of  character,  if  already 
in  the  recipient  of  the  sacrament,  are  quickened, 
broadened,  extended,  elevated,  perfected  ;  if  not  in 
him  this  life  in  its  beginnings  is  imparted.  In 
a  heavenly,  spiritual  manner  the  partakers  of  the 
Lord’s-supper  by  faith  do  so  eat  the  flesh  of  Christ 
and  drink  his  blood  as  that,  as  our  Lord  himself 
saith,  They  dwell  in  him  and  he  in  them.  Proffi 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


355 


ably,  to  unbelieving  bystanders  there  is  no  service 
of  the  Christian  religion  so  meaningless  and  use¬ 
less  as  the  eating  of  bread  and  drinking  wine  after 
the  manner  practiced  in  the  Churches;  but  to  the 
penitent  believer  there  is  no  other  service  in  which 
he  so  consciously  comes  near  to  Christ  ;  no  service 
in  which  his  spiritual  strength  is  so  percepti¬ 
bly  increased ;  in  which  his  religious  joys  are 
so  greatly  multiplied  ;  and  in  which  his  hopes  are 
so  strongly  confirmed. 

9.  The  Supper  is  a  sign.  A  sign,  in  the  sense 
here  intended,  is  that  by  which  a  thought  is  ex¬ 
pressed  or  a  doctrine  declared.  The  sense  is  the 
same  as  when  we  say  words  are  signs  of  ideas. 
There  are  a  few  sounds  and  motions  which  natu¬ 
rally  express  states  of  mind,  but  most  words  de¬ 
rive  their  meaning  from  an  agreement  among 
those  who  use  them  ;  they  have  no  natural  adap¬ 
tation  to  express  the  ideas  they  represent.  By 
the  appointment  or  ordinance  of  God,  as  well  as 
by  agreement  among  men,  any  thing  may  be  made 
the  sign,  representative,  symbol,  or  exponent  of 
any  other  thing,  or  idea,  or  doctrine.  Our  affirma¬ 
tion  is  that  God  has  ordained  water  baptism  as 
indicating,  expressing,  representing  the  Spirit’s 
work  in  the  regeneration  of  the  souls  of  men. 
Baptism  is  the  sign  of  regeneration.  In  like  man¬ 
ner  God  has  ordained  the  Lord’s-supper  as  a  rep¬ 
resentation  of  Christ’s  work  in  the  redemption  of 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


356 

men  by  his  death  upon  the  cross.  The  Supper  is 
the  sign  of  atonement.  Of  course  it  symbolizes  all 
that  is  inseparably  connected  with  the  doctrine  of 
salvation  by  and  through  the  death  of  God’s  incar¬ 
nate  Son.  So  that  it  may  be  said  to  be  the  sign  or 
symbol  of  the  Christian  system  of  religion.  Emi¬ 
nently  it  expresses,  declares,  represents,  the  doc¬ 
trines  of  sin,  both  original  and  actual,  of  pardon  by 
propitiation,  of  our  Lord’s  divinity,  of  his  incarna¬ 
tion,  of  the  Holy  Spirit’s  agency  in  the  application 
of  atonement,  and  the  necessity  of  faith  as  the  in¬ 
dispensable  condition  of  salvation  and  eternal  life. 

10.  The  Supper  is  a  seal.  The  Gospel  of 
Jesus  Christ  is  an  announcement  of  good  news,  a 
proclamation  of  an  amnesty  from  the  King  Eternal 
to  his  rebellious  subjects  upon  earth,  in  which,  on 
condition  of  repentance  towards  God  and  faith  in 
our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  God  promises  to  forgive 
our  past  sins,  cleanse  our  hearts  from  all  unright¬ 
eousness,  adopt  us  as  his  children,  and  make  us 
heirs  of  eternal  life.  This  Gospel  is  called  a  cove¬ 
nant  or  contract  between  God  and  man,  and  the 
sacraments  are  said  to  be  the  seals  set  to  that  con¬ 
tract  by  which  its  conditions  are  confirmed  and  the 
fulfillment  of  its  promises  assured.  The  idea  of 
a  covenant  accords  with  Bible  representation,  the 
idea  of  a  seal  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Word,  and 
perhaps  it  was  divinely  designed  that  the  sacra¬ 
ments  should  be  considered  as  seals  to  the  cove- 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


357 


nant.  Theologians  insist  upon  it,  and  no  reason 
is  obvious  why  any  one  should  object.  Hence, 
we  say  the  Supper  is  a  seal.  At  every  observ¬ 
ance  of  this  sacred  rite,  yea,  at  every  thought  of 
it,  we  are  most  impressively  reminded  and  assured 
of  God’s  good  will  towards  us,  of  his  great  love 
wherewith  he  has  loved  us,  of  his  long  suffering 
and  tender  mercy,  and  of  his  readiness,  since  he 
spared  not  his  own  Son,  with  him  freely  to  give 
us  all  things.  By  this  seal,  our  faith  that  his  prom¬ 
ises  are  all  yea  and  amen  in  Christ  Jesus,  is  sig¬ 
nally  strengthened.  God  condescended  to  confirm 
his  promise  to  Abraham  by  an  oath  ;  because  with 
men  an  oath  for  confirmation  is  an  end  of  all 
strife,  and  being  also  willing  more  abundantly  to 
show  unto  the  heirs  of  promise  the  immutability 
of  his  counsel  he  confirmed  it  by  an  oath  ;  that  by 
two  immutable  things,  in  which  it  was  impossible 
for  God  to  lie,  we  might  have  a  strong  consolation 
who  have  fled  for  refuge  to  lay  hold  upon  the 
hope  set  before  us.  If  God  confirms  his  promises 
with  an  oath,  so  that  man  may  be  assured  by  his 
promises  and  his  oath,  then  surely  there  is  no  pre¬ 
sumption  in  regarding  his  divinely  appointed  ordi¬ 
nances  as  seals  set  to  confirm  his  covenants. 

II.  THE  EFFICACY  OF  THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 

The  reader  is  referred  to  what  is  said  above 
respecting  the  efficacy  of  the  sacraments .  The 


358 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Roman  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  is  affirmed 
solely  on  the  authority  of  the  Roman  Church. 
Under  a  claim  to  infallibility  that  Church  has 
affirmed  that  our  Savior’s  words,  “  This  is  my 
body,”  are  to  be  interpreted  in  the  most  literal 
sense  possible,  so  that  the  communicant  in  the 
Supper  does  literally  eat  the  flesh  and  drink  the 
blood  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  Accordingly  the 
doctrine  of  the  efficacy  of  the  Supper  is  that  the 
eaten  flesh  and  drank  blood  imparts  to  the  re¬ 
cipient  the  principle  of  eternal  life.  That  such  a 
doctrine  can  not  be  refuted  with  arguments,  or  at 
least  that  one  holding  such  a  doctrine  can  not  be 
convinced  of  his  error  by  arguments  is  manifest, 
since  the  doctrine  itself  is  wholly  outside  the  realm 
of  reason.  It  is  entirely  a  superstition  ;  not  only 
without  warrant  in  reason,  but  also  without  any 
support  in  adequate  authority.  Superstitions  are 
removed  not  by  processes  of  reasoning,  but,  if  at 
all,  by  so  directing  attention  to  the  truth  as  to  call 
thought  away  from  the  superstition.  If  the  victim 
becomes  convinced  of  what  is  true,  he  finds  that 
his  superstition  has  departed,  he  knows  not  how 
or  when — it  has  been  displaced  by  that  which  is 
better.  But  if  any  one  inquires  what  may  be  said 
antagonistic  to  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation, 
we  reply,  all  the  case  requires  or  admits  of  is  an 
appeal  to  common  sense.  Must  the  words,  “this 
is  my  body,”  be  interpreted  literally?  do  they  not, 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


359 


in  the  light  of  an  honest  judgment,  admit  of  a 
different  interpretation  ?  Evidently  the  common 
intelligence  of  mankind  will  pronounce  at  once 
that  the  words  in  question  mean  simply,  this  rep- 
resents  my  body ;  and  since  the  bread  and  wine, 
after  consecration,  retain  all  the  sensible  qualities 
of  bread  and  wine,  the  same  as  before,  common 
perception  affirms  that  they  are  bread  and  wine, 
and  nothing  else.  The  real  presence  is  a  fiction 
of  the  imagination — it  is  abhorrent  to  reason. 
When  the  Lord  broke  the  bread  and  said,  This 
is  my  body,  he  did  not  hold  himself  in  his  own 
hand ;  and  when  the  priest  consecrates  the  wa¬ 
fer,  that  wafer  does  not  become  the  same  that 
was  nailed  to  the  cross  and  entombed  in  the 
sepulcher. 

The  doctrine  of  consubstantiation  owes  its  ex¬ 
istence  in  the  world  purely  to  the  antecedent 
existence  of  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  and 
is  a  resort  to  avoid  antagonizing  the  prejudice 
prevailing  in  the  public  mind  in  favor  of  the  Ro¬ 
man  doctrine  of  the  “  real  presence.”  It  avoids 
some  of  the  monstrous  absurdities  of  Romanism, 
but  as  a  doctrine  of  the  efficacy  of  the  Supper,  it 
is  equally  at  fault  with  its  more  absurd  prede¬ 
cessor — it  makes  the  Supper  efficacious  because 
of  the  real  presence.  The  substance  of  Christ’s 
body  is  with  the  bread  and  wine,  and  therefore 
partaking  of  the  bread  and  wine  imparts  to  the 


36° 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


recipient  the  divine-human  Christ,  and  is  in  him  a 
source  of  spiritual  life.  That  the  literal  eating  or 
drinking  of  any  material  substance  can  by  any 
possibility  “ex  opere  operato  impart  moral  quali¬ 
ties  to  the  soul  of  the  eater  is  pronounced  non¬ 
sense.  That  the  eating  and  drinking  can  by 
appointment  and  ordination  be  made,  on  any  con¬ 
dition  to  be  performed  by  the  eater — that  is,  can  be 
made  ‘  ‘  ex  opere  op er antis  — to  impart  moral  qual¬ 
ities,  is  not  less  superstitious  than  the  doctrine  of 
an  inhering  efficiency  itself.  Eating  and  drinking 
can  not  be  in  any  way  the  source  or  cause  of 
moral  excellence.  It  may  by  appointment  be  made 
the  occasion,  the  instrument,  the  condition  on  which 
divine  agency  may  be  exerted  to  produce  moral 
and  religious  results ;  but  it  is  in  itself  wholly, 
naturally,  and  necessarily  inadequate,  unadapted 
to  be  the  moral  cause  of  any  thing.  The  efficacy  . 
of  the  Supper  is  derived  wholly  from  the  agency 
of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  service  itself  has  no  more 
adaptation  to  produce  the  results  contemplated  in 
its  institution  than  any  other  service  would  have 
had  that  might  have  been  selected  and  employed 
for  the  same  purpose.  Eating  and  drinking  are  no 
more  adapted  to  the  work  of  saving  the  soul  from 
sin  than  clay  moistened  with  spittle  is  adapted  to 
give  sight  to  one  born  blind. 

The  Supper  is  a  means  of  grace.  A  proper 
observance  of  the  ordinance  is  instrumental  in  se- 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


361 


curing  the  supernatural  advantages  of  religion. 
It  may  be  that  the  Supper  has  a  grace  peculiar 
to  itself;  that  is  to  say,  possibly  some  religious 
influence  may  be  exerted  upon  the  mind,  some 
spiritual  advantage  or  profit  may  be  secured, 
through  the  proper  use  of  this  sacrament,  that 
could  not  be  obtained  in  any  way.  It  is,  however, 
quite  probable  that  if  the  blessing  received  through 
this  means  of  grace  differ  from  that  or  those  re¬ 
ceived  through  other  means,  such  as  prayer, 
preaching,  and  reading  the  Scriptures,  it  differs 
rather  in  degree  than  kind.  The  Scriptures  do 
not  warrant  the  idea  of  any  peculiar  distinct  grace 
that  may  be  articulately  stated  and  defined  as  re¬ 
sulting  from  the  Lord’s-supper,  but  they  do  not 
intimate  that  the  Supper  has  no  peculiar  grace. 
The  design  of  the  ordinance,  the  circumstances 
attending  our  Lord  and  his  disciples  at  the  time 
it  was  instituted,  and,  indeed,  all  that  pertains  to 
it,  naturally  invest  the  service  with  an  impressive 
solemnity,  and  with  an  interest  more  tender  and 
affecting  than  any  other.  The  Church  in  all  its 
history  has  regarded  this  as  its  most  solemn  and 
most  impressive  service.  Hence  it  is  not  unrea¬ 
sonable  to  expect  a  blessing  at  the  table  not  found 
elsewhere. 

If  we  can  not  definitely  designate  any  peculiar 
grace,  this  is  no  bar  to  the  fact  that  the  Supper 
confers  in  some  sense  a  special  blessing.  It  must 


362 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


be  remembered  that  what  is  here  said  of  the 
Spirit’s  agency  when  he  employs  the  Supper  as 
his  instrument  must  be  said  of  his  agency  at  all 
times.  Consciousness  does  not  distinctly  draw  a 
line  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural. 
We  can  not  by  any  process  of  introspection  within 
our  power  distinguish  states  of  mind  which  are 
due  to  supernatural  causes  from  those  that  arise 
by  natural  and  ordinary  processes.  The  laws  of 
thought,  feeling,  and  volition  are  divinely  appointed, 
and  the  Spirit  does  not  violate  .his  own  laws.  His 
operations  are  ever  in  accordance  therewith.  There 
is,  then,  nothing  anti-scriptural  or  unphilosophic  in 
supposing  that  the  Supper  is  attended  with  a 
blessing  peculiar  to  itself,  perhaps  differing  only  in 
degree,  not  in  kind,  from  other  spiritual  blessings, 
yet  differing.  And  this  supposition  may  be  rea¬ 
sonably  indulged,  though  we  are  not  able  distinctly 
to  define  in  what  that  peculiar  blessing  consists. 

It  is  the  office  of  the  Spirit  to  enlighten, 
quicken,  strengthen,  guide,  sanctify,  and  comfort. 
The  two  great  thoughts  of  religion  are  sin  and 
salvation.  The  Supper  is  eminently  a  recognition 
of  these  two  all-absorbing  ideas.  When  man, 
therefore,  approaches  the  table,  thereby  confessing 
his  sins  and  his  sinfulness,  it  is  reasonable  and 
Scriptural  to  expect  the  Spirit  to  enlighten  the  eyes 
of  his  understanding  to  see  as  he  could  not  see 
without  divine  aid  the  exceeding  sinfulness  of  sin. 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


363 


Man's  apprehension  of  his  need  of  a  Savior  and 
of  salvation  may  be  expected  to  be  more  vivid  at 
such  a  time  than  at  any  other  time  or  under  any 
other  circumstances.  And  especially  when  man 
commemorates  the  death  of  Christ,  thereby  pro¬ 
fessing  his  faith  in  Christ’s  death  as  his  only 
ground  of  hope  that  his  sins  may  be  forgiven  and 
he  himself  be  saved,  it  is  both  reasonable  and 
Scriptural  to  expect  that  then  the  Spirit  will  take 
of  the  things  of  Christ  and  show  them  unto  him, 
so  that  he  will  see,  as  he  could  not  see  without 
such  aid,  the  Lamb  of  God  who  takes  away  the 
sin  of  the  world  ;  it  may  be  expected  that  he  then 
and  there  will  be  enabled  to  lay  hold  upon  the 
hope  set  before  him  in  the  Gospel  with  a  faith 
more  intelligent,  firmer,  stronger,  more  persistent, 
and  more  consciously  saving  than  in  the  use  of 
any  other  means  of  grace.  In  like  manner,  if  we 
consider  the  Supper  as  a  sacrament,  an  occasion  of 
renewing  our  covenant  with  God,  of  reconsecration 
of  self  to  duty,  how  reasonable  that  feeble  man 
should  be  divinely  strengthened  to  make  the  firm 
resolve  !  or  if  the  Supper  be  regarded  as  a  eucha- 
rist,  how  reasonable  that  the  Spirit  who  helps 
man’s  infirmities  should  inspire  grateful  praise, 
and  make  man’s  thanksgiving  an  acceptable  offer¬ 
ing  unto  the  King  of  kings  and  Lord  of  lords ! 
or  if  the  Supper  be  a  communion,  a  season  of  the 
goodly  fellowship  of  the  saints,  may  it  not  be 


364 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


expected  that  He  to  whom  the  Church  is  as  the 
apple  of  an  eye,  will  intensify,  elevate,  purify,  and 
bless  that  service  which,  more  than  any  other,  is 
exponential  of  the  love  Christians  bear  one  to¬ 
wards  another.  In  a  word,  the  Lord’s-supper  is 
made  efficacious  through  the  Spirit  for  all  the  pur¬ 
poses  of  salvation  and  eternal  life. 

III.  THE  VALIDITY  OF  THE  SUPPER. 

The  blessing,  breaking,  giving,  and  eating  of 
bread  ;  the  blessing,  pouring,  giving,  and  drinking 
of  wine,  constituted  the  principal  facts  connected 
with  the  service  when  instituted  ;  and,  so  far  as 
outward  acts  are  concerned,  these  are  generally 
considered  all  that  is  essential.  It  is  deemed  an 
unimportant  circumstance  that  the  bread  was  un¬ 
leavened  ;  the  Lord  used  what  was  before  him — 
any  other  would  have  served  as  well  if  it  had  been 
present.  The  wine,  some  think,  was  unfermented. 
Whether  it  was  or  was  not  so  then,  certainly  it  is 
expedient  that  it  should  be  so  now ;  and  since  fer¬ 
mentation  is  not  essential,  Churches  do  well  to  ex¬ 
clude  it  from  the  sacred  Supper.  The  disciples 
received  the  sacrament  reclining  on  couches,  after 
the  manner  of  the  Jews  at  their  feasts.  The  serv¬ 
ice  occurred  at  night ;  probably  not  at  an  early 
hour  in  the  evening.  After  the  Supper  they  sang 
a  hymn  and  then  went  out  into  the  mount  of 
Olives.  All  these  things  are  mere  circumstances ; 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


365 


it  is  not  required  that  any  of  them  should  be 
repeated.  As  to  these  outward  elements  and  acts, 
good  judgment  would  seem  to  dictate  that  the 
officers  of  the  Church  should,  so  far  as  possible, 
provide  such  elements  and  make  such  arrange¬ 
ments  for  the  administration  as  would  be  likely  to 
attract  the  least  attention.  To  use  at  the  sacra¬ 
ment,  in  the  name  of  wine,  what  is  not  so  much 
like  wine  as  mere  sweetened  water,  especially  if  it 
be  a  mixture  offensive  to  the  taste,  is  as  likely  to 
distract  thought,  and  tends  as  much  to  subvert  the 
purpose  of  the  ordinance  as  would  the  use  of  an 
alcoholic  wine.  Let  that  be  used  which  the  people 
are  accustomed  to  recognize  as  bread  and  wine  ; 
let  the  bread  be  in  shape  to  be  conveniently 
broken,  let  the  wine  be  provided  in  a  larger  vessel, 
to  be  poured  out  into  the  cup  ;  let  the  people  sit, 
stand,  or  kneel  as  they  are  accustomed  to  do,  and 
let  the  Supper  be  at  such  time  of  the  day,  and 
with  such  frequency  of  occurrence  as,  in  the  judg¬ 
ment  of  the  particular  Church  where  the  service  is 
to  occur,  shall  be  most  convenient  and  profitable 
to  the  people. 

The  ordinance  is  valid  when,  or  its  validity  con¬ 
sists  in  the  fact  that,  it  is  such  that  God  will  own 
and  bless  it ;  such  that  the  Holy  Spirit  will  ren¬ 
der  it  efficacious  to  accomplish  the  purpose  for 
which  the  ordinance  was  instituted,  and  for  which 
the  people,  when  rightly  disposed  in  mind,  observe 


366 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


it.  The  above-named  circumstances  are  not  essen¬ 
tial  to  this  purpose,  and,  of  course,  not  essential 
to  the  validity  of  the  ordinance,  any  farther  than 
they  stand  related  to  the  purpose  and  intent  of  the 
participants.  If  in  giving  attention  to  these  things 
the  participants  do  intend,  according  to  their  best 
information  and  ability,  to  do  the  thing  which  the 
Master  commanded,  when  he  said,  “Do  this  in 
remembrance  of  me,”  their  intent,  honestly  and 
piously  entertained,  will  render  the  service  valid, 
whatever,  in  a  given  case,  they  may  do.  Of 
course,  it  is  patent,  that  in  such  a  case  bread  will 
be  eaten  and  wine  will  be  drank  ;  but  incidental 
circumstances  may  vary  as  occasion  may  require. 

The  Administrator . — The  ancient  claim  of  the 
Roman  Church,  and  more  modern  claim  of  the 
English  Church,  that  any  so-called  Lord’s-supper 
is  not  a  valid  sacrament,  unless  it  be  administered 
by  a  minister  ordained  by  the  imposition  of  epis¬ 
copal  hands,  and  unless  the  so-called  episcopal 
authority  be  derived  from  episcopal  ordination  in  a 
regular  succession  from  St.  Peter,  will  be  consid¬ 
ered  in  the  following  chapter,  under  the  head  of 
Church  Polity. 

We  make  no  objection  to  the  doctrine  that  any 
particular  Church  is  fully  authorized  to  determine 
the  orders  in  its  ministry,  and  to  appoint  and  or¬ 
dain  its  ministers  in  its  own  way,  according  to  its 
own  judgment  of  what  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 


THE  LORD'S-SUPPER. 


3^7 


Gospel  and  the  exigencies  of  the  Church  may  re¬ 
quire.  We  only  object  when  a  given  Church 
assumes  that  its  chosen  methods,  orders  of  min¬ 
isters,  and  modes  of  administration  are  essential  to 
validity,  so  that  all  others  are  not  valid,  and  are 
but  senseless  services,  which  God  can  not  bless  and 
render  efficacious.  Of  course,  every  particular 
Church  does,  in  its  organization,  determine  the 
number,  titles,  character,  and  duties  of  its  officers. 
The  officers  of  a  Church  being  designated,  and 
their  duties  defined,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the 
individual  members  of  said  Church  to  be  obedient 
to  and  to  esteem  very  highly  in  love  for  their 
works’  sake,  those  that  are  over  them  in  the  Lord, 
and  admonish  them.  It  would  be  wrong  for  the 
laity  to  interfere  with  the  duties  assigned  to  the 
ministry,  because  such  a  course  of  conduct  would 
disturb  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  Church.  It  is 
reasonably  expected  that  schisms,  dissensions,  and 
disputations  in  respect  even  to  these  minor  mat¬ 
ters  of  modes  and  forms  would  so  grieve  the  Holy 
Spirit  of  God  that  he  would  depart  from  a  Church 
so  rent  and  so  disturbed.  Wherever,  then,  there 
is  a  consecrated  ministry,  duly  appointed,  author¬ 
ized,  and  ordained  to  administer  the  sacraments  in 
the  Church,  it  is  expected  that  such  ministry,  and 
not  the  laity,  will  administer  the  ordinances.  And 
yet,  should  a  company  of  believers  be  so  situated 
that  the  services  of  a  minister,  regularly  ordained, 


363 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


could  not  be  secured,  such  a  company  might  select 
one  of  their  own  number  and  appoint  him  to  bless, 
break,  and  distribute  bread,  and  to  bless  and  give 
to  others  the  cup  ;  and  they  doing  this  with  a  pure 
and  pious  intent  to  obey  our  Lord’s  dying  com¬ 
mand,  as  we  see  it,  there  is  no  authority  in  the 
Word  of  God  for  affirming  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
would  not  bless  that  service  as  a  holy  sacramental 
offering  made  unto  God. 

The  Communicants . — The  doctrine  of  “close 
communion,”  so-called,  as  held  and  practiced  by 
some  Baptist  Churches,  is  founded  on  two  assump¬ 
tions  :  First,  that  baptism  is  an  essential  prerequi¬ 
site  to  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper ;  and,  sec¬ 
ond,  that  without  immersion  there  is  no  baptism. 
The  second  of  these  affirmations  we  have  already 
discussed.  The  first  is  only  an  inference  from 
what  may  be  called  the  natural  order  of  things. 
If  a  man  be  rightly  disposed  to  receive  the  Lord’s- 
supper,  the  opinions  and  sentiments  which  thus 
dispose  him  would  also  induce  him  at  the  first 
opportunity,  if  he  were  not  already  so,  to  become 
a  member  of  the  Church.  As  baptism  is  the 
initiatory  rite,  of  course,  in  the  natural  order  of 
events,  the  rite  of  baptism,  as  a  fact  in  history* 
would  occur  in  each  individual  case  before  the 
sacrament  of  the  Supper.  But  to  say  that,  in  the 
natural  order  of  events  baptism  is  administered 
before  the  Supper  is  received,  is  quite  a  different 


THE  LORD'S-SUPPER. 


369 


thing  from  saying  that  baptism  is  an  essential 
prerequisite  to  the  Supper ;  that  it  is  so  essential, 
that  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper  would  not  be 
valid  if  administered  to  an  unbaptized  person. 
We  affirm  that  if,  in  all  other  respects,  a  person 
were  qualified  to  receive  the  Supper  of  the  Lord, 
the  fact  that  he  had  not  been  baptized,  supposing, 
of  course,  that  it  was  no  fault  of  his  that  he  had 
not  been,  ought  not  to  debar  him  from  the  privi¬ 
lege.  As  a  matter  of  order  if  possible,  the  admin¬ 
istrator  in  such  a  case  should  defer  the  Supper  a 
sufficient  time,  then  baptize  the  candidate,  and  after 
that  administer  to  him  the  Supper  of  the  Lord. 
We  say  again,  he  should  do  this  as  a  matter  of 
Church  order,  but  not  as  a  matter  of  Scrip¬ 
ture  requirement.  Is  it  alleged  that  the  apostles 
preached  baptism  as  the  first  duty  of  converts  ? 
We  assent  and  reaffirm  that  they  did  so  because, 
in  the  nature  of  the  case,  that  is  the  first  duty  in  the 
order  of  time  ;  not  because  baptism  qualifies  the 
convert  for  the  Supper  in  any  such  sense,  as  that 
without  it  he  could  not  be  qualified.  The  apos¬ 
tolic  practice  is  simply  in  accordance  with  natural 
order,  and  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  quoted  as  a 
divinely  given  directory.  If  close  communionists 
insist  upon  straining  matters  to  their  extremes,  we 
in  return  might  make  an  argument  by  the  same 
process,  and  insist  that  Christian  baptism  was  not 

instituted  till  the  commission  was  given  to  preach 
c  24 


370 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


the  Gospel,  disciple  all  nations,  and  baptize  them 
in  the  name  of  the  Holy  Trinity;  and  if  so,  then 
no  proof  is  extant  that  the  apostles  themselves, 
who  administered  the  Supper,  and  ordained  others, 
giving  them  authority  to  administer  it,  ever  re¬ 
ceived  Christian  baptism. 

A  credible  profession  of  faith  in  Jesus  Christ 
as  the  Son  of  God  and  the  Savior  of  men  is  the 
sole  condition  of  admission  to  membership  in  the 
Christian  Church,  which  admission  is  by  the  ini¬ 
tiatory  rite  of  baptism,  and  entitles  the  disciple  to 
all  the  privileges  of  the  Church — admission  to  the 
table  of  the  Lord  included.  The  table  is  the 
Lord’s  table,  and  not  the  exclusive  property  of  any 
particular  Church.  ,  All  persons  who,  in  a  judg¬ 
ment  of  charity,  are  members  by  faith  of  Christ’s 
spiritual  body,  the  universal  Church,  are  entitled 
by  their  relation  to  the  great  Head  of  the  Church, 
to  commemorate  his  death  in  communion  and 
fellowship  with  other  members  of  the  same  mystb 
cal  body.  None  but  such  as  are  notoriously  anti- 
christian  can  be  rightfully  excluded.  The  respon¬ 
sibility  of  eating  and  drinking  unworthily  must  rest 
with  the  communicant  himself — the  administrator 
can  not  judge,  he  knows  not  the  hearts  of  his  fel¬ 
low-men.  If  the  life  of  the  applicant  for  admission 
to  the  table  be  not  immoral,  if  he  profess  peni¬ 
tence,  a  purpose  of  righteousness,  a  desire  to  be 
saved  from  sin,  and  faith  in  the  death  of  our  Lord 


THE  LORD’S-SUPPER. 


Jesus  Christ,  as  the  only  ground  of  human  hopes 
for  salvation  and  eternal  life,  then  the  adminis¬ 
trator  can  not  lawfully  exclude  him. 

The  invitation  in  the  ritual  of  our  Church 
appropriately  describes  the  essential  prerequisites 
and  qualifications  for  admission  to  the  sacrament 
of  the  Lord’s-supper:  “Ye  that  do  truly  and  ear¬ 
nestly  repent  of  your  sins,  and  are  in  love  and 
charity  with  your  neighbors,  and  intend  to  lead  a 
new  life,  following  the  commandments  of  God,  and 
walking  from  henceforth  in  his  holy  ways,  draw 
near  with  faith,  and  take  this  holy  sacrament  to 
your  comfort ;  and  devoutly  kneeling  make  your 
humble  confession  to  Almighty  God.” 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


Church  Polity. 

The  topics  properly  belonging  to  the  subject 
of  Church  Polity  might  be  treated  scientifically  by 
discussing  the  rights  and  duties  of  ministers  and 
the  rights  and  duties  of  laymen ;  and  when  the 
rights  and  duties  of  ministers  were  exhaustively 
and  articulately  stated  and  defended,  the  rights 
and  duties  of  laymen  would  be  obvious  without 
articulate  statement.  We  do  not  propose  to  fol¬ 
low  this  line  of  thought  precisely,  but  shall  devote 
the  following  pages  chiefly  to  a  discussion  of  the 
Christian  ministry  :  as  to  the  source  of  its  author¬ 
ity  ;  the  nature  of  a  call  to  the  performance  of 
its  duties ;  its  functions ;  the  qualifications  pre¬ 
requisite  in  those  who  enter  into  its  service  ;  and 
the  orders  or  offices  into  which  it  may  be  divided. 

This  discussion  of  the  Christian  ministry  in 
general  will  be  followed  by  a  statement  and  de¬ 
fense  of  the  Polity  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church. 


372 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


373 


THE  CHRISTIAN  MINISTRY. 

The  reader  is  referred  to  Chapter  First  of  this 
Seventh  Book,  in  which,  under  the  head  of  “The 
Church,”  we  have  said  what  we  deemed  necessary 
to  say  by  way  of  defining  the  term,  and  in  defend 
ing  the  affirmation  that  the  institution,  as  so  de¬ 
fined,  exists  by  a  divine  appointment. 

It  is  the  will  of  God  that  men  organize  them¬ 
selves  into  societies  for  their  mutual  edification  in 
piety  ;  and  to  this  end  that  they  preserve  a  per¬ 
petual  use  of  the  means  of  grace ;  namely,  the 
preaching  of  the  Word  of  God,  the  administration 
of  the  sacraments,  and  all  other  things  necessary 
for  the  purposes  of  such  organizations.  An  or¬ 
ganization  for  executive  purposes,  for  the  accom¬ 
plishment  of  defined  ends,  for  the  performance  of 
certain  acts,  by  its  nature  involves  the  idea  of  the 
appointment  of  designated  persons,  whose  duty  it 
shall  be  to  do  what  is  required  to  be  done.  Ex¬ 
ecutive  efficiency  always  requires  the  location  of 
responsibility.  If  the  Gospel  is  to  be  preached, 
some  one  must  be  appointed  whose  special  duty  it 
shall  be  to  preach  it.  So  also  of  the  administra¬ 
tion  of  the  sacraments,  and  of  whatever  else  it 
may  be  the  will  of  God  that  the  Church  should 
do.  In  a  word,  organization  for  executive  pur¬ 
pose  involves  the  appointment  of  officers.  If, 
therefore,  the  existence  of  the  Church  be  by 


374 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


divine  authority  its  officers  are  divinely  commis¬ 
sioned. 

The  Christian  ministry  is  a  divine  institution . 
That  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  individual  persons 
be  appointed  to  perform  the  duties  contemplated 
in  the  organization  of  the  Church,  and  that  they 
for  this  purpose  separate  themselves  from  the  or¬ 
dinary  avocations  of  secular  life  and  devote  them¬ 
selves  exclusively  to  religious  services,  is  evident 
from  all  that  is  said  in  the  Scriptures  either  di¬ 
rectly  or  indirectly  upon  the  subject.  Under  the 
patriarchal  dispensation  it  is  manifest  that  the  fa¬ 
ther  of  the  family  was  the  religious  teacher  of  his 
household.  He  offered  the  sacrifices,  made  sup¬ 
plications,  and  offered  thanksgivings.  This  priest¬ 
hood,  being  the  first  in  the  history  of  the  race,  is 
spoken  of  as  of  marked  distinction.  Even  Abra¬ 
ham,  and  Levi,  then  in  Abraham’s  loins,  as  St. 
Paul  says,  offered  tithes  to  Melchizedek,  the  priest 
of  the  most  high  God  ;  and  Christ  himself  was  a 
priest  after  the  order  of  Melchizedek.  Under  the 
Mosaic  dispensation  the  separation  of  Aaron  and 
Levi  for  the  service  of  the  temple  is  most  dis¬ 
tinctly  required  by  a  divine  commandment.  To 
transcribe  all  the  .Scriptures  in  which  Moses  is 
instructed  by  direct  revelation  from  God  respect¬ 
ing  the  Aaronic  and  Levitical  priesthoods  would 
be  to  rewrite  a  very  large  portion  of  the  books 
of  the  Mosaic  law.  A  few  passages  must  suffice  : 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


375 


“Take  thou  unto  thee  Aaron  thy  brother,  and  his 
sons  with  him,  from  among  the  children  of  Israel, 
that  they  may  minister  unto  me  in  the  priest’s  office. 
And  he  that  is  the  high-priest  among  his  brethren, 
upon  whose  head  the  anointing  oil  was  poured, 
and  that  is  consecrated  to  put  on  the  garments, 
shall  not  uncover  his  head  nor  rend  his  clothes  ; 
neither  shall  he  go  out  of  the  sanctuary,  nor  pro¬ 
fane  the  sanctuary  of  his  God ;  for  the  crown  of 
the  anointing  oil  of  his  God  is  upon  him :  I  am 
the  Lord.  And  thou  shalt  appoint  Aaron  and  his 
sons,  and  they  shall  wait  on  their  priest’s  office  ; 
and  the  stranger  that  cometh  nigh  shall  be  put  to 
death.  And  Aaron  was  separated  that  he  should 
sanctify  the  most  holy  things,  he  and  his  sons  for¬ 
ever,  to  burn  incense  before  the  Lord,  to  minister 
unto  him,  and  to  bless  in  his  name  forever.  Bring 
the  tribe  of  Levi  near,  and  present  them  before 
Aaron  the  priest,  that  they  may  minister  unto  him  ; 
thou  shalt  give  the  Levites  unto  Aaron  and  to  his 
sons  :  they  are  wholly  given  unto  him  out  of  the 
children  of  Israel.  And  I,  behold  I,  have  taken 
your  brethren,  the  Levites,  from  among  the  chil¬ 
dren  of  Israel ;  to  you  they  are  given  as  a  gift 
from  the  Lord,  to  do  the  service  of  the  tabernacle 
of  the  congregation.” 

The  prophets  were  divinely  called.  That  they 
claimed  a  divine  commission  is  evident  from  their 
frequent  use  of  the  phrase,  “Thus  saith  the  Lord.” 


376 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


“Son  of  man,  I  have  made  thee  a  watchman  unto 
the  house  of  Israel  :  therefore  hear  the  word  at 
my  mouth,  and  give  them  warning  from  me. 
When  they  went  from  nation  to  nation,  and  from 
one  kingdom  to  another  people,  he  suffered  no 
man  to  do  them  wrong  ;  yea,  he  reproved  kings 
for  their  sakes,  saying,  Touch  not  mine  anointed, 
and  do  my  prophets  no  harm.” 

These  quotations  suffice  to  show,  what  is  either 
expressed  or  implied  in  all  the  Scriptures,  that  in 
the  dispensations  of  religion  preparing  for  and  in¬ 
troducing  the  Christian  dispensation  a  ministry 
existed  by  divine  appointment.  If  this  were  not 
asserted  in  direct  terms,  it  were  sufficiently  evi¬ 
dent  that  it  is  so,  since  from  the  nature  of  the  case 
it  must  be  so.  A  religion  in  the  world  without  a 
ministry  is  an  unknown  thing.  All  religions  have 
their  priests,  teachers,  ministers  ;  by  whatever 
name  they  are  called,  they  are  persons  appointed 
to  do  what  their  religion  requires  to  be  done. 

We  come  now  directly  to  our  proposition ; 
namely,  the  Christian  ministry  is  a  divine  institution. 

The  apostles  were  divinely  called.  “And  it 
came  to  pass  in  those  days  that  he  went  out  into 
a  mountain  to  pray,  and  continued  all  night  in 
prayer  to  God.  And  when  it  was  day  he  called 
unto  him  his  disciples;  and  of  them  he  chose  twelve, 
whom  also  he  called  apostles.  And  he  ordained 
twelve,  that  they  should  be  with  him,  and  that  he 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


377 


might  send  them  forth  to  preach,  and  to  have 
power  to  heal  sicknesses,  and  to  cast  out  devils. 
Ye  have  not  chosen  me  ;  but  I  have  chosen  you, 
and  ordained  you,  that  ye  should  go  and  bring 
forth  fruit,  and  that  your  fruit  should  remain. 
Men  and  brethren,  this  Scripture  must  needs  have 
been  fulfilled  which  the  Holy  Ghost  by  the  mouth 
of  David  spake  before  concerning  Judas,  for  he 
was  numbered  with  us  and  had  obtained  part  of 
this  ministry  ;  for  it  is  written  in  the  book  of  the 
Psalms,  Let  his  habitation  be  desolate,  and  let  no 
man  dwell  therein  ;  and  his  bishopric  let  another 
take.  Wherefore  of  these  men,  which  have  com- 
panied  with  us  all  the  time  that  our  Lord  Jesus 
went  in  and  out  among  us,  beginning  from  the 
baptism  of  John,  unto  that  same  day  that  he  was 
taken  up  from  us,  must  one  be  ordained  to  be  a 
witness  of  his  resurrection.  And  they  gave  forth 
their  lots  ;  and  the  lot  fell  upon  Matthias,  and  he 
was  numbered  with  the  eleven  apostles.  And  I 
said,  Who  art  thou,  Lord  ?  And  he  said,  I  am 
Jesus,  whom  thou  persecutest ;  but  rise,  stand  upon 
thy  feet ;  for  I  have  appeared  unto  thee  for  this  pur¬ 
pose,  to  make  thee  a  minister  and  a  witness  both 
of  these  things  which  thou  hast  seen  and  of  those 
things  in  the  which  I  will  appear  unto  thee,  deliv¬ 
ering  thee  from  the  people,  and  from  the  Gentiles, 
unto  whom  now  I  send  thee,  to  open  their  eyes, 
and  to  turn  them  from  darkness  to  light,  and  from 


378 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


the  power  of  Satan  unto  God,  that  they  may  re¬ 
ceive  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  inheritance  among 
them  which  are  sanctified  by  faith  that  is  in  me. 
Whereupon,  O  King  Agrippa,  I  was  not  disobedi¬ 
ent  unto  the  heavenly  vision.  For  I  am  the  least 
of  the  apostles,  that  am  not  meet  to  be  called  an 
apostle,  because  I  persecuted  the  Church  of  God. 
Neither  went  I  up  to  Jerusalem  to  them  which 
were  apostles  before  me  ;  but  I  went  into  Arabia, 
and  returned  again  unto  Damascus.  Whereunto 
I  am  ordained  a  preacher  and  an  apostle,  a  teacher 
of  the  Gentiles  in  faith  and  verity.” 

The  call  of  the  seventy:  “After  these  things 
the  Lord  appointed  other  seventy  also,  and  sent 
them  two  and  two  before  his  face  into  every  city 
and  place  whither  he  himself  would  come.  There¬ 
fore  said  he  unto  them,  The  harvest  truly  is  great, 
but  the  laborers  are  few.  Pray  ye  therefore  the  Lord 
of  the  harvest  that  he  would  send  forth  laborers 
into  his  harvest.  Go  your  ways  ;  behold,  I  send 
you  forth  as  lambs  among  wolves.  He  that  hear- 
eth  you  heareth  me;  and  he  that  despiseth  you 
despiseth  me ;  and  he  that  despiseth  me  despiseth 
him  that  sent  me.” 

The  call  of  others  to  the  ministerial  office  by 
apostolic  authority:  “And  when  they  had  ordained 
them  elders  in  every  Church,  and  had  prayed  with 
fasting,  they  commended  them  to  the  Lord  on 
whom  they  believed.  Neglect  not  the  gift  that  is 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


379 


in  thee,  which  was  given  thee  by  prophecy  with 
the  laying  on  of  the  hands  of  the  presbytery.  For 
this  cause  left  I  thee  in  Crete,  that  thou  shouldst 
set  in  order  the  things  that  are  wanting  and  ordain 
elders  in  every  city  as  I  had  appointed  thee.  And 
the  saying  pleased  the  whole  multitude,  and  they 
chose  Stephen,  a  man  full  of  faith  and  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  and  Philip,  and  Prochorus,  and  Nicanor, 
and  Timon,  and  Parmenas,  and  Nicolas,  a  prose¬ 
lyte  of  Antioch,  whom  they  set  before  the  apos¬ 
tles  ;  and  when  they  had  prayed  they  laid  their 
hands  upon  them.  And  he  gave  some  apostles, 
and  some  prophets,  and  some  evangelists,  and 
some  pastors  and  teachers  ;  for  the  perfecting  of 
the  saints,  for  the  work  of  the  ministry,  for  the 
edifying. of  the  body  of  Christ.” 

The  above  passages  require  no  comment  to 
make  it  plain  that  they  prove  the  point  in  hand; 
namely,  the  Christian  ministry  is  a  divine  institu¬ 
tion.  We  pass,  then,  at  once  to  a  second  thought 
involved  in  this  ;  namely,  The  Christian  ministry 
is  a  vocation,  not  a  profession. 

When  we  say  the  ministry  is  a  divine  institu¬ 
tion  we  mean  not  only  that  it  is  the  will  of  God 
that  a  ministry  should  exist,  but  also  that  it  is  his 
will  that  particular  persons,  designated  by  himself, 
should  occupy  said  ministry.  In  other  words,  God 
calls  those  whom  he  hath  chosen  for  this  purpose 
to  separate  themselves  from  the  ordinary  avocations 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


380 

of  secular  life,  and  devote  themselves  exclusively 
to  the  work  he  assigns  them  in  his  Church  ;  and 
this  call  is  individual  and  personal.  It  is  not  a 
general  call  addressed  to  persons  of  certain  quali¬ 
fications,  and  so  left  to  their  own  option  as  that 
they  will  be  equally  well-pleasing  to  God  whether 
they  accept  or  refuse;  but  it  is  a  call  to  Peter, 
James,  and  John,  as  individual  persons,  and  is  of 
the  nature  of  a  divine  requirement,  which  they 
must  obey  or  come  into  condemnation  before  God. 
“No  man  taketh  this  honor  unto  himself,  but  he 
that  is  called  of  God,  as  was  Aaron.  Though  I 
preach  the  Gospel  I  have  nothing  to  glory  of;  for 
necessity  is  laid  upon  me,  yea,  woe  is  unto  me  if  I 
preach  not  the  Gospel ;  for  if  I  do  this  thing  will¬ 
ingly  I  have  a  reward,  but  if  against  my  will  a 
dispensation  of  the  Gospel  is  committed  unto  me.” 

This  idea  of  a  divine  call  to  the  Gospel  minis¬ 
try  might  seem  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  natural 
inference  from  the  divine  omniscience.  God  knows 
what  avocation  is  best  for  each,  individual  of  all  the 
race  ;  and  being  of  infinite  good  will,  it  might  be 
naturally  inferred  that  he  not  only  has  a  place  for 
each  one  of  all  the  human  family,  but  also  that  it 
is  his  will  that  each  one  should  occupy  that  place 
which  he  sees  is  best  for  him.  Moreover,  this 
view  would  not  annihilate  all  distinctions  between 
secular  and  sacred  callings,  though  it  would  very 
essentially  modify  what  is  a  very  common  opinion. 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


381 


Most  men  seem  to  think  that  obedience  to  God’s 
will  in  respect  to  a  call  to  the  ministry  is  more 
imperative  than  obedience  in  other  particulars ; 
that  ministers  are  consecrated  men  in  a  sense  in 
which  other  men  are  not  consecrated  ;  that  selfish¬ 
ness  and  self-seeking-  are  totally  inexcusable  in 
ministers,  but  to  some  extent  are  allowable  in  men 
engaged  in  secular  pursuits.  Now,  the  truth  is, 
all  men  are  equally  obligated  to  do  whatever  they 
do  with  an  eye  single  to  the  glory  of  God  ;  that 
is,  to  make  duty  their  governing  motive.  All 
men  are  equally  permitted  to  acknowledge  the 
Lord  in  all  their  ways.  Whether  a  man  be  an 
agriculturalist,  a  mechanic,  a  merchant,  a  minister, 
or  a  missionary,  he  is  bound  to  be  a  religious  man 
in  all  his  pursuits  ;  to  carry  his  purpose  of  right¬ 
eousness  and  obedience  to  his  sense  of  duty  with 
him  perpetually,  and  never  to  deviate  therefrom. 

In  what,  then,  does  a  call  to  the  Gospel  minis¬ 
try  differ  from  any  other  calling  ?  Perhaps  we 
may  say,  first,  it  is  more  specific  and  definite.  A 
man  endowed  with  a  mechanical  genius  may  find  a 
wide  range  for  the  employment  of  his  talent,  and 
it  may  be  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  he  build 
warehouses  or  steamships ;  and  so  of  all  other 
secular  callings.  Whereas,  the  range  of  a  minis¬ 
ter’s  vocation  is  more  restricted,  and  the  heavenly 
vision  points  him  to  this  or  that  particular  thing, 
and  says  do  this  and  nothing  else.  But  again, 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


382 

very  essentially  the  ministerial  vocation  differs  from 
the  ordinary  avocations  of  life  in  the  extent  of  its 
responsibilities.  It  is  man’s  highest  calling,  it  is 
an  honor,  than  which  Providence  bestows  upon 
mankind  none  that  is  greater ;  it  more  immediately 
involves  -results  of  the  highest  importance ;  the 
salvation  of  men  is  instrumentally  connected  with 
it ;  the  prosperity  of  the  Church  and  the  welfare 
of  the  commonwealth  depend  more  upon  the  min¬ 
istry  than  upon  any  other  class  of  citizens  ;  hence 
each  individual  minister  must  be  held  to  a  higher 
responsibility  than  any  other  one  person,  other 
things  being  equal.  Again,  corresponding  to  this 
great  responsibility  there  must  be,  in  sensitive 
minds,  a  distinctness  and  an  intensity,  in  their  sense 
of  duty,  which,  being  more  clearly  cognized  in  con¬ 
sciousness  than  the  same  sense  in  respect  to  any 
other  duty,  comes  to  be  considered  a  call,  special 
and  unique  in  itself,  and  specially  divine.  In  this 
view  it  doubtless  is  so,  and  yet  it  is  not  anomalous ; 
it  is  perfectly  analogous  to  God’s  method  of  dealing 
with  men  in  his  requirements  of  them  in  other  re¬ 
spects.  Its  specialty  consists  in  its  sacredness, 
and  not  at  all  because  it  is,  in  any  sense,  unnatural 
or  unreasonable.  Of  course,  the  call  to  the  min¬ 
istry  is  supernatural ;  but  it  is  so  in  the  same 
sense  that  regeneration  and  assurance  are  super¬ 
natural  ;  it  is  from  an  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
upon  the  mind  of  its  subject. 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


383 


OBJECTIONS. 

The  religious  society  called  Friends  are  gen¬ 
erally  understood  to  deny  that  the  ministry,  as 
regarded  by  all  other  Christian  Churches,  is  a  di¬ 
vinely  appointed  institution  of  the  Church.  Their 
most  distinguishing  characteristic  is  to  ignore,  as 
far  as  possible,  all  externals  in  religion.  Baptism 
is  by  the  Spirit :  “He  shall  baptize  you  with  the 
Holy  Ghost” — water  baptism  is  excluded.  The 
Supper  is  that  spoken  of  in  the  Scripture,  which 
says  :  “I  stand  at  the  door  and  knock,  if  any  man 
hear  my  voice  and  open  the  door  I  will  come  in 
and  sup  with  him  and  he  with  me.”  The  inner 
light,  the  “  light  that  enlighten eth  every  man  that 
cometh  into  the  world,”  is  their  guide,  and  silent 
devotion  is  more  common  than  vocal.  The  emi¬ 
nent  respectability  of  the  sect  as  such,  and  the 
amiable  and  excellent  character  of  its  members, 
give  their  opinions  a  just  title  to  a  respectful  con¬ 
sideration,  and  yet,  as  we  see  it,  it  is  obvious,  from 
a  surface  view,  that  the  effort  to  ignore  externals 
is  mostly  a  failure,  and  by  necessity  must  be  ;  and 
that  so  far  forth  as  it  is  successful,  it  is  a  detri¬ 
ment.  So  far  as  the  Friends  have  an  existence  in 
the  world,  that  existence  is  due  to  the  exter¬ 
nals  which  they  admit  and  practice.  They  have 
their  meeting-houses,  their  solemn  assemblies, 
their  high  seats  occupied  by  their  ministers,  their 


384 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


monthly,  quarterly,  and  yearly  meetings  for  busi¬ 
ness,  their  common  and  statute  laws  for  the  ad¬ 
ministration  of  discipline — in  a  word,  all  the  es¬ 
sentials  of  an  organization  ;  hence  they  exist,  but 
their  effort  to  exclude  externals  is  so  far  suc¬ 
cessful  that  efficiency  is  excluded,  and  they  barely 
exist.  The  genial  influence  of  their  good  char¬ 
acter,  and  their  adherence  to  their  opinions  re¬ 
specting  oaths,  slavery,  and  war,  have  given  them 
an  influence  in  the  world ;  but  for  aggressive 
advancement  upon  the  powers  of  darkness,  for 
attack  upon  the  opposing  forces  of  the  world,  for 
any  thing  like  executive  efficiency  in  advancing 
the  civilizations  of  mankind,  they  are  well-nigh 
totally  inoperative.  Again,  it  is  objected  to  the 
common  doctrine  of  a  divinely  instituted  ministry 
that  it  was  not  designed  to  be  perpetual.  It  is 
said  that  in  the  infancy  of  mankind  the  patriarchal 
priesthood,  in  the  youth  of  the  race  the  Aaronic 
and  Levitical  ministry,  and  in  the  inauguration  of 
Christianity,  the  apostleship  and  the  presbytery, 
were  needful,  and  were  therefore  instituted ;  but  in 
the  advanced  manhood  of  Christian  civilization  no 
such  ministries  are  required,  and  hence  they  ought 
to  be  dismissed.  It  is  further  alleged  that  it  is 
prophesied,  that  in  the  last  days  the  priesthood  is 
to  become  universal,  so  that  old  men  shall  dream 
dreams,  young  men  shall  see  visions,  and  both 
sons  and  daughters  shall  prophesy.  We  reply  to 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


385 


this  last  argument :  First.  When  the  old  dispensa¬ 
tion  ceased,  the  new  one  commenced;  the  “last 

_  A 

days”  began  at  Pentecost.  The  prophecy  respect¬ 
ing  a  universal  priesthood  was  inceptively  fulfilled 
on  the  day  of  Pentecost,  for,  said  Peter,  This  is  that 
which  was  spoken  by  the  prophet  Joel ;  your  sons 
and  your  daughters  shall  prophesy.  It  was  fulfilled 
contemporaneously  with  the  inauguration  of  the 
Christian  ministry — both  the  universal  priesthood 
and  the  apostleship,  with  the  presbytery,  subsisted 
at  the  same  time.  To  the  alleged  affirmation  that 
the  Christian  ministry  is  not  needed,  we  reply  :  If 
the  time  is  ever  to  come  when  all  the  people  shall 
be  so  taught  of  God  as  to  need  no  teachers,  that 
time  is  not  yet.  It  is  not  true  even  of  the  most 
advanced  Christian  community  now  on  earth,  that 
the  mass  of  the  people  have  such  a  knowledge  of 
God  and  of  his  will  as  revealed  in  his  Word,  that 
they  have  no  need  of  the  offices  of  the  Christian 
ministry.  That  time  never  can  come,  for  children 
are  born  into  the  world  as  ignorant  as  were  their 
parents  at  their  birth.  Knowledge  is  not  inherited  ; 
the  successive  generations  are  to  acquire  knowl¬ 
edge  by  personal  effort  under  instruction,  in  the 
same  way  that  it  was  acquired  by  their  ancestors. 
Again,  the  amount  of  religious  knowledge  actually 
existing  in  any  community  is  always  overestimated. 
People  do  not  know  as  much  of  those  things  that 

make  for  their  peace  as  their  neighbors  suppose, 
c  25 


3*6 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


nor  do  they  know  as  much  as  they  themselves 
think  they  do  ;  and  none  are  more  ignorant  of  the 
true  state  of  the  case  as  to  themselves  and  others, 
than  those  who  affirm  that  the  people  have  no  need 
of  pulpit  ministrations. 

But  as  to  the  perpetuity  of  the  Gospel  ministry 
the  teachings  of  the  Scriptures  are  decisive.  The 
great  commission  to  go  into  all  the  world  and  dis¬ 
ciple  all  nations,  is  accompanied  with  the  declara¬ 
tion  that  the  divine  presence  should  attend  his 
ministers  unto  the  end  of  the  world — which  is 
equivalent  to  an  affirmation  that  the  ministry  itself 
should  continue  till  the  time  of  the  consummation 
of  all  things.  Agreeably  to  this  is  all  that  is 
elsewhere  said  in  the  Scriptures  on  the  subject. 
Ministers  are  spoken  of  as  stewards  of  a  house¬ 
hold  whose  Master  is  absent.  In  the  absence  of 
the  Master  they  are  to  give  to  the  servants  each 
his  portion  of  meat  in  due  season ;  they  are  to 
watch  for  the  return  of  the  Master  as  one  that 
must  render  an  account ;  their  stewardship  is  to 
continue  till  the  Master’s  return — that  return  is  at 
the  end  of  the  world.  Again,  the  present  dispen¬ 
sation  is  the  last  dispensation  of  mercy  and  pro¬ 
bation  in  the  history  of  the  race — these  are  the 
“  last  days  no  change  of  ministry  or  of  the  min¬ 
istration  is  anticipated  by  any  thing  recorded  in 
Word  of  God — all  we  are  authorized  to  expect  is 
a  largely  increased  success,  a  triumphant  victory 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


387 


in  the  now  existing  contest,  and  the  universal 
prevalence  of  the  kingdom  of  God  ;  but  no  new 
dispensation,  no  marked  change  in  agencies  or  in¬ 
strumentalities.  The  visions  of  Swedenborg  and 
the  revelations  of  Joseph  Smith  are  not  fulfillments 
of  New  Testament  prophecies — there  is  no  Scrip¬ 
ture  warrant  for  any  expectations  of  any  thing  of 
the  kind.  The  kingdom  of  heaven  is  an  everlast¬ 
ing  kingdom ;  it  shall  not  be  given  to  another 
nation ;  the  stone  cut  from  the  mountain  without 
hands  shall  itself  become  a  great  mountain ;  it  shall 
dash  in  pieces  all  opposing  kingdoms,  it  shall  fill 
the  whole  earth  and  shall  stand  forever. 

Another  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  a  divinely 
appointed  ministry  is  that  it  tends  towards,  and  in¬ 
evitably  results  in,  an  oppressive  hierarchy ;  that  it 
always  results  in  a  dominating  priesthood,  and  a 
minified,  enslaved,  and  oppressed  people.  This 
objection  claims  that  the  apprehension  of  a  divine 
mission  to  certain  functions  involves  the  idea  of  an 
exclusive  divine  right ;  that  is  to  say,  whoever 
thinks  he  is,  by  divine  command,  required  to  per¬ 
form  certain  acts  conceives  that  he  has  an  exclu¬ 
sive  right  to  do  those  things  ;  so  that,  if  any  one 
interferes  to  do  the  same  things,  or  to  dictate  to 
nim  how  he  shall  do  them,  such  a  one  violates  a 
divinely  given  right.  It  is  alleged  in  support  of 
this  objection  that  the  facts  of  history  show  the 
truthfulness  of  the  allegation.  It  is  claimed  that 


388 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


the  doctrine  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  has  al¬ 
ways  resulted  in  civil  oppression,  and  that  in  the 
same  way  and  for  the  same  reason  the  doctrine 
of  the  divine  rights  of  the  priesthood  has  always 
resulted  in  ecclesiastical  tyranny. 

In  reply,  it  is  pertinent  to  remark  that  it  is 
noticeably  common  that  those  whose  declamations 
are  most  vociferous  in  denunciation  of  civil  and 
ecclesiastical  oppressions  do  themselves,  in  the 
total  absence  of  self-consistency,  allow  and  even 
contend  for  a  divine  right  to  something.  In  the 
state  they  denounce  a  monarchy ;  in  the  Church, 
a  hierarchy ;  but  in  both  state  and  Church  they 
claim  a  divine  right  for  a  democracy.  There  is 
and  ought  to  be,  and  it  is  the  divine  will  there 
should  be,  such  a  thing  as  a  government  in  the 
world.  In  the  Church  and  in  the  state  power 
must  be  located  somewhere,  even  though  it  is  lia¬ 
ble  to  be  abused.  Executive  efficiency  requires 
the  concentration  of  power  and  the  location  of  re¬ 
sponsibility  ;  the  former  for  utility,  and  the  latter 
as  a  check  and  a  restraint  against  abuse.  These 
things  all  whose  opinions  deserve  consideration 
will  admit ;  and  the  objection  to  a  divinely  author¬ 
ized  ministry  now  before  us  is  not  consistently 
made  by  persons  entertaining  these  opinions.  The 
question  as  to  what  form  of  Church  government 
furnishes  at  once  the  greatest  efficiency  and  the 
most  effectual  defense  against  the  abuse  of  power 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


389 


is  another  question,  which  we  shall  discuss  further 
on.  As  to  persons  who  object  to  a  ministry  that 
it  is  liable  to  become  a  dominating  power,  lording 
it  over  God’s  heritage,  and  object  with  a  view  to 
an  annihilation  of  the  ministry  in  every  form — that 
is  to  say,  as  to  arrant  levelers,  pronounced  anar¬ 
chists — we  have  only  to  say  that  the  time  devoted 
to  them,  if  wisely  used,  will  be  employed  in  con¬ 
ducting  them  to  asylums  for  the  insane. 

In  what  does  a  call  to  the  Christian  ministry 
consist  ?  or  by  what  evidences  may  an  individual 
person  know  that  he  is  divinely  called  to  the  work 
of  the  Gospel  ministry  ? 

First,  there  must  be  in  the  subject  himself  a 
clear  conviction  of  duty.  We  here  leave  out ‘of 
account  all  the  processes  by  which  he  has  come 
to  that  conviction,  all  the  evidences  on  which  his 
judgment  in  the  case  is  founded,  and  mean  simply 
to  say  that  before  he  makes  a  commencement  in 
the  work  itself  he  must  be  well  satisfied  in  his 
own  mind  that  it  is  his  duty  to  take  upon  himself 
this  holy  office.  The  genesis  and  growth  of  this 
conviction  will  be  different  in  different  minds.  In 
some  an  impression  to  this  effect  has  its  beginning 
in  early  childhood,  and  is  never  displaced ;  but, 
rather,  grows  with  growth  and  is  strengthened 
with  strength.  Many  a  young  man,  in  the  days 
of  his  youthful  pride  and  worldly  ambition,  has 
refused  to  become  a  Christian  because  of  a  resist- 


390 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


less  conviction  that  if  he  attempt  to  live  a  con¬ 
scientious  life  he  would  be  obliged  to  devote  him¬ 
self  to  the  Christian  ministry.  Some,  never  re-  * 
sisting  such  an  impression,  but  cherishing  it,  have 
grown  up  into  all  the  habits,  associations,  and  con¬ 
victions  that  belong  to  the  vocation,  and  without 
any  special  revelation,  or  any  thing  but  what  might 
be  expected  to  arise  naturally  in  a  mind  so  dis¬ 
posed,  they  have  rightly  judged  themselves  divinely 
called  ;  and,  not  disobedient  to  this  heavenly  mani¬ 
festation,  have  been  useful  ministers  of  the  New 
Testament  during  life.  That  such  impressions 
should  be  made  on  the  minds  of  children  is  nothing 
strange  or  unnatural,  nor  are  such  cases  extreme 
and  infrequent.  God,  who  knows  the  end  from 
the  beginning,  and  has  in  his  own  mind  a  place  in 
his  providential  designs  for  each  one  of  all  his 
children,  would  do  nothing  unlike  himself,  or  un¬ 
usual  in  his  ways,  if  he  should  thus  prepare  his 
ministers  for  th^ir  high  calling  and  their  life  -  time 
work.  St.  Paul  says  God  separated  him  from  his 
mother’s  womb,  and  Samuel  was  called  by  an  au¬ 
dible  voice  when  but  a  child.  If  these  be  called 
extreme  cases  we  should  call  the  opposite  extreme 
the  case  of  those  who  by  a  sudden  and  unexpected 
revelation  are  called  to  the  work.  St.  Paul, 
though  separated  from  his  mother’s  womb,  and 
enabled  to  live  in  all  good  conscience,  nevertheless 
through  ignorance  had  come  to  kick  against  the 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


391 


pricks,  to  make  war  against  the  truth,  and  to  op¬ 
pose  the  purposes  of  God.  To  him  the  Master 
appeared  in  a  light  above  the  sun  at  noonday,  with 
an  audible  voice  revealed  to  him  his  will,  and  com¬ 
missioned  him  as  a  minister  and  an  apostle.  But 
evidently  such  revelations  are  not  to  be  expected 
as  of  frequent  occurrence.  St.  Paul’s  mission  was 
peculiar,  and  required  peculiar  qualifications.  The 
life  he  was  called  to  live,  and  the  work  he  was  called 
to  do,  are  not  possible  to  any  one  who  has  not  posi¬ 
tive  knowledge  that  the  cause  he  serves  is  the  cause 
of  God,  of  truth,  and  humanity.  We  do  not  in¬ 
tend  here  to  say  that  the  usual  call  to  the  minis¬ 
try  is  not  of  the  nature  of  a  revelation  ;  for  we 
maintain  that  it  is  so  in  all  cases,  even  where  it 
appears  least  so.  It  is  an  impression  upon  the 
mind  of  its  subject  by  the  Holy  Sprit  that  it  is  his 
duty  to  preach  the  Gospel.  And  this  is  a  revela¬ 
tion  from  God.  The  circumstances  and  manner 
of  the  genesis  and  growth  of  the  impression  are 

incidental,  not  at  all  essential ;  but  what  we  intend 

« 

in  saying  that  ‘such  revelations  as  that  made  to 
St.  Paul  are  not  to  be  expected  as  of  frequent 
occurrence  is  that  sensible  manifestations,  miracu¬ 
lous  or  even  marvelous  phenomena,  are  not  to  be 
expected.  Those  cases  where  in  a  spiritual  way 
an  overwhelming  conviction  or  impression  comes 
as  thunder  from  a  clear  sky,  sudden,  unexpected, 
yet  clear,  powerful,  resistless,  are  not  of  frequent 


392 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


occurrence,  so  that  no  one  can  reasonably  inter 
from  the  absence  of  such  manifestation  that  he  is 
not  called  of  God  to  preach  the  Gospel. 

As  a  fact  in  history,  probably  most  ministers 
come  to  their  conviction  of  duty  in  respect  to  the 
ministry  very  much  in  the  same  way  as  any  godly 
man  comes  to  such  a  conviction  in  respect  to  any 
other  duty ;  and,  as  I  suppose,  this  method  is  more 
desirable  and  more  reliable  than  any  other. 

An  intelligent  and  pious  man,  contemplating 
any  important  enterprise,  will  take  the  matter  in 
prayer  to  God  ;  the  frequency,  fervency,  and  per¬ 
sistency  of  his  prayers  will  be  as  the  magnitude 
of  the  interest  involved.  Having  consciously  a 
paramount  desire  that  God  so  direct  his  mind  in 
the  investigation  as  to  bring  him  to  such  a  conclu¬ 
sion  as  God  sees  will  be  for  the  best,  he  confi¬ 
dently  trusts  that  he  will  be  so  guided.  He  trusts 
in  God  to  this  effect  whether  or  not  in  the  investiga¬ 
tion  consciousness  cognizes  distinctly  a  supernatural 
influence  operating  upon  his  mind ;  his  faith  in 
divine  promises  assures  him  that,  having  asked, 
he  will  receive  all  needed  aid.  Thus  praying  and 
thus  trusting,  he  uses  his  natural  powers  of  mind 
in  discussion  and  decision,  just  as  he  would  do  if 
he  knew  that  supernatural  aid  could  not  be  granted 
him.  He  uses  all  available  opportunities  for  ob¬ 
taining  information  :  he  makes  comparisons,  forms 
judgments,  deduces  inferences,  and  comes  to  con- 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


393 


elusions  by  the  natural,  ordinary  processes  of 
thought ;  and  when  his  mind  is  made  up  that  it  is 
his  duty  to  do  thus  and  thus,  this  conviction  is  to 
him  identical  with  the  conviction  that  it  is  God’s  will 
that  he  should  do  thus  and  thus.  If  the  question 
under  discussion  were  whether  he  should  locate 
his  family  in  this  neighborhood  or  in  an  adjoining 
one,  there  would  not  be  the  same  degree  of  inter¬ 
est  as  if  the  question  were  whether  he  make  his 
permanent  home  where  he  is  or  remove  to  a  dis¬ 
tant  land  ;  and  so  in  all  the  concerns  of  life  that 
come  up  for  discussion  and  decision.  No  earthly 
interest  can  be  of  greater  importance  to  a  young 
man  than  that  which  is  involved  in  the  question 
whether  or  not  he  devote  his  life  to  the  duties  of 
the  Christian  ministry.  Of  course,  then,  if  he  be 
intelligent  and  pious  there  will  be  an  intensity  of 
feeling,  a  depth  of  interest  in  the  investigation  of 
this  question,  that  is  not  legitimate  in  any  other 
investigation  ;  but,  though  in  this  respect  peculiar, 
the  process  need  not  be,  ought  not  to  be,  in  any 
sense  abnormal.  But  it  is  said  cases  frequently 
occur  of  persons  who  in  their  own  judgment  have 
neither  qualification  for  nor  adaptation  to  such  a 
work,  but  have  an  irresistible  impression  that  it  is 
their  duty  to  preach.  They  know  not  whence  the 
impression  came,  or  how  it  continues.  It  is  to 
them  without  foundation  in  reason ;  it  is  wholly 
unaccountable ;  and  yet  of  itself  it  overbalances 


394 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


all  antagonizing  forces.  If  this  be  so,  then  is  the 
case  abnormal,  and  admits  of  no  reasoning  pro¬ 
cesses.  To  the  man  himself  his  sense  of  duty 
must  be  his  rule  of  life  ;  he  must  follow  it  wher¬ 
ever  it  lead  him.  If  the  judgment  of  the  Church 
accords  with  his  judgment  and  affirms  an  entire 
want  of  qualifications,  of  course  the  Church  will 
withhold  their  approbation,  and  the  man  must  do 
as  he  can.  A  conviction  of  duty,  then,  founded 
on  an  apprehension  of  personal  qualifications, 
adaptations,  tastes,  inclinations,  desires,  opinions, 
sentiments,  providential  indications,  and  the  known 
judgments  of  others  competent  to  form  a  reliable 
opinion — a  conviction  thus  founded  and  formed 
and  perpetuated  prayerfully,  piously,  constitutes 
one  element  of  what  may  be  considered  a  divine 
call  to  the  Christian  ministry. 

But  the  wisest  and  best  of  men  are  liable  to 
form  incorrect  opinions  even  in  matters  of  religion 
and  duty,  and  that,  too,  notwithstanding  the  prom¬ 
ised  and  assured  guidance  of  the  Spirit  of  truth  ; 
hence  the  necessity  of  a  second  element  to  render 
the  call  valid  and  reliable. 

Again,  if  it  be  a  given  man’s  duty  to  preach, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  people  to  hear  him,  to  support 
him,  and  to  cooperate  with  him ;  hence  the  Church 
has  rights  and  duties  that  must  be  taken  into 
account. 

The  second  element  in  a  valid  call  to  the  Chris- 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


395 


tian  ministry  is  the  approbation  and  authority  of 
the  Church.  If  the  regularly  constituted  authori¬ 
ties  of  the  Church  where  the  candidate  resides, 
being  personally  acquainted  with  his  gifts,  graces, 
and  usefulness,  are  very  generally  (it  would  be 
better  still  if  the  judgment  were  unanimous)  of 
the  opinion  that  it  is  clearly  the  candidate’s  duty  to 
engage  in  the  work  of  a  Gospel  minister,  and 
do  signify  their  judgment  by  a  properly  attested 
certificate  ;  this  judgment,  thus  recorded  and  at¬ 
tested,  being  accordant  with  the  candidate’s  own 
intelligently  and  piously  formed  convictions,  then  is 
the  call  complete  and  adequate,  and  may  be  rea¬ 
sonably  considered  a  divine  call. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  MINISTERS,  OR  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE 

OFFICE. 

\ 

It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  construct  a  cata¬ 
logue  of  ministerial  duties,  but  rather  to  discuss 
the  difficult  and  delicate  question  of  ministerial 
prerogatives.  However,  in  passing,  it  will  not  be 
improper  to  remark,  that  it  is  the  chief,  the  para¬ 
mount  duty  of  a  minister  to  preach  the  Gospel  of 
the  Son  of  God.  This  includes  the  idea  of  teach¬ 
ing,  instructing,  reproving,  admonishing,  entreat¬ 
ing,  persuading,  to  the  extent  that  the  people  be 
made  to  know,  to  feel,  and  to  acknowledge  all  that 
pertains  to  a  life  of  godliness.  To  this  end  we 
place  first  in  importance  a  full  statement  and  clear 


39^ 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


defense  of  the  doctrines  of  the  book  ol  God.  This 
includes  the  obligation  “to  banish  and  drive  away 
all  erroneous  and  strange  doctrines  contrary  to 
God’s  Word.”  The  knowledge  of  God  is  the  life 
of  the  soul ;  the  people  perish  for  the  lack  of 
knowledge.  “To  know  God  and  Jesus  Christ 
whom  he  hath  sent  is  eternal  life.”  Piety  and 
morality  are  not  the  products  of  ignorance  ;  igno¬ 
rance  is  not  the  mother  of  devotion.  The  min¬ 
ister  is,  therefore,  to  “go  and  teach;”  he  is  to 
disciple  his  hearers  to  Christ ;  and  from  the  nature 
of  the  case  it  is  obvious  that  the  only  effectual 
method  of  Gospel  teaching  is  that  which  thor¬ 
oughly  indoctrinates  the  people  in  Gospel  truths. 
These  are  the  foundations  of  all  duties  and  expe¬ 
riences  ;  if  the  foundations  be  removed  or  are 
wanting,  what  will  the  people  do  ? 

Next  to  doctrines  come  duties.  Practical  god¬ 
liness  must  be  insisted  upon  as  of  first  impor¬ 
tance,  not  only  here  and  there  a  little,  but  also 
much  every-where — “line  upon  line,  precept  upon 
precept,”  distinctly  stated,  vigorously  defended. 
Whether  the  people  hear  or  forbear,  it  is  the 
minister’s  duty  to  lift  up  his  voice  as  a  trumpet, 
and  show  the  people  their  transgressions,  and 
make  known  unto  them  their  sins ;  to  show  the 
beauties  of  holiness  and  persuade  the  people  to  the 
practice  of  virtue. 

Experience  will  measurably  take  care  of  itself. 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


397 


However,  to  point  out  what  experiences  of  holy 
love,  joy,  and  peace,  what  satisfaction  in  conscious¬ 
ness  may  be  expected  from  a  belief  of  the  truth 
and  the  discharge  of  duty,  is  always  serviceable 
as  an  incentive  to  the  right,  and  therefore  may 
be  profitably  employed  as  persuasives  to  piety. 
So  also,  on  the  other  hand,  the  hard  ways  of  the 
transgressor,  the  terrible  consequences  of  sin,  are 
powerful  motives,  when  properly  apprehended, 
to  deter  men  from  vice  and  crime.  Knowing  the 
terrors  of  the  law  will  induce  the  minister  to  per¬ 
suade  men  ;  and  men  may  be  persuaded  by  a  pres¬ 
entation  of  what  prompted  the  persuasion.  To 
preach  Christ,  then,  is  to  preach  all  that  pertains 
to  sin  and  salvation ;  but  all  is  incidental  to  the 
great  work  of  showing  the  Lamb  of  God  that 
taketh  away  the  sin  of  the  world — all  must  point 
to  Christ  or  be  reflected  from  him.  Christ  is 
alpha  and  omega ,  the  beginning  and  the  end  of 
Gospel  ministrations.  The  minister’s  only  business 
here  below  is  to  cry,  Behold,  behold  the  Lamb. 

“  Happy,  if  with  bis  latest  breath 
He  may  but  gasp  his  name; 

Preach  him  to  all,  and  cry  in  death, 

Behold  !  behold  !  the  Lamb  !’’ 

The  administration  of  discipline  is  a  function 
of  the  ministerial  office.  The  honor  of  God  and 
of  his  Church  must  be  defended.  Purity  in  char¬ 
acter  and  uprightness  in  life  must  be  maintained 
in  the  ministry  and  membership  of  the  Church, 


398 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


both  on  account  of  their  inherent  value,  and  of 
their  necessity  as  a  testimony  to  an  unbelieving 
world  to  the  excellence  and  divinity  of  religion. 
That  the  responsibility  of  administering  discipline 
rests  in  part  upon  the  laity  is  conceded  by  all. 
The  limitations  of  prerogatives,  the  question  as  to 
what  functions  of  discipline  belong  to  the  ministry 
and  what  to  the  laity  will  be  referred  to  hereafter. 
The  thought  here  is,  that  to  some  extent  ministers 
are  appointed  to  administer  discipline,  and  are  held 
responsible  by  the  great  Head  of  the  Church  for 
the  faithful  discharge  of  this  duty. 

Pastoral  duties  need  not  be  specially  referred 
to  in  this  connection ;  they  are  not,  however,  * 
passed  over  as  being  of  less  importance  than 
preaching  and  discipline,  but  as  having  less  con¬ 
nection  with  the  special  topic  now  before  us ; 
namely,  the  difficult  and  delicate  question  of 
prerogatives. 

To  what  extent  does  the  office  of  the  ministry 
involve  the  idea  of  exclusive  rights  or  official 
prerogatives?  We  first  direct  attention  to  the 
general  application  of  the  doctrine  of  rights  to  the 
office  of  the  minister. 

The  idea  of  a  divine  vocation  is  no  other  than 
an  idea  that  God  calls  and  requires  certain  per¬ 
sons  to  do  certain  things.  Now  this  is  evidently, 
in  its  nature,  exclusive.  The  call  itself  confers 
authority ;  and,  therefore,  whoever  interferes  vio- 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


399 


lates  a  right.  The  minister  is  called  to  qualify 
himself  to  do  for  the  good  of  others  what  they  can 
not  do  for  themselves  ;  and  it  is  the  possession  of 
such  qualifications  that  constitutes  him  a  minister ; 
without  them  he  is  not,  and  can  not  be,  a  minister 
unto  the  people.  This  ability  and  disposition  to 
do  for  the  good  of  others  what  they  can  not  do 
for  themselves  is  the  foundation  of  rights  in  all 
cases,  and  is  no  less  applicable  to  religious  teach¬ 
ers  than  it  is  to  civil  governments  and  to  parental 
authorities.  Is  it  said  that  the  people  employ 
their  ministers  to  do  for  them  what  they  desire  to 
be  done,  and  that,  therefore,  the  minister  has  no 
rights  but  such  as  the  people  confer?  We  take 
direct  issue  on  such  an  affirmation.  The  people 
do  indeed,  in  a  sense,  employ  their  ministers  and 
pay  them  wages ;  and  have,  therefore,  certain 
rights  which  the  ministry  may  violate ;  but  the 
people’s  redress  and  remedy  in  case  their  rights 
are  violated,  and  the  method  by  which  such  viola¬ 
tions  are  to  be  prevented,  is  not  found  in  an 
unlimited  dictation  to  the  ministry,  but  in  the 
removal  of  the  incumbent  when  convicted  of 
such  a  crime.  Ministers  are  not  mere  tools  for 
the  people’s  use ;  they  are  men  commissioned 
by  divine  authority  to  preach  the  Gospel  of  the 
Son  of  God,  and  to  administer  discipline  in  the 
Church  of  God  as  required  by  the  Holy  Scrip¬ 
tures  ;  and  they  are  required,  on  their  responsi- 


400 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


bility  to  the  great  Head  of  the  Church  to  preach 
the  Gospel  as  they  understand  it ;  and  to  admin¬ 
ister  discipline  as  they  understand  the  Scriptures 
require. 

Agents  are  of  several  kinds.  Common  labor¬ 
ers  are  agents  employed  to  do  the  will  of  their 
employers  both  as  to  ends  and  means.  What 
they  are  to  do  and  how  they  are  to  do  it  is  deter¬ 
mined  by  the  will  of  their  employers  ;  and  they  are 
to  obey  orders  regardless  of  consequences.  Phy¬ 
sicians  are  agents  employed  to  secure  an  end,  but 
are  employed  because  they  are  supposed  to  know 
better  than  their  employers  do  by  what  means  the 
end  desired  may  be  secured.  Ministers,  so  far 
forth  as  they  are  the  employes  of  their  people,  are 
agents  of  the  same  class  as  physicians.  They  are 
to  do  a  work  which  their  people  can  not  do.  It  is 
their  ability  to  do  this  that  constitutes  them  minis¬ 
ters.  The  pulpit  is  not  a  mere  stage,  where  the 
performer’s  only  purpose  is  the  pleasure  of  the 
people.  Ecclesiastical  courts  are  not  mere  con¬ 
ventions,  nor  is  the  pastor  in  the  Church  court  a 
mere  chairman.  The  Church  is  invested  with 
divine  authorities  and  prerogatives,  and  some  of 
them  belong  to  ministers  by  virtue  of  their  office. 

An  agent  held  to  responsibility  can  not  be 
required  to  do  that  for  which  he  is  responsible 
according  to  the  will  of  another  ;  he  must  be  sole 
arbiter  in  all  questions  of  personal  duty.  An 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


401 


executive,  even,  must  execute  the  laws  as  he  un¬ 
derstands  them. 

Secondly,  we  direct  attention  to  the  application 
of  this  doctrine  of  rights  to  specific  duties.  In 
what  sense  is  the  right  of  a  minister  exclusive  in 
the  matter  of  preaching  the  Gospel  ? 

Suppose  a  minister  appointed  to  a  given  Church. 
The  manner  of  his  appointment  need  not  be  con¬ 
sidered  in  this  connection.  He  is  there,  we  will 
say,  by  the  authority  of  the  Church,  which  author¬ 
ity,  in  the  case  of  all  established  Churches,  is 
founded,  in  part  at  least,  upon  the  consent  of  the 
laity!  It  is  only  requisite  for  the  present  illustra¬ 
tion  that  it  be  supposed  that  the  laity,  recognizing 
the  man  as  a  minister  called  of  God,  as  was  Aaron, 
have  received  him  as  such,  and  that  now  he  has 
the  right  of  a  Gospel  minister  to  the  pulpit  of  said 
Church.  In  what  sense  is  that  right  exclusive  ? 
Very  plainly,  in  the  sense  that  no  man  can  at  his 
own  will,  and  against  the  will  of  the  pastor,  eject 
the  pastor  from  his  pulpit  and  occupy  the  same 
himself;  nor  can  the  pastor,  during  the  time  of 
his  stipulated  pastorship,  be  forcibly  ejected  by  any 
authority  except  on  impeachment  after  lawful  pro¬ 
cesses  of  discipline.  But  evidently  this  is  not  say¬ 
ing  that  no  one  else  except  {he  pastor  shall  ever  on 
any  occasion  occupy  the  pulpit  of  a  given  Church. 
With  the  pastor’s  consent  any  one  may  do  so,  and 

not  only  any  minister,  but  any  layman,  male  or 
c  26 


402 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


female.  The  pastor  being  held  strictly  responsi¬ 
ble,  he  may  at  his  option  employ  any  talent  in  his 
aid  which  he  judges  will  be  for  the  glory  of  God 
and  the  good  of  the  people.  The  doctrine  of  ex¬ 
clusive  rights  does  not  shut  the  mouths  of  all  who 
have  not  been  regularly  ordained.  An  intelligent 
minister  is  ever  ready  to  say,  Would  God  that  all 
his  people  did  prophesy !  and  he  will  allow  the 
Word  free  course,  that  it  may  be  glorified. 

As  the  pulpit  belongs  for  the  time  to  the  pas¬ 
tor,  to  be  occupied  by  himself  in  person  or  by 
those  whom  he  shall  appoint,  so  is  it  his  at  such 
times  as  he  shall  select  for  public  ministration.  It 
is  his  to  select  such  topics,  and  to  discourse  upon 
them  with  such  frequency  and  at  such  lengths,  as 
in  his  judgment  is  best  adapted  to  promote  the 
spiritual  welfare  of  his  people.  If  he  be  wise  he 
will  consult  and  advise  with  the  intelligent  and 
godly  of  his  laymen,  and  he  will  ever  cherish  a 
profound  respect  for  their  judgment  and  will  heed 
their  counsels  ;  but  in  all  these  matters  he  is  to 
himself  sole  and  ultimate  authority.  So  that  any 
private  or  concerted  action  tending  to  thwart  the 
pastor  in  the  execution  of  his  godly  purposes  is 
schismatic,  is  a  violation  of  rights,  is  carrying 
strange  fire  to  the  altar  of  God’s  house,  is  reach¬ 
ing  forth  an  unconsecrated  hand  to  steady  the 
ark  of  God. 

Again :  let  us  inquire  to  what  extent  and  in 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


403 


what  sense  the  doctrine  of  ministerial  prerogatives 
applies  to  the  administration  of  discipline  ?  This 
question  can  not  be  articulately  answered  without 
well-nigh  an  exhaustive  treatise  on  ecclesiastical 
jurisprudence.  We  shall  attempt  only  a  charcoal 
sketch  ;  but  shall  endeavor  to  give  to  it  such  dis¬ 
tinctness  of  outline  as  will  indicate  what  the  filling 
up  should  be. 

Government  is  naturally  divided  into  three 
departments,  legislative,  judiciary,  and  executive. 
It  is  frequently  said  that  Christ,  the  head  of  the 
Church,  claims  for  himself  all  legislative  authority, 
and  that  all  that  is  of  the  nature  of  law  in  eccle¬ 
siastical  government  is  already  enacted,  and  is 
fully  recorded  in  the  writings  of  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment.  This  is  doubtless  true  so  far  as  the  end  to 
be  secured  is  concerned  ;  what  the  Church  is  to 
do  is  distinctly  stated  in  the  Word  of  God.  It  is 
also  true  in  the  sense  that  whatever  the  Church 
devises  must  be  in  accordance  with  what  is  re¬ 
vealed.  But  that  the  question  of  means,  the 
question  how  to  do  it,  is  fully  answered  in  the 
Scriptures  no  one  will  claim.  The  varied  and 
ever -varying  circumstances  of  human  society  re¬ 
quire  different  methods  at  different  times  ;  so  that 
at  all  times  the  question,  What  is  best  adapted  to 
secure  the  end  sought  ?  is  a  question  for  discus¬ 
sion,  deliberation,  and  decision.  The  Church, 
then,  has  conventional  functions.  Whether  we 


404 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


call  this  legislation  or  designate  it  by  some  other 
term  makes  no  difference  with  the  facts.  Practi¬ 
cally,  the  Church  must  legislate  in  respect  to 
many  of  its  duties,  its  privileges,  and  its  methods 
of  operation. 

Who  shall  have  authority  to  legislate  for  the 
Church  ?  Is  legislation  an  exclusive  prerogative 
of  the  ministry  ?  or  of  the  laity  ?  or  does  it  belong 
to  the  two  united  ?  If  the  latter,  are  the  two  to 
constitute  one  body,  acting  conjointly,  or  are  they 
to  deliberate  separately,  the  joint  action  of  the  two 
separate  bodies  being  required  for  the  enactment 
of  law  ?  The  Roman  Church  locates  all  legislative 
authority  ultimately  with  the  pope,  to  whom  this 
authority  belongs,  as  is  alleged  by  that  Church, 
because  he  is  Christ’s  vicegerent.  Congregation¬ 
alism  locates  all  governmental  powers  in  the  sep¬ 
arate  single  congregation.  Every  separate  Church 
is  itself  the  source  of  all  authority  by  which  it  is 
governed.  The  pastor  is  moderator,  and  the  deci¬ 
sions  of  the  assembled  Church  are  final.  All 
other  theories  of  Church  government  range  be¬ 
tween  these  two  extremes  —  between  Romanism 
and  Congregationalism  ;  all  agreeing  in  this  one 
affirmation  that  lawful  authority  in  the  Church  re- 
ults  from  the  concurrent  consent  of  both  the 
clergy  and  the  laity.  In  the  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church  the  General  Conference,  composed  of 
ministers  and  laymen,  has  “  full  powers,”  under 


CHURCH  POLITY.  405 

specified  limitations  and  restrictions,  “  to  make 
rules  and  regulations  for  our  Church.” 

Since  in  any  given  Church  the  pastor  is  but 
one  to  the  whole  number  of  the  membership,  if  he 
be  only  a  moderator,  and  if  the  decision  of  a  ma¬ 
jority  be  final,  without  veto  or  appeal,  it  is  obvious 
that  Congregationalism,  in  theory,  makes  all  gov¬ 
ernment  the  exclusive  right  of  the  laity.  That 
this  is  impracticable  is  obvious  for  several  reasons. 
The  matter  determined  has  respect  to  something 
to  be  done.  The  executive  agent  is  the  pastor. 
In  all  cases  of  conflict  between  the  opinions  of  the 
pastor  and  of  his  people  the  pastor  will  be  required 
to  do  what  he  judges  ought  not  to  be  done  ;  and 
of  course,  in  case  of  a  conscientious  scruple,  he 
will  not  do  it.  Again,  though  the  pastor  be  in 
the  assembly  only  a  moderator,  it  is  not  possible 
that  in  any  important  matter  his  opinions  should 
be  unknown  to  his  people  ;  and  by  so  much  as  he 
is  a  pastor  in  their  esteem  by  so  much  is  it  cer¬ 
tain  that  his  opinions  will  determine  their  votes. 
It  is  replied  to  this  that  the  pastor  has  influence 
with  his  people,  and  so  has  his  own  way,  because 
he  is  a  good  and  an  intelligent  man,  and  therefore 
has,  as  the  wise  and  good  always  ought  to  have,  a 
power  over  his  people  which  is  legitimate  and  law¬ 
ful.  We  reply,  This  is  true,  and,  moreover,  is 
supposed  to  be  actual  in  all  cases.  All  ministers 
are  supposed  to  be  good  men,  and  in  matters  of 


40  6 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


religion,  in  the  affairs  of  the  Church,  to  be  wiser 
than  their  people.  This  is  the  basis  of  their  call 
to  the  ministry ;  it  is  their  qualification  for  it ;  it  is 
the  ground  of  all  their  rights  as  ministers.  This 
effort  of  Congregationalists  to  apologize  for  ignor¬ 
ing  the  ministry  in  their  theory  of  government  is 
an  effort,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  both  to  recog¬ 
nize  and  deny  a  natural  right.  A  minister  is  one 
called  of  God  to  separate  himself  from  other  avo¬ 
cations,  and  so  devote  himself  to  the  affairs  of  the 
Church  as  to  have  a  more  perfect  knowledge  of 
them  and  a  deeper  interest  in  them  than  others, 
being  occupied  with  other  pursuits,  have  or  can 
have.  Now,  to  say  that  such  a  one  has  influence  in 
determining  Church  enterprises,  because  he  is  an 
intelligent  and  pious  man,  and  not  at  all  because  he 
is  a  minister,  is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  a  mere  quib¬ 
ble.  That  the  theory  of  Congregationalism  is 
impracticable  is  obvious,  not  only  from  the  fact 
that,  in  cases  of  conflict  between  the  opinions  of 
the  ministry  and  laity,  it  requires  the  minister  to 
do  what  he  can  not  do  conscientiously,  and  not 
only  because  the  minister  possesses  a  knowledge 
of,  and  an  interest  in,  Church  affairs,  that  will 
naturally  and  certainly  give  him  a  determining 
power  in  respect  to  them  ;  but  also  because  a  sin¬ 
gle  Church,  operating  separately,  can  not  dis¬ 
charge  the  functions  for  which  the  Church  was 
organized.  To  preach  the  Gospel  to  every  crea- 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


407 


ture  requires  the  combined  action  of  the  Churches. 
Combinations  for  this  purpose,  and  others  involved 
in  it,  must  be  inaugurated  and  carried  on  by  min¬ 
isters  chiefly,  or  they  will  not  exist,  or  at  best  have 
but  a  feeble  and  inefficient  existence.  Laymen 
who  are  competent  to  share  in  works  of  this  kind 
are  men  of  talents  which  are  occupied  with  other 
affairs.  Idlers  can  not  do  these  things  ;  men  of 
executive  efficiency  are  otherwise  employed  ;  min¬ 
isters  are  called  from  other  employments  that  they 
may  attend  to  them — it  belongs  to  their  vocation, 
it  is  their  duty  to  attend  to  them. 

The  theory  of  the  Roman  Church,  which,  is  the 
extreme  of  this  question,  opposite  to  Congrega¬ 
tionalism,  is  too  preposterous  to  require  discus¬ 
sion.  The  most  healthy  and  efficient  action  in  the 
Church  is  the  result  of  a  harmonious  co-operation 
of  all  its  members,  both  clergy  and  laity.  There 
are  no  conflicting  interests,  and  when  all  things 
are  rightly  understood  there  will  be  no  conflicts. 
The  ministry  especially  have  no  interests  that  an¬ 
tagonize  the  interests  of  the  laity — the  ends  to  be 
secured  are  identical,  and  the  methods  of  labor 
are  of  no  interest  except  so  far  as  they  most 
efficiently  secure  the  ends  which  all  are  supposed 
to  seek.  The  co-operation  of  the  laity  is  indis¬ 
pensable — they  must  therefore,  be  consulted,  and 
their  good  will  must  be  secured.  How  shall  this 
be  done?  We  take  for  granted,  without  discus- 


4o8 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


sion,  that  a  pure  democracy  is  impossible.  Neither 
the  whole  Church  nor  so  many  of  them  as  are 
required  for  necessary  combination  can  be  assem¬ 
bled  in  one  place.  Representation  is  required  by 
the  nature  of  the  case.  We  assume  this  without 
argument,  the  more  readily  because  Congregation- 
alis.ts  themselves  have  organized  representative 
“associations,  synods,  and  conventions. ”  They 
say,  to  be  sure,  simply  for  advice  and  counsel, 
not  for  legislative  purposes  ;  but  this,  as  we  see 
it,  is  of  no  avail,  for  “associations”  have  some 
authority  of  some  kind,  to  some  extent ;  or,  surely, 
not  only  is  their  action  void,  but  they  themselves 
are  the  equivalents  of  so  many  nonentities. 

What  ratio  of  representation,  as  to  ministers 
and  laymen,  does  the  nature  of  the  case  or  do  the 
teachings  of  the  New  Testament  require  in  the  leg¬ 
islative  assemblies  of  the  Church  ?  In  the  Acts  of 
the  Apostles  several  instances  of  Church  action 
are  recorded.  The  first  is  the  appointment  of 
Matthias  to  the  apostleship  in  the  place  of  Judas 
the  traitor.  After  a  speech  by  Peter  addressed  to 
the  disciples,  Joseph  and  Matthias  were,  the  record 
says,  appointed  ;  and  then,  after  prayer,  they  gave 
forth  their  lots,  and  the  lot  fell  on  Matthias.  The 
precise  method  here  is  not  designated.  Some  say 
the  appointment  of  the  two  was  by  a  tie  vote,  and 
then  the  decision  between  the  two  was  by  lot ;  oth¬ 
ers  that  the  selection  of  the  two  was  a  nomination, 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


409 


perhaps  by  the  apostles,  perhaps  promiscuous,  and 
the  so-called  giving  of  their  lots  was  the  formal 
vote  of  the  Church.  There  is  evidently  nothing  in 
this  transaction  that  determines  any  question  of 
Church  polity  beyond  the  general  fact  that  both 
the  apostles  and  disciples  took  part  in  the  election 
of  an  apostle.  The  second  instance  of  Church  ac¬ 
tion  recorded  was  the  election  of  seven  deacons. 
In  this  instance  it  is  plainly  stated  that  first  the 
apostles  called  a  meeting,  showed  the  necessity  of 
the  appointment  of  men  to  the  duties  specified, 
and  called  upon  the  Church  to  nominate  candidates. 
The  Church  did  so,  and  then  the  apostles  or¬ 
dained  the  persons  nominated.  Of  the  office  then 
instituted  we  shall  speak  hereafter  in  another  con¬ 
nection,  here  we  direct  attention  simply  to  the 
method  of  action  ;  and  we  evidently  find  nothing 
additional  to  what  was  apparent  in  the  other  case  ; 
namely,  some  sort  and  degree  of  coaction  between 
the  apostles  and  disciples.  The  third  instance  is 
the  case  of  the  complaint  against  Peter  for  having 
preached  unto  the  Gentiles  at  the  house  of  Cor¬ 
nelius.  When  Peter  returned  to  Jerusalem  from 
his  visit  at  the  house  of  Cornelius,  “they  that 
were  of  the  circumcision  contended  with  him,  say¬ 
ing,  Thou  wentest  into  men  uncircumcised  and 
didst  eat  with  them.”  Peter  rehearsed  the  cir¬ 
cumstances  of  his  vision  at  Joppa,  the  invitation 
of  the  messengers  from  Cornelius,  the  command 


4io 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


of  the  Spirit  to  go,  the  reception  he  and  the 
six  brethren  who  accompanied  him  received,  his 
preaching,  the  baptism  of  the  Holy  Ghost  which 
fell  on  all  them  that  heard,  and  the  admission  of 
the  Gentiles  to  the  Church  by  baptism.  And,  it 
is  recorded  that  “when  they  heard  these  things 
they  held  their  peace  and  glorified  God,  saying, 
Then  hath  God  also  to  the  Gentiles  granted  re¬ 
pentance  unto  life.”  Who  the  “they  of  the  cir¬ 
cumcision”  were,  whether  apostles  or  disciples, 
or  both,  the  record  does  not  state.  Nothing  is 
learned  here  of  any  fixed  forms  of  ecclesiastical 
jurisprudence — there  was  a  complaint,  a  public  vin¬ 
dication,  and  an  acquittal,  such  as  to  form  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  seemed  to  require. 

The  next  instance  recorded  is  that  of  the  ac¬ 
tion  of  the  Church  at  Antioch  for  the  relief  of 
“the  brethren  who  dwelt  in  Judea  in  the  time  of 
the  dearth  throughout  all  the  world  which  came  to 
pass  in  the  days  of  Claudius  Caesar.”  The  dis¬ 
ciples,  every  man  according  to  his  ability,  contrib¬ 
uted,  and  sent  their  contribution  to  the  elders  at 
Jerusalem  by  the  hands  of  Barnabas  and  Saul. 
The  disciples  at  Antioch  made  the  contribution, 
Barnabas  and  Saul  carried  it,  and  the  elders  at 
Jerusalem  received  and  distributed  it — all  as  the 
exigencies  of  the  times  seemed  to  require,  nothing 
in  accordance  with  any  prescribed  rules.  The 
next  instance  of  Church  action  we  notice  is  the 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


411 

appointment  of  Barnabas  and  Saul  as  missionaries. 
“There  were  at  Antioch  certain  prophets  and 
teachers,  to  whom,  as  they  ministered  to  the  Lord 
and  fasted,  the  Holy  Ghost  said,  Separate  me  Bar¬ 
nabas  and  Saul  for  the  work  whereunto*  I  have 
called  them  ;  and  when  they  had  fasted  and  prayed 
and  laid  hands  on  them,  they  sent  them  away.” 
After  an  extensive  and  successful  missionary  tour 
they  returned  “to  Antioch,  from  whence  they  had 
been  recommended  to  the  grace  of  God  for  the 
work  which  they  had  fulfilled  ;  and  when  they  had 
gathered  the  Church  together  they  rehearsed  all 
that  God  had  done  with  them,  and' how  he  had 
opened  the  door  of  faith  unto  the  Gentiles.”  In  this 
case  the  call  was  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  the  ordination 
by  the  prophets  and  teachers,  the  letters  of  recom¬ 
mendation  probably  by  the  prophets  and  teachers 
in  behalf  of  the  Church,  and  the  report  was  made 
to  the  whole  Church  assembled  together — there  is 
nothing  of  preconcerted  formality  here.  The  next 
case  we  mention  is  that  of  the  controversy  at  An¬ 
tioch  respecting  circumcision,  which  was  referred 
to  the  Church  at  Jerusalem  for  decision.  Certain 
men  came  to  Antioch  from  Judea,  and  taught  the 
brethren  that  except  they  be  circumcised  after  the 
manner  of  Moses  they  could  not  be  saved.  Paul 
and  Barnabas  had  no  small  discussion  and  dispu¬ 
tation  with  them.  It  was  determined  that  Paul 
and  Barnabas,  with  certain  other  of  them,  should 


412 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


go  up  to  Jerusalem  unto  the  apostles  and  elders 
about  f.his  question.  They  went,  and  being  re¬ 
ceived  by  the  Church,  the  apostles,  and  elders, 
they  declared  all  things  that  God  had  done  with 
them.  At  Jerusalem  certain  of  the  sect  of  the 
Pharisees  which  believed  still  contended  that  it 
was  needful  to  circumcise  the  Gentiles  and  to  com¬ 
mand  them  to  keep  the  law  of  Moses.  The  apos¬ 
tles  and  elders  came  together  to  consider  of  this 
matter.  Peter,  Barnabas,  and  Paul  each  made  an 
argument  on  the  subject.  James  showed  how 
Peter’s  testimony  concerning  God’s  visitation  to 
the  Gentiles  was  a  fulfillment  of  the  prophetic 
Scriptures,  and  then  gave  his  sentence,  with  which 
all  were  agreed.  Then  it  pleased  the  apostles  and 
elders,  with  the  whole  Church,  to  send  chosen 
men  of  their  own  company  to  Antioch  with  Paul 
and  Barnabas  ;  namely,  Barsabas  and  Silas,  chief 
men  among  the  brethren,  who  were  themselves 
also  prophets.  The  decision  of  the  apostles  and 
elders  was  communicated  in  an  epistle.  The  mes¬ 
sengers  came  to  Antioch,  gathered  the  multitude 
together,  and  delivered  the  epistle ;  which,  when 
they  had  read,  they  rejoiced  for  the  consolation. 
This  is  the  clearest  case  of  Church  legislation 
found  in  the  record  of  apostolic  times.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  the  Church  at  Antioch  did  not 
decide  the  question  for  themselves,  nor  did  they 
send  to  Jerusalem  merely  for  advice — the  decision 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


4 13 


of  the  Jerusalem  Church  was,  with  them,  authori¬ 
tative  and  final.  Again,  the  deliberative  assembly 
at  Jerusalem  was  composed  solely  of  apostles  and 
elders.  Peter,  Barnabas,  Paul,  and  James  are  the 
only  ones  mentioned  as  taking  an  active  part  in 
the  discussion.  James  formulated  the  decision  of 
the  court.  The  letters  were  written  and  sent  in 
the  name  of  the  apostles  and  elders  and  brethren. 
The  messengers  chosen  and  sent  from  Jerusalem, 
Judas,  surnamed  Barsabas,  and  Silas,  were  chief 
men  among  the  brethren,  and  also  themselves 
prophets,  who  with  many  words  exhorted  and  con¬ 
firmed  the  brethren  at  Antioch.  Silas  did  not 
return  to  Jerusalem,  but  became  Paul’s  traveling 
companion — a  fellow  missionary  with  an  apostle,  a 
fellow  prisoner  at  Philippi,  who  at  midnight  prayed 
and  sang  praises  to  God,  and  after  the  earthquake 
which  released  the  prisoners  he  preached  the 
Gospel  of  salvation  to  the  convicted  jailer  and  his 
household.  Now,  in  this  clear  case  of  Church 
legislation,  stated  with  greater  definiteness  than 
any  other,  having  respect  to  the  most  difficult  and 
most  troublesome  question  of  the  times,  what  do 
we  learn  as  to  the  polity  of  the  Church  in  apostolic 
times  ?  Certainly  nothing  that  indicates  the  exist¬ 
ence  of  any  fixed  system,  nothing  that  determines 
any  authoritative  limitation  or  definition  of  juris¬ 
diction.  What  is  done  ?  how  is  it  done  ?  and  who 
does  it  ?  are  questions  that  seem  to  be  decided  by 


4H 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


the  then  present  judgment  of  the  Church,  all  con¬ 
curring  ;  which  judgment  results  from  a  consid¬ 
eration  and  discussion  of  existing  exigencies. 

The  last  instance  we  mention  is  that  of  the 
accusation  against  St.  Paul,  made  at  the  time  of 
his  last  visit  to  Jerusalem;  namely,  that  he  taught 
all  the  Jews  which  were  among  the  Gentiles  to  for¬ 
sake  Moses.  It  is  recorded  that  Paul,  with  several 
attendants,  was  gladly  received  by  the  brethren, 
and  that  on  the  day  following  this  reception  they 
went  in  unto  James;  and  all  the  elders  were  pres¬ 
ent.  Paul  declared  particularly  what  things  God 
had  wrought  among  the  Gentiles  by  his  ministry  ; 
and  when  they  heard  it  they  glorified  God,  and 
said  unto  him,  Thou  seest,  brother,  how  many 
thousands  of  Jews  there  are  which  believe,  and 
they  are  all  zealous  of  the  law,  and  are  informed 
of  thee  that  thou  teachest  all  the  Jews  which  are 
among  the  Gentiles  to  forsake  Moses,  saying,  that 
they  ought  not  to  circumcise  their  children,  neither 
to  walk  after  the  customs.  Having  rehearsed  this 
accusation  from  the  people,  James  and  the  elders 
directed  Paul  to  purify  himself  according  to  the 
Jewish  custom,  and  thus  show  publicly  that  he 
himself  walked  orderly  and  kept  the  law.  Which 
thing  Paul  essayed  to  do,  but  was  attacked  by  a 
riotous  mob  in  the  temple  itself,  was  rescued  by 
the  chief  captain,  appealed  to  Caesar,  and  was  sent 
a  prisoner  to  Rome.  We  note  nothing  here  but 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


415 


the  fact  that  when  James  and  the  elders  were 
themselves  well  pleased  with  Paul,  and  did  glorify 
God  on  account  of  what  God  had  done  by  his 
ministry,  nevertheless  out  of  regard  to  the  popu¬ 
lar  opinion  respecting  him,  they  gave  him  apostolic 
directions — perhaps  they  were  requirements  for 
satisfying  the  public  mind.  The  good  will  of  the 
people,  if  possible  by  lawful  means,  must  be 
maintained. 

The  purpose  for  which  we  have  recited  these 
instances  of  Church  action  has  become  apparent 
in  the  course  of  the  recital.  The  appointment  of 
the  deacons  seems  to  indicate  that  the  election 
of  Church  officers  belongs  to  the  people  and  their 
ordination  to  the  ministers  ;  but  the  appointment 
of  Barnabas  and  Saul  as  missionaries  was  by  the 
Holy  Ghost,  and  was  divinely  indicated  directly  to 
the  prophets  and  teachers,  who  proceeded  forth¬ 
with  to  ordain  them.  The  election  of  the  deacons 
looks  a  little  like  Congregationalism ;  but  the 
discussion  and  settlement  of  the  question  about 
circumcision  looks  wholly  towards  a  hierarchy — 
and  so  of  the  rest.  Plainly,  no  system  of  Church 
government  is  indicated  in  the  New  Testament, 
much  less  is  one  distinctly  defined  and  divinely 
required.  The  Church  is  left  to  exercise  its  godly 
judgment  in  adapting  its  operations  and  actions  to 
the  emergencies  and  exigencies  of  the  times  in 
which  its  action  is  required. 


4i  6 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Now,  after  what  may  seem  to  be  a  digression, 
we  return  to  the  question,  What  ratio  of  repre¬ 
sentation  between  the  ministry  and  the  laity  do 
the  teachings  of  the  New  Testament,  or  what  ratio 
does  the  nature  of  the  case  require  in  the  legisla¬ 
tive  assemblies  of  the  Church  ?  The  above  shows, 
we  think  conclusively,  that  the  New  Testament 
does  not  give  sufficient  data  for  a  definite  answer, 
and  that  this  matter  is  left  for  the  decisions  of 
the  Church.  What  then  does  the  nature  of  the 
case  suggest  as  equitable  and  expedient  ?  Cer¬ 
tainly  not  a  per  capita  representation.  It  seems 
hardly  necessary  to  say  this,  as  no  one  would  pre¬ 
sume  to  claim  it  in  so  many  words,  though  they 
might  advocate  principles  which  imply  it ;  but  it 
may  serve  as  an  illustration  of  the  question,  and 
lead  to  a  more  ready  apprehension  of  what  follows. 
Suppose,  then,  a  Church  in  which  the  ratio  of  the 
ministry  to  the  membership  is  one  to  five  hundred, 
one  pastor  to  five  hundred  members.  A  per  capita 
representation  in  the  governing  assemblies  of  the 
Church  would  place  the  ministry  in  a  very  hopeless 
minority — a  pure  democracy  is  then  out  of  the 
question.  Shall  the  representation  be  equal,  one 
layman  for  every  minister  ?  This,  in  the  councils 
of  a  single  local  Church,  would  place  all  power 
and  authority  in  the  hands  of  two  men,  the  pastor 
and  one  layman.  This  will  not  do,  for  in  local 
Churches  since  the  co-operation  of  each  and  all 


CHURCH-POLITY. 


417 


of  the  individual  members  is  requisite  for  the  high¬ 
est  prosperity,  the  laity  must  and  ought  to  be  fully 
represented.  Where  the  local  interests  of  an  indi¬ 
vidual  Church  are  discussed,  and  where  measures 
are  adopted  for  the  well-being  of  such  a  Church, 
the  laity  must  be  very  largely  in  the  majority  ;  in¬ 
deed,  since,  in  most  cases,  there  is  officially  but 
one  minister  to  a  Church,  these  primary  assem¬ 
blies  are,  and  must  be,  the  equivalents  of  assem¬ 
blies  composed  wholly  of  laymen.  In  the  higher 
courts  of  the  Church,  bodies  having  authority  to 
act  for  and  administer  the  government  of  many 
Churches,  an  equal  representation  might  not  be 
detrimental ;  but,  in  such  a  case,  a  comparatively 
small  number,  composed  of  either  ministers  or  lay¬ 
men,  must  constitute  a  quorum,  since  ordinarily 
laymen,  though  appointed,  would  not  in  numbers 
equal  to  that  of  the  ministry  attend  such  meetings. 

Our  conclusion  is,  that  in  all  the  governing 
functions  of  the  Church,  whether  legislative,  judi¬ 
ciary,  or  executive,  the  ministry  must  be  endowed 
with  a  balance  of  power.  If  by  constitutional  pro¬ 
visions  the  ministry  be  endowed  with  an  abso¬ 
lutely  dominating  power  that  were  an  objectionable 
hierarchy  ;  but  a  balance  of  power,  hedged  about 
with  suitable  checks  and  restraints,  must  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  ministry,  if  the  highest  possibility  of 
Church  efficiency  be  attained.  Even  in  the  pri¬ 
mary  councils  of  the  individual  Church,  if  the  pas 
c  27 


4i8 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


tor  have  not  a  personal  influence  with  his  people, 
which  will  secure  to  him  the  piloting  power  in 
stormy  times,  there  is  a  weakness  in  the  pastorate 
which  is  a  certain  bar  to  prosperity.  He  can  not 
have  a  dominating  power  that  will  annihilate  all 
opposing  opinions,  for  the  consent  and  co-operation 
of  his  Church  is  an  indispensable  prerequisite  to 
success.  But  his  personal  influence,  or  the  rules 
and  regulations  of  the  Church,  better  if  both,  must 
be  such  that  the  final  decision  is  largely  subject  to 
his  control.  Of  necessary  and  suitable  checks 
and  restraints,  we  may  speak  to  better  advan¬ 
tage  when  we  come  to  discuss  specific  forms  of 
government. 

.In  the  higher  councils  of  the  Church,  where 
only  the  idea  of  representation  is  applicable,  the 
ratio  is  different  in  different  Churches,  and  in  dif¬ 
ferent  bodies  of  the  same  Church.  The  presby¬ 
teries,  synods,  and  assemblies  of  the  Presbyterian 
Churches  are  composed  of  an  equal  number  of 
ministers  and  ruling  elders.  The  ruling  elders 
are,  however,  elected  to  hold  office  during  life,  and 
might  be  reckoned  as  a  subordinate  branch  of  the 
ministry.  In  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  the 
quarterly  and  district  conferences  are  composed 
mostly  of  laymen,  the  Annual  Conference  wholly  of 
ministers,  and  the  General  Conference  of  ministers 
and  laymen — the  latter  but  a  small  minority.  The 
practice  of  all  Churches  recognizing  the  lawfulness 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


419 


of  representative  bodies  endowed  with  governing 
powers,  gives  to  the  clergy  a  balance  of  power ;  and 
we  affirm,  that  in  the  nature  of  the  case  this  of 
right  ought  so  to  be.  Why  not?  what  objection? 
Why,  it  is  said  this  minifies  the  laity,  gives  the 
clergy  opportunity  to  lord  it  over  God's  heritage — 
it  is  a* hierarchy,  a  monarchy,  a  tyranny.  Chris¬ 
tian  equality  and  a  common  brotherhood  requires 
a  pure  democracy,  and  so  on  to  the  end  of  a  long 
chapter.  Now  all  this  and  all  other  objections  to  a 
properly  constituted  supervision  by  the  clergy  of 
ecclesiastical  affairs  assume  that  the  ministry  and 
the  membership  have  conflicting  interests,  when  it 
is  manifest  that  no  such  case  exists  except  where 
one  or  the  other,  or  both,  become  traitors  to  the 
cause  they  profess  to  serve.  To  provide  against 
the  possibility  of  treason  by  the  annihilation  of  all 
power  is  to  sacrifice  well-nigh  all  the  ends  of 
life.  Executive  efficiency  requires  the  location  of 
authority  ;  protection  against  the  abuse  of  power 
is  not  to  be  sought  in  its  destruction,  but  in  proper 
checks  and  restraints. 

The  interests  of  the  minister  and  of  his  Church 
are  the  same.  What  is  for  the  good  of  one  is  for 
the  good  of  the  other.  The  minister  is  divinely 
called  to  devote  his  entire  resources  to  the  well¬ 
being  of  his  people,  and  is  supposed  to  have  a 
more  perfect  knowledge  and  a  deeper  interest  in 
their  best  good  than  they  have  themselves.  A 


420 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


true  minister  will  never  oppress  the  people  he 
serves.  The  great  Shepherd  laid  down  his  life  for 
the  sheep,  and  all  his  true  followers  in  the  pas¬ 
torate  have  a  portion  of  his  spirit.  That  a  balance 
of  power  be  invested  in  the  clergy,  that  a  con¬ 
trolling  influence  be  at  their  command,  is  involved 
in  the  nature  of  the  vocation  itself.  They  are  to 
leave  the  ordinary  avocations  of  life  and  devote 
themselves  exclusively  to  the  interests  of  the 
Church  for  this  very  purpose,  that  they  may  qualify 
themselves  for,  and  devote  themselves  to,  the 
direction  of  Church  affairs. 

We  have  allowed  this  discussion  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  ministerial  prerogatives  to  take  a  some¬ 
what  extended  range  under  the  topic  of  ministerial 
functions,  because  it  is  as  pertinent  here  as  any¬ 
where,  and  could  not  be  entirely  ignored.  We, 
however,  leave  it  at  this  point,  and  conclude  the 
topic  by  a  brief,  and  because  brief,  an  imperfect 
specification  of  the  duties  belonging  to  the  minis¬ 
terial  office.  It  belongs  to  the  ministerial  office  to 
preach  the  Gospel,  to  organize  Churches,  to  pre¬ 
side  in  all  Church  assemblies  except  such  as  are 
purely  financial,  to  administer  discipline  by  insti¬ 
tuting  and  conducting  all  Church  trials,  and  by 
executing  the  orders  of  all  Church  courts,  to  pre¬ 
pare,  authorize,  and  ordain  other  ministers,  to  rep¬ 
resent  the  Church  in  her  deliberative  assemblies, 
to  legislate  for  the  enactment  of  such  rules  and 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


42  1 


regulations  as  the  good  of  the  Church  may  re¬ 
quire,  and  to  perform  all  those  offices  of  oversight, 
kindness,  and  good  will  which  naturally  belong  to 
the  pastoral  care  of  the  flock. 

.  MINISTERIAL  QUALIFICATIONS. 

In  what  is  said  above  in  respect  to  the  Chris¬ 
tian  ministry  it  has  been  asserted  or  assumed 
that  the  vocation  is  founded  on  certain  qualifica¬ 
tions  possessed  by  the  incumbent  of  the  office  or 
to  be  sought  by  the  candidate  for  it.  It  is  sup¬ 
posed  that  when  God  calls  a  man  to  the  ministry 
he  does  so  because  he  sees  in  him  the  requisite 
qualifications  or  an  ability  and  disposition  to  ac¬ 
quire  them  ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  Church. 
The  doctrine  of  rights  is  founded  upon  the  same 
basis.  The  right  of  the  parent  to  govern  the 
child  is  based  upon  the  parent’s  ability  and  dispo¬ 
sition  to  do  for  the  child’s  good  what  he  can  not  do 
for  himself.  So,  also,  the  minister  has  rights  so 
far,  and  only  so  far,  as  he  possesses  qualifications 
for  ministerial  work. 

Now,  as  religion  touches  every  point  of  human 
life,  as  every  congregation  embraces  well-nigh  all 
descriptions  of  human  character  and  condition,  and 
as  the  minister’s  office  is  to  elevate  his  people  to 
a  higher  standard  of  culture  and  attainment  than 
that  they  occupy,  it  has  been  preposterously  in¬ 
ferred  that  the  minister  must  possess  all  knowl- 


422 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


edge ;  that  he  must  not  only  be  a  man  of  books, 
but  also  a  man  of  affairs  ;  that  he  must  know 
the  peculiar  temperaments,  habits,  trials,  tempta¬ 
tions — in  a  word,  the  peculiar  experiences  of  all 
his  people,  and  thus  be  qualified  to  minister  to 
each  individual  a  portion  suited  precisely  to  his 
personal  requirements.  That  this,  if  it  were  the 
will  of  the  Lord,  is  to  human  apprehension  greatly 
to  be  desired,  no  one  will  question  ;  but  to  affirm 
that  no  man  can  be  a  valid  Gospel  minister  unless 
he  can  measure  up  to  such  a  standard  is  to  affirm 
what  is  obviously  unwarranted.  There  are  diver¬ 
sities  of  gifts  ;  no  one  man  possesses  all  kinds  of 
talents.  Some  are  apostles,  some  prophets,  some 
evangelists,  some  pastors  and  teachers.  There 
are  different  kinds  of  work  to  be  done  in  the 
Church,  and  the  diversity  of  talents  in  the  laborers 
corresponds  to  the  diversity  of  the  work  to  be 
done.  A  man  who  is  an  apostle  to  one  class  of 
hearers  is  as  one  who  speaks  in  an  unknown 
tongue  to  another  class. 

As,  on  the  one  hand,  some  place  the  standard 
of  qualification  so  high  that  to  realize  it  is  impos¬ 
sible  ;  so,  on  the  other  hand,  some  discount  qual¬ 
ifications  altogether,  and  affirm  that  success  in 
the  Gospel  ministry  depends  solely  upon  divine 
inspiration.  It  is  affirmed  that  whomsoever  God 
calls  he  will  qualify,  and  qualify  by  the  immediate 
unction  of  the  Spirit.  Scripture  is  quoted  in  sup- 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


423 


port  of  this  idea:  “Paul  planted,  and  Apollos  wat¬ 
ered,  but  God  gave  the  increase.”  This  and  par¬ 
allel  passages  are  quoted  in  a  sense  that  assumes 
that  the  planting  and  watering  might  as  well  have 
been  done  by  wooden  men,  by  machinery,  as  by 
apostolic  ministration.  Indeed,  the  idea  assumes 
what  is  equivalent  to  the  affirmation  that  idiots  and 
insane  people  will  do  for  ministers,  because  it  is 
God  who  does  the  preaching.  “It  is  not  by  might 
nor  by  power,  but  by  my  Spirit,  saith  the  Lord” — 
as  though  the  might  and  the  power  were  just  as 
well  absent  as  present.  Since  divine  aid  is  essen¬ 
tial,  instrumentality  is  of  no  account.  God  and  an 
idiot  can  do  as  much  as  any  other  two  in  the  uni¬ 
verse.  But  enough  of  this  ;  such  talk  is  evidently 
either  the  prattling  of  a  child  or  the  raving  of  a 
maniac.  If  men,  who  are  men  of  sense  in  other 
matters,  sometimes  talk  thus,  as  I  am  sorry  to 
say  they  do,  it  is  because  they  have  in  this  thing 
become  either  dishonest  or  fanatical.  “  If  the 
blind  lead  the  blind,  both  shall  fall  into  the  ditch. 
A  bishop  must  be  blameless,  apt  to  teach,  not  a 
novice,  lest  being  lifted  up  with  pride  he  fall  into 
the  condemnation  of  the  devil.  Holding  fast  the 
faith  as  he  hath  been  taught,  that  he  may  be  able 
by  sound  doctrine  both  to  exhort  and  to  convince 
gainsayers.  Let  no  man  despise  thy  youth,  but 
be  thou  an  example  of  the  believers,  in  word,  in 
conversation,  in  charity,  in  spirit,  in  faith,  in  purity. 


424 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Till  I  come  give  attendance  to  reading,  to  exhor¬ 
tation,  to  doctrine.  And  the  things  that  thou  hast 
heard  of  me,  the  same  commit  thou  to  faithful 
men  that  they  may  be  able  to  teach  others  also. 
Lay  hands  suddenly  on  no  man.  Feed  the  flock  of 
God  which  is  among  you,  taking  the  oversight;  not 
by  constraint,  but  willingly  ;  neither  as  being  lords 
over  God’s  heritage,  but  being  ensampies  to  the 
flock.  The  fruit  of  the  righteous  is  a  tree  of  life, 
and  he  that  winneth  souls  is  wise.  These  things 
write  I  unto  thee,  that  thou  mayest  know  how 
thou  oughtest  to  behave  thyself  in  the  house  of 
God,  which  is  the  Church  of  the  living  God,  the 
pillar  and  ground  of  the  truth.  Study  to  show 
thyself  approved  unto  God  a  workman  that  need- 
eth  not  to  be  ashamed,  rightly  dividing  the  word 
of  truth.  In  all  things  shewing  thyself  a  pattern 
of  good  works ;  in  doctrine  showing  uncorruptness, 
gravity,  sincerity,  sound  speech,  that  can  not  be 
condemned ;  that  he  that  is  of  the  contrary  part 
may  be  ashamed,  having  no  evil  thing  to  say  of 
you.  Therefore,  seeing  we  have  this  ministry,  as 
we  have  received  mercy,  we  faint  not ;  but  have 
renounced  the  hidden  things  of  dishonesty,  not 
handling  the  Word  of  God  deceitfully;  but  by 
manifestation  of  the  truth  commending  ourselves 
to  every  man’s  conscience  in  the  sight  of  God.” 
These  passages,  with  a  very  large  number  of 
others  with  a  similar  import,  both  by  what  they 


CHURCH  POLITY. 


425 


say  of  the  character  of  a  Christian  minister,  and 
of  the  nature  of  the  work  to  which  he  is  called, 
indicate  very  clearly  that  a  minister  of  the  Gospel 
must  be  a  man  of  eminent  piety,  knowledge,  and 
culture  ;  an  ensample  to  the  flock — a  sort  of  model 
man,  one  whose  conduct  is  worthy  of  imitation, 
and  of  a  character  such  as  may  be  aspired  after. 
“Christ  loved  the  Church  and  gave  himself  for  it, 
that  he  might  sanctify  and  cleanse  it  with  the 
washing  of  water,  by  the  Word  ;  that  he  might 
present  it  to  himself  a  glorious  Church,  not  having 
spot  or  wrinkle  or  any  such  thing,  but  that  it 
should  be  holy  and  without  blemish.”  And  he 
employs  his  ministers  as  agents  in  carrying  for¬ 
ward  his  designs.  Ministers,  then,  are  uplifting 
humanity  towards  a  condition  of  perfection  in  all 
that  pertains  to  a  perfect  humanity.  How  can 
they  do  this  unless  they  themselves  stand  upon  a 
more  elevated  plane  than  those  do  for  whose 
elevation  they  labor?  Men  influence  the  character 
of  others  more  by  what  they  are  than  by  what 
they  say  or  do.  If,  then,  ministers  seek  a  high  cul¬ 
ture  in  intelligence  and  spirituality  for  their  people, 
how  can  they  accomplish  the  end  and  purpose  of 
their  toil  unless  they  are  themselves  highly  culti¬ 
vated  ?  We  have  said  above  that  a  minister  can 
not  be  the  superior  of  all  his  people  in  all  re- 
specfs,  but  he  must  be  above  those  he  benefits  in 
respect  to  the  things  in  which  they  are  benefited  ; 


426 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


he  must  be  above  his  people  in  some  regards,  or 
he  can  not  be  a  pastor  to  them.  In  an  itinerant 
ministry  a  class  of  talents  may  be  profitably  em¬ 
ployed  which  would  be  even  detrimental  in  a  set¬ 
tled  ministry.  A  man  of  limited  general  attain¬ 
ments,  but  of  deep  piety  and  a  correct  knowledge 
of  the  rudiments  of  Gospel  truths,  may  be  very 
useful  for  a  short  time,  or  in  an  occasional  service, 
even  to  a  congregation  whose  general  culture  is 
superior  to  his  own  ;  because,  in  respect  to  some 
few  things,  he  is  in  advance  of  them.  But  were 
such  a  man  to  become  the  settled  pastor  of  such 
a  Church,  the  settlement  would  be  either  a  failure 
or  a  detriment ;  either  after  a  short  time,  he  would 
be  dismissed,  or  the  Church  would  at  length  sink 
to  his  level.  The  minister,  then,  who  is  the  per¬ 
manent  pastor  of  any  people,  must  be  above  the 
average  of  his  people  in  natural  endowments  and  ‘ 
in  learned  acquirements,  in  purity  and  perfection 
of  character,  and  in  all  the  excellencies  of  a  true 
humanity.  A  true  Gospel  minister  is  a  true  man  ; 
a  thoroughly  honest  man,  of  sound  judgment, 
of  good  social  qualities,  an  average  knowledge 
of  common  affairs,  and  a  thorough  and  superior 
knowledge  of  God’s  holy  Word. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Classification  of  Ministerial  Duties  and 

Offices. 

In  preceding  pages  we  have  endeavored  to 
show  that  the  Christian  Church  and  its  ministry 
are  divine  institutions,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  God’s 
will  that  such  institutions  should  exist  among  men. 
We  have  treated  of  the  call  to  the  ministry,  its 
nature  and  evidences,  of  ministerial  prerogatives 
and  qualifications.  We  come  now  to  consider 
the  classifications  of  ministerial  duties  and  offices. 
The  duties  of  the  Christian  ministry  are  numerous 
and  varied.  Men  differ  from  each  other  in  natural 
endowments  and  in  their  acquirements  ;  in  temper¬ 
aments,  tastes,  habits,  judgments,  desires,  and 
affections  ;  and  hence  they  differ  greatly  in  their 
adaptations  to  the  varied  pursuits  of  life.  Very 
naturally  and  reasonably,  therefore,  we  should 
judge  a  priori,  we  should  antecedently  expect  that 
the  duties  of  the  ministry  would  be  divided  into 
classes  and  that  certain  persons  would  be  ap¬ 
pointed  to  perform  certain  duties.  We  should 

anticipate  that  the  principle,  called  in  political 

427 


428 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


economy  the  division  of  labor,  would  apply  to  the 
ministry  as  well  as  to  other  pursuits  in  life.  The 
saying  which,  in  modern  parlance,  has  come  to  as¬ 
sume  the  dignity  of  a  maxim,  “the  right  man  in  the 
right  place,”  is  intended  to  express  what  is  wise 
and  what  is  essential  to  the  greatest  success  in  all 
kinds  of  enterprises.  These  reasonable  anticipa¬ 
tions  in  respect  to  the  ministry  are  fully  met  in 
what  the  Scriptures  teach  on  the  subject.  Under 
the  Mosaic  dispensation  the  duties  of  the  temple 
were  very  specifically  classified,  and  the  different 
families  in  the  sons  of  Aaron  and  Levi  were  by 
legal  enactments  assigned  to  different  services  in 
and  about  the  temple.  In  the  New  Testament  we 
read  of  apostles,  prophets,  evangelists,  ministers, 
bishops,  presbyters,  deacons,  pastors,  teachers, 
and  others,  as  persons  separated  and  appointed  to 
service  in  the  ministry  ;  and  this,  too,  in  the  very 
beginnings  of  Gospel  work,  in  the  infancy  of  the 
Church,  when  its  adherents  were  comparatively 
few  and  feeble.  It  is  true,  however,  as  is  evident 
from  the  literal  meaning  and  actual  use  of  the 
terms,  that  several  of  these  might  be  and  were 
applied  to  the  same  persons,  to  persons  holding 
one  and  the  same  office.  An  apostle  is  one  who 
is  sent,  an  angel,  a  messenger  ;  a  prophet  is  one 
who  either  foretells  future  events  or  expounds 
mysteries,  he  is  a  teacher  ;  an  evangelist  is  a  good 
angel,  a  messenger  sent  on  an  errand  of  good 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  429 

will ;  a  minister  is  one  who  serves ;  a  deacon  is 
the  same,  a  servant ;  a  bishop  is  an  overseer,  a 
superintendent ;  a  presbyter,  is  an  aged  man,  or 
one  who  is  in  some  way  venerable,  either  by  his 
years,  or  by  his  character,  or  by  his  office  ;  a  pas¬ 
tor  has  the  care  of  a  flock,  is  a  shepherd.  From 
these  definitions  it  is  manifest  that  several  of  these 
terms,  and,  in  a  limited  sense,  all  of  them,  may  be 
applied  to  the  same  person  ;  but  we  affirm,  and 
this  affirmation  will  become  apparent  in  what  fol¬ 
lows,  that  it  is  equally  manifest  that,  in  New  Tes¬ 
tament  use,  they  are  not  so  applied,  that  is,  are 
not  all  applied  to  one  and  the  same  office,  but.  are 
so  used  as  to  indicate  what  we  have  said  above  ; 
namely,  that  the  duties  of  the  ministry  are  divided 
into  classes,  and  that  certain  persons  are  appointed 
to  certain  offices. 

Can  any  specific  classification  claim  divine 
*  authority?  Using  the  term  “orders”  in  the  sense 
common  in  ecclesiastical  discussions,  are  there  or¬ 
ders  in  the  Christian  ministry  ?  Is  the  alleged 
maxim,  “no  bishop,  no  Church,”  true?  On  the 
other  hand,  is  the  affirmation  that  an  episcopacy  is 
contrary  to  apostolic  usage,  and,  therefore,  in  vio¬ 
lation  of  divine  right,  true  ?  What  about  this 
much  talked  of  doctrine  of  “orders”  in  the  Chris¬ 
tian  ministry  ? 

That,  under  the  Mosaic  dispensation,  certain 
persons  were  appointed  to  certain  services  in  the 


430 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


temple,  and  that  the  classification  was  very  defi¬ 
nite  and  specific,  is  too  patent  to  admit  of  discus  • 
sion.  No  one  will  make  any  issue  as  to  this 
assertion.  But  the  services  of  Christian  congre¬ 
gations  were  not  modeled  after  those  of  the  tem¬ 
ple,  but  after  those  of  the  synagogue ;  and  the 
officers  of  the  Christian  Church  did  not  resemble 
the  different  classes  of  the  Aaronic  and  Levitical 
priesthood,  but  were  nearly,  if  not  precisely,  sim¬ 
ilar  to  those  of  the  common  synagogue. 

But  what  we  regard  as  furnishing  determinative 
data  for  an  answer  to  our  present  question  is  the 
fact  that,  after  the  commission  given  by  our  Lord 
himself  just  before  his  ascension  to  his  disciples, 
to  “go  into  all  the  world  and  preach  the  Gospel 
to  every  creature,”  so  far  as  New  Testament  rec¬ 
ords  furnish  information  on  the  subject,  every 
appointment  made  to  any  office  in  the  Church  was 
made  to  meet  an  emergency,  and  was  just  adapted 
to  the  emergency  which  required  the  appointment. 
If  this  be  so,  and  we  propose  to  show  presently 
that  it  is,  then  the  conclusion  is  legitimate  that 
the  division  of  labor  among  the  officers  of  the 
Christian  Church  is  left  to  the  Church  itself;  and 
is  to  be  made  from  time  to  time  as  in  the  godly 
judgment  of  the  Church  the  ever-varying  circum¬ 
stances  and  exigencies  of  human  life  may  require. 

When  at  Jerusalem  the  apostolic  labors  became 
so  abundant  that  it  was  impossible  to  give  due 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


43  1 


attention  to  minute  matters,  and  when  because  of 
consequent  neglect  just  cause  of  complaint  arose, 
and  complaint  was  actually  made  by  the  Greeks 
that  their  widows  were  neglected  in  the  daily  min¬ 
istration,  the  apostles  said  to  the  Church,  It  is 
not  meet  that  we  leave  the  Word  of  God  to  serve 
tables :  therefore,  that  we  may  give  ourselves 
wholly  to  preaching  the  Word  and  to  prayer,  look 
ye  out  seven  men,  who  shall  have  charge  of  these 
financial  concerns.  Under  the  circumstances,  and 
because  of  this  requirement,  the  deacons  were 
elected  and  ordained.  When  the  apostles  had 
made  converts  in  any  given  city,  and  were  called 
to  depart  that  they  might  preach  the  Gospel  in 
other  cities,  they  organized  their  converts  into  a 
Church  and  appointed  the  requisite  officers.  If 
the  whole  synagogue  in  which  they  had  preached 
believed,  the  Church  was  already  organized  at  their 
hands  ;  the  rulers  of  the  synagogue  became  the 
elders  and  deacons  of  the  Christian  Church — pos¬ 
sibly  without  any  formal  election  or  ordination. 
If,  however,  as  was  frequently  the  case,  the  rulers 
of  the  synagogue  ejected  them,  and  they  estab¬ 
lished  separate  congregations,  these  new  assem¬ 
blies  must  be  organized  by  the  appointment  and 
ordination  of  requisite  officers.  These  were,  so 
far  as  we  know,  always  after  the  pattern  of  the 
Jewish  synagogue.  We  shall  hereafter  look  again  > 
at  this  particular.  For  the  present  we  will  say, 


43  2 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


the  apostles  in  all  such  cases — that  is,  when  they 
left  one  city  to  go  to  another — organized  their 
converts  into  a  Church  by  the  appointment  and 
ordination  of  elders  and  deacons,  just  what  officers 
were  necessary  to  conserve  the  fruit  of  their 
labors  and  carry  forward  the  work  of  evangelizing 
the  people.  When  a  larger  number  of  prophets 
and  teachers  than  was  necessary  for  the  work  of 
the  Church  were  enjoying  a  pleasant  vacation  in 
the  goodly  fellowship  of  the  Church  at  Antioch, 
and  the  Holy  Ghost  said  unto  them,  Separate  me 
Barnabas  and  Saul  for  the  work  whereunto  I  have 
called  them,  the  prophets  and  teachers  forthwith 
laid  hands  on  the  appointed  missionaries,  in  the 
name  of  the  Church  gave  them  letters  of  commen 
dation,  and  sent  them  forth.  Saul  was  already, 
by  divine  authority,  an  apostle,  but  was  not  so 
reckoned  in  the  Church.  We  may  call  this  appoint¬ 
ment  and  ordination  of  these  missionaries  the 
origin  of  the  class  of  ministers  called  evangelists. 
When  Paul,  having  become  a  recognized  apostle, 
was  so  successful  in  making  converts,  and  the 
work  specially  on  his  hands  became  so  onerous 
that  it  was  impossible  to  organize  Churches  in  all 
places  where  they  were  called  for,  he  appointed 
Timothy  and  Titus,  with  authority  to  ordain  elders 
in  every  city,  and  to  set  in  order,  according  to  in¬ 
structions  he  gave  them,  all  things  necessary  for 
the  well-being  and  prosperity  of  the  Churches.  It 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


433 


is  common  to  call  Timothy  and  Titus  evangelists, 
but  this  does  not  designate  their  special  office. 
All  traveling  ministers  are  evangelists,  and  of 
course  in  this  sense  it  is  proper  to  apply  this  term 
to  Timothy  and  Titus  ;  but  their  special  appoint¬ 
ment  with  authority  to  ordain  elders  makes  them 
assistant  apostles. 

There  are  several  kinds  of  service  spoken  of 
in  the  New  Testament  which  are  not  distinctly 
defined  ;  and  there  are  also  several  different  per¬ 
sons  and  classes  of  persons  spoken  of  as  prom¬ 
inent  laborers,  concerning  whom  we  are  not  defi¬ 
nitely  informed  either  as  to  their  appointment  or 
the  circumstances  requiring  it,  or  the  precise  na¬ 
ture  of  the  service  which  they  rendered.  Paul 
says  of  three  of  the  apostles,  James,  John,  and 
Cephas,  that  they  “seemed  to  be  pillars  in  the 
Church/ ’  Probably  nothing  more  is  meant  than 
that  their  activity  and  efficiency  made  them  prom¬ 
inent,  perhaps  even  among  their  fellow  apos¬ 
tles  ;  they  were  for  some  reason  chief  supports  to 
the  Church.  Some  were  called  prophets.  Of 
these  some  foretold  future  events  ;  but  more  were 
so  called  because  they  explained  mysteries,  were 
apt  to  teach.  They  eminently  possessed  the  gift 
of  imparting  instruction.  Some  had  the  gift  of 
tongues  ;  some  wrought  miracles.  Some  were 
skilled  in  governmental  affairs  ;  some  in  healing. 

There  were  deaconesses.  Some  of  the  deacons, 
c  28 


434 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


as  Stephen  and  Philip,  were  preachers  of  the 
Gospel ;  but  we  do  not  know  that  any  of  the  dea¬ 
conesses  were  preachers.  Paul  mentions  several 
whom  he  calls  his  fellow  laborers  ;  and  some  were 
his  fellow  prisoners.  These  were  doubtless  his 
traveling  companions  and  assistants.  He  speaks 
of  the  household  of  Stephanas,  which  “addicted 
themselves  to  the  ministry  of  the  saints.”  Phoebe 
was  a  servant  of  the  Church  at  Cenchrea,  and 
a  succorer  of  many  and  of  Paul  also  ;  she  went 
to  Rome  on  business,  for  which  she  had  need  of 
assistance  from  the  Church  at  Rome.  Priscilla 
and  Aquila  were  Paul’s  “helpers  in  Christ  Jesus.” 
The  beloved  Persis  “labored  much  in  the  Lord.” 
And  so  of  many  others  to  whom  Paul  makes  ref- 
ference,  in  the  salutations  with  which  he  usually 
closes  his  epistles,  as  persons  rendering  distin¬ 
guished  service  in  furthering  the  ends  of  the  Gos¬ 
pel,  of  whose  particular  relations  to  the  Church, 
whether  official  or  not,  and  if  official,  as  to  what 
their  particular  office  might  be,  we  are  not  in¬ 
formed.  That  many  of  these  services  were  re¬ 
quired  by  the  exigencies  of  the  times,  and  that 
many  of  the  persons  employed  in  them  were  em¬ 
ployed  only  temporarily,  is  evident  upon  the  surface 
of  the  record  itself.  Indeed,  some  of  the  duties 
belonging  to  the  most  prominent  and  important 
offices  of  the  Church  were  temporary.  Even  the 
apostleship  itself,  if  considered  as  to  all  that  per- 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  435 

tained  to  it  during  the  lives  of  the  apostles,  all 
must  admit  was  a  temporary  office.  We  shall 
hereafter  show,  that  so  much  of  what  constituted 
the  apostolic  office  necessarily  passed  away  with 
the  death  of  John,  the  last  of  their  number,  that 
those  speak  not  unadvisedly  who  say  that  the 
office  itself  ceased  entirely  at  John’s  death. 

Indeed,  the  idea  that  a  classification  of  Church 
duties,  or  in  other  words,  that  classes  of  Church 
officers,  or  in  other  words  still,  that  orders  in  the 
Christian  ministry,  are  in  the  New  Testament  dis¬ 
tinctly  designated,  and  by  apostolic  authority  des¬ 
ignated  as  essential  to  a  Christian  Church,  is 
evidently  preposterous.  To  say,  “  If  no  bishop, 
no  Church,”  or  to  say,  “  If  an  episcopacy,  no 
Church,”  is  in  either  case  and  in  both  cases  to 
say  what  common  sense  will  reject  instanter.  It 
is  only  by  the  assumption  of  infallibility,  or  the 
affectation  of  great  learning  in  ecclesiastical  lore, 
that  such  nonsense  ever  becomes  even  respectable. 
When  men  affirm  that  the  form  of  an  ordinance 
or  the  ordination  of  the  ministry  is  essential  to  the 
existence  of  a  Christian  Church  in  such  a  sense 
that  all  so  -  called  Churches  that  have  not  that 
form  or  that  ordination  are  not  Christian  Churches, 
and  their  ordinances  and  ministerial  offices  are  not 
valid,  it  is  pardonable  if  such  arrogance  be  rebuked 
with  an  impatient  contempt.  The  very  call  to  the 
ministry  itself  is  not  uniformly  exclusive.  Usually 


436 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


a  call  to  the  ministry  is  a  call  from  manual  labor 
to  an  exclusive  devotion  to  religious  duties  ;  and 
yet  Paul,  when  occasion  required,  labored  with  his 
own  hands  at  tent-making,  and  supplied  his  own 
wants  and  the  wants  of  those  that  were  with  him; 
and  in  all  ages  of  the  Church,  God  has  honored 
men  who  were  ordinarily  engaged  in  secular  pur¬ 
suits,  but  who  occasionally  performed  ministerial 
service,  by  giving  them  eminent  success  in  evangel¬ 
istic  work.  The  Christian  Church,  its  ordinances, 
and  its  ministry  are  sacred  institutions  ;  they  are 
to  the  great  Head  of  the  Church  as  a  bride  to  her 
husband  ;  but  to  suppose  that  there  is  in  the  di¬ 
vine  mind  any  such  solicitude,  interest,  or  affec¬ 
tion  towards  mere  externals  and  instrumentalities, 
mere  ceremonies  and  official  distinctions  as  High- 
churchism  in  any  of  its  forms  represents,  is  sim¬ 
ply  childish. 

To  what  conclusion  may  we  come  at  the  pres 
ent  stage  of  our  progress  in  this  discussion  ? 

It  is  pertinent,  though  not  immediately  con¬ 
nected  with  our  topic,  to  remark :  First,  that  as 
the  Church  is  an  institution  organized  for  the 
mutual  edification  of  its  members  in  holiness  of 
life  and  character,  and  for  a  testimony  to  unbe- 
ievers  that  the  Christian  religion  is  true  and 
divine,  it  follows  that  all  persons  connected  with 
the  Church,  whether  official  or  private  members, 
whether  male  or  female,  old  or  young,  learned  or 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  437 

unlearned,  without  respect  to  birth,  nationality, 
color,  or  condition,  all  members  of  the  Church, 
are  entitled  to  give  testimony  in  the  public  congre¬ 
gation,  as  well  as  in  private  conversation,  as  they 
have  opportunity,  as  to  what  they  know  of  the 
reality  and  divinity  of  religion  ;  as  to  what  they 
know,  by  an  experience  of  its  effects  upon  them¬ 
selves,  and  by  what  they  have  observed  of  its 
effects  upon  others.  It  is  not  only  the  privilege  of 
the  entire  membership  thus  to  bear  testimony,  but 
it  is  also  their  duty  so  to  do.  The  Old  Testament 
Scriptures  state  it  as  a  fact,  either  in  the  history 
of  times  then  past,  or  in  a  prophecy  of  what  would 
be  in  the  future,  that  “they  that  feared  the  Lord 
spake  often  one  to  another;”  and  from  the  direc¬ 
tions  given  by  St.  Paul  to  the  Corinthian  Church 
respecting  the  order  to  be  observed  in  their  public 
assemblies,  it  is  evident  that  at  some  of  their 
gatherings  they  were  accustomed  to  speak  one 
after  another  as  each  should  be  inclined,  and  as 
opportunity  might  allow.  In  a  word,  the  Church, 
both  ancient  and  modern,  at  some  times  with  more 
and  at  others  with  less  frequency,  has  held  social 
meetings,  in  which  all  its  members  alike  were  enti¬ 
tled  to  take  part  either  in  prayer  or  praise  or  tes¬ 
timony — public  ministration,  to  this  extent,  was 
and  is  a  common  duty  and  privilege. 

We  remark,  secondly,  that  as  the  Church  is  an 
institution,  not  only  for  the  mutual  edification  of  its 


438 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


members  and  for  a  testimony  to  unbelievers,  but 
also  an  institution  for  the  instruction  and  persuasion 
of  the  public  mind,  and  as  practical  and  experimen¬ 
tal  godliness  is  founded  upon  doctrinal  truth,  and 
as  the  doctrines  of  religion  are  themselves  themes 
of  the  profoundest  thought,  and  are  inseparably 
connected  with  all  philosophies  and  all  sciences,  it 
follows  that  the  purposes  and  intents  of  Church 
organization  require  that  a  competent  number 
of  believers  in  Christ  should  separate  themselves 
from  secular  pursuits  and  devote  themselves  exclu¬ 
sively,  for  life,  to  the  study  and  proclamation  ol 
Gospel  truth  ;  and  we  find,  in  the  teachings  of  the 
Scriptures,  not  only  that  it  is  God's  will  that  some 
members  of  his  Church  do  thus  devote  them¬ 
selves  exclusively  to  Gospel  ministrations,  but  also 
that  He  by  his  Spirit  calls  individual  persons  to 
this  high  and  holy  calling. 

W»e  remark,  thirdly,  that  as  it  has  pleased  God 
not  only  to  establish  his  Church  in  the  earth  as 
a  monument  to  perpetuate  the  knowledge  and 
remembrance  of  religion  among  men,  but  also 
to  ordain  that  certain  ordinances  be  observed  ; 
namely,  baptism  and  the  Lord’s-supper,  for  the 
same  monumental  and  other  purposes  ;  and  as  the 
Church  has  other  duties  besides  the  preaching  of 
the  Gospel  and  the  administration  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  ;  such  as  the  discipline  of  its  members,  the 
care  of  the  poor,  the  visitation  of  the  sick,  the 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


439 


infirm,  the  aged,  as  well  as  prisoners  and  neg- 
lecters  of  religion  ;  and  as  all  these  incur  expense, 
and  thus  necessitate  financial  responsibilities  ;  that 
is  to  say,  as  the  Church  is  organized  for  the  per¬ 
formance  and  execution  of  a  large  number  of  di¬ 
verse  and  difficult  acts,  and  as  few  men,  if  any, 
are  competent  to  discharge  efficiently  so  many 
obligations,  or  are  adapted  to  services  so  diverse  ; 
and,  again,  as  these  duties  are  not  only  numerous 
and  diverse,  but  also  incongruous,  it  not  being  fit 
that  those  who  preach  the  Gospel  should  leave  the 
Word  of  God  to  serve  tables,  but  should  rather 
give  themselves  wholly  to  prayer  and  preaching 
of  the  Word,  it  follows  that  the  official  responsi¬ 
bilities  of  the  Church  must  be  divided  among  its 
members,  and  that  some  devote  themselves  to  one 
class  of  duties  and  others  to  others.  And,  it 
further  follows,  since  Church  organization  necessi¬ 
tates  financial  transactions  for  which  laymen  may 
be  supposed  to  be  better  qualified  than  clergymen  ; 
and  since  these  financial  responsibilities  are  to  be 
met  mostly  or  entirely  by  laymen,  it  follows  that  it 
is  both  proper  and  expedient  that  such  offices 
should  be  filled  by  laymen — laymen  may  and 
should  be  office-bearers  in  the  Church. 

We  remark,  fourthly,  that  since  there  are, 
always  have  been,  and  will  be  yet  more  and  more 
among  believers,  many  of  high  natural  endow¬ 
ments,  of  extensive  learned  acquirements,  of  pro- 


440 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


found  piety,  and  entire  consecration  to  God,  whose 
relations  to  life,  outside  the  Church,  prevent  them 
from  an  entire  devotion  to  the  ministration  of  the 
Word,  but  not  from  occasional  services  therein ; 
and,  again,  since  there  are  many  who,  though  not 
qualified  or  adapted  to  the  work  of  the  ministry  as 
a  permanent  vocation,  are  well  qualified  to  be 
extensively  useful  as  occasional  assistants,  it  fol¬ 
lows  that  men  ordinarily  employed  in  secular  pur¬ 
suits  may  be  authorized  and  appointed  to  perform 
occasional  ministerial  service. 

We  remark,  fifthly,  that  since  the  apostles, 
who  were  commissioned  by  our  Lord  to  com¬ 
plete  the  inauguration  of  his  kingdom  upon  earth, 
who  acted,  so  far  as  we  know,  with  co-ordinate 
authority,  and  who  completed  the  canon  of  Scrip¬ 
ture,  and  authoritatively  organized  Churches,  did 
make  such  appointments  to  office  as  the  existing 
circumstances  seemed  to  require,  and  never  after 
any  prescribed  model  of  Church  government ;  and 
since  the  New  Testament  does  not  in  any  way  fur¬ 
nish  sufficient  data  for  the  inference  that  the  head 
of  the  Church  has  prescribed  and  does  require 
any  specific  form  of  ecclesiastical  polity,  it  follows 
that  the  Church  is  left  to  the  exercise  of  its 
godly  judgment  as  to  the  form  of  its  govern¬ 
ment,  and  may,  as  exigencies  require,  appoint  such 
officers  as  in  its  judgment  will,  under  the  circum¬ 
stances  of  the  case,  be  most  expedient. 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  44 1 

So  much  for  our  conclusion  thus  far,  but  the 
controversies  and  discussions  usual  on  the  subject 
of  Church  polity  render  it  necessary  that  several 
topics,  but  briefly  referred  to  in  the  above  discus¬ 
sion  be  more  articulately  considered. 

First.  Churches,  during  apostolic  times  and  in 
times  immediately  successive,  were  organized  after 
the  model  of  the  Jewish  synagogue.  If  we  should 
think  of  Christ  as  discussing  in  his  own  mind  the 
externals  of  his  proposed  earthly  kingdom ;  the 
forms  and  ceremonies  to  be  observed  by  his  people 
in  their  solemn  assemblies,  and  specially  the  form 
of  government  to  be  adopted  in  his  Church,  what 
would  we  reasonably  anticipate  as  his  conclusion  ? 
Is  it  that  he  would  devise  something  entirely  new 
among  men  ?  or  is  it  that  he  would  adopt  such 
existing  institutions  as  were  adapted  to  his  pur¬ 
pose  ?  He  himself  kept  the  Passover  and  other 
Jewish  feasts;  he  worshiped  in  the  temple;  he 
was  baptized  of  John,  saying,  It  was  needful  that 
we  fulfill  all  righteousness ;  he  frequently  attended 
the  synagogue  and  took  part  in  its  services,  read¬ 
ing  and  expounding  the  law  and  the  prophets ;  in 
a  word,  he  was  a  scrupulous  observer  of  all  rites 
and  ceremonies  of  the  then  existing  religion,  and 
manifested  a  profound  respect  for  the  existing 
institutions  of  his  times.  He  certainly  would  not 
innovate  merely  for  the  sake  of  innovation  ;  so  far 
as  existing  institutions  would  serve  his  purpose,  so 


44  2 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


far  we  should  expect  that  he  would  adopt  them. 
It  is  antecedently  probable  that  he  did  so.  The 
external  forms  of  the  Jewish  religion  in  the  times 
of  Christ  were  all  found  in  those  of  the  temple  and 
of  the  synagogue.  The  temple  service  was  local 
and  national,  whereas  Christianity  is  for  all  times, 
places,  and  peoples.  The  temple  service  was  too 
ceremonial,  too  ritualistic,  too  expensive,  too  osten¬ 
tatious,  required  too  much  of  splendor  and  display, 
for  the  simplicity  and  spirituality  of  the  Christian 
religion.  And  besides  being  in  a  very  large  part 
of  itself  a  system  of  types,  shadows,  and  symbols 
of  better  things  to  come,  and  those  better  things 
thus  symbolized  being  now  at  hand,  the  temple 
service  was  soon  to  pass  away.  There  is  no  rea¬ 
son  to  anticipate  that  the  Savior  would  construct 
his  Church  after  the  model  of  the  temple ;  yea, 
more,  it  is  even  highly  probable  that  he  would  not. 
The  synagogue,  in  the  opinion  and  estimation  of 
the  Jewish  people,  though  not  so  sacred,  was  con¬ 
sidered  as  practically  even  more  valuable  than  the 
temple.  It  was  to  be  found  wherever  a  number 
of  Jews  sufficient  to  form  a  congregation  resided. 
Its  principal  purpose,  namely,  the  instruction  of 
the  people  in  the  knowledge  of  the  law  of  God, 
was  not  only  in  harmony,  but  was  well-nigh  iden¬ 
tical,  with  the  leading  purpose  of  the  Christian 
Church — the  teaching  and  disciplining  of  all  nations 
in  the  knowledge  of  God  through  Christ. 

o  o 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


443 


The  apostles,  like  their  Master,  were  Jews,  ar¬ 
dently  attached  in  affection  to  the  institutions  and 
services  of  the  Jewish  religion.  They  frequently, 
both  during  the  life-time  of  their  Lord  and  after 
his  ascension,  attended  the  services  of  both  the 
temple  and  of  the  synagogue.  If,  therefore,  the 
inauguration  of  the  ritualistic  service  and  the  form 
of  Church  polity  were  left  to  the  judgment  and  de¬ 
cision  of  the  apostles,  it  is  reasonable  to  anticipate 
that  they  would  so  far  as  practicable  adopt  the 
existing  institutions  of  the  Jewish  religion.  Into 
whatever  city,  town,  or  village  they  went  to  preach 
the  Gospel,  in  fulfillment  of  their  great  commis¬ 
sion,  they  first  entered  into  the  synagogue,  and 
there  remained,  reasoning  and  alleging  out  of  the 
Scriptures  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ;  and  unless 
ejected  by  an  overpowering  opposition  they  con¬ 
tinued  their  ministrations  in  the  synagogue,  and 
made  no  attempt  to  establish  a  separate  con¬ 
gregation. 

These  considerations  are  sufficient  of  them¬ 
selves  to  establish  a  strong  probability  that  the 
Christian  Church,  so  far  as  its  external  forms  were 
established  by  the  action  of  Christ  and  his  apos¬ 
tles,  was  modeled  after  the  fashion  of  the  syna¬ 
gogue,  and  not  of  the  temple.  But  what  were  the 
facts,  so  far  as  the  New  Testament  informs  us? 
We  have  just  above  said  that  the  principal  serv¬ 
ice — namely,  the  reading  and  expounding  of  the 


444 


ECCLES10L0GY. 


Scriptures  —  was  the  same  in  both,  in  the  syna¬ 
gogue  and  in  the  Christian  assembly.  In  both 
the  elders  sat  in  a  semicircle,  facing  the  congrega¬ 
tion.  The  services  were  the  same,  and  conducted 
in  the  same  order :  first,  the  reading  of  the  law 
and  the  prophets  ;  then  the  sermon,  explaining  the 
lessons  read  ;  and  then  the  prayer.  In  Christian 

assemblies,  after  the  services  common  to  both  were 
♦ 

concluded,  the  Supper  of  the  Lord  was  adminis¬ 
tered.  These  last-mentioned  facts  are  not  distinctly 
stated  in  the  New  Testament  itself,  but  what  is  there 
stated  harmonizes  perfectly  with  these  statements, 
and  the  earliest  histories  of  the  Church  invariably 
affirm  that  Christian  worship  was  after  this  form 
and  manner.  The  Lord's-supper  was  instituted 
at  the  close  of  the  supper  of  the  Passover,  which 
was  eaten  in  private  dwellings.  It,  therefore,  is 
not  an  appropriation  of  any  existing  institution 
either  of  the  temple  or  synagogue,  but  is  rather  a 
substitution  for  the  Passover.  Baptism  was  the 
service  by  which  proselytes  were  initiated  into  the 
Jewish  religion.  It  was  never  administered,  so  far 
as  we  know,  in  the  temple ;  it  belonged  to  the 
synagogue,  but  might  be  administered  wherever 
proselytes  were  made,  even  in  the  wilderness,  as 
in  the  case  of  John’s  baptism,  or  by  the  wayside, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  eunuch’s  baptism  by  Philip. 
The  ordination  of  elders  by  the  imposition  of  hands 
is  wholly  of  the  synagogue.  The  priests  of  the 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  445 

temple  were  never  inducted  into  office  by  any  serv¬ 
ice  bearing  any  resemblance  to  ordination  by  the 
imposition  of  hands.  The  descendants  of  Aaron 
and  Levi,  when  arrived  at  the  proper  age,  were 
examined  by  the  Sanhedrim  as  to  their  fitness 
physical  and  moral  for  the  office  of  priests  in  the 
temple.  If  approved  as  free  from  physical  and 
moral  blemish  they  were  clothed  in  white,  and, 
entering  into  the  temple,  they  joined  their  asso¬ 
ciates  of  the  priesthood  in  the  duties  assigned 
them.  Probably  it  is  in  allusion  to  this  practice 
that  in  the  Book  of  the  Revelation  the  worthy  are 
said  to  walk  with  Christ  in  white.  The  ordina¬ 
tion,  therefore,  of  the  Christian  ministry  by  the 
imposition  of  hands  is  a  practice  adopted  by  the 
Church  from  the  model  of  the  synagogue.  The 
sentence  of  excommunication  in  cases  of  Church 
discipline  was  the  same  thing  as  among  the  Jews 
was  called  casting  out  of  the  synagogue.  The 
Christians  called  their  assemblies  synagogues — in¬ 
stance  the  passage  in  James  :  “If  there  come  into 
your  synagogue  a  man  with  a  gold  ring,”  etc. 

The  resemblance  as  to  externals  between  the 
Christian  Church  and  the  Jewish  synagogue  was 
so  perfect  that  the  outside  world  uniformly  con¬ 
sidered  Christians  as  a  sect  of  Jews  —  instance, 
vvhen  Claudius  issued  a  decree  that  all  Jews  should 
depart  from  Rome,  Aquila  and  Priscilla,  though 
eminent  Christians,  were  compelled  to  depart. 


446 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Second.  Among  the  considerations  connected 
with  the  present  topic,  deserving  distinct  state¬ 
ment,  is  the  obvious  fact  that  with  the  death  of  the 
apostles  the  apostolic  office  ceased.  The  apostles 
were  inspired  men  ;  they  were  divinely  inspired  to 
complete  the  canon  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  to 
determine  authoritatively  whatever  might  be  neces¬ 
sary  after  the  ascension  of  our  Lord  for  the  full 
establishment  of  the  kingdom  which  Christ  had  set 
up  among  men.  To  them,  in  a  special  sense,  the 
keys  of  the  kingdom  were  intrusted.  They,  with 
Christ  as  corner-stone,  were  the  foundation  of  the 
Christian  edifice.  They  were  endowed  with  mirac¬ 
ulous  powers.  After  the  pentecostal  baptism  of 
the  Holy  Ghost  they  authenticated  the  divinity  of 
their  mission  by  works  which  Christ  said  were  even 
greater  than  those  wrought  by  himself.  Now,  if 
we  take  away  these  special  and  miraculous  endow¬ 
ments,  and  the  offices  and  purposes  for  which 
these  endowments  were  given,  there  will  be  nothing 
left  except  what  is  common  to  the  entire  Chris¬ 
tian  ministry.  The  apostles  preached,  baptized, 
administered  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper  ;  exer¬ 
cised  discipline,  ordained  ministers  ;  and  so,  also, 
by  virtue  of  their  office,  the  Church  so  directing, 
may  all  ministers  of  the  Gospel  do  these  same 
things.  The  apostolic  office,  in  all  that  distin¬ 
guished  it  from  the  ordinary  ministry,  by  the  na¬ 
ture  and  necessity  of  the  case,  expired  with  the 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


447 


death  of  its  incumbents — the  apostles  had  not  and 
could  not  have  any  successors  in  that  which  was 
peculiar  to  themselves  ;  in  respect  to  those  func¬ 
tions  of  their  office,  which  are  common  to  the 
Christian  ministry  all  ministers  are  their  suc¬ 
cessors.  The  true  apostolic  succession  consists  in 
a  succession  of  faithful  ministers  of  the  Gospel  of 
the  grace  of  God  ;  that  is  to  say,  faithful  ministers 
are  the  successors  of  the  apostles  in  the  only 
sense  in  which  the  apostles  may  be  said  to  have 
any  successors. 

Third.  In  the  New  Testament  the  terms  bishop 
and  elder  are  indiscriminately  applied  to  the  same 
person,  or  rather  are  terms  used  to  designate  the 
same  office.  The  word  in  the  original,  which  is 
translated  bishop,  is  episcopos ,  which  signifies  an 
overseer,  a  superintendent ;  and  the  word  trans¬ 
lated  elder,  is  presbuteros ,  which  signifies  an  aged 
man,  or  a  man  for  some  cause  regarded  as  vener¬ 
able.  Now  that  both  of  these  terms  might,  with 
propriety,  be  applied  to  any  minister  of  the  Gos¬ 
pel  is  evident  from  their  literal  signification,  and 
that  it  is  probable  that  they  were  so  applied  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  in  all  ages  and  among 
all  religionists  it  is  a  common  thing  to  speak  of 
religious  teachers  in  this  way,  applying  to  them 
several  different  names,  signifying  the  different 
:haracteristics  and  functions  of  their  office  as  re- 
igious  teachers  and  guides.  This  practice  is  very 


448 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


common  now  in  our  own  times.  Our  religious 
teachers  are  called  pastors,  ministers,  elders,  cler¬ 
gymen,  priests,  fathers,  et  cetera.  In  other  lan¬ 
guages,  besides  the  English,  a  similar  diversity  of 
terms  is  used  in  precisely  the  same  way.  What 
is  thus  usual,  natural  in  itself,  and  therefore  prob¬ 
able,  is,  in  New  Testament  usage,  especially  in 
reference  to  the  two  terms  now  under  considera¬ 
tion,  evidently  matter  of  fact.  The  word  episcopos 
occurs  only  five  times  in  the  New  Testament ;  the 
first  is  in  Acts  xx,  28:  “Take  heed,  therefore, 
unto  yourselves,  and  to  all  the  flock  over  which  the 
Holy  Ghost  hath  made  you  overseers,  to  feed  the 
Church  of  God  which  he  has  purchased  with  his 
own  blood.”  In  this  passage  the  word  trans¬ 
lated  “overseers”  is,  in  the  original,  “ episcopous'' 
Who  the  persons  addressed  were  is  determined  by 
the  seventeenth  verse  of  the  same  chapter:  “And 
from  Miletus  he  sent  to  Ephesus,  and  called  the 
elders  of  the  Church,  and  when  they  were  come 
to  him  he  said  unto  them” — and  then  follows  his 
address  from  the  eighteenth  to  the  thirty-fifth 
verses  inclusive.  In  this  seventeenth  verse  the 
persons  sent  for,  who  came  and  were  addressed 
as  bishops,  are  called  “ presbuterous,”  presbyters, 
and  the  word  is  translated  “elders.”  Plainly, 
then,  the  terms  “bishops”  and  “elders”  are 
here  applied  to  the  same  persons,  are  used  in  the 
same  sense — they  signify  the  same  office. 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


449 


Again,  in  the  above  quoted  twenty-eighth  verse, 
the  Church  is  called  a  “flock,”  and  these  elders, 
bishops,  are  exhorted  “to  feed  the  Church  of 
God  ;”  that  is,  to  act  toward  the  Church  as  shep¬ 
herds  or  pastors — this  is  the  same  as  if  the  term 
“pastor”  had  been  applied  to  these  persons  in  the 
same  verse  in  which  they  are  called  bishops. 
Paul,  with  the  same  breath,  calls  them  bishops,  and 
enjoins  fidelity  in  the  office  of  a  pastor ;  and  Luke, 
the  inspired  writer  of  the  Acts,  and  Paul’s  travel¬ 
ing  companion  at  the  time,  calls  the  same  per¬ 
sons  presbyters,  elders.  This  twentieth  chapter 
of  Acts  is,  of  itself,  determinative  of  our  present 
question ;  the  case  is  so  clear  that  we  have  no 
need  to  look  further.  The  words  bishop  and 
elder  were  titles  of  the  same  office,  but  since  much 
is  made  of  this  question,  we  may  examine  the 
other  passages  in  which  these  words  are  used. 
The  next  passage  in  which  the  word  bishop  oc¬ 
curs  is  Philippians  i,  i  :  “  Paul  and  Timotheus,  the 
servants  of  Jesus  Christ,  to  all  the  saints  in  Christ 
Jesus  which  are  at  Philippi,  with  the  bishops  and 
deacons.”  The  terms  saints,  bishops,  and  dea¬ 
cons,  describe  all  the  members  of  the  Church  at 
Philippi,  or  they  do  not — the  category  is  exhaus¬ 
tive,  or  it  is  not.  If  it  is,  then  there  were  only 

two  classes  of  official  members  in  that  Church  ; 

♦ 

namely,  “bishops”  and  “deacons;”  for  none  will 

question  but  that  by  the  term  “saints”  Paul  in- 
c  29 


450 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


tended  to  include  all  private  members.  If  the 
category  is  not  exhaustive  and  there  was  another 
class  of  officials  called  elders,  it  is  quite  unac¬ 
countable  that  they  should  be  left  out  of  the 
enumeration ;  for  if  there  were,  as  it  is  alleged 
there  were,  three  classes,  or  so-called  orders  of 
ministers,  namely,  bishops,  elders,  and  deacons, 
the  elders  or  presbyters  were,  as  all  will  concede, 
the  class  most  intimately  connected  with  the  people 
in  their  official  relations,  and  therefore  most  prom¬ 
inent.  To  mention  the  bishops,  who,  if  they  were 
a  distinct  order,  had  only  a  general  oversight,  and 
sustained  a  remote  relation  to  the  members  of  the 
Church ;  and  to  mention  also  the  deacons  who, 
if  there  were  three  orders  in  the  ministry,  held 
only  a  subordinate  office,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
neglect  to  mention  the  presbyters  or  pastors, 
those  most  nearly  related  to  the  people,  most  en¬ 
deared  to  them,  and  therefore  most  prominent 
among  them,  is  surely  quite  unnatural,  and  may 
be  pronounced  as  wholly  improbable  ;  but  if  the 
words  bishop  and  elders  are  titles  of  the  same 
office,  and  may  be  applied  to  the  same  persons,  as 
we  have  seen  they  were  in  the  passage  quoted 
above  from  the  Acts,  then  the  address  to  the 
Philippians  is  natural — all  is  transparent,  there  is 
no.  difficulty  in  the  case.  The  third  instance  in 
which  the  term  episcopos  occurs  is  in  i  Timothy  iii, 
2:  “A  bishop  must  be  blameless.”  In  this  third 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  45  I 

chapter  of  1  Timothy  Paul  first  describes  the 
qualifications  of  a  bishop,  and  then  the  quali¬ 
fications  of  the  deacons,  and  also  of  their  wives, 
but  makes  no  mention  of,  or  allusion  to,  el¬ 
ders.  Throughout  the  epistle  he  is  giving  Tim¬ 
othy  directions  concerning  different  classes  of  per¬ 
sons,  women  in  general,  widows,  servants,  the 
aged,  the  young,  and  the  rich.  Nowhere  in  the 
epistle  is  there  any  allusion  to  the  elders,  if  there 
were  any  such  in  the  Church,  as  distinct  from  the 
bishops.  The  term  elder  does  not  occur  except 
in  the  first  and  second  verses  of  the  fifth  chapter, 
where  evidently  it  expresses  age  and  not  office. 
“Rebuke  not  an  elder,  but  entreat  him  as  a 
father  and  the  younger  men  as  brethren,  the  elder 
women  as  mothers  and  the  younger  as  sisters,  with 
all  purity.”  Here  the  argument  is  the  same,  only 
stronger,  as  in  the  quotation  from  Philippians.  To 
describe  definitely  and  at  length  the  qualifications 
of  bisnops  and  of  deacons  in  an  epistle  of  general 
admonition  as  to  different  classes  of  persons  and 
officers,  and  to  make  no  allusion  whatever  to  the 
eldership,  which  is  the  most  prominent  and  impor¬ 
tant  office  of  the  three,  if  there  be  three,  is  cer¬ 
tainly  very  strange  ;  it  is  indeed  not  at  all  supposa- 

ble.  We  affirm  that  the  case  furnishes  reasonable 

* 

proof  that  besides  the  apostles  with  their  assist¬ 
ants  there  were,  in  apostolic  times,  no  other  officers 
of  the  Church  recognized  as  regular  and  perma- 


452 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


nent  but  those  that  are  here  called  bishops  and 
deacons ;  that  is  to  say,  the  proof  is  conclusive 
that  the  terms  bishop  and  elder  designate  the 
same  office.  The  next  case  is  in  the  epistle  to 
Titus:  “For  this  cause  left  I  thee  in  Crete  that 
thou  shouldest  set  in  order  the  things  that  are 
wanting  and  ordain  elders  in  every  city,  as  I  had 
appointed  thee  ;  if  any  be  blameless,  the  husband 
of  one  wife,  having  faithful  children  not  accused 
of  riot  or  unruly.  For  a  bishop  must  be  blameless, 
as  the  steward  of  God.”  Here  we  are  informed 
that  Paul  left  Titus  in  Crete,  among  other  things, 
to  ordain  elders,  if  he  should  find  candidates  prop¬ 
erly  qualified.  The  requisite  qualifications  for  the 
elders  he  is  to  ordain  are  said  to  be  those  that 
must  be  possessed  by  a  bishop.  The  identifica¬ 
tion  is  perfect,  the  two  terms  in  question  are  used 
for  one  and  the  same  office.  The  only  other  use 
of  the  word  episcopos  is  in  i  Peter  ii,  25:  “Ye 
were  as  sheep  going  astray  ;  but  are  now  returned 
unto  the  shepherd  and  bishop  of  your  souls.” 
Here  the  term  is  applied  to  Christ,  and,  of  course, 
has  no  bearing  upon  our  present  question.  How¬ 
ever,  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  word  “ poi- 
mena ,”  translated  shepherd,  would  be  as  literally 
ranslated  by  the  word  pastor. ;  and  then  the  pas¬ 
sage  would  read  “to  the  pastor  and  bishop  of 
your  souls;”  and  as  the  two  terms  are  applied  to 
the  same  person,  Christ,  they  may  be,  they  are, 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  453 

here  synonymous  ;  that  is  to  say,  this  passage,  in 
connection  with  those  above  considered,  teaches 
that  bishop,  presbyter,  or  elder  and  pastor  are 
titles  of  the  same  office.  The  word  presbuteroi , 
translated  elders,  occurs  sixty-seven  times  in  the 
New  Testament.  In  the  Gospels  and  first  ten 
chapters  of  the  Acts  it  is  applied  to  members  of 
the  Sanhedrim.  That  body  was  composed  of  “the 
chief  priests,  the  scribes,  and  the  elders,”  the  latter 
of  whom  were  laymen  of  age,  wisdom,  and  ability. 
In  the  remaining  chapters  of  the  Acts  and  in  the 
epistles,  the  term  elders  is  applied  either  to  the 
rulers  of  the  synagcfgue  or  to  the  corresponding 
officers  of  the  Christian  Church.  The  four  and 
twenty  elders  spoken  of  in  the  book  of  the  Reve¬ 
lation  are  evidently  dignitaries  of  the  heavenly 
assembly.  Nothing  bearing  upon  our  present  ques¬ 
tion,  additional  to  what  is  written  above,  can  be  de¬ 
duced  from  the  passages  where  the  word  elder  is 
used,  as  it  usually  is,  singly  and  in  a  general  way, 
to  designate  one  or  the  other  of  these  officers ; 
namely,  members  of  the  Sanhedrim,  rulers  of  the 
synagogue,  and  officers  of  the  Christian  Church. 
So  much  for  the  identification  of  the  office  of 
bishop  and  elder. 

Fourth.  We  have  above  remarked  that  the 
Christian  Church  was  constructed  after  the  model 
of  the  synagogue,  that  the  apostolic  office  termi¬ 
nated  with  the  lives  of  the  apostles,  and  that  the 


454 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


terms  bishop  and  elder  are  titles  of  the  same 
office.  We  now  come  to  our  fourth  remark ; 
namely,  that  the  New  Testament  does  not  dis¬ 
tinctly  define  the  office  of  a  deacon.  It  is  true,  to 
be  sure,  that  this  remark  might  be  made  of  any 
other  office  of  the  Church  ;  but  the  relation  of  the 
office  of  deacon  to  the  question  of  Church  polity 
makes  it  needful  that  the  fact  should  be  distinctly 
noted. 

It  is  more  than  probable  that  in  New  Testa¬ 
ment  times  any  good  man,  having  a  good  intent, 
with  ability,  opportunity,  and  disposition  to  do  a 
good  work,  might  do  it  whether  specially  appointed 
thereto  or  not ;  and  with  but  few  exceptions,  what¬ 
ever  that  work  might  be,  he  would  not  be  cen¬ 
sured  as  an  innovator  or  intruder.  Probably  all 
did  what  they  could  do  for  the  edification  of  the 
Church  and  the  good  of  the  cause.  But  this  is 
not  saying  there  were  no  officials  in  the  Church, 
nor  that  official  members  had  no  specified  duties. 
There  were  offices  in  the  Church ;  and  that  of 
deacon  was  one  of  them,  and  doubtless  it  had 
peculiar  functions. 

The  word  diakonos  occurs  thirty  times  in  the 
New  Testament.  In  twenty  places  it  is  translated 
by  the  word  minister  ;  in  seven  places  by  the  word 
servant,  and  in  three  by  the  word  deacon.  In  all 
these  cases  it  is  used  in  the  sense  of  one  who 
serves.  A  minister,  a  deacon,  is  a  servant,  differing 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  455 

from  a  doulos ,  a  slave,  only  in  the  idea  of  a  higher 
order.  Of  course,  he  is  not  a  servant  of  his  people 
in  the  sense  that  their  will  is  his  law,  but  that  he 
labors  for  their  good. 

The  paronyms  of  diakonos  have  the  same  gen¬ 
eric  meaning.  Diakonia  is  a  ministry,  a  service, 
a  ministration,  an  administration ;  and  diakoneo  is 
to  minister,  to  administer,  to  serve,  and  to  use  the 
office  of  a  deacon.  Now,  this  use  of  the  word 
shows  that  it  is  a  title  that  may  be  applied  to  any 
minister  of  the  Gospel,  of  whatever  class  or  order ; 
indeed,  it  may  be  applied  to  any  officer  of  the 
Church,  whether  clergyman  or  layman. 

All  writers  on  Church  polity,  from  the  earliest 
times  until  now,  so  far  as  I  know,  take  it  for 
granted  that  the  office  of  deacon  in  the  Christian 
Church  had  its  beginning  with  the  appointment 
of  the  seven  to  attend  to  the  daily  ministration, 
recorded  in  the  sixth  chapter  of  Acts.  This  can 
be  accounted  for  by  no  other  supposition  than  that 
the  early  traditions  on  the  subject  were  unanimous, 
and  were  so  evidently  correct  as  to  admit  of  no 
question.  We  may,  therefore,  also  admit  the 
same  thing  without  question.  But  it  is  not  a  little 
strange,  if  there  are  three  orders  of  ministers  in 
the  Church  by  divine  appointment,  if  this  matter 
of  three  orders  be  so  essential  that  a  Church 
without  them  is  not  a  Church,  it  is  not  a  little 
strange,  I  say,  that  the  term  deacon  is  never  ap- 


456 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


plied  in  the  New  Testament  to  either  of  the  seven. 
Indeed,  no  title  is  given  to  any  of  them  except  to 
Philip,  and  he  is  called  an  evangelist.  More  than 
this,  we  never  hear  any  thing  about  any  of  them 
after  their  ordination  except  Stephen  and  Philip, 
unless  the  Nicolaitans  spoken  of  in  Revelation, 
whom  God  and  the  Church  hated,  claimed  Nicolas 
as  their  founder.  From  what  we  have  thus  far 
said,  it  is  sufficiently  evident  that  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment  does  not  distinctly  define  the  office  of  a  dea¬ 
con,  and  we  may  reasonably  infer  from  hence  that 
such  an  office  in  the  ministry  is  not  by  divine  right 
and  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  Christian  ministry. 

Were  the  deacons  ministers  or  laymen?  On 
the  one  hand,  it  is  not  disputed  that  they  were 
originally  appointed  for  a  financial  service,  and,  so 
far  as  the  record  informs  us,  appointed  exclusively 
for  this  service.  It  is  sometimes  said,  in  reply  to 
this,  that  they  were  appointed  to  perform  a  service 
which  the  apostles  had  previously  rendered.  But 
evidently  this  does  not  prove  that  receiving  and 
disbursing  the  funds  of  the  Church  belongs  to 
the  ministerial  office,  any  more  than  the  fact  that 
Paul  wrought  at  tent -making  is  evidence  that 
making  tents  is  a  ministerial  duty.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  not  disputed  that  Stephen  and  Philip 
were  immediately  after  their  appointment  exten¬ 
sively  engaged  in  preaching  the  Gospel ;  and  the 
latter  baptized  converts  in  large  numbers,  and  also 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


457 


performed  many  miracles.  We  know  nothing  of 
the  other  deacons,  what  they  were,  or  what  they 
did.  Again,  the  deacons  were  ordained  by  the 
imposition  of  hands.  This  is  not  decisive  of  the 
question  ;  but  though  it  is  not  proof  that  deacons 
were  ministers,  it  looks  very  much  that  way,  and 
is,  under  the  circumstances,  adequate  ground  for 
a  fair  presumption  that  they  were.  Again,  in 
Paul’s  directions  to  Timothy  respecting  the  ordi¬ 
nation  of  ministers  he  speaks  of  the  deacons  in  the 
same  way  as  of  bishops  or  elders,  and  specifies 
well-nigh  the  same  qualifications  in  both  cases. 
Again,  in  i  Timothy,  third  chapter,  after  delineating 
the  qualifications  of  a  bishop,  and  then  in  immediate 
succession  enumerating  the  qualifications  of  a  dea¬ 
con,  in  the  tenth  verse  Paul  says,  “  Let  these  also 
first  be  proved;  then  let  them*  use  the  office  of  a 
deacon,  being  found  blameless  and  then  in  the 
thirteenth  verse  he  says,  “They  that  have  used 
the  office  of  a  deacon  well  purchase  to  themselves 
a  good  degree.”  Here  we  evidently  have  a  pro¬ 
bation  for  the  office  of  a  deacon,  and  a  probation 
in  the  office  for  promotion  to  a  higher  degree  or 
office ;  all  of  which  is  perfectly  natural,  indeed, 
indispensable,  if  deacons  be  ministers  and  candi¬ 
dates  for  promotion  in  the  ministry,  but  wholly 
anomalous  and  without  a  known  parallel  in  history 
if  the  deaconship  be  merely  a  temporary  financial 
office  occupied  only  by  laymen. 


458 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Our  conclusion  respecting  the  office  of  deacon 
in  the  Christian  Church  is,  that  it  was  inaugurated 
on  this  wise  :  on  nomination  by  the  membership, 
under  apostolic  supervision,  seven  men  were  by 
apostolic  authority  appointed  to  the  office,  and 
were  ordained  by  the  imposition  of  apostolic  hands  ; 
that  others  were,  probably  in  all  the  Churches, 
afterwards  appointed  and  ordained  in  the  same 
way  and  by  the  same  authority ;  that  the  office 
has  continued  in  the  Church  from  that  time  to  the 
present  ;  that  its  duties  are  not  distinctly  defined 
in  the  New  Testament;  that  it  was  a  ministerial 
office  of  subordinate  rank,  including  among  its 
duties  at  the  first  some  attention  to  financial  mat¬ 
ters  ;  and  that  the  functions  of  the  office  were 
well  understood  in  post  -  apostolic  times,  and  are 
with  sufficient  accuracy  described  in  the  early 
writings  of  the  Church — from  all  of  which  we 
infer  that  the  existence  of  such  an  office  in  the 
ministry  has  apostolic  sanction,  but  is  not  by  divine 
right,  or,  in  other  words,  is  not  essential  to  the 
validity  of  Church  organization.  A  Church  may 
or  may  not  have  deacons  in  its  ministry,  as  it  in 
its  godly  judgment  may  deem  expedient,  and  in 
either  case  it  is  equally  a  Christian  Church  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  will  of  God. 

The  establishment  of  different  grades  in  the 
ministry  is  commended  by  the  fact  that  it  furnishes 
opportunity  for  a  full  and  fair  trial  or  probation, 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES. 


459 


by  which  the  Church  may  the  better  determine 
before  full  admission  to  all  the  functions  of  its  min¬ 
istry  whether  the  candidates  possess  the  requisite 
qualifications.  It  also  furnishes  the  candidates 
themselves  with  better  opportunities  for  deciding 
whether  they  are  divinely  called  to  this  work ;  and 
it  is  also  to  them  a  proper  stimulus  and  incentive 
to  fidelity,  because  here,  as  every-where  else,  men 
prove  by  faithfulness  in  the  less  their  qualifications 
for  and  their  title  to  the  greater.  That  different 
grades  in  the  ministry  are  not  an  inexpediency  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  to  them  no  valid  objec¬ 
tion  can  be  made.  The  system  has  no  disadvan¬ 
tages  ;  it  works  no  detriment.  It  has  some  ad¬ 
vantages,  is  a  very  proper  thing  in  itself,  and  is 
therefore,  to  them  that  like  it,  a  very  good  thing  ; 
provided,  always,  that  its  abettors  never  set  up  for 
it  the  preposterous  claim  of  a  divine  right. 

Fifth.  Our  fifth  remark  in  this  connection  is, 
that  the  question  as  to  the  number  of  orders  in 
the  ministry,  except  with  high  -  churchmen,  is  a 
question  void  of  significancy.  What  is  the  mean¬ 
ing  of  this  word  orders  ?  In  the  vocabulary  of  the 
high-churchman  it  has  a  distinct  and  well-under¬ 
stood  definition ;  it  is  a  rank,  a  class,  a  division  of 
men,  made  by  divine  appointment.  It  implies  that 
it  is  the  will  of  God  that  the  ministers  of  his 
Church  should  tje  divided  into  classes  ;  and,  that 
it  is  so  Cod’s  will  that  such  classification  should 


460 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


exist  that  it  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  Church 
organization,  a  so-called  Church  without  orders  in 
its  ministry  is  not  a  valid  Church.  The  question, 
How  many  orders  are  there  in  the  Christian  min¬ 
istry  ?  is  to  a  High-churchman  an  intelligent 
question,  and  he  answers  it  numerically.  He  says 
there  are  three,  bishops,  presbyters,  and  dea¬ 
cons — he  knows  what  he  says,  and  most  distinctly 
means  what  he  says.  This  distinction  of  orders 
implies,  further,  that  the  peculiar  functions  of  each 
are  by  divine  authority  exclusive.  Instance,  the 
right  of  ordination  belongs,  by  divine  appointment, 
exclusively  to  the  episcopacy  ;  so  that,  a  so-called 
minister  not  episcopally  ordained  is  not  a  Chris¬ 
tian  minister.  The  ordinances  administered  by 
such  a  one  are  not  valid  ;  marriage  by  such  is  not 
matrimony,  and  the  parties  joined  together  by 
ministers  not  episcopally  ordained  live  in  adultery. 
A  High-churchman  attaches  a  most  significant  and 
tremendous  meaning  to  his  word  orders. 

The  theory  opposed  to  these  preposterous 
assumptions  of  Romanists  and  High-churchmen  is, 
that  there  is  no  divine  requirement  for  any  classi¬ 
fication  of  ministerial  duties  whatever.  God  has 
signified  in  his  Word  that  it  is  his  will  that  certain 
men,  whom  he  calls,  shall  devote  themselves  to  the 
service  of  his  Church  ;  and  that  the  Church  shall 
recognize  persons  giving  evidence  of  such  a  divine 
call  as  its  ministers ;  shall  appoint  them  to  the 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  46 1 

I 

ministry,  authorize  them  to  discharge  the  functions 
of  the  ministerial  office,  shall  co-operate  with  them 
in  their  work,  and  contribute  to  their  temporal 
support.  But  as  to  the  mode  of  their  election,  the 
forms  and  ceremonies  of  their  ordination,  the  per¬ 
sons  or  officers  by  whom  they  shall  be  ordained, 
the  division  of  their  labors,  and  the  ranks,  classes, 
or  orders  into  which  they  themselves  shall  be  di¬ 
vided,  the  New  Testament  gives  no  distinct  direc¬ 
tions,  and  therefore  as  to  these  things  there  are 
no  divine  requirements ;  but  the  Church  is  left 
to  determine  them  at  its  discretion,  provided, 
always  that  in  its  action  it  does  not  contravene  any 
plainly  revealed  principle  of  Church  government. 
Now,  if  to  one  holding  this  theory  the  question, 
How  many  orders  are  there  in  the  Christian  min¬ 
istry  ?  be  asked,  and  the  term  orders  be  accepted 
in  the  sense  of  High-churchism,  the  only  answer 
he  can  give,  consistent  with  his  own  theory,  is  that 
there  are  no  orders  at  all ;  there  is  no  divine  re¬ 
quirement  for  any  classification  whatever ;  all  Chris¬ 
tian  ministers,  so  far  as  divine  right  is  concerned, 
are  co-ordinate.  That  is  to  say,  he  has  in  his 
theory  no  use  for  the  term  orders,  in  the  sense  in 
which  Romanists  and  High-churchmen  use  it. 

But  it  will  be  said  that  the  word  orders,  as  used 
by  Protestants,  generally  has  another  signification ; 
namely,  a  distinction  of  classes  in  the  ministry  by 
the  conventional  decisions  of  the  Church.  In  this 


ECCLES10L0GY. 


'  462 

sense,  the  only  answer  most  Protestants  can  give, 
consistent  with  their  theory,  to  the  question,  How 
many  orders  are  there  ?  is,  just  as  many  as  the 
Church  pleases  to  make.  Plainly,  then,  in  any 
sense,  the  question  as  to  the  number  of  orders  is 
forestalled,  and  in  consistency  ought  to  be  dis¬ 
counted  by  the  decision  of  the  antecedent  question, 
whether  there  are  any  orders  at  all  by  divine  right. 

It  is  not  very  uncommon,  in  the  parlance  of  the 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  to  say  that  there  are 
two  orders  in  the  ministry.  Let  us  examine  this  a 
little  and  see  how  it  looks.  We  have  nominally 
three  classes,  bishops,  elders,  and  deacons.  In 
theory  it  is  affirmed  that  bishops  and  elders  are 
of  the  same  order  ;  so  we  have  two  orders,  pres¬ 
byters  and  deacons.  Now  we  do  not  claim  that 
the  two  are  by  divine  right,  for  we  have  always 
recognized  the  English  Wesleyan  Church  as  a 
true  and  valid  Christian  and  Methodist  Church, 
and  they  have  no  deacons  and  but  one  ordination 
for  their  elders.  The  distinction  then  is  with  us, 
by  conventional  decision.  On  what  is  this  distinc¬ 
tion  founded  ?  Our  bishops  are  differentiated  from 
our  elders  by  at  least  three  very  important  pre¬ 
rogatives,  and  our  elders  differ  from  our  deacons  by 
only  one  prerogative,  and  that  a  very  unimportant 
one.  Necessities  excepted,  the  right  of  ordination, 
the  power  to  station  traveling  ministers,  and  the 
presidency  of  the  General  Conference,  are  exclu- 


MINISTERIAL  DUTIES  AND  OFFICES.  463 

sive  prerogatives  of  the  bishops  ;  but  the  only 
prerogative  possessed  by  an  elder  not  possessed 
by  a  deacon  is  the  right  to  read  the  consecrating 
prayer  over  the  elements  in  the  sacrament  of  the 
Lord’s-supper.  Now,  to  call  the  distinction  be¬ 
tween  a  bishop  and  an  elder  a  distinction  of  office , 
and  that  between  an  elder  and  a  deacon  one  of 
order ,  and  at  the  same  time  to  attach  any  sacred¬ 
ness  or  important  elevation  in  degree  to  the  idea 
of  an  order,  not  belonging  to  an  office,  is,  to  say 
the  least  of  it,  a  strange  misnomer.  If  the  word 
order  means  a  class  of  ministers  ordained  by  the 
imposition  of  hands,  then,  of  course,  all  will  agree 
that  we  have  three  orders.  If  the  word  means 
simply  a  class  of  ministers,  made  a  class  in  no 
other  way  than  by  a  conventional  classification  of 
ministerial  duties  and  an  assignment  of  one  class 
of  duties  to  one  class  of  ministers,  and  another 
class  of  duties  to  another  class  of  ministers,  then 
the  Methodist  Church  has  at  least  seven  orders, 
bishops,  traveling  elders,  traveling  deacons,  local 
elders,  local  deacons,  traveling  ministers  on  trial, 
and  local  preachers  not  ordained ;  if  we  add  su¬ 
perannuates  and  supernumeraries,  we  have  nine  ; 
if  we  further  add  editors,  book  agents,  secretaries 
of  Church  societies  and  presidents  and  professors 
of  colleges  and  academies,  all  of  whom  may  be 
legally  constituted  ministers,  then  we  have  at  least 
thirteen  orders  in  our  ministry.  Very  plainly  the 


464 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


word  orders,  in  any  sense  in  which  the  word  is  of 
any  use,  has  no  place  in  a  Methodist  vocabulary. 
Methodists  have  no  need  for  the  use  of  the  word, 
and  the  same  may  be  said  of  all  others,  except 
Romanists  and  High-churchmen. 


CHAPTER  X. 


Episcopacy. 

Episcopacy  was  a  natural  growth  from,  or  a 
development  of,  the  state  of  things  inaugurated 
by  the  apostles.  As  may  be  naturally  expected, 
no  important  change  occurred  during  the  first 
century.  In  the  extant  writings  of  those  times  all 
allusions  to  the  matter  of  Church  polity  conform 
substantially  to  similar  allusions  in  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment.  Clement  of  Rome,  who  wrote  about  A.  D. 
95  ;  Polycarp,  a  disciple  of  John,  who  wrote  about 
A.  D.  140;  and  Justin  Martyr,  a  contemporary  of 
Polycarp, — all  address  ministers  as  presbyters  and 
deacons,  or  bishops  and  deacons,  in  the  same  way 
that  they  are  addressed  in  the  epistles  of  Paul, 
indicating  clearly  that  up  to  and  during  their  times 
the  chief  ministers  of  the  Church  belonged  to  one 
or  the  other  of  two  and  only  two  classes.  In  the 
writings  of  Ignatius,  A.  D.  116,  a  distinction  be¬ 
tween  bishops  and  presbyters  first  makes  its  ap¬ 
pearance.  It  is  said  by  some  that  these  so-called 

epistles  of  Ignatius  are  forgeries,  and  by  others 
c  30  465 


466 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


that  they  are  interpolated  copies  of  original  epis¬ 
tles.  But  even  if  these  epistles  of  Ignatius  are 
discounted  as  unworthy  of  confidence,  the  subse¬ 
quent  histories  make  it  evident  that  early  in  the 
second  century  changes  in  the  externals  of  the 
Church  began  to  appear,  and  that  episcopacy  had 
its  beginning  among  the  earliest  developments  of 
post -apostolic  times.  To  our  thought  a  careful 
consideration  of  the  facts  of  the  case  will  make  it 
appear  that  an  episcopal  form  of  Church  govern¬ 
ment  was  the  result  of  a  natural  growth  from  the 
apostolic  germ  ;  was  the  natural,  if  not  the  neces¬ 
sary,  result  of  development. 

The  Church  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  Polycarp 
and  Ignatius  could  not  remain  stationary  ;  it  must 
either  dwindle  and  become  extinct,  or  it  must 
prosper,  develop  its  powers,  and  extend  its  dimen¬ 
sions.  Change  is  inseparable  from  growth — the 
Church  in  maturity  could  not  be  the  same  as  in 
its  infancy  —  and  change  is  in  nothing  more  inevi¬ 
table  than  in  external  forms.  Nothing  short  of  a 
divine  prohibition  expressed  in  positive  terms, 
either  by  Christ  himself  or  by  his  inspired  apos¬ 
tles,  could  prevent  some  variations  in  the  institu¬ 
tions  of  the  Church  from  the  forms  left  by  its 
founders.  No  well-defined  system  of  Church  pol¬ 
ity  was  instituted  ;  no  directions  were  left  to  guide 
the  Church  in  its  future  action.  The  Church  for 
the  time  being  took  on  such  forms  as  circumstances 


EPISCOPACY. 


467 


required,  and  it  was  left  to  its  own  discretion  in 
determining  what  forms  its  future  exigencies  might 
demand.  The  Great  Head  of  the  Church  foresaw 
what  would  be,  and  did  not  impose  any  prohibitory 
interdicts  to  prevent  it,  or  any  precautionary 
prophecies  to  forewarn  the  Church  against  it. 
Episcopacy  did  actually  arise,  and  for  at  least 
twelve  hundred  years  was,  without  opposition,  the 
only  existing  form  of  Church  government  through¬ 
out  the  Christian  world.  It  has  always  been,  and 
is  now,  the  form  adopted  by  a  very  large  majority 
of  the  Churches  naming  the  name  of  Christ. 

For  the  details  of  the  rise  and  progress  of 
episcopacy  the  reader  must  be  referred  to  the 
ecclesiastical  histories.  Our  purpose  does  not  re¬ 
quire  us  to  refer  to  them.  The  authorities,  so  far 
as  they  are  reliable,  give  precisely  the  same  ac¬ 
count  of  the  rise  of  this  system,  as  to  its  essential 
characteristics,  that  one  would  naturally  suppose 
it  to  be,  forming  his  judgment  from  the  facts, 
statements,  and  references  recorded  in  the  New 
Testament.  With  the  Acts  and  Epistles  as  our 
guide  and  the  basis  of  our  judgment,  we  think  of 
the  Christian  Church  during  the  first  seventy 
years  of  its  history  as  consisting  of  assemblies  of 
believers  in  Christ,  united  together  by  a  form  of 
association  as  simple  as  can  well  be  conceived. 
Their  meetings  are  held  in  the  synagogues  of  the 
Jews  wherever  they  have  liberty  to  use  them;  or 


468 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


in  seminaries  of  learning,  as  in  the  school  of  Tyr- 
annus  ;  or  in  private  dwellings,  as  in  the  house  of 
Stephanas — or,  in  a  word,  in  any  obtainable  place 
most  convenient.  When  assembled,  they  were 
seated,  whenever  practicable,  after  the  manner  of 
the  synagogue,  the  elders  sitting  in  a  semicircle 
facing  the  people. 

The  elders,  where  their  organization  was  com¬ 
plete,  were  ten  in  number ;  sometimes  less,  never 
more,  it  is  said,  in  a  single  congregation.  Of 
these,  one  corresponding  to  the  ruler  of  the  syna¬ 
gogue  was  the  elder,  presbyter,  bishop,  pastor, 
perhaps,  as  in  Revelation,  the  angel  of  the  Church  ; 
two  others  were  assistant  pastors, — the  three  cor¬ 
responding  to  what  are  called  the  “rulers  of  the 
synagogue.”  The  ten  constituted  the  presbytery 
of  the  Church,  or  its  official  board.  It  is  probable 
that  the  three  rulers  were  ordained  ministers,  the 
assistant  pastors  being  as  such  authorized,  in  the 
absence  of  the  pastor,  to  administer  the  sacra¬ 
ments.  The  other  seven  elders  might  be  ministers 
or  laymen ;  probably  most  or  all  of  them  were 
laymen,  elevated  to  this  honor,  as  were  “the  elders 
of  the  people”  in  the  synagogues  of  the  Jews,  for 
their  wisdom,  their  gravity,  or  their  age. 

The  services  consisted,  first,  of  the  reading  of 
the  Scriptures  by  one  of  the  elders,  probably  one 
of  the  assistant  pastors,  to  whom  that  duty  was 
specially  assigned ;  after  which  the  pastor  expounded 


EPISCOPACY. 


469 


the  lesson  read  and  made  an  exhortation  to  the 
people.  This  service,  however,  was  not  restricted ; 
the  pastor  might  give  liberty  to  any  one  in  the 
congregation  to  address  the  people.  At  least,  this 
is  probable,  since  it  not  unfrequently  occurred  in 
the  synagogue — instance,  when  Paul  and  his  com 
pany  came  to  Antioch  in  Pisidia,  and  had  gone 
into  the  synagogue  and  sat  down,  “after  the  read¬ 
ing  of  the  law  and  the  prophets  the  rulers  of  the 
synagogue  sent  unto  them  saying,  Ye  men  and 
brethren,  if  ye  have  any  word  of  exhortation  for 
the  people,  say  on.”  The  sermon  or  exhortation 
ended,  the  pastor  offered  prayer,  and  the  people 
responded  Amen.  This  done,  the  sacrament  of  the 
Lord’s  -  supper  was  administered,  after  which  the 
service  was  closed. 

The  jurisprudence  of  the  primitive  Church  is 
more  imperfectly  delineated  in  the  New  Testament 
than  is  its  polity  in  other  respects.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  the  instructions  of  our  Lord  as  to  our 
treatment  of  a  brother  who  trespasses  against  us 
has  any  respect  whatever  to  Church  action.  It 
may  be  that  our  Savior  had  in  mind  simply  a  case 
of  personal  difference,  and  not  at  all  a  case  of 
public  scandal ;  if  so,  the  word  Church  means  in¬ 
dividual  members  of  the  Church.  We  are  first  to 
seek  a  settlement  privately  between  him  and  our¬ 
selves  alone,  then  in  case  of  failure  to  take  two 
or  three ;  and  failing  in  this  attempt,  to  take 


470 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


several.  But  suppose  the  case  be  a  case  of  im¬ 
moral  conduct,  and,  if  known,  of  public  scandal, 
requiring  in  the  last  resort  Church  discipline.  It 
is  not  certain  whether  the  word  Church  means  the 
entire  members  or  the  official  council.  In  Paul’s 
reproof  of  the  Corinthian  Church  because  of  their 
indulgence  towards  the  incestuous  person,  the  re¬ 
proof  implies  a  censure  upon  the  Church  generally, 
and  so  far  forth  is  an  argument  for  Congregation¬ 
alism  ;  but  in  his  stern  assurance  that  if  he  him¬ 
self  were  present  matters  would  be  differently 
disposed  of,  we  have  a  strong  intimation  that  dis¬ 
ciplinary  authority  pertained  to  the  ministry.  But 
we  know  nothing  positively  respecting  the  method 
in  which  charges  were  preferred,  to  whom  pre¬ 
ferred,  of  whom  the  court  of  trial  was  composed, 
what  was  the  method  and  order  of  procedure, 
whether  there  was  any  right  of  appeal,  how  courts 
of  appeal  were  constituted,  by  whom  sentence  was 
pronounced  ;  indeed,  we  have  well-nigh  no  infor¬ 
mation  whatever  as  to  disciplinary  procedure. 

In  the  infancy  of  the  Churches  it  is  probable 
that  all  the  official  members  rendered  their  serv¬ 
ices  without  any  financial  remuneration  ;  but  it  is 
evident  that  in  all  cases  where  the  people  were 
able  to  contribute  an  adequate  support  for  their 
pastor  they  were  required  to  do  so,  and  the  pas¬ 
tors  were  required  to  give  themselves  wholly  to 
the  Word  of  God  and  prayer.  This  is  evident 


EPISCOPACY. 


471 


from  the  frequent  exhortations  given  in  the  Epis¬ 
tles  on  this  subject;  they  ‘‘that  were  taught  in  the 
Word  ”  were  required  “  to  communicate  unto  him 
that  teacheth  in  all  good  things.”  The  leading 
Church  enterprise  of  the  times  was  the  dissemina¬ 
tion  of  the  Word,  and  in  this  work  all  shared  as 
they  had  opportunity.  When  scattered  abroad  by 
persecution  they  went  every-where  preaching  the 
Word,  as  was  the  case  when  Saul  made  havoc  of 
the  Church  after  the  martyrdom  of  Stephen.  And 
when  the  Church  had  rest  and  was  prospered, 
missionaries  were  sent  forth  with  letters  of  com¬ 
mendation,  as  in  the  case  of  Paul  and  Barnabas, 
sent  from  the  Church  at  Antioch.  This  work  of 
evangelization  must  have  occupied  the  entire  at¬ 
tention  of  the  Church  and  employed  all  its  resources 
during  the  years  of  the  first  century.  There  was 
neither  occasion  nor  opportunity  for  devising 
Church  polities  for  the  administration  of  the  affairs 
of  established  and  prosperous  Churches.  This 
work  began  when  the  condition  of  the  Church  re¬ 
quired  it,  which  state  of  things  began  to  appear 
early  in  the  second  century. 

From  the  first  the  pastors  administered  some 
form  of  government.  They  presided  over  the 
presbytery.  The  pastor  was  the  angel  of  the 
Church,  the  man  in  whom  centered  the  chief  au¬ 
thority.  When  there  were  several  Churches  in 
the  same  city  the  presbyters  of  all  the  Churches 


472 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


assembled  together  for  consultation  concerning  the 
general  interests  of  the  cause  in  the  city  where 
they  dwelt,  and  for  co-operation  in  spreading  the 
Gospel  in  the  regions  beyond.  In  these  assem¬ 
blies  some  one  must  preside.  As  is  usual  in  such 
cases,  the  one  appointed  to  this  honor  would  be 
the  pastor  of  the  most  prominent  Church,  or  the 
man  most  distinguished  and  most  deserving  of 
such  honor.  Soon,  when  the  general  interests 
of  the  Church  in  such  a  city  required  the  entire 
attention  of  some  one,  the  president  of  the  metro¬ 
politan  presbytery  would  very  naturally  be  called 
to  such  an  office,  and  thus  become  another  and  a 
higher  officer  than  had  previously  existed.  In  the 
nature  of  the  case  such  a  one  would  exercise 
some  sort  of  supervision  over  all  the  Churches ; 
over  all  the  ministers  and  members  of  all  the 
Churches  included  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  pres¬ 
bytery  in  which  his  office  originated  ;  he  became 
the  angel  of  the  whole  Church  in  that  city  and  its 
suburbs.  Soon  he  was  distinguished  from  other 
presbyters  by  such  titles  as  would  indicate  his  of¬ 
fice,  and  the  word  episcopos,  bishop,  was  seized  upon 
and  used  for  this  purpose.  It  had  previously  been 
indiscriminately  applied  to  all  presbyters,  but  from 
this  point  onward  it  began  to  be  used  exclusively 
to  designate  not  a  “ pastor  gregis  merely,  but 
a  “ pastor  gregis  et  pastorum  ” — it  was  the  title 
of  him  who  exercised  a  general  oversight ;  who 


EPISCOPACY. 


473 


was  an  overseer  of  the  Churches  both  as  to  the 
ministry  and  the  membership.  This  is  the  origin 
of  episcopacy.  For  the  details  of  its  progress 
from  this  humble,  natural,  and  praiseworthy  com¬ 
mencement  to  its  terrible  corruption  and  prostitu¬ 
tion  as  seen  in  the  assumptions  of  the  eastern 
patriarchs  and  western  popes,  we  must  look  to  the 
ecclesiastical  histories.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  say, 
that  bishops  of  cities  became  bishops  of  provinces, 
of  states,  and  of  empires ;  became  archbishops, 
patriarchs,  and  popes,  and  became  thus  by  the 
same, processes  by  which  power  is  usually  central¬ 
ized,  and  by  which  ambitious  men  make  for  them¬ 
selves  high  places  and  occupy  them. 

THEORIES. 

The  theory  of  High-churchism,  so-called,  affirms 
that  there  are  three  orders  in  the  Christian  ministry 
by  divine  appointment.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  God’s 
will  that  there  should  be  in  his  Church  bishops, 
presbyters,  and  deacons  ;  and  it  is  so  his  will  that 
without  them  a  Christian  Church  can  not  be  consti¬ 
tuted — any  so-called  Church  whose  ministry  does 
not  consist  of  three  orders,  a  Church  which  has  not 
bishops,  presbyters,  and  deacons  is  not  a  Church  ; 
its  so-called  ministers  are  innovators  or  pretend¬ 
ers,  and  its  ordinances  are  not  valid  Christian 
ordinances.  According  to  this  theory  the  ordina¬ 
tion  of  ministers  and  the  confirmation  of  the  people 


474 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


belong  exclusively  to  the  episcopacy ;  the  imposi¬ 
tion  of  hands  by  any  others,  if  made  in  the  name 
of  God  for  a  religious  purpose,  is,  if  not  sacrile¬ 
gious,  at  best  but  a  useless  and  an  unmeaning 
ceremony.  The  right  of  ordination,  according  to 
this  theory,  is  derived  from  an  episcopal  ordina¬ 
tion,  transmitted  in  an  unbroken  succession  from 
the  apostles  ;  and  this  regular  succession  is  essen¬ 
tial  to  the  validity  of  ministerial  functions.  No 
man  not  in  that  succession  has  or  can  have  any 

right  to  exercise  the  functions  of  the  ministerial  of- 

% 

fice.  Episcopal  authority  is  the  highest  court  of 
appeal,  its  decisions  are  final  and  obligatory,  it 
extends  mediately  or  immediately  to  all  matters 
pertaining  to  the  Church ;  to  it  all  members 
and  ministers  of  the  Church  are  in  some  sense 
responsible.  Episcopacy  is,  in  the  fullest  sense, 
what  the  word  indicates,  an  overseeing,  a  superin¬ 
tendency  ;  it  is  a  supervision  with  authority  to 
command. 

The  alleged  grounds  on  which  these  high 
claims  are  founded  are,  as  held  by  some,  that 
God’s  will  respecting  the  constitution  of  his  Church 
is  indicated  by  the  polity  of  the  Mosaic  Church. 
The  Aaronic  priesthood  foreshadowed  the  epis¬ 
copacy,  its  high  priest  the  Papacy,  and  the  Levit- 
ical  priesthood  symbolized  the  presbytery.  The 
more  common  argument  derives  the  episcopacy 
from  the  apostleship,  and  the  presbyters  and  dea- 


EPISCOPACY.  475 

cons  from  the  orders  so  denominated  in  the  New 
Testament. 

The  further  proofs  alleged  are  drawn  chiefly 
from  the  writings  of  the  Fathers,  and  from  the  facts 
of  ecclesiastical  history.  In  reply  to  all  arguments 
from  this  source  we  are  content  simply  to  say, 
that  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  not  only  af¬ 
firm  that  the  fathers  were  in  favor  of  an  episco¬ 
pacy,  but  also  admit  that  some  of  them  have  said 
what  favors  the  high  claims  of  Papacy.  Their 
testimony,  however,  in  this  matter,  is  not  with  us 
decisive  and  final.  Such  claims  as  those  that  con¬ 
stitute  High-churchism  can,  with  us,  be  sustained 
by  nothing  short  of  a  plain  and  unequivocal  “thus 
saith  the  Lord.”  Beyond  the  mere  fact  that  there 
were  in  the  Church  in  apostolic  times  apostles, 
presbyters,  and  deacons,  the  only  Scripture  proofs 
of  high-churchism  alleged  are  those  which  appear 
to  say  that  the  Church  is  built  upon  the  rock, 
Peter,  and  that  Peter  is  intrusted  with  the  keys 
of  the  heavenly  kingdom.  “Thou  art  Peter,  and 
upon  this  rock  will  I  build  my  Church,  and  the 
gates  of  hell  shall  not  prevail  against  it,  and  I  will 
give  unto  thee  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven  ; 
and  whatsoever  thou  shalt  bind  on  earth  shall  be 
bound  in  heaven  ;  and  whatsoever  thou  shalt  loose 
on  earth,  shall  be  loosed  in  heaven.”  (Matt, 
xvi,  1 8,  19.)  In  Matthew  xviii,  18,  these  same 
words,  “  whatsoever  ye  shall  bind  on  earth  shall  be 


476 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


bound  in  heaven,”  occur  in  connection  with  our 
Lord’s  instructions  respecting  procedure  in  case 
a  brother  trespass  against  us,  and  evidently  refer 
to  the  act  of  forgiving  an  injury  by  trespass,  or 
of  retaining-  censure  and  condemnation  because 
of  trespass  unrepented.  In  John  xx,  21-23,  it  is 
written:  “Then  said  Jesus  to  them  again,  Peace  be 
unto  you:  as  my  Father  hath  sent  me,  even  so  send 
I  you  ;  and  when  he  had  said  this,  he  breathed  on 
them,  and  saith  unto  them,  Receive  ye  the  Holy 
Ghost ;  whosesoever  sins  ye  remit,  they  are  remit¬ 
ted  unto  them;  and  whosesoever  sins  ye  retain, 
they  are  retained.”  What  did  our  Lord  mean  by 
these  weighty  words?  We  reply,  whatever  he 
meant  he  did  not  mean  to  resign  his  own  place  as 
head  of  the  Church  and  install  Peter  therein  ;  he 
did  not  appoint  Peter  to  be  God’s  vicegerent  upon 
earth,  he  did  not  give  to  Peter  the  power  to  open 
and  shut  the  gates  of  eternal  life  by  forgiving  or 
at  his  own  option  retaining  the  sins  of  his  fellow- 
men  ;  he  did  not  confer  upon  Peter  sole  power  of 
perpetuating  the  Church  and  its  ministry ;  he  did 
not  authorize  him  by  the  imposition  of  hands  to 
transmit  the  headship  of  the  Church  and  the 
power  to  pardon  sin  to  successors,  and  through 
those  successors  to  others  unto  the  end  of  time. 
W e  affirm  that  whatever  he  said  and  did,  he  did 
not  say  and  do  these  things  ;  and  we  make  this 
affirmation,  first,  because  the  ideas  themselves  are 


EPISCOPACY. 


477 


too  tremendously  awful  to  be,  even  for  a  moment, 
supposable ;  and,  secondly,  because  these  pas¬ 
sages  admit  of  a  rational  and  Scriptural  inter¬ 
pretation  which  involves  no  such  preposterous 
doctrines. 

The  words  of  our  Lord  seem  to  represent, 
they  do  represent,  that  Peter  personally  sustained 
some  prominent  relation  to  the  Church  ;  a  relation 
signified  by  that  of  a  foundation  to  the  structure 
erected  upon  it.  The  Church  was,  in  some  sense, 
built  upon  Peter ;  and  so  it  was  upon  all  the 
“  prophets  and  apostles,  Christ  himself  being  the 
chief  corner-stone.”  Peter  preached  the  sermon 
that  inaugurated  the  dispensation  of  the  Holy 
Ghost  ;  he  also  introduced  the  Gospel  dispensation 
to  the  Gentile  world — -he  turned  one  key  at  Jeru¬ 
salem  on  the  day  of  Pentecost,  and  another  in  the 
house  of  Cornelius.  But  again,  Peter’s  confession 
of  faith,  “thou  art  the  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  living 
God,”  is  eminently  the  rock  on  which  Christ  builds 
his  Church  in  the  world — such  a  profession  is  and 
always  has  been  the  condition  of  membership  in 
his  Church.  The  power  of  the  keys  may  more 
Scripturally  be  regarded  as  the  power  authorita¬ 
tively  to  announce  the  conditions  on  which  the 
pardon  of  sin  may  be  granted  than  a  power  to 
grant  pardon  ex  cathedra .  But,  lastly,  if  extraor¬ 
dinary  prerogatives,  such  as,  or  similar  to,  those 
claimed  by  Papacy  were  conferred  by  the  words 


478 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


of  our  Lord  now  under  consideration,  those  pre¬ 
rogatives  were  conferred  exclusively  upon  the 
apostles.  They  were  divinely  inspired  to  complete 
the  canon  of  the  Scriptures,  and  to  inaugurate 
much  that  pertained  to  the  establishment  of  the 
Church.  By  their  inspiration  they  were  rendered 
infallible  for  the  purposes  for  which  they  were 
inspired  ;  but  in  respect  to  those  things  they  had 
no  successors.  They  had  power  to  bind  and  loose 
as  no  other  men  since  have  ever  had.  To  inter¬ 
pret  these  Scriptures  in  a  sense  solely  applicable 
to  the  apostles,  and  then  apply  such  interpretation 
to  pretended  successors,  is  a  most  palpable  non 
sequitur. 

Papacy  and  High-churchism,  as  to  fundamental 
principles  and  outline  doctrines,  have  been  suf- 
ficently  discussed  in  preceding  pages.  That  their 
claims  are  wholly  preposterous  has  been  shown 
from  the  obvious  fact  that  the  apostles  had  no  suc¬ 
cessors,  and  that,  from  the  nature  of  their  office, 
they  could  not  have  any ;  from  the  obvious  fact 
that  during  the  apostolic  times  the  terms  bishop 
and  elder  signified  the  same  office ;  or,  in  other 
words,  that  there  was  but  one  office  besides 
the  diaconate,  which  office  was  designated  inter¬ 
changeably  by  those  two  titles ;  from  the  fact  that 
the  Christian  Church  was  modeled  after  the  syna¬ 
gogue  ;  and  from  the  further  fact  that  episcopacy 
had  its  origin  in  times  subsequent  to  the  close 


EPISCOPACY. 


479 


of  the  Scripture  canon.  Another  historic  fact,  not 
alluded  to  above,  fatal  to  the  pretensions  of  Pa¬ 
pacy  and  High-churchism,  is,  that  in  the  rise  and 
progress  of  the  hierarchy,  even  as  it  existed  in 
the  second  century,  but  more  especially  in  the 
form  which  it  subsequently  assumed,  and  in  which 
it  has  continued  until  the  present,  it  was  modeled, 
not  after  the  Mosaic  economy,  nor  after  apostolic 
practice,  but  after  the  civil  polity  of  the  Roman 
Empire.  Constantine  made  special  efforts  to  make 
the  polity  of  the  Church  agree  as  nearly  as  pos¬ 
sible  with  that  of  the  State.  To  this  end  he  not 
only  modified  the  polity  of  the  Church,  but  also 
changed  the  Roman  jurisprudence  and  the  consti¬ 
tution  of  the  empire.  What  now  exists  in  the 
Roman  Church  is  not  so  much  a  transmission  by 
an  unbroken  succession  of  apostolic  authority  and 
practice,  as  an  imitation  of,  and  a  succession  to, 
the  glories  and  splendors  of  the  Roman  Empire. 
In  these  things  we  see  not  so  much  of  Christ  and 
the  apostles,  as  of  Caesar  and  the  emperors. 

Moderate  Episcopacy ,  or  Low- chur chism. — This 
theory  does  not  claim  any  divine  right  for  an  epis¬ 
copal  form  of  government ;  it  agrees  with  well-nigh 
all  who  oppose  High-churchism  in  affirming  that 
no  specific  form  of  Church  polity  is  prescribed 
in  the  New  Testament,  and  that,  therefore,  the 
Church  is  left  to  adopt  such  form  as,  in  its  judg¬ 
ment,  best  meets  the  requirements  of  the  case. 


480 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


It,  however,  claims  that  episcopacy  with  suitable 
checks  and  restraints  does  not  contravene  any 
principle,  doctrine,  or  practice  of  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment  ;  and  also  that  it  conforms  with  New  Testa¬ 
ment  teachings  as  nearly  as  any  system  adapted 
to  the  changed  circumstances  of  the  Church  could 
be  expected  to  conform.  It  also  claims  that  epis¬ 
copacy  is  adapted  to  conserve  the  unity  of  the 
Church  ;  is  itself  a  connectional  bond,  and  serves 
to  strengthen  and  maintain  all  other  bonds  by 
which  the  several  Churches  are  united  in  one 
communion  ;  is  an  efficient  agent,  and  imparts  effi¬ 
ciency  to  all  other  agencies  by  which  the  purposes 
of  the  Church  are  accomplished  ;  and,  in  a  word, 
is,  so  far  as  human  wisdom  is  competent  to  deter¬ 
mine,  the  best  form  of  Church  government  known 
among  men.  It  arose  early  in  the  history  of  the 
Church,  has  withstood  the  changes  of  centuries, 
has  been  at  all  times  the  prevailing  polity,  and  for 
many  centuries  was,  without  controversy  or  dis¬ 
sent,  the  form  of  government  adopted  by  the  uni¬ 
versal  Church. 

Presbyterianism. —  This  differs  not  essentially 
in  what  it  affirms  of  fundamental  principles  from 
moderate  episcopacy.  It,  however,  rejects  episco¬ 
pacy  in  form  and  name,  affirms  the  equality  of 
ministers,  and  has  therefore  but  one  order ;  namely, 
presbyters.  Its  elders  and  deacons  are  held  to  be 
laymen ;  and  the  president  of  the  presbytery  is 


EPISCOPACY. 


481 


only  a  moderator  of  the  assembly,  a  “ primus  inter 
pares ” — first  among  equals.  Presbyterians,  gen¬ 
erally  with  apparently  strong  convictions,  affirm 
that  in  their  judgment  a  government  by  the  pres¬ 
bytery  conforms  more  nearly  than  any  other  to  the 
New  Testament  example.  They  do  not,  however, 
insist  that  their  form  of  government  is  divinely 
required ;  they  frankly  fraternize  with  Churches 
of  different  polities. 

Congregationalism . —  This  is  fundamentally  an 
affirmation  not  only  that  all  authority  originates  in 
the  consent  of  the  governed,  but  also  that,  essen¬ 
tially,  power  must  abide  where  it  originates.  It  is 
professedly  a  government  of  the  people,  by  the 
people.  The  primary  assembly  is  final  court  of 
appeal.  They  may  appoint  officers  ;  but  officers 
are  their  servants,  to  do  their  will.  Though  power 
is  delegated,  it  is  still  retained  ;  so  that  the  action 
of  officers  may  be  reviewed  and  reversed  by  the 
original  constituency.  In  a  word,  all  governmental 
power,  legislative,  judiciary,  and  executive,  origi¬ 
nates  in,  and  ever  remains  with,  the  congregation. 
This  is  in  substance  the  theory.  The  practice 
may  in  some  instances  conform  ;  but  generally,  as 
we  see  it,  the  theory  is  found  to  be  impracticable. 
According  to  our  observation,  there  is  no  Protest¬ 
ant  Church  in  which  the  ministry  practically  exer¬ 
cise  more  power  than  in  the  Congregational 

Church.  It  is  said  that  this  is  so  because  their 
c  31 


482 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


ministers  are  by  their  culture  and  piety  entitled  to 
the  respect  and  confidence  of  their  people  ;  that 
they  have  influence  and  power  because  power  of 
right  belongs  to  men  of  excellence  and  worth, 
such  as  they  are.  We  reply,  So  it  is,  and  so  it 
ought  to  be  ;  so  would  the  Head  of  the  Church 
have  it,  and  so  has  he  ordained.  It  is  of  divine 
appointment  that  the  ministry  be  invested  with 
prerogatives,  and  that  they  be  such  in  their  char¬ 
acter  as  entitles  them  to  such  prerogatives.  They 
are  to  have  power,  and  are  to  be  such  men  as  will 
exercise  that  power  for  the  glory  of  God  and  the 
good  of  men. 

Theoretic  Congregationalism  is  mostly  a  pro¬ 
test  against  episcopacy  and  Presbyterianism,  espe¬ 
cially  the  former ;  and  the  objection  usually  urged 
against  episcopacy  isf  that  it  comes  of  a  worldly 
ambition  and  the  love  of  power,  and  results  in 
tyranny  and  oppression  towards  the  people.  The 
proofs  are  usually  found  in  the  Dark  Ages,  it 
being  assumed  that  the  corruptions  of  those  times 
came  in  because  of  episcopacy,  and  for  the  want 
of  Congregationalism.  We  reply,  the  promise 
of  God  that  the  gates  of  hell  should  not  prevail 
against  his  Church  is  security  against  the  extinc¬ 
tion  of  the  Church  in  any  case  ;  so  that  when  we 
speak  of  any  form  of  government  as  contributing 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  Church,  or  as  working  a 
detriment,  we  speak  humanly.  When  a  Congre- 


EPISCOPACY. 


4S3 

gationalist  says  the  corruptions  of  the  Romish 
Church  came  in  through  episcopacy  he  speaks  hu¬ 
manly  ;  and  in  the  same  way,  speaking  humanly, 
one  may  say  that  but  for  episcopacy  the  corrup¬ 
tions  that  then  assailed  the  Church  would  have 
overwhelmed  it,  and  it  would  have  become  extinct. 
If  there  had  been  in  those  dark  days  no  conserv- 
ing  power  above  what  Congregationalism  can  af¬ 
ford,  in  all  human  probability,  the  Christian  Church 
would  have  been  blotted  from  the  face  of  the  earth. 
The  fact  is,  that  corruption,  tyranny,  and  oppres¬ 
sion,  either  in  state  or  Church,  come  not  from  the 
form  of  the  government,  but  from  the  character  and 
disposition  of  depraved  men.  One  form  of  gov¬ 
ernment  may  be  a  better  protection  against  these 
things  than  another  form  ;  but  certainly  the  anni¬ 
hilation  of  government  can  not  be  either  a  pre¬ 
ventive  of,  or  a  protection  against,  the  evils  that 
come  from  the  desires  and  designs  of  bad  men. 
Theoretic  Congregationalism  is  well-nigh  no  gov¬ 
ernment  at  all.  To  prevent  the  abuse  of  power  it 
disallows  its  existence.  No  man  must  be  invested 
with  prerogatives,  lest  he  misuse  them. 

The  theory  is  founded  upon  a  wrong  interpre¬ 
tation  of  the  doctrine  that  the  just  powers  of  gov¬ 
ernment  are  derived  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed.  In  the  sense  in  which  the  theory  as¬ 
sumes  that  this  doctrine  is  to  be  taken,  the  doc¬ 
trine  itself  is  not  true.  When  society  is  constructed 


4§4 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


according-  to  the  will  of  God  men  are  born  into 
governments  both  civil  and  ecclesiastical,  and  are 
naturally  under  obligation  to  accept  the  responsi¬ 
bilities  imposed  by  governmental  relations.  They 
may  refuse  to  do  so,  as  they  may  refuse  to  earn 
their  bread  by  honest  labor,  but  such  refusal  is 
rebellion  against  God. 

Loyal  obedience  to  the  mandates  of  govern¬ 
ment  comes  from  the  consent  of  the  governed ; 
but  the  obligation  thereto  comes  from  the  will  of 
God,  is  required  by  the  greatest  good,  and  is 
therefore  an  obligation  naturally  binding  upon  all 
rational  beings.  The  idea  that  the  investment  of 
authority  and  power  with  the  few  naturally  and 
necessarily  tends  to  the  oppression  of  the  many, 
is  subversive  of  all  government ;  to  affirm  it,  is  to 
affirm  the  impossibility  of  a  just  and  equitable 
administration.  To  affirm  that  the  rights  of  the 
individual  are  better  secured  by  a  pure  democracy 
than  by  a  representative  government,  is  to  affirm 
what  is  not  true ;  and  it  is  not  any  more  true 
when  the  affirmation  has  respect  to  legislative  en¬ 
actments  than  it  is  when  affirmed  of  judicial  deci¬ 
sions.  And  evidently  any  man  feels  that  his  rights 
are  more  secure  when  they  depend  upon  a  verdict 
of  a  jury  of  twelve  men  than  when  they  are  deter¬ 
mined  by  a  majority  vote  of  a  popular  assembly. 

It  is  sometimes  alleged  that  Presbyterianism 
and  episcopacy,  specially  the  latter,  tends  to  a 


EPISCOPACY. 


485 


minifying  of  the  people  intellectually  and  socially, 
so  that  under  a  Congregational  form  of  Church 
government  the  people  attain  a  higher  culture. 
For  illustration,  it  is  allowed  that  the  episcopal 
form  of  government  in  the  Methodist  Church  con¬ 
tributes  to  the  efficiency  of  that  Church  in  mis¬ 
sionary  and  pioneer  work  and  in  revival  labors  ; 
but  it  is  alleged  that  its  episcopacy  is  a  bar  to 
the  subsequent  training  and  development  of  the 
people,  so  that  the  people  of  that  Church  are  less 
intelligent  and  refined  than  they  would  be  if  their 
Church  government  were  more  democratic.  This 
is  purely  an  assumption.  It  has  its  origin  in  com¬ 
parisons  made  between  Methodist  Churches,  com¬ 
posed  of  members  most  of  whom  were  recently 
gathered  from  the  highways  and  hedges,  and 
Congregational  and  other  Churches  which  were 
venerable  when  Methodism  was  born.  Inferences 
from  such  comparisons  are  evidently  unreliable. 
But  on  this  question  a  positive  refutation  is  at 
hand.  History  does  not  show  an  example  of  a 
people  who,  according  to  their  ability  and  oppor¬ 
tunity,  have  done  more  in  the  work  of  educating 
themselves  and  others  than  have  the  people  of 
the  Methodist  Church  during  the  century  of  their 
existence. 

Congregationalists  generally  allow  that  Church 
polity  is  to  be  determined  by  the  conventional 
agreement  of  the  Church  itself.  Some,  however, 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


486 

are  of  a  different  opinion.  There  is  at  this  writ¬ 
ing  lying  before  me  on  my  table  a  work  of  much 
learning  and  labor,  in  which  the  attempt  is  made 
to  demonstrate  that  Congregationalism  is  by  divine 
right;  that  the  New  Testament  Church  was  dis¬ 
tinctly  democratic  ;  that  it  is  plainly  revealed  that 
it  is  God’s  will  that  his  Church  should  be  Congre¬ 
gational  as  to  its  polity ;  that  episcopacy  is  itself  a 
corruption,  a  violation  of  God’s  order ;  and  that 
any  other  and  all  forms  of  Church  government 
not  Congregational  are  naturally  and  necessarily 
detrimental  to  soundness  in  doctrine  and  purity  in 
life.  This  is  high-churchism  at  the  opposite  end 
of  the  line  ;  and  though  it  comes  from  one  who 
makes  much  of  the  argument  from  the  assumed 
superiority  of  Congregationalists  in  culture,  we 
venture  to  say  the  whole  argument  is  a  failure, 
and  the  doctrine  is  not  according  to  truth. 

We  conclude  that,  since  executive  efficiency 
requires  the  concentration  of  power,  since  the 
Church  is  eminently  an  organization  for  evangel¬ 
izing  the  world,  since  well-organized  responsibility 
is  adequate  protection  against  the  abuse  of  power, 
since  confessedly  an  episcopal  form  of  govern¬ 
ment  is  an  efficient  instrument  for  the  propagation 
of  the  Gospel,  and  since  no  form  of  Church  polity 
is  divinely  required,  but  the  Church  is  left  at  its 
own  option  to  select  that  form  which  in  its  judg¬ 
ment  is  best  adapted  to  its  requirements,  we 


EPISCOPACY. 


487 


conclude  that  an  episcopacy,  properly  guarded 
with  checks,  balances,  and  suitable  responsibilities, 
may  be  adopted  by  any  Church  choosing  so  to 
do  ;  and  that  the  system  may  be  made  efficiently 
promotive  of  God’s  glory  and  the  good  of  men. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


The  Polity  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal 

Church. 

1.  The  term  Methodist  is  simply  a  distinguish¬ 
ing  title.  The  term  Methodist  was  applied  to  Mr. 
Wesley  and  his  associates  at  Oxford  at  first  in 
derision ;  signifying  that,  in  the  opinion  of  those 
who  applied  the  term  to  them,  they  were  exces¬ 
sively  and  foolishly  methodical  in  their  habits  of 
life.  The  term  was  accepted  and  used  by  those  to 
whom  it  was  applied,  as  signifying  what  they  de¬ 
sired  and  designed  to  be,  namely,  men  who  regu¬ 
lated  their  lives  according  to  a  correct  and  proper 
method.  Methodists  of  our  time  do  not  claim  to 
be  more  methodical  in  their  habits  of  life  than  are 
their  fellow-Christians  of  other  Churches.  The 
term  has  lost  its  original  significance,  and  is  now 
used  merely  as  a  name  to  distinguish  us  from 
others  ;  especially  from  other  episcopal  Churches. 

2.  The  organization  is  a  valid  Christian  Church. 

The  associations  formed  by  Mr.  Wesley  and  his 

associates  were  originally  called  societies.  They 

488 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


489 


were  designed  to  be  and  were  mere  voluntary  asso¬ 
ciations  of  persons  for  mutual  improvement  in  ex¬ 
perimental  and  practical  godliness.  They  were  not 
designed  to  affect,  and  did  not  at  first  at  all  affect, 
Church  relations.  Their  members  were  all  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Church  of  England  ;  they  attended  its 
regular  services,  and  received  the  sacraments  at 
its  altars  ;  the  meetings  of  the  societies  were  *not 
held  in  Church  hours.  Mr.  Wesley  himself  con¬ 
tinued  during  life  a  regular  presbyter  in  the  estab¬ 
lished  Church.  The  same  state  of  things  arose 
in  America  and  continued  during  the  existence  of 
the  colonial  government.  Soon  after  the  close  of 
the  Revolutionary  War  most  of  the  clergymen 
of  the  establishment,  many  of  whom  were  Tories, 
left  the  country  and  returned  to  England.  This 
left  the  people  without  the  sacraments,  and  the 
Methodist  societies  demanded,  even  clamorously, 
that  their  preachers  should  assume  the  office  of 
elders,  and  administer  to  them  the  sacraments. 
The  preachers  did  not  think  themselves  authorized 
so  to  do,  and  appealed  to  Mr.  Wesley  for  relief. 
He,  as  he  said,  regarded  the  Methodist  societies 
of  America  as  sheep  in  the  wilderness,  without  a 
shepherd,  and  felt  himself  providentially  called 
upon  to  make  such  provisions  as  that  these  shep¬ 
herdless  sheep  might  have  pastoral  care ;  might 
receive  the  sacrament  of  the  Lord’s-supper,  and 
consecrate  their  children  to  God  in  Christian  bap- 


490 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


tism.  Accordingly  he  ordained  Dr.  Coke  a  pres¬ 
byter  of  the  Church  of  England,  giving  him 
authority  to  exercise  the  office  of  a  bishop,  call¬ 
ing  him  a  superintendent,  which  is  only  another 
name  for  the  same  thing.  He  sent  him  to  America, 
directing  him  to  ordain  Francis  Asbury  to  the 
same  episcopal  office.  These  two,  Dr.  Coke  and 
Francis  Asbury,  were  to  have  a  general  superin¬ 
tendency  of  all  the  Methodist  societies  in  America; 
were  to  travel  at  large  through  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  land,  and  ordain  elders  wherever 
suitable  candidates  could  be  found  whose  services 
as  presbyters  were  required  by  the  exigencies  of 
the  people.  Mr.  Wesley  prepared  a  form  of  dis¬ 
cipline  for  the  use  of  the  people  called  Methodists, 
in  America,  which  discipline  contained  articles 
of  religion,  general  rules  of  society,  and  a  ritual 
for  ordination  and  other  services  of  the  Church. 
The  preachers  of  America,  in  General  Conference 
assembled,  received  Dr.  Coke  in  his  office  as  a 
bishop;  they  elected  Francis  Asbury  to  the  same 
office,  and  he,  according  to  Mr.  Wesley’s  direc¬ 
tions,  was  ordained  as  a  bishop  in  the  Church. 
The  conference  adopted  the  discipline  as  their  con¬ 
stitutional  and  statute  law,  and  thus  became  a 
regularly  and  fully  organized  Christian  Church. 
The  Methodists  of  America  were  no  longer  a  mere 
aggregation  of  societies,  organized  within  the  pale 
of  the  English  Church,  but  were  themselves  a 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY.  49 1 

properly  constituted  evangelic  Church  of  God. 
The  General  Conference,  at  first  an  assembly  com¬ 
posed  of  all  preachers  who  chose  to  attend,  soon 
became  a  delegated  body,  composed  of  representa¬ 
tives  elected  by  the  several  annual  conferences. 
The  book  of  discipline  adopted  has,  subject  to 
quadrennial  revision  by  the  General  Conference, 
remained  the  law  of  the  Church  until  the  present. 
The  assemblies  of  the  people,  from  then  until 
now,  have  been  “  congregations  of  faithful  men,  in 
which  the  pure  Word  of  God  has  been  preached 
and  the  sacraments  duly  administered  according  to 
Christ’s  ordinance  in  all  those  things  that  of  neces¬ 
sity  are  requisite  to  the  same.”  The  Methodist 
societies  of  America,  in  General  Conference  assem¬ 
bled,  by  their  adoption  of  the  Discipline  as  their 
constitutional  and  statute  laws,  and  by  their  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  Dr.  Coke  in  his  office,  as  their  bishop, 
became  a  visible  Church  of  Christ. 

3.  The  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  as  its 
name  indicates,  is  an  episcopal  Church — not  a  con¬ 
gregational  Church  nor  a  presbyterian  Church, 
but  a  true  and  valid  episcopal  Church.  Its  bishops 
have  been  set  apart  by  three  distinct  elections 
and  ordinations  ;  they  were  first  elected  and  or¬ 
dained  to  the  office  of  a  deacon  in  the  Church  ; 
then  they  were  elected  and  ordained  to  the  office 
of  an  elder ;  and  then  they  were  as  distinctly 
elected  and  ordained  to  the  office  of  a  bishop  in 


492 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


the  Church  of  God  ;  and  neither  of  these  services 
was  unmeaning ;  they  were  not  empty  ceremonies, 
but  each  was  significant  of  power  and  authority 
conferred,  and  each  successive  ordination  conferred 
what  did  not  belong  to  that  which  preceded  it. 

The  power  of  ordination  and  the  right  to  sta¬ 
tion  the  pastors  belong  exclusively  to  the  bishops. 
Now,  the  act  by  which  a  minister  is  ordained  is 
that  which  confers  the  right  to  administer  the  ordi¬ 
nances  ;  and  the  act  by  which  a  given  man  is  made 
the  pastor  of  a  given  people  is  that  which  gives 
existence  to  a  pastorate.  The  bishop,  then,  has 
sole  power  to  do  two  things,  without  which  a 
Christian  Church  can  not  exist.  May  it  not  be 
said  that  such  a  Church  is  founded  upon  episcopal 
authority  ?  that  it  is  essentially  episcopalian  ?  It 
is  not  pertinent  here  to  inquire  how  the  bishops 
came  by  their  power — this  is  not  now  the  ques¬ 
tion  ;  we  are  looking  at  the  thing  as  it  is.  Look¬ 
ing  at  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  as  it  is,  we 
affirm,  for  the  reasons  above  given,  that  it  is 
essentially  and  fundamentally  an  episcopal  Church, 
without  the  discount  of  any  thing  essential  to  a 
government  by  bishops,  and  without  any  leanings 
towards  any  thing  else.  There  are  three  distinct 
classes  of  ministers,  as  distinct  as  any  three  corre¬ 
sponding  classes  in  any  episcopal  Church  that  ever 
was.  If  we  must  use  the  word  order,  and  may 
say  we  have  two  orders  in  our  ministry,  we  must, 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


493 


tor  a  stronger  reason,  say  we  have  three  orders  ; 
tor  the  episcopacy  is  differentiated  from  the  elder¬ 
ship  by  an  incomparably  greater  difference  than 
the  eldership  is  from  the  diaconate. 

Again,  while  the  pastoral  jurisdiction  of  each 
elder  and  each  deacon  is  limited  to  a  given  lo 
cality,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  episcopacy  has  no 
geographical  boundaries.  Mr.  Wesley  said,  “the 
world  is  my  parish  but  a  bishop  of  the  Meth¬ 
odist  Episcopal  Church  can  say  that  in  a  sense 
more  practically  demonstrable  than  could  Mr. 
Wesley  himself;  to  complete  an  episcopal  visita¬ 
tion  literally  requires  a  circumnavigation  of  the 
globe.  Again,  the  characteristic  which,  more  than 
any  other,  has  always  been  considered  as  distin¬ 
guishing  episcopacy  from  presbyterianism  is,  that, 
according  to  the  latter,  presbyters  have  no  supe¬ 
riors,  and  are  not  subject  to  supervision  ;  all  min¬ 
isters  are  pastor es  gregis  ;  none  are  pastores  pcisto- 
rum ;  while,  according  to  episcopacy,  bishops  have 
a  supervision  of  the  pastors.  Now  it  is  patent 
that  the  functions  of  a  Methodist  bishop  pertain 
almost  entirely  to  a  supervision  of  the  pastor¬ 
ate.  Bishops  have  almost  nothing  to  do  with  the 
people ;  indeed,  nothing  at  all  directly.  It  is 
sometimes  said  that  the  right  of  ordination  per¬ 
tains  to  the  presbytery,  and  that  the  episcopacy 
are  invested  therewith  by  such  a  voluntary  sur¬ 
render  as  that  bishops  are  only  agents  or  officers 


494 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


of  the  presbytery  ;  so  that  what  the  bishops  do  is 
ipso  facto  done  by  the  presbytery  itself.  In  like  man¬ 
ner,  and  for  a  more  obvious  reason,  it  might  be  said 
that  the  right  to  choose  his  field  of  labor  belongs  to 
the  individual  minister,  and  that  the  Methodist  itin¬ 
erant  has  surrendered  that  right  to  the  episcopacy 
in  such  a  way  that  the  bishop  is  his  agent  in  mak¬ 
ing  his  appointment ;  so  that  in  truth  he  appoints 
himself.  And  so,  also,  it  may  be  said  the  people 
have  a  natural  right  to  select  their  own  pastors, 
but  have  so  surrendered  that  right  as  that  they 
do  through  the  bishops  make  their  own  selections 
and  receive  pastors  of  their  own  appointment. 

This  idea,  that  the  bishop  is  the  agent  or  officer 
of  the  presbytery,  and  only  that,  is  sometimes  de¬ 
fended  by  the  affirmation  that  ordination  pertains 
to  the  presbytery  in  such  a  sense  as  that  the 
presbytery  has  no  right  to  divest  itself  of  it. 
Hence,  though  it  may  delegate  this  power  for  a 
purpose  and  a  time,  it  may  not  so  alienate  the 
power  from  itself  as  that  it  might  not  have  con¬ 
stant  control  over  it,  and  at  any  time  resume  it. 
That  the  presbytery  has  no  right  to  alienate  the 
right  of  ordination  from  itself  seems  to  be  consid- 
ered  by  a  class  of  writers  on  ecclesiastical  polity 
as  axiomatical,  or,  if  not  so,  as  a  proposition  to  be 
admitted  without  controversy.  For  what  reason 
this  doctrine  is  so  considered  is  not  at  all  obvious 
to  the  present  writer.  Certainly,  if  this  be  so  the 


METHODIST  CHU.RCH  POLITY.  495 

• 

Methodist  Episcopal  Church  is  in  a  hopeless  con¬ 
dition  of  non-churchism ;  for,  by  the  unanimous 
consent  of  all  its  presbytery,  the  episcopacy  have 
had,  and  for  a  century  have  exercised,  the  right 
of  ordination  exclusively.  And  as  to  the  idea  of  a 
possible  resumption  of  that  power  by  the  presby¬ 
tery,  it  is  evidently  simply  silly  to  make  the  sup¬ 
position.  The  right  of  ordination  and  the  power 
to  station  the  pastors  could  not  be  taken  from  the 
episcopacy  without  a  revolution  ;  and  if  they  were 
taken  the  resultant  would  be  certainly  not  what 
the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  is  and  always  has 
been  in  fact,  nor  would  it  be  what  the  Church  is 
and  has  been  in  theory ;  it  would  be  entirely  an¬ 
other  thing,  both  in  fact  and  in  theory. 

As  we  understand  the  case,  the  reason  why 
Methodist  writers  have  so  generally  denominated 
our  polity  presbyterian  and  not  episcopalian,  the 
reason  why  they  affirm  that  we  have  two  orders  of 
ministers  and  not  three,  why  they  affirm  that  our 
bishops  are  primi  inter  pares  and  not  ministers  of 
a  higher  grade,  is  because  they  have  seen  no  other 
way  to  avert  the  papistic  sneer  that  high -episco¬ 
palians  have  been  wont  to  cast  upon  us.  Putting 
on  airs,  they  have  been  accustomed  to  say  to  us, 
You  episcopalians  !  whence  came  your  orders  ? 
Mr.  Wesley  was  only  a  presbyter — how  could  he 
confer  what  he  did  not  himself  possess  ?  The 
true  reply  to  such  a  contemptuous  sneer  is,  a  bold 


496 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


and  confident  affirmation:  Yes,  sir;  we  are  epis¬ 
copalians,  as  true  and  valid  as  the  sun  ever  shone 
upon.  You  are  not  yourselves  episcopalians  in 
the  sense  you  claim,  in  the  sense  of  a  divine  right ; 
for  there  are  none  such.  Your  apostolic  succes¬ 
sion  is  broken  at  so  many  points  that  it  is  no  suc¬ 
cession  at  all.  Mr.  Wesley  ordained  Dr.  Coke 
for  the  same  reason  that  St.  Paul  ordained  Timo¬ 
thy,  for  the  reason  that  in  his  judgment  he  was 
providentially  called  thereto — providential  circum¬ 
stances  plainly  indicating  that  the  efficiency  of  the 
Church  in  propagating  the  Gospel  of  the  Son  of 
God  would  thereby  be  promoted,  as  was  not  pos¬ 
sible  by  any  other  known  procedure.  The  validity 
of  Dr.  Coke’s  ordination  is  not  derived  from  Mr. 
Wesley’s  prerogatives  as  a  presbyter  in  the 
Church  of  England,  but  from  his  authority  as 
founder  of  the  Methodist  Church.  No  pope,  pa¬ 
triarch,  bishop,  archbishop,  or  apostle  ever  or¬ 
dained  a  minister  wfith  clearer  evidence  that  the 
thing  was  right  and  proper,  and  that  therefore 
it  might  be  reasonably  inferred  that  it  was  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  the  will  of  God,  than  Mr.  Wesley 
had  that  the  ordination  of  Dr.  Coke  by  the  impo¬ 
sition  of  his  hands  was  divinely  approved. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  Mr.  Wesley  did  not 
intend  to  authorize  the  establishment  of  an  epis¬ 
copal  Church  when  he  gave  the  societies  in  Amer¬ 
ica  a  superintendent  and  a  form  of  discipline,  and 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


497 


the  proof  alleged  is,  that  he  called  Dr.  Coke  and 
Mr.  Asbury  superintendents,  and  rebuked  them 
for  allowing  themselves  to  be  called  bishops.  To 
any  one  conversant  with  the  facts  this  is  too  feeble 
to  bear  repetition,  and  is  entirely  undeserving  of 
reply.  The  facts  are  :  Mr.  Wesley  was  by  educa¬ 
tion  a  high-churchman.  The  reading  of  Stilling- 
fleet’s  “  Irenicum”  cured  him  of  that  folly;  but,  as 
he  himself  said,  he  believed  that  an  episcopal  form 
of  government,  though  not  divinely  required,  is 
the  best  form  known  among  men,  and  nearest  to 
the  New  Testament  model.  He  intended  to  give, 
and  did  give,  that  form  to  his  societies  in  America. 
He  avoided  the  term  bishop,  and  rebuked  Mr. 
Asbury  for  wearing  it,  because  of  the  worldly 
pride,  pomp,  and  ostentation  with  which  that  word 
was  associated  in  English  society  ;  but  the  thing 
intended  by  the  word,  when  properly  used,  he  ap¬ 
proved,  and  he  gave  the  same  to  us  when  he 
ordained  a  bishop  for  us  and  authorized  the  organ¬ 
ization  of  our  Church. 

4.  The  supreme  power  of  the  Methodist  Epis¬ 
copal  Church  is  vested  in  the  General  Conference. 
The  General  Conference  is  the  only  legislative 
body  in  the  Church ;  it  has  full  power  to  make 
rules  and  regulations,  under  six  restrictions. 

These  restrictive  rules  constitute  the  constitu¬ 
tional  law  of  the  Church.  In  the  government  of 
the  United  States  the  Constitution  specifies  what 


49§ 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


Congress  may  do.  All  governmental  matters  not 
therein  specified  are  reserved  to  the  State  govern¬ 
ments  ;  but  in  the  government  of  the  Methodist 
Episcopal  Church  the  constitution  specifies  what 
the  General  Conference  may  not  do,  investing  the 
Conference  with  full  powers  to  do  whatever  is  not 
thus  prohibited.  These  restrictive  rules  may  be 
changed  by  the  concurrent  votes  of  two-thirds  of 
the  members  of  the  General  Conference  and  three- 
fourths.  of  all  the  members  of  the  annual  con¬ 
ferences. 

The  General  Conference  has  judiciary  functions 
in  respect  to  the  bishops  ;  it  may  be  an  original 
court  of  trial  in  case  a  charge  of  maladministra¬ 
tion  is  preferred  against  a  bishop  at  the  Confer¬ 
ence,  and  is  entertained  by  it.  It  is  the  court  of 
appeal  in  all  cases  where  a  bishop  has  by  the  judi¬ 
cial  conference  been  convicted  of  immorality  or  of 
improper  conduct. 

The  General  Conference  has  sole  power  to 
elect  the  bishops,  and  the  bishops  are  held  strictly 
amenable  to  this  Conference.  Their  Christian, 
moral,  and  official  character,  and  their  administra¬ 
tion,  are  quadrennially  reviewed  by  a  committee 
of  the  Conference,  consisting  of  one  delegate  from 
each  of  all  the  annual  conferences,  and  if  approved, 
on  the  recommendation  of  said  committee,  the 
character  of  the  bishop  is  passed  by  a  vote  of 
the  Conference.  A  more  strict  surveillance,  a 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


499 


more  rigid  accountability,  is  scarcely  possible  in 
human  affairs. 

The  General  Conference  fixes  the  boundaries 
of  the  annual  conferences,  and  prescribes  the  func¬ 
tions  of  the  judicial,  the  annual,  and  the  quarterly 
conferences.  Indeed,  by  its  “  full  powers  to  make 
rules  and  regulations  for  our  Church,”  it  may  be 
said  to  prescribe  the  rights  and  duties  of  all  its 
constituents,  of  all  the  ministers  and  members  of 
the  Church,  from  senior  bishop  to  youngest  layman. 

5.  The  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  is  not  an 
aggregate  of  integers,  but  is  itself  an  integer,  a 
unit.  This  is  a  natural  corollary  from  what  has 
just  been  said  of  the  powers  and  functions  of  the 
General  Conference.  The  bishops,  editors,  agents, 
and  secretaries  elected  by  the  General  Conference 
are  officers  of  the  whole  Church,  their  jurisdiction 
applying  as  perfectly  at  every  point  as  at  any 
point.  The  whole  organization  is  so  perfectly 
unified  in  the  powers  and  functions  of  the  Gen¬ 
eral  Conference  that,  by  a  not  very  wide  latitude 
of  expression,  it  may  be  said  that  every  individual 
member  of  the  Church  is  a  member  of  the  one 
whole,  rather  than  of  the  local  so-called  Church 
where  his  name  is  recorded,  which  so-called  local 
Church  is  itself  a  fractional  part  of  a  whole,  and 
not  an  integer.  By  the  constitution,  nature,  and 
polity  of  the  organization  the  connectional  princi¬ 
ple  extends  to  all  that  pertains  to  it. 


I 


500 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


6.  To  what  form  of  civil  government  does  the 
polity  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  most 
nearly  conform  ? 

(1)  Civil  governments  are  sustained  by  phys¬ 
ical  force ;  the  army  and  the  navy  are  always  ready 
to  enforce  its  decrees.  Ecclesiastical  governments 
are  sustained  only  by  the  moral  force  of  persua¬ 
sion.  Christ’s  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world  ;  his 
servants  do  not  fight.  This  difference  is  so  funda¬ 
mental,  and  so  modifies  the  parts  and  the  whole  of 
both,  that  comparisons  are  well-nigh  impossible. 

(2)  The  Church,  in  its  beginnings,  is  every¬ 
where  missionary.  The  minister  calls  the  people  ; 
he  goes  into  the  territory  of  an  enemy ;  he  pro¬ 
poses  to  them  a  system  of  doctrines  and  duties, 
and  it  is  by  their  acceptance  of  what  he  proposes 
that  they  become  members  of  the  Church.  All 
governmental  powers  are,  by  the  head  of  the 
Church  for  the  time  being,  vested  in  the  mission¬ 
ary  ;  and  these  powers  are  transmitted  from  the 
ministry  to  the  laity  as  the  latter  advance  in 
Christian  culture,  and  themselves  become  co¬ 
workers  together  with  him  in  the  work  of  God. 
By  the  nature  of  the  case,  then,  the  Church  com¬ 
mences  in  an  absolute  monarchy  ;  and  from  that  is 
transformed  to  a  representative  republic  as  its 
condition  and  circumstances  allow  of  such  trans¬ 
formation.  Power  is  originally  vested  in  the  high¬ 
est  court,  and  descends  from  that  to  the  lower ; 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY.  50 1 

but  when  maturity  is  reached  the  current  is  re¬ 
versed.  A  pure  democracy  could  never  originate 
a  Christian  Church.  Men  must  first  be  converted 
by  the  preaching  of  the  Gospel  before  they  will 
organize  a  Church,  elect  and  ordain  a  minister. 

(3)  The  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  as  it  now 
exists  in  these  United  States,  conforms  as  near  to 
a  republic  as  the  nature  of  the  case  allows.  Our 
episcopacy  exercise  powers  that  are  essential  to 
the  existence  of  a  Church  ;  and  it  may  therefore 
be  said — it  is  said  by  our  enemies — that  our  gov¬ 
ernment  is  a  pure  aristocracy,  or  at  least  is  aris¬ 
tocratic.  We  reply,  The  episcopacy  derives  its 
powers  from  the  General  Conference,  and  is 
strictly  amenable  to  it.  Our  government  there¬ 
fore,  though  episcopalian,  is  not  so  by  the  episco¬ 
pacy  as  to  constitute  an  aristocracy.  The  General 
Conference  is  itself  a  representative  body.  All  its 
voting  members  are  elected  for  one  session  only. 
With  the  final  adjournment  of  each  session  the 
Conference  itself  dies,  and  its  successor  is  a  body 
newly  elected  by  its  constituents.  The  Confer¬ 
ence  is  in  no  sense  a  close  corporation,  and  its 
members  are  in  no  sense  a  governing  class.  Of 
course,  no  one  will  say  that  our  government  is  a 
monarchy  ;  no  man  of  good  sense  will  say  that  it, 
or  any  other  government ,  is  a  pure  democracy.  A 
pure  democracy  is  the  equivalent  of  anarchy.  If 
our  polity  is  not  aristocratic,  to  what,  then,  may  it 


502 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


be  likened  but  to  a  republic  ?  It  is  that  nearly. 
If  class-leaders  were  elected  by  the  classes  and 
stewards  were  elected  by  the  societies,  as  trustees 
are  elected,  representation  would  be  well-nigh  com¬ 
plete.  The  leaders,  stewards,  trustees,  and  Sab¬ 
bath-school  superintendents,  all  laymen,  make  a 
large  majority  of  the  quarterly  conference.  By 
them  license  to  preach  is  first  granted  ;  candidates 
for  admission  into  the  annual  conference  are  recom¬ 
mended  by  them.  No  man  can  be  authorized  as  a 
minister  in  the  Church  without  a  vote  of  the  laity. 
The  annual  conference,  then  —  not  by  a  perfect 
representation  ;  that,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  is 
impossible  —  does  represent  the  quarterly  confer¬ 
ence,  and  through  them  the  people.  The  General 
Conference  is  purely  and  perfectly  a  representative 
body,  directly  representing  by  elected  delegates 
both  the  ministry  and  the  laity. 

7.  The  jurisprudence  of  the  Methodist  Epis¬ 
copal  Church.  This  may  be  judged  of,  and  its 
application  understood,  by  simply  considering  its 
fundamental  principle.  With  one  single  exception 
every  member  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church 
is,  by  constitutional  provision,  entitled,  when  ac¬ 
cused,  to  a  trial  by  a  committee  composed  of  his 
peers,  and  to  an  appeal.  The  exception  referred 
to  is  when  a  complaint  is  made  to  the  General 
Conference  against  a  bishop  for  maladministration, 
and  is  sustained.  The  original  accusation  being 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


503 


made  in,  and  sustained  by,  the  highest  court  in 
the  Church,  no  appeal  is  possible.  A  private 
member,  if  accused,  must  be  tried  first  by  a 
committee  composed  of  laymen,  and  if  convicted 
may  appeal  to  the  quarterly  conference.  A  local 
preacher  is  tried  by  the  quarterly  conference,  and 
may  appeal  to  the  annual  conference.  A  trav¬ 
eling  preacher  is  tried  by  a  committee  of  traveling 
preachers,  members  of  his  own  conference,  and 
if  convicted,  he  may  appeal  to  the  judicial  confer¬ 
ence.  Bishops,  when  accused  of  immorality  or  im¬ 
propriety  are  tried  by  a  judicial  conference,  and  if 
convicted  may  appeal  to  the  General  Conference. 

OBJECTIONS. 

Papists  and  High-churchmen  object  to  the 
Methodist  episcopacy  that  it  is  not  in  the  regular 
apostolic  succession,  and  therefore  not  by  divine 
right,  and  therefore  not  valid.  Those  Presbyte¬ 
rians  and  Congregationalists,  who  believe  that 
their  form  is  the  New  Testament  form,  and  that 
Christ  and  the  apostles  have,  in  the  New  Testa¬ 
ment,  signified  their  intent  that  that  form  should 
be  perpetuated  in  the  Church,  object  that  our 
government  contravenes  the  revealed  will  of  God. 
These  objections  have  been  sufficiently  answered 
above.  The  most  common  objection,  however, 
and  that  in  which  declaimers  are  wont  to  indulge 
most  profusely,  is,  that  an  episcopal  form  of  gov- 


504 


ECCLESI0L0GY. 


ernment  exalts  the  clergy,  and  gives  them  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  lord  it  over  God’s  heritage,  and  that  it 
minifies  the  laity,  oppresses  them  and  deprives 
them  of  their  rights.  That  an  episcopacy  does 
give  to  the  officers  of  the  Church  rights  and  pre¬ 
rogatives  is  true ;  and  the  same  thing  is  true 
of  any  government  that  is  a  government ;  without 
prerogatives  in  the  ministry  a  Church  can  not 
exist.  But  when  it  is  said  that  the  ministers  of 
the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  lord  it  over  God’s 
heritage,  or  that  the  membership  of  that  Church 
are  oppressed  and  deprived  of  their  rights,  a  state¬ 
ment  is  made  concerning  facts  that  the  facts  them¬ 
selves  do  not  sustain. 

That  for  a  century  episcopal  power  has  been 
exercised  among  us  without  the  occurrence  of  cor¬ 
ruption  or  the  abuse  of  power  is  sufficient  proof 
that  our  episcopacy  is  properly  guarded,  that 
efficient  and  adequate  checks  are  in  operation. 
This  last  objection  is  sometimes  formulated  on  this 
wise  :  The  government  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church  is  not  in  harmony  with,  but  is  antagonistic 
to,  the  civil  institutions  of  our  country — it  is  not 
democratic  but  aristocratic,  and  tends  towards  Pa¬ 
pacy  and  an  absolute  monarchy.  This  objection 
has  been  answered  just  above,  but  we  answer, 
further,  by  confidently  affirming  that  no  Church 
polity  in  our  land  conforms  more  perfectly  to  the 
institutions  of  our  country  than  does  that  of  the 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


505 


Methodist  Episcopal  Church.  We  leave  those 
who  entertain  the  objection  to  make  the  compari¬ 
sons  for  themselves,  and  leave  with  them  whatever 
advantage  they  may  think  they  derive  from  so 
doing.  With  us  the  affirmation  we  make  is  ob¬ 
vious,  and  does  not  require  specific  vindication. 

THE  ITINERANCY. 

We  have  seen  that  the  chief  and  distinguishing 
functions  of  the  episcopal  office  are  the  ordination 
of  ministers  and  their  assignment  to  their  fields 
of  labor.  These  duties  require  that  the  bishops 
travel  through  the  whole  connection  ;  they  preside 
in  the  annual  conferences  and  exercise  a  general 
supervision  over  all  the  interests  of  the  Church. 
We  have  seen  that  by  their  office  the  Church  is 
unified  and  the  connectional  principle  sustained. 
But  our  theory  of  Church  government  allows  that 
ordinations  might  be  by  the  presbytery,  and  it  is 
obvious  that  the  unity  of  the  Church  has  an  ade¬ 
quate  exponent  and  support  in  the  General  Con¬ 
ference.  The  practical  utility  of  an  episcopacy  and 
the  chief  argument  for  it  is  found,  then,  in  the  fact 
that  it  is  the  most  efficient,  most  economical,  and 
most  satisfactory  method  of  effecting  the  annual 
changes  required  by  our  system  of  itinerancy. 
But,  it  is  asked,  why  this  system  ?  for  what  reasons 
has  it  been  adopted,  and  why  is  it  so  persistently 
perpetuated  ?  A  system  that  requires  for  its  per- 


5°6 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


petuity  a  power  so  ponderous  as  is  the  episcopal 
power,  and  one  that  may  become  so  perilous,  must 
be  sustained,  if  at  all,  by  very  weighty  arguments. 
We  reply,  an  intinerant  ministry  was  not  at  first 
the  result  of  a  plan  first  proposed  and  then  exe¬ 
cuted,  but  like  every  other  peculiarity  of  Meth¬ 
odism  it  arose  out  of  the  necessities  and  exigencies 
of  the  times.  Mr.  Wesley  and  his  assistants  at 
first  in  England,  and  afterwards,  more  especially 
in  America,  were  evangelists.  They  felt  that  a 
dispensation  of  the  Gospel  had  been  committed 
unto  them,  and  they  could  not  do  otherwise  with  a 
good  conscience  before  God  than  go  from  city  to 
city,  from  place  to  place,  and  preach  the  Gospel 
unto  the  people.  The  special  circumstances  of 
their  entire  field  in  America,  the  sparse  popula¬ 
tion,  the  pioneer  condition  of  society,  rendered  it 
impossible  for  them  to  reach  the  people  by  any 
other  means  than  by  an  itinerant  ministry.  Thus 
the  institution  arose — it  was  wondrously  success¬ 
ful,  and  has,  up  to  our  times,  been  evidently 
blessed  of  God.  Our  argument  for  an  itinerant 
ministry,  then,  in  brief,  is  that  it  originated  in  a 
providential  necessity,  and  has  been,  through  all 
our  history,  eminently  approved  and  blessed  by 
the  great  Head  of  the  Church.  We  should  not 
feel  at  liberty  to  abandon  the  system  if  we  desired 
so  to  do,  without  the  clearest  evidence  that  it  was 
God’s  will  it  should  be  so  abandoned.  It  must  be 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY.  50 7 

conceded,  for  it  is  obvious  that  when  the  Gospel 
is  introduced  into  new  territories  the  missionary 
must  call  the  people,  he  must  to  some  extent  be  a 
traveling  minister,  and  when  a  minister  labors  in  a 
district  sparsely  populated  his  parish  must  have 
large  geographical  dimensions,  so  that  the  Meth¬ 
odist  circuit  system,  or  something  like  it,  is  a 
necessity.  But  the  queries  of  the  objector  have 
respect  to  the  expediency  of  changing  ministers 
from  one  field  of  labor  to  another.  Why  not  allow 
the  missionary  to  continue  his  missionary  work  till 
he  has  created  a  fixed  parish,  and  then  allow  him 
to  continue  therein  during  life?  Why  may  not 
the  pastoral  relation,  when  established  between  a 
given  pastor  and  his  people,  be  a  permanent  rela¬ 
tion  ?  The  advantages  accruing  from  a  frequent 
change  of  pastors  are  several.  1.  Every  parish 
sufficiently  large  to  sustain  the  stated  means  of 
grace  contains  a  great  diversity  of  character ; 
men  differ  largely  in  constitutional  temperaments, 
in  educational  predilections,  in  habits  of  thought, 
in  classes  of  opinions,  and  these  differences  exist 
in  every  congregation.  No  one  man  can  be  an 
apostle  to  all  these  different  classes  of  persons. 
In  a  pastorate  of  fifty  years  not  more  two  or  three 
extensive  revivals  of  religion  will  be  likely  to 
occur — one  soon  after  the  pastor  is  installed,  and 
the  next  one  after  another  generation  have  arrived 
at  maturity.  By  a  frequent  change  of  pastors  all 


< 


1 


508 


ECCLESIOLOGY. 


classes  of  persons  in  the  congregation  stand  a 
better  chance  to  be  appealed  to  by  one  adapted  to 
reach  and  persuade  them.  2.  By  a  change  of 
pastors  the  talents  in  the  ministry  are  more  widely 
disseminated,  more  equally  distributed,  and  the 
brighter  lights  of  the  Church  cast  their  effulgence 
over  a  larger  area  of  mind.  3.  A  larger  num¬ 
ber  of  laborers  may  be  employed  in  the  vine¬ 
yard  by  a  changing  than  by  a  permanent  pastorate. 
Men  whose  natural  endowments  and  learned  ac¬ 
quirements  are  entirely  inadequate  to  a  successful 
pastorate  of  long  duration  may  be  as  useful  for  a 
short  period  of  time  as  any  others.  4.  A11  in¬ 
tensity  of  feeling  and  a  degree  of  interest  in  re¬ 
ligion  and  in  the  services  of  the  Church  may  be 
maintained  by  a  diversity  of  talent  in  the  pulpit 
that  is  impossible  through  the  labors  of  a  stated 
ministry.  Men  are  naturally  insensible  to  that 
with  which  they  are  familiar.  To  arouse  attention 
and  excite  emotion,  something  new  is  required. 
The  old  may  satisfy  the  intellect,  it  indeed  gratifies 
a  natural  love  of  the  permanent,  but  it  seldom 
rouses  the  slumbering,  stirs  the  inactive,  or  awak¬ 
ens  the  indifferent. 


OBJECTION. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  evangelists  awaken 
emotion  ;  but  it  requires  a  pastorate  of  years  to 
discipline  the  people  in  sound  doctrine,  and  hence 


METHODIST  CHURCH  POLITY. 


509 


a  changing  ministry  can  not  produce  those  higher 
and  more  excellent  forms  of  Christian  life  and 
character  which  are  founded  upon  a  broad  and  in¬ 
telligent  apprehension  of  Christian  doctrine.  We 
reply,  by  what  does  the  successful  evangelist 
awaken  emotion,  if  not  by  an  impressive  pres¬ 
entation  of  the  doctrines  of  religion  ?  Who  has 
the  most  perfect  apprehension  of  divine  truth,  he 
that  is  unaffected  by  it,  or  he  that  is  stirred  to  the 
depths  of  consciousness  and  moved  to  fervency  of 
spirit  and  resistless  activity?  The  idea  that  a 
staid,  uniform,  settled  state  of  things  is  better  for 
religion  than  a  state  of  excitement  is  not  well 
founded.  The  stable  and  the  permanent  is  a 
good,  if  it  be  a  good  that  is  permanent ;  but  in 
religious  matters  uniformity  is  possibly  the  product 
of  indifference. 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  III. 


FIGURES  REFER  TO  PAGES. 


AbrAHAMIC  covenant,  278. 

Adoption  recognized  in  baptism, 
280. 

Apostles,  assistant  — appointment 
of,  433;  office  of — expired  at 
their  death,  446. 

Baptism,  its  nature — a  sign  of  re¬ 
generation,  275  ;  a  recognition  of 
justification,  277 ;  of  adoption, 
280;  a  profession  of  faith,  281; 
a  recognition  of  covenant  obliga¬ 
tions,  282  ;  a  means  of  grace,  283  ; 
an  act  of  obedience,  284. 

Baptism,  its  efficacy — not  ex  opere 
operato  nor  ex  opere  operantis ,  but 
supernatural,  286. 

Baptism,  its  validity,  287. 

Baptism,  subjects  of — infants  proper 
subjects  because  they  are  entitled 
to  that  which  it  represents,  289; 
not  that  infants  are  regenerated, 
but  that  they  are  entitled  to  be 
regenerated,  292 ;  baptism  some¬ 
times  reflexive,  and  may  be  an¬ 
ticipatory,  293  ;  regeneration  not 
a  sine  qua  non  prerequisite,  294 ; 
the  apostles  baptized  persons 
whose  status  as  to  the  new  birth 
they  could  not  know,  294 ;  chil¬ 
dren  are  born  into  the  civil, 
ecclesiastical,  and  social  status  of 
their  parents,  297;  Christian  Jews 


did  not  complain  that  their  chil¬ 
dren  were  deprived  of  natural 
rights,  298  ;  the  apostles  probably 
baptized  infants,  298;  infant  bap¬ 
tism  at  no  time  an  innovation, 
299 ;  whose  children  may  be  bap¬ 
tized,  301. 

Baptism,  mode  of — does  the  valid¬ 
ity  of  baptism  depend  upon  its 
mode?  303  ;  no  excuse  for  exclu¬ 
siveness  in  such  a  matter,  305  ; 
how  much  must  be  conceded  to 
immersionists,  306 ;  was  the  apos¬ 
tles’  practice  uniform  ?  307  ;  did 
the  apostles  immerse  ?  308 ;  sig¬ 
nification  of  the  word  baptize, 
309;  classical  usage;  310;  use  of 
the  word  in  the  Septuagint,  3 1 2  ; 
New  Testament  use,  314 ;  John’s 
baptism,  314;  accordant  with 
Jewish  practice,  316;  the  Jews 
never  practiced  immersion,  317; 
John  could  not  immerse  the  mul¬ 
titude  he  baptized,  319;  com¬ 
pares  his  baptism  with  that  by 
the  Holy  Ghost,  320;  why  in 
Jordan,  321;  “going  down  into 
the  water,”  322  ;  pentecostal 
baptism,  324 ;  baptism  of  the 
eunuch,  329;  “buried  in  bap¬ 
tism,”  331;  baptism  of  suffer- 
ing,  333;  “unto  Moses  in  the 
cloud,”  334 ;  “  diverse  washings,” 

511 


512 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  III. 


334;  of  cups,  etc.,  335;  of  Cor¬ 
nelius,  337;  “vesture  clipped  in 
blood,”  337;  the  promise  of  the 
Spirit  and  its  fulfillment,  338; 
post-apostolic  practice,  338;  con¬ 
clusion,  341. 

Benevolence,  duties  of,  151- 

Bishop  and  elder  terms  applied  to 
the  same  office,  447. 

Celibacy,  172. 

Character,  34,  66  ,  duties  of  benev¬ 
olence  as  to,  154. 

Church — term  defined,  233  ;  a  divine 
institution,  237  ;  must  be  organ¬ 
ized  according  to  the  divine  will, 
240. 

Church,  polity  of — the  ministry  a 
divine  institution,  373;  the  pa¬ 
triarchal,  Aaronic,  and  Levitical 
priesthoods,  374;  the  prophets, 
375;  the  apostles  divinely  called, 
376;  call  of  the  seventy,  378; 
the  ministerial  call  personal,  379  ; 
nature  of  the  call,  380;  super¬ 
natural,  382;  objections,  383  ;  the 
Quaker  theory,  383  ;  not  perpet¬ 
ual,  384,  Scripture  testimony  re¬ 
specting  the  perpetuity  of  the 
ministry,  386  ;  an  oppressive  hie¬ 
rarchy,  387;  call  to  the  minis¬ 
try — in  what  does  it  consist?  a 
conviction  of  duty,  389 ;  genesis 
of  the  conviction,  390;  approba¬ 
tion  and  authority  of  the  Church, 
394.  See  Ministry. 

Circumcision  a  sign  of  regenera¬ 
tion,  275. 

Confirmation,  261. 

Congregationalism,  404,  481. 

Conscience — defined,  37;  functions, 
40 ;  discriminating,  41  ;  impul¬ 
sive,  44 ;  retributive,  46  ;  exist¬ 


ence  of,  48;  doctrine  of  a  natural 
conscience,  50;  authority  of,  53  ; 
defects  in  natural,  80. 

Consubstantiation,  266,  359- 

Contracts,  160. 

Covenants,  old  and  new,  278. 

Culture,  moral — method,  74;  means, 
76;  nature,  77;  providence,  78; 
revelation,  79  ;  self,  94 ;  physical 
training,  95;  mental  discipline, 
97  5  as  to  the  intellect,  99  ;  as  to 
the  sensibilities,  100;  as  to  the 
gesthetic  nature,  102 ;  as  to  the 
will,  103  ;  religious  education, 
104;  cultivation  of  a  devotional 
spirit,  201. 

Deacons,  appointment  of,  431,  455 ; 
office  not  defined,  454. 

Divorce,  173. 

Duties  to  men  as  men — as  to  their 
right  to  life,  1 14;  the  death  pen¬ 
alty  enacted  by  divine  law,  1 1 5  ; 
the  magistrate  the  executive,  116; 
defensive  war  obligatory,  1 17; 
life  may  be  taken  in  self-defense, 
1 18;  in  some  cases  for  other  pur¬ 
poses,  120;  war  without  just 
cause  a  great  crime,  1 2 1  ;  one  or 
the  other  or  both  parties  crimi¬ 
nally  responsible,  122  ;  revolu¬ 
tions,  when  justifiable,  123. 

Duties  to  men  as  men — as  to  their 
right  to  liberty,  123  ;  physical, 
intellectual,  and  religious  liberty 
defined,  124;  objections  an¬ 
swered,  127. 

Duties  to  men  as  men — as  to  their 
right  to  property,  130  ;  the  right 
to  property  founded  on  what? 
131  ;  communism,  132;  the  right 
acquired  (1)  by  the  gift  of  God, 
134 ;  (2)  by  labor,  136;  (3)  by 


INDEX  TO  VOLUM.E  Ilf. 


513 


exchange,  gift  will,  inheritance, 
accession,  and  possession,  136; 
the  right  violated  by  robbery, 
137;  burglary,  theft,  fraud,  138; 
gambling,  138;  speculation,  139; 
cheating,  141  ;  the  law  of  the 
buyer  and  seller,  142;  monopo¬ 
lies,  143  ;  the  borrower  and 
lender,  144. 

Duties  to  men  as  men — as  to  their 
right  to  reputation,  145 ;  the 
right  violated  by  suspicion,  147; 
by  evil  speaking,  14S  ;  testimony 
against  a  neighbor  for  the  ends 
of  public  justice,  for  the  protec¬ 
tion  of  the  innocent  or  the  good 
of  the  offender,  obligatory,  148. 

Duties  to  men  as  men — as  to  their 
wants,  150;  reciprocity,  150;  be¬ 
nevolence,  1 5 1 ;  law  of,  152. 

Duties  to  men  as  men—  as  to  char¬ 
acter,  154;  importance  of,  1 5 5  ; 
how  discharged,  156. 

Duties  of  veracity — truth  a  natural 
right,  157;  law  of  veracity,  158; 
truth  natural,  moral,  159;  obli¬ 
gation  refers  to  moral  truth,  159; 
law,  how  violated,  159;  contracts, 
in  what  sense  binding,  160; 
oaths,  161. 

Duties  arising  out  of  special  rela¬ 
tions — doctrine  of  rights,  162; 
rights  of  persons  and  of  things, 
163. 

Duties  of  chastity,  167 ;  law  of, 
168;  how  violated,  169. 

Duties,  domestic  —  husbands  and 
wives,  170;  matrimony,  170;  cel¬ 
ibacy,  172;  polygamy,  173;  di¬ 
vorce,  173;  parents  and  children, 
178;  masters  and  servants,  182. 

Duties,  civil — civil  government  a 
divine  institution,  184;  majorities 

33 


rule,  186  ;  the  form  discretionary, 
186;  right  of  suffrage,  187;  func¬ 
tions  of  government,  190;  duties 
of  magistrates  and  citizens,  192; 
of  employers  and  employes,  of 
principals  and  agents,  194. 

Duties  to  God,  or  piety — may  mo¬ 
rality  exist  without  piety?  198; 
piety  not  possible  without  moral¬ 
ity,  199;  cultivation  of  a  devo¬ 
tional  spirit,  201 ;  prayer,  205  ; 
what,  206;  utility  of,  207;  states 
of  mind  implied,  209  ;  form  of, 
210;  extempore  or  written,  21 1  ; 
private,  social,  and  domestic,  212  . 
the  Sabbath,  214;  made  for  man, 
216;  instituted  at  the  creation, 
217;  a  religious  institution,  217; 
monumental,  217;  for  all  peoples 
and  all  times,  218;  the  Mosaic 
Sabbath,  219;  what  was  pecu¬ 
liarly  Jewish  abrogated,  220  ;  is 
the  law  of  the  Sabbath  positive 
or  moral?  221 ;  pharisaical  exac¬ 
tions  rebuked  by  Christ,  223;  the 
first  day  of  the  week  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Sabbath,  223  ;  obligations  of 
civil  rulers  in  respect  to  the  Sab¬ 
bath,  226. 

Ends,  subordinate,  ultimate,  ana 
supreme,  34,  66. 

Episcopacy — a  natural  growth  from 
the  status  of  the  Church  in  apos¬ 
tolic  times,  465  ;  authorities,  467  ; 
officers  and  manner  of  worship  in 
the  early  Church,  468;  Church 
jurisprudence,  469 ;  remuneration 
for  services,  470;  pastors  admin¬ 
istered  government,  471  ;  metro¬ 
politan  pastors  become  bishops, 
472 ;  high-churchism,  473  ;  al¬ 
leged  proofs,  474;  Peter  and  the 


5H 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  III. 


power  of  the  keys,  475 ;  the 
claims  of  papacy  and  high- 
church  ism  preposterous,  478  ; 
moderate  episcopacy,  479 ;  pres- 
byteiianism,  480;  Congregation¬ 
alism,  4S1  ;  theory  discussed,  482  ; 
a  moderate  episcopacy  lawful  and 
expedient,  486. 

Episcopos,  447. 

Ethics — theoretical,  9;  philosoph¬ 
ical,  10;  Christian,  10;  Holy 
Scriptures  as  a  system  of,  87. 

Ethics,  practical  —  classification  of 
duties,  91. 

Evangelists,  appointment  of,  432. 

Extreme  unction,  263. 

Government,  ecclesiastical,  403  ; 
civil  government  a  divkie  institu¬ 
tion,  184;  functions  of,  190. 

Holy  Scriptures,  86;  superiority  as 
a  system  of  ethics,  87 ;  means  of 
grace,  254. 

Infants  entitled  to  baptism,  289. 

Intuition,  what,  17. 

Itinerancy  —  an  episcopal  govern¬ 
ment  for  the  sake  of  an  itinerancy, 
505 ;  successful,  and  therefore 
should  not  be  hastily  abandoned, 
506;  diversity  of  demand  in  the 
congregation  requires  diversity  of 
supply  in  the  pulpit,  507  ;  minis¬ 
terial  talent  more  widely  diffused, 
and  a  larger  supply  available,  508. 

Liberty,  124. 

Magistrates  and  citizens,  duties 
of,  192. 

Masters  and  servants,  182. 

Matrimony,  170. 


Means  of  grace  —  ordinary,  243  ; 
preaching,  243;  a  divine  power 
attends  the  Word,  244;  efficacy 
of  the  Word,  246;  the  rational¬ 
istic  theory,  250;  Augustinian, 
250;  Arminian,  252. 

Mind — one  and  indivisible,  13;  a 
faculty  of,  what,  13;  classification 
of  powers  and  faculties,  15. 

Ministers,  duties  of,  395,  420. 

Ministers,  qualifications  for,  421,426. 

Ministers,  classification  of,  427. 

Ministry,  Christian,  373  ;  call  to  the, 
379,  438. 

Ministry,  functions  of — to  preach, 
395  ;  to  define  and  enforce  duties, 
396 ;  to  administer  discipline,  397 ; 
pastoral  duties,  398. 

Ministry,  prerogatives  of — necessa¬ 
rily  exclusive,  398;  ministers  not 
mere  employes  of  the  people, 
399  ;  but  professional  agents,  400; 
they  command  their  pulpits,  401 ; 
have  prerogatives  in  administer¬ 
ing  discipline,  403 ;  who  shall 
legislate?  Roman  Catholic  and 
Congregational  theories,  404;  the 
latter  impracticable,  406  ;  the  for¬ 
mer  preposterous,  407 ;  represen¬ 
tation  indispensable,  407;  a  pure 
democracy  impossible,  408;  New 
Testament  teaching — the  appoint¬ 
ment  of  Matthias,  408;  election 
of  the  deacons,  409 ;  the  com¬ 
plaint  against  Peter,  409;  ap¬ 
pointment  of  Paul  and  Barnabas, 
410;  controversy  at  Antioch  re¬ 
specting  circumcision,  41 1  ;  accu¬ 
sation  against  Paul,  414;  all 
teach  that  no  specific  form  of 
Church  polity  existed,  415;  per 
capita  representation  impossible, 
416;  equal,  a  detriment,  416; 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  III. 


515 


the  ministry  must  have  a  balance 
of  power,  not  a  dominating  power, 
4U;  ratio  of  representation  dif¬ 
ferent,  418;  the  annihilation  of 
power  not  the  proper  method  of 
preventing  its  abuse,  419 ;  the 
interests  of  all  parties  the  same, 
419- 

Ministry,  qualifications  for,  pre¬ 
sumed  in  all  who  are  called,  421 ; 
diversities  of  gifts,  422;  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  all  qualifications  absurd, 
423;  a  culture  in  advance  of  the 
people  requisite,  425. 

Ministry  —  classification  of  duties 
and  officers,  427;  under  the  Mo¬ 
saic  law,  428 ;  under  the  New 
Testament,  428 ;  can  any  specific 
classification  claim  divine  author¬ 
ity?  429;  the  Mosaic  very  def¬ 
inite,  430;  not  so  the  New  Tes¬ 
tament,  430;  the  appointment  of 
the  deacons,  431  ;  the  synagogue 
officers,  431;  evangelists,  432; 
assistant  apostles,  433 ;  diverse 
officers,  434 ;  high-church  claims, 
435;  all  Church  members  wit¬ 
nesses  for  the  truth,  436;  minis¬ 
terial  call  special,  437;  laymen 
officers  of  the  Church,  439 ;  sec¬ 
ular  men  may  occasionally  render 
ministerial  service,  440;  no  form 
of  Church  government  prescribed, 
440 ;  Churches  organized  after 
the  model  of  the  synagogue,  441 ; 
probable,  442 ;  the  facts,  443 ; 
services  similar,  444;  Christians 
considered  a  Jewish  sect,  445; 
the  apostolic  office  ceased  at  the 
death  of  the  apostles,  446  ;  bishop 
and  elder  convertible  terms,  sig¬ 
nify  the  same  office,  447 ;  office 
of  deacon  not  defined,  454;  were 


deacons  ministers  or  laymen,  456  ; 
the  office  has  apostolic  sanction, 
is  useful,  but  not  essential  to 
validity,  458;  orders  in  the  min- 
try,  how  many?  459;  high-church 
reply,  460;  low-church,  461;  the 
term  in  Methodist  parlance,  462. 

Morality,  or  duties  to  our  fellow 
men,  107;  love  required,  107; 
defined,  108 ;  rational  love  the 
fulfilling  of  the  law,  109;  duties 
of,  classified,  112. 

Motives  —  governing  motive  and 
desultory  volition,  67. 

Natural  religion — defects  in,  80; 
theistic  methods,  82. 

Oaths,  161. 

Obligation  —  origin  of  idea,  11; 
place  of  birth,  18;  conditions, 
19;  ground,  22;  theories,  24; 
(1)  will  of  God,  24;  (2)  utility, 
28;  (3)  the  right,  30;  (4)  the 
good,  34. 

Orders  in  the  ministry,  459 ;  high- 
church  theory,  460;  low-church, 
461. 

Parents  and  children,  duties  of, 
178. 

Penalty,  the  death,  1 1 5 

Penance,  262. 

Pentecostal  baptism,  324. 

Peter  and  the  power  of  the  keys, 

475- 

Piety,  or  duties  to  God,  98. 

Polity  of  the  Church,  373.  See 
Church  Polity. 

Polity  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church — the  term  Methodist  only 
a  distinguishing  title,  488;  the 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church  a 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  III. 


5l6 

valid  Church,  488;  an  episcopal 
Church,  491  ;  three  distinct  ordi¬ 
nations,  491  ;  the  right  to  ordain 
and  station  ministers  exclusive, 
492 ;  bishops  pastores  pastorum, 
493  ;  the  right  of  ordination  not 
inalienable  in  the  presbytery, 
494;  why  do  Methodists  claim  to 
be  presbyterians?  495;  Mr.  Wes¬ 
ley  intended  to  institute  an  epis¬ 
copal  Church  in  America,  496; 
supreme  power  in  the  General 
Conference,  497  ;  functions  of  the 
General  Conference,  498 ;  the 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church  an 
integer,  499;  its  polity  conforms 
most  nearly  to  a  republic,  501 ; 
fundamental  principle  of  Meth¬ 
odist  jurisprudence,  502;  objec¬ 
tions,  503. 

Polygamy,  173. 

P%yer,  205,  255. 

Preaching,  243. 

Prerogatives  of  ministers,  398. 

Presbuteros ,  447. 

Presbyterianism,  480. 

Property,  131. 

Reciprocity,  duties  of,  151. 

Regeneration,  baptism  a  sign  of, 

275- 

Reputation,  145. 

Revelation  necessary  for  a  perfect 
system  of  ethics,  10;  for  moral 
culture,  78.  * 

Right  may  be  distinguished  from 
innocence,  59;  Dr.  Wayland’s 
distinction,  61. 

Rights  —  as  to  life,  1 14;  liberty, 
124;  property,  131;  equality  of 
rights,  150;  doctrine  of,  162;  of 
persons  and  of  things,  163 ;  of 


parents,  164;  governments,  165 
ministers,  401. 

Ritualistic  observances  essential  to 
the  visibility  of  the  Church,  256. 

Sabbath,  214. 

Sacraments  religion  has  an  exter¬ 
nal  form,  256;  if  commanded  a 
mere  ceremony  is  obligatory,  257  ; 
the  term  ambiguous,  258;  a  sign, 
a  seal,  259;  the  Roman  Catholic 
additions,  261 ;  why  two,  and 
only  two  ?  263  ;  efficacy  of,  265  ; 
Roman  theory,  transubstantia- 
tion,  265  ;  Lutheran  theory,  con- 
substantiation,  266  ;  rationalistic 
♦  theory,  reflex  influence,  269 ; 
Protestant  theory,  the  efficacy 
wholly  supernatural,  270;  neces¬ 
sity  of,  271  ;  only  necessary  as  an 
act  of  obedience,  272;  validity 
of,  273  ;  consists  in  an  intent  on 
the  part  of  participants  to  do 
what  is  commanded,  274. 

Suffrage — to  whom  does  the  right 
belong1?  187. 

Supper  of  the  Lord — Scripture  tes¬ 
timony,  343  ;  the  Methodist  Dis¬ 
cipline,  345;  observance  divinely 
required,  346  ;  nature  of — a  com¬ 
memoration,  347;  a  monument, 
348  ;  a  profession  of  faith,  349 ; 
a  sacrament,  350;  a  communion, 
351;  an  act  of  obedience,  352;  a 
eucharist,  352  ;  a  means  of  grace, 
353 ;  a  seal  to  the  Gospel  cov¬ 
enant,  356  ;  efficacy  of — doctrine 
of  real  presence,  358;  ci ex  opere 
operato ,”  “  ex  opere  operantis ,” 

360;  does  the  Supper  confer  a 
blessing?  361;  validity  of — es¬ 
sentials,  364 ;  validity,  what  ? 


INDEX  TO  VOLUME  III. 


517 


365;  so-called  apostolic  succes¬ 
sion  not  essential,  366;  qualifica¬ 
tions  in  administrator  conven¬ 
tional  with  the  Church,  366 ; 
close  communion  founded  on 

1 

false  assumptions,  368 ;  a  cred¬ 
itable  profession  sole  qualifica¬ 
tion,  370. 

Synagogue,  the  Church  modeled 
after  the,  430,  431,  441. 

Transubstantiation,  265,  358. 

Truth;  demand  for,  157. 


Utilitarianism,  28,  68. 

Veracity,  duties  of,  157. 

Virtue — always  an  act  of  choice, 
58;  theory  of,  63;  objections, 
68 ;  in  imperfect  beings,  69 ;  re¬ 
sponsibility  for  defects  in  virtue, 
72. 

War,  defensive,  obligatory,  117. 

Worship,  manner  of,  in  early  times, 
468. 

Wrong,  distinguished  from  guilt,  60. 


DATE  DUE 


